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Abstract 
This thesis is a case-study of Slobodan Milosevic as a prototype of the 
"criminal" leader. Challenging the existing consensus among Western liberals, 
for whom Milosevic is unquestionably criminal, it asks whether and to what 
extent Milosevic is a criminal leader. It approaches this by first dissecting the 
Western construction of Milosevic as a criminal leader into its key components 
- his actions and intentions, his motivations, his personality and psychology, 
and his comparison with other "criminal" leaders. This normative-driven 
construction is then empirically tested, using two main sources. The speeches 
of Milosevic, fundamentally misrepresented by many Western commentators, 
are analyzed. The second primary source used is semi-structured interviews 
(supported by public opinion poll data). Strongly influenced by bottom-up 
studies of the Hitler and Stalin regimes, two leaders that can be seen as crucial 
cases of the criminal leader, this research is particularly concerned with 
exploring how ordinary people in Serbia - heavily neglected in the existing 
Western literature - view Milosevic. This allows us to ascertain whether and to 
what extent the Western, liberal construction of Milosevic as a criminal leader 
has domestic/field validity. What the interview data reveals is a sharp 
discrepancy between the external (Western) and domestic (Serbian) 
viewpoints. The Serbian interviewees overwhelmingly view Milosevic not as a 
criminal leader, but as a "bad" (unsuccessful) leader and/or as a victim. This 
discrepancy is translated into, and used to develop, a general concept of the 
criminal leader. This conceptualization emphasizes both the externally 
constructed nature of the criminal leader (policy dimension) and the 
importance of studying the criminal leader from below (domestic dimension). 
Acknowledgements 
Since I began this research almost four years ago, countless numbers of people 
have helped me. I am extremely grateful to all of them and I thank them from 
the bottom of my heart. It is impossible to mention everybody by name, but I 
would like to say a special thank you to the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) for funding my research and for allowing me to make several 
visits to Serbia. I also want to especially thank my three supervisors - Dr 
Vanessa Pupavac, Professor Simon Tonney, and Dr Jan Meyer-Sahling. Each 
of them has been amazing and given me not only excellent feedback on my 
work, but also endless moral support and encouragement. 
I must also thank many people in Serbia. I first of all want to thank all of my 
interviewees, especially those who, out of a desire to help me with my 
research, agreed to be interviewed despite feeling nervous and apprehensive. I 
hope that each of them gained something from the interview process, just as I 
did. 
I must say a particular thank you to my good friend Dusan Pavlovic. He has 
helped me enonnously since I met him three years ago, providing me with 
contacts, lending me reading materials, and sending me infonnation by email. 
He has also introduced me to the some of the best places in Belgrade to go for 
coffee. 
lowe a big thank you to Ivana Spasic, \\'ho kindly provided me with contacts 
outside of Belgrade and who, despite her very busy schedule, has always been 
ready to help me. I would also like to thank my friend Rade Jerenie, who 
assisted me in translating some of the interviews from Serbian into English. 
I particularly want to thank those who helped me to arrange interviews, in 
particular Nermin Vucelj in Novi Pazar and Tanja Vujisie in Kosovska 
Mitrovica. I give a special thank you to those who generously allowed me to 
stay in their homes, particularly Marta Petkovie in Subotica, Dijana Suboticki 
and her family in Kikinda, Katarina Dunjic-Mandic in Cacak, Olivera Tomie in 
Kragujevac, and Dave Shipley in Pristina. I would also like to thank my 
landlady in Belgrade, Milka Amanovie, who patiently helped me with my 
Serbian and made me feel part of her family. 
Various research institutes and NGOS in Serbia have also greatly helped me. I 
would especially like to thank staff at Sloboba (particularly Vladimir 
Krsljanin), Group 484, Roma Heart, the Institute for Philosophy and Social 
Theory, TNS Medium Gallup (in particular Srbobran Brankovie and Jasna 
Milosevie), the Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute (especially 
Svetlana Logar), the National Democratic Institute, the Agency for Applied 
Sociological and Political Research ("'Argument"), the Belgrade Centre for 
Human Rights (particularly Ilir and Dubravka), and the Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights in Serbia (especially Sonja Biserko). 
Finally, I would like to thank my Mother, not only for putting up with me over 
the last four years, but also for giving me so much support and for making so 
many sacrifices. Without her, I could never have come this far. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page Number 
Abstract .................................................................................... 1 
Acknowledgements .... , ................................................................ 2 
Table of Contents ........................................................................ 4 
Map of Serbia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7 
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................... 8 
Introduction ............................................................................... 9 
Part One: The Criminal Leader; 
Deconstructing, Defining and Developing the Concept 
Chapter 1 
The Criminalization of Slobodan Milosevic; 
An Overview of Western Literature 
Introduction .............................................................................. 33 
I.I.The Construction of Slobodan Milosevic as a Criminal Leader ............. 36 
1.2. Liberalism and the Criminalization of Slobodan Milosevic .................. 57 
1.3. Some Alternative Views in the Western Literature ........................... 60 
Chapter 2 
The Criminal Leader and IR 
Introduction .............................................................................. 73 
2. 1. Changing Explanations of War; From Structure to Agency .................. 74 
2.2. The Normative Tum in IR ........................................................ 82 
2.3. Changing Attitudes Towards War ............................................... 84 
2.4. The Erosion of the Principle of Sovereign Immunity ........................ 94 
2.5. Developing the Concept of the Criminal Leader. ............................. 96 
Chapter 3 
Studying Criminal Leaders; The Case for a Bottom-Up Approach 
Introduction ............................................................................ 112 
3.1. Hitler, Stalin and the View From Below ..................................... .113 
3.2. Criticisms of Everyday Life Approaches ..................................... 122 
3.3. Examples of Bottom-Up Research vis-a.-vis the Former Yugoslavia ..... 128 
Part Two: Is Milosevic a Criminal Leader? 
Analysis of MiioseviC's Speeches and Qualitative Interview Data 
Chapter 4 
Milosevic in his Own Words,' An Analysis ofhis Main Speeches 
Introduction ............................................................................ 138 
4.1. Milosevi6's Kosovo Polje and Gazimestan Speeches ....................... 142 
4.2. Milosevi6's Speeches, 1990-1998 ............................................. 152 
4.3. Milosevi6's Speeches, 1999-2000 ............................................. 166 
An Introduction to the Interview Data Chapters 
The Interviewees ...................................................................... 182 
Sampling Strategies ................................................................... 188 
The Interview Process ................................................................ 190 
Some Anticipated Criticisms of the Interview Data .............................. 191 
Chapter 5 
Domestic Views on an External Construction,' 
Part I - The Wars in the Former Yugoslavia 
Introduction ............................................................................ 204 
5.1. Milosevi6's Policy Concerns ................................................... 206 
5.2. Milosevi6 Was Most Responsible for the Wars .............................. 214 
5.3. Milosevi6 Planned the Wars .................................................... 223 
5.4. Serbian Crimes Committed During the Wars Were Planned ............... 227 
5.5. Milosevic used Violence to Achieve His Ends .............................. 234 
Chapter 6 
Domestic Views on an External Construction; 
Part II - The Incitement of Ethnic Hatred 
Introduction ............................................................................ 249 
6.1. MiloseviC's Speeches ............................................................ 250 
6.2. The Serbian Media ............................................................... 255 
6.3. MiloseviC's Treatment of National Minorities in Serbia ................... 259 
6.4. The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees ....................... 263 
6.5. Concluding the Analysis ........................................................ 282 
Chapter 7 
Milosevic as Seen By the Serbian Interviewees; 
"Bad" but not Criminal 
Introduction ............................................................................ 293 
7.1. Milosevic as a "Bad" Leader. .................................................. 294 
7 2 M 'l" ." E . "C' " ""05 " 1 osevlc s conomlc nmes ............................................... j 
7.3. Milosevic as a Victim ............................................................ 324 
Chapter 8 
Interviewees' Attitudes Towards The Hague Tribunal 
Introduction ............................................................................ 335 
8.1. Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees .......................................... 338 
8.2. Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees ............................. 353 
Conclusion .............................................................................. 363 
Appendix 1: The Interviewees ................................................. , ..... 391 
Bibliography .................................................. , ........................ 395 
n 
DonubeD 
River 
o ti 
,,-
Sarajevo 
Drina o 
River 
Croatia 
Subotica 
Pannonian 
Plain Tisza 
Novi DRiver 
Sad Zrenjanin 
Serbia 
Belgrade 
o ,r Sova / , 
River Smederevo 
Kragujevac 
Uzice 
o MoroYQ 
River 
.". // 
Montenegro 
Podgorica I' 
Tivat r Um 
~ ~
© -a hlcMaps con 
SERBIA & MTNG. ! 
LOW I H ILLS I MOUNTAINS 
80 mi 
80 km 
Bor 
Nis 
.. 
.. 
o 
Danube 
River 
Sofia 
ra 
Bar 
River I 
Dardvi(a \ . . \ /-: SkopJe 
nl Pdzren 
Map of Serbia 
(http ://vvwvv.worldatlas.com/webimagelcountrys/europe/lgco lor/yucolor.htm) 
List of Abbreviations 
DS - Democratic Party 
DSS - Democratic Party of Serbia 
FRY - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
OS - Civic Alliance Party 
HLC - Humanitarian Law Centre 
ICC - International Criminal Court 
ICTR - International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY - International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
IDP - Internally displaced person 
JUL - Yugoslav United Left 
KLA - Kosovo Liberation Army 
NDI - National Democratic Institute 
RTS - Radio Television Serbia 
SANU - Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts 
SFRY - Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
SMMRI - Strategic Marketing and Media Research Institute 
SPO - Serbian Renewal Movement 
SPS - Socialist Party of Serbia 
SRS - Serbian Radical Party 
Introduction 
""A black cloud has lifted from the Balkans", remarked Bill Clinton (Beric, 
2002, p.271). This "black cloud" was Slobodan Milosevic, spectacularly 
overthrown in a popular uprising on 5 October 2000. After his decade in 
power, Milosevic was to begin a new life, in a prison cell. An indicted war 
criminal standing trial in The Hague, Milosevic faces charges of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide. His legal criminalization, however, is 
only one part of the story and one that is not central to this thesis. This 
research is primarily concerned with the normative dimension of MiloseviC's 
criminalization. 
The image of Milosevic as normatively criminal is the dominant image that one 
finds of him in Western literature on the former Yugoslavia. This research 
aims to discover, through analysis of MiloseviC's speeches and qualitative 
interview data, whether and to what extent this image of Milosevic exists 
outside of Western literature. The key question that drives this research, 
therefore, is whether, on the basis of the primary sources analyzed, Milosevic 
is a criminal leader. 
A second question that drives the thesis, and is closely connected to the first. is 
the question of how one should study a criminal leader. Related, subsidiary 
questions that the thesis seeks to answer are what is a criminal leader? How is a 
criminal leader constructed? Who determines \\"hich leaders are deemed 
criminaL and is the concept of the criminal leader uniyersal? 
The consensus that Milosevic is a criminal leader is overwhelming, and exists 
independently of developments in The Hague Tribunal. To question and 
challenge this consensus is not to imply that Milosevic has no political 
responsibility, or that he is entirely innocent. Whether he is guilty of the 
crimes for which he stands accused in law is a matter for the Tribunal to 
decide, on the basis of the evidence presented to it. By asking whether and to 
what extent Milosevic is a criminal leader, the aim of this thesis is to stimulate 
fresh debate, to highlight the value of heavily neglected primary sources, and to 
draw attention to alternative images of Milosevic. 
Overview of Approach 
Susan Woodward, a leading authority on the former Yugoslavia, has 
highlighted a general pattern in the post-Cold War period of US officials 
identifying "rogue" or "renegade" states, "headed by "new Hitlers" such as 
Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic, who defied all forms of civilized 
behaviour and had to be punished to protect those norms and to protect 
innocent people" (Woodward, 1995, p.7). Such leaders, as Woodward makes 
clear, are criminalized on normative grounds. They are deemed to pose a 
fundamental threat to quintessential liberal values. The origin of these leaders' 
criminalization, moreover, is external. Like the related concepts of "rogue" or 
"renegade" states, the concept of the criminal leader is externally constructed. 
One of the key objectives of this thesis is to explore how the external 
construction of Milosevic as a criminal leader fits with domestic conceptions. 
In other words, do ordinary people in Serbia themselyes view i\ 1 iloseyic as a 
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criminal leader? Clearly, this is a question that has important implications for 
the legal proceedings currently being brought against Milosevic in The Hague, 
as we shall see. 
A normative response to this question might be that the Serbian people, by 
supporting Milosevic, are complicit in his crimes and, therefore, hIghly 
unlikely to regard him as a criminal leader. This, however, is a weak 
argument. Milosevic did enjoy considerable support during his early years in 
power, yet we cannot condemn the Serbian people before understanding why 
they supported him and what they were actually giving their support to. 
Unfortunately, the interviews conducted as part of the present research do not 
allow us to directly answer this question, since so few of the interviewees 
admitted to being supporters of Milosevic - either today or in the past. While 
clearl y this is an area for future research, analysis of Milosevic' s speeches 
suggests that his attractive, if often unrealistic economic pledges were a 
significant reason for his popularity. Thus, it might be argued that Milosevic's 
popular appeal was strongly practical. 
Normativists might also argue that the Serbs are in denial about events in the 
former Yugoslavia, making it very improbable that they will be able to see 
their former leader as criminal until they themselves have been re-educated. 
Such an argument, however, is also problematic. Firstly, it is true that only a 
tiny minority of the Serbian interviewees mention the wars, but many also 
express a desire to forget the past and move on with their lives. This urge to 
1 1 
forget should not necessarily be equated with denial. It can also be seen as a 
coping strategy. In view of Serbia's difficult economic situation, moreover, 
confronting the past is arguably not a priority for many people. Their concerns 
are more immediate and practical, namely trying to make ends meet. 
Secondly, although the majority of the Serbian interviewees regard themselves 
as MiloseviC's biggest victims, this is not unsurprising. As we would expect, 
they judge Milosevic on account of what he did to them personally. Their 
frame of reference, therefore, is fundamentally different from that used by 
Western authors, who focus on Milosevic' s crimes in a regional context. 
Thirdly, given that the Western media heavily vilitied the Serbs during the 
nineties I, it was perhaps to be expected that the interviewees would want to 
emphasize to a Western researcher how they themselves suffered under 
Milosevic. 
Finally, some might argue that the Serbs do not share the moral standards of 
the West, making it almost certain that they would reject the dominant Western 
view of Milosevic as a criminal leader. Such an argument, however, is flawed. 
The fact that the Serbian interviewees, overall, do not regard Milosevic as a 
criminal leader does not mean that their morality is inferior to our own. 
Rather, the discrepancy between their view of Milosevic as a bad leader and/or 
victim and the Western, liberal view of Milosevic as a criminal leader can be 
I In his discussion of the \\'ar in Bosnia, for example, the former BBe war correspondent 
Martin Bell asks, " ... when had we ever shown a civilian victim of sniper fire on the Serb side 
of the lines'? When had \\'e reported from their hospitals')" (BelL 1996. p.114). 
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seen as illustrating E.H Carr's argument that "the current canons of 
international virtue" have mainly been created by ""the English-speaking 
peoples" (Carr, 1939, p.l02). In other words, it is Western morality that 
prevails in international politics. This, in tum, can help to explain the lack of 
attention that has been given in Western literature to the domestic viewpoint -
the view of ordinary people in Serbia. 
This thesis, rather than dismissing the domestic viewpoint as inherently flawed 
and problematic, argues that it is essential. Leadership is a relationship, an 
'"interaction between leaders and followers" (Kellerman, 1986, p.xiii). To help 
us answer the question of whether Milosevi6 is a criminal leader, therefore, it is 
unsatisfactory to focus only on one half of the leadership relationship. The 
view from below must also be considered. In short, the criminal leader must be 
studied both from the top down and from the bottom up. 
Overall, the existing Western literature is typically top-down in its approach. 
Its explanations of Yugoslavia's demise and descent into war focus on the 
actions and decisions of political leaders and elites; little attention is given to 
what was happening at the grassroots level. Similarly, the Milosevi6 regime is 
nearly always studied from the top down. Milosevi6, his wife, the Serbian 
Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the 
Army - these are usually viewed as the key actors. When the Serbian people 
are mentioned, it is often in only a very abstract way, as highlighted by the 
various essentialist references to "the Serbian national psyche" (Clark, 2000, 
p.70) and "the Serb mind" (Cohen, 1998, p.222). 
Journalistic accounts are likewise prone to take a very top-down perspectiYe 
that "'focuses mainly on institutions and political leaders and their duties and 
decisions, while leaving the common folk to exemplify trends, to serve as 
types: a fallen soldier, a screaming mother, a dead baby ... ,. (Sudetic, 1998, 
p.xxxii). 
In this thesis, however, "'ordinary" people - defined as persons who, as 
individuals, exercise little direct influence on national affairs and policy-
making - playa key role. The research uses qualitative interviews to gain 
insight into ordinary peoples' opinions of Milosevic, in order to find out 
whether and to what extent the dominant Western view of Milosevic as a 
criminal leader exists within Serbia itself. By providing the reader with 
alternative, domestic images of Milosevic, the thesis both makes an important 
contribution to existing Western scholarship, and provides valuable new insight 
into Milosevic' s leadership and regime. 
In its commitment to a more "bottom-up" approach, the research thus departs 
from the existing Western literature on the Milosevic regime. Instead, it is 
strongly influenced by the work of certain academics, variously known as 
"Revisionists", social historians, and "historians of everyday life", such as 
Stephen Kotkin, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Ian Kershaw, Detlev Peukert and Alf 
Ludtke. These scholars, dissatisfied with traditional, top-down historiography 
of the Stalin and Hitler regimes, have concentrated on studying these regimes 
from below, by seeking to reconstruct the everyday liYes of ordinary people. 
1-+ 
To study such regImes from below has proven extremely controversial, 
particularly on moral grounds. Critics, such as Peter Kenez and Alfred Meyer, 
contend that focusing on the "trivial" elements of everyday life detracts 
attention away from the atrocities committed, thereby sanitizing the regimes. 
Despite such objections, bottom-up approaches have generated both important 
debate and new insight into the regimes. 
In particular, they have exposed as problematic the assumption that ordinary 
people are simply victims of such regimes, but without going to the other 
extreme of arguing that ordinary people, to use Goldhagen' s description of the 
German people, are "'willing executioners" (Goldhagen, 1997). What these 
scholars have argued, and shown, is that the relationship between these regimes 
and mass society was not one-way; each exerted a level of influence, albeit 
unequal, upon the other. 
The existing Western literature on the Milosevic regime, however, by virtue of 
its heavy top-down bias, largely fails to acknowledge this. It is content to 
represent the Serbian people - either as a pathological nation or, more 
typically, as victims. 
In adopting a strongly bottom-up approach, this thesis is not seeking to 
highlight the culpability of the Serbian people. Rather, it is concerned with 
how the interviewees assess MiloseviC's culpability. Equally, the research - in 
contrast to some existing, largely anthropological bottom-up research on the 
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fonner Yugoslavia2 - does not endeavour to portray ordinary people simply as 
victims, a "typically liberal wrong premise" (Zizek, 1999, p.80). Instead, it 
seeks to give ordinary people in Serbia a voice, to generate some insight into 
their everyday lives during the nineties, and to explore the degree to which 
domestic and external views of Milosevic either coincide or conflict. 
The thesis explores not only the experiences and opinions of ordinary Serbian 
people, but also of national minorities in Serbia. The latter have received little 
attention in Western literature, and their inclusion in the interview sample not 
only gives it added richness and depth, but also strengthens the interview data 
by showing that the researcher has made an clear attempt to deal with so-called 
"contrary cases". 
The research is problem-driven, rather than methods-driven, and is primarily 
area-studies-based. The very detailed picture that the area specialist seeks to 
paint is such that he uses a variety of materials to achieve the desired richness 
and texture. His approach is often eclectic, relying upon various disciplines, 
such as history, sociology, anthropology and cultural studies. Similarly, this 
thesis adopts a self-consciously eclectic approach that draws upon both social 
history and IR. In this way, it contributes not only to area studies, through its 
detailed empirical research. It makes an important contribution to broader 
debates in international history regarding the merits and disadvantages of using 
a bottom-up approach . 
.' Fxamples \\'ill be gi\en in chapter 3. 
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The thesis also contributes to wider debates in IR and international politics 
about the "criminal" leader, an ill-defined concept that it seeks to de\'elop. 
This conceptualization of the criminal leader provides an important framework 
or backdrop for the entire research, and broadens the implications of the thesis 
and its findings. The initial concept of the criminal leader that the thesis 
develops, comprising four key dimensions, is modified to include an 
additional, fifth dimension - a domestic dimension. The theoretical importance 
of this domestic dimension both justifies the thesis' strongly bottom-up 
approach and, in tum, is empirically confirmed by the interview data and the 
discrepancy it reveals between external and domestic views of Milosevic. 
The thesis' eclecticism not only generates valuable new insight into 
Milosevic's leadership and regime. By expanding the scope of the research 
question beyond area studies, it both facilitates "greater communication and 
experimentation across a wider range of research communities across the social 
sciences" (Sil, 2004, p.322), and demonstrates that the problems and issues that 
area specialists address have much broader relevance and significance. Unless 
this is recognized, it seems likely that area studies will unfortunately remain on 
the margins of Politics departments in the UK, sidelined by its stronger 
competitors such as IR, comparative politics, and political theory. 
Overview of Methods 
In keeping with its overall approach, the thesis is eclectic in terms of its 
methods. It uses both qualitative and quantitative sources, and combines 
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textual analysis of MiloseviC's speeches with analysis of interview data and 
public opinion polls.3 
The thesis seeks to fill an important gap in the existing Western literature by 
exploring the view from below. Before we find out what ordinary people in 
Serbia have to say about Milosevic, however, it is important to first find out 
what Milosevic was saying to them when he was in power. Milosevic' s 
speeches are a key primary source, and yet one that the existing Western 
literature, despite being strongly top-down, has surprisingly overlooked. 
Western authors typically refer to, and misrepresent, only three particular 
speeches - MiloseviC's Kosovo Polje speech (April 1987), his Gazimestan 
speech (June 1989), and his address to Serbia's municipal leaders (March 
1991 ). 
This research exammes Milosevic' s mam speeches and addresses between 
1987 and 2000. The fact that Milosevic rarely appeared in public and gave 
very few interviews makes systematic analysis of his speeches especially 
worthwhile. These speeches provide valuable insight into certain aspects of 
Milosevic's leadership, such as his relationship with the Serbian people and 
how he sought to win popular support. They are also important in terms of 
allowing us to look at how Milosevic portrayed himself as a leader. Did he, for 
example, present himself as a criminal leader intent on causing war and 
mayhem? The conclusion reached is that Milosevic' s speeches challenge, 
3 According to Gerring, ..... method-eclecticism, rather than fixed rules of procedure, IS likely 
to remain - and should remain - the dominant mode of inquiry in the social sciences" (Gerring, 
2Ot)}, p.242). In his "ie\\', ..... social science is often led astray by a too rigid adherence to 
method. t\lost research designs cannot be reduced to a single method" (Gerring, 2001. p.240). 
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rather than confinn, the image of him as a criminal leader. In particular, they 
do not support the literature's claims, central to his construction as a criminal 
leader, that he planned the wars in the fonner Yugoslavia and incited ethnic 
hatred. 
Although the thesis is not methods-driven, its main contributions to the existing 
Western literature on the Milosevic regime derive primarily from its bottom-up 
method and rich interview data. Ninety people in Serbia and Kosovo were 
interviewed between May and September 2004, using qualitative, semi-
structured interviews. Of these ninety interviewees, sixty-seven can be 
described as ordinary people. Forty-nine are Serbs, and eighteen are national 
minorities (Albanians, ethnic Hungarians, Muslims, Roma, and one Slovak). 
The remammg twenty-three interviewees are elites, purposively selected 
because of their particular knowledge of the Milosevic regime and/or personal 
relationship with Milosevic. Ten of the elite interviewees knew him, and seven 
of these ten used to work closely with him. They include the current vice-
president of Milosevic' s SPS, two fonner Foreign Ministers of Serbia, and one 
of the authors of the famous 1986 SANU Memorandum. 
Interviews can be either quantitative (structured) or qualitative (semi-
structured, unstructured). In this case, qualitative interviews were chosen for 
three main reasons. First, the main purpose of the interviews was to explore in 
detail the opinions that ordinary people in Serbia have of Miloseyic, and 
thereby ascertain whether and to what extent they themselves yicw him as a 
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criminal leader. Qualitative interviews were seen as most appropriate for this 
purpose. Unlike structured interviews, they would allow the interviewer 
flexibility, the chance to probe in depth, and the opportunity to follow up key 
points that the interviewees might raise. 
Secondly, it was believed that qualitative interviews would give the best insight 
into ordinary peoples' everyday life experiences during the Milosevic period. 
an area that the existing Western literature heavily neglects. As Bouma and 
Atkinson argue, "Qualitative research may be appropriate where the 
investigator is attempting to understand the nature of a person's experiences" 
(Bouma and Atkinson, 1995, p.208).4 Insight into these experiences, in tum, 
would give us the context in which to evaluate and assess interviewees' 
opinions about Milosevic. Other scholars interested in exploring the realm of 
everyday life, such as Kotkin and Liidtke, have similarly used qualitative, 
rather than quantitative research methods. 
Thirdly, the present research is a response to existing Western literature about 
Milosevic and his regime. Since this literature is qualitative, rather than 
quantitative, it made most sense to use qualitative sources to explore the degree 
to which the image of Milosevic as a criminal leader exists outside of Western 
literature. It was also felt that by using qualitative interviews, the thesis could 
make an important contribution to the existing Western literature. Few authors 
have conducted interviews as part of their research, and those who have used 
4 For their part, Marshall and Rossman argue that qualitative research has unique strengths for 
research "that is exploratory or descriptive, that assumes the yalue of context and setting. and 
that searches for a deeper understanding of the participants' lived experiences of the 
phenomenon'" (Marshall and Rossman, 1999, p.60). 
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interviews have most frequently interviewed elites. Bennett, for example, 
interviewed "as many key figures as possible throughout the former 
Yugoslavia" (Bennett, 1995, p.x); and LeBor's interviewees included Mira 
Markovic (Milosevic' s wife), Borislav Milosevic (Milosevic' s brother), and 
Dusan Mitevic (the former head of Radio Television Serbia) (LeBor, 2002). 
Finally, semi-structured interviews were chosen over unstructured interviews. 
Semi-structured interviews have some structure, in the form of an interview 
guide, but this is not rigidly adhered to. They strike a balance between the 
rigidity of structured interviews and the extreme looseness of unstructured 
interviews. In an unstructured interview, the interviewer will have decided 
only in general terms about the themes and topic areas to be explored. The 
decision to use semi-structured, rather than unstructured interviews was based 
mainly on practical grounds. As Arksey and Knight argue, 
Unstructured interviews produce a wealth of qualitative data; the findings 
can generate deep insights into peoples' understandings of their social 
world. However, at the analysis stage of the research, the time needed to 
do justice to all the data that have been collected is considerable. This is 
an important consideration to bear in mind, and generally this type of 
interview is not suitable for projects that have to be completed when time 
is in short supply (Arksey and Knight, 1999, p.7). 
Since time in the field was limited, unstructured interviews would not have 
been appropriate. Furthermore, given that quite specific information was being 
sought from interviewees, it would have made little sense to use unstructured 
interviews. 
Structured interviews, most commonly used in survey research, were also 
rejected, for the following reasons. Firstly, structured interviews are not 
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appropriate for exploring peoples' expenences and opIlllOns III depth. 
Quantitative research is positivist and embodies a view of social reality as an 
external, objective reality. Uniformity in interview procedure is therefore 
essential, in order to be able to isolate, measure, and understand this reality. 
This means that the interview schedule must be rigidly followed. It also means 
that, 
.. , the interviewer is expected to perform like a 'robot', acting in a neutral 
voice, offering the same impression to the respondents, using the same 
style, appearance, prompts, probes, etc., and showing no initiative, 
spontaneity or personal interest in the research topic. The purpose of this 
is to reduce interviewer bias to a minimum and achieve the highest 
degree of uniformity in procedure (Sarantakos, 1998, p.247). 
This very strict interview procedure, combined with the use of closed questions 
(the questions must be direct and easily quantified), means that ·· .. .in a 
structured interview format there is little freedom for respondents to talk about 
what is important to them, or to raise their particular concerns" (Arksey and 
Knight, 1999, p.90). 
Secondly, it was considered essential to gain the interviewees' trust. Not only 
were they to be asked questions about a difficult period that many now want 
simply to forget. They were to be asked these questions by an interviewer 
whose country bombed Serbia and Kosovo just six years ago. In quantitative 
research, however, the interviewer is required to be detached and aloof. This 
would have preserved a problematic distance between interviewer and 
interviewees, thus making it very difficult to establish any degree of real trust. 
It would also have made the interviews very formal, which might have 
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discouraged interviewees from speaking openly.5 The requirement of strictly 
following the interview schedule, moreover, would have limited how the 
interviewer was able to deal with the situation when interviewees became 
upset. 
Thirdly, because it seeks to make generalizations and predictions, the 
structured interview privileges breadth over depth. Consequently, the sample 
is typically large and, most importantly, representative, so that very broad 
conclusions can be drawn. The present research, however, privileges depth 
over breadth, and it has consciously strived to avoid making the sort of 
sweeping claims and generalizations that one finds in so much of the existing 
Western literature on the Milosevi6 regime. It is not seeking to find out how 
many people in Serbia regard Milosevi6 as a criminal leader, but rather to 
explore in detail how ordinary Serbs and national minorities view Milosevi6 
today. Thus, while every effort was made to introduce diversity into the 
interview sample, the overall objective was to achieve a rich sample that would 
generate important bottom-up insight. 
According to Sarantakos, ""A structured interview is in reality a questionnaire 
read by the interviewer as prescribed by the researcher" (Sarantakos, 1998, 
p.247). There are, of course, other ways of conducting a questionnaire. For 
example, one can survey people on the street, send them a questionnaire, or 
interview them via telephone. For the purposes of the present research. 
5 Once in the field, it quickly became apparent that interviewees. with the exception of the elite 
interviewees. were more relaxed and more forthcoming when the interviews were kept \'ery 
informal. 
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however, it was felt that any kind of survey would not be suitable, primarily for 
practical reasons. 
In the UK, market researchers often approach shoppers and ask them to 
complete a survey. In Serbia, however, it would be very unwise to do this. 
Some Serbs are very wary and suspicious of people from the W est6, and 
therefore unlikely to respond well to being stopped on the street. 
The major problem with the mail or self-completion questionnaire IS the 
problem of non-response. As May argues, 
... unless people have an incentive, either through an interest in the 
subject which the survey is covering or some other basis, then response 
rates are likely to be low and the figure of 40 per cent, or four out of 
every ten people sent a questionnaire, is not uncommon (May, 2001, 
p.97). 
Had self-completion questionnaires been used in the present instance, it is 
probable that the response rate would have been even lower. It is likely that if 
questionnaires were randomly sent out to Serbian people by a Western 
researcher, many of them would have been suspicious and, therefore, not have 
responded. 
Another problem with this type of survey is that it is very impersonal. In the 
words of Aldridge and Levine, "The language of survey research betrays its 
lack of concern with the individual: respondents, samples, cases" (Aldridge and 
Levine. 200 L p.13). In contrast, the present research does not treat the 
individual simply as a respondent or case. and this is reflected in the research 
I> The girlfriend of one interviewee. for example, suspected the interviewer of being a ~ p y . .
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method chosen. Unlike the survey, the semi-structured interview can be 
viewed as a conversation or dialogue between two individuals, interviewer and 
interviewee. This made it possible to tailor the questions according to who was 
being interviewed. Had a survey been used, it would have been necessary to 
devise three separate surveys - one for the (ordinary) Serbian interviewees, one 
for the Serbian elite interviewees, and one for the national minority 
interviewees. 
Finally, surveys by telephone would not have been practical. If the 
respondents were randomly selected, it is likely that many of them would not 
have spoken English, and it would have been extremely difficult for the 
interviewer to interview people in Serbian by telephone. Furthermore, some 
people would almost certainly have put the telephone straight down upon 
hearing a foreign accent. 
Notwithstanding the decision to use semi-structured interviews, rather than 
surveys, public opinion poll data nevertheless plays an important role in this 
thesis and nicely complements the interview data. The opinion polls that are 
incorporated into the thesis were conducted between September 1990 and June 
2005 by five polling institutes in Belgrade - the Agency for Applied 
Sociological and Political Research (""ArgumenC), Marten Board 
International, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Strategic 
Marketing and Media Research Institute (SMMRI), and TNS Medium Gallup. 7 
7 Unfortunately, it was not possible to find any public opinion polls of national minorities. 
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It is also important to emphasize that the findings of this thesis could be used 
as a basis for future survey research. To cite Gaskell, "" .. .insights gained from 
qualitative interviewing may improve the quality of survey design and 
interpretation" (Gaskell, 2000, p.39). Surveys, in tum, would help us to 
ascertain whether and to what extent the opinions expressed by the 
interviewees are generalizable to the Serbian population as a whole. 
Outline of Chapters 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I is literature-based and comprises 
three chapters. Together, these three chapters lay the foundations for Part II. 
They explore how Milosevic has been constructed as a criminal leader and how 
his criminalization can be linked to broader developments in the field of IR. 
They also seek to develop the concept of the criminal leader, and to answer the 
question of how one studies a criminal leader. Part II is empirical, and consists 
of five chapters. These chapters analyze MiloseviC's speeches and qualitative 
interview data (and some public opinion poll data), to find out whether and to 
what extent these sources support the image of Milosevic as a criminal leader 
and whether, therefore, on the basis of these sources, we can say that Milosevic 
is a criminal leader. 
Chapter 1 is an overview of Western (essentially Anglo-American) literature 
on Milosevic and the former Yugoslavia. The authors whose work forms the 
focus of this first chapter are academics, journalists, and dramatis personae. 
The aim of this chapter is to deconstruct, and to thereby identify the key 
elements in, Milosevic' s construction as a criminal leader. It argues that the 
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most important element in this construction is Milosevic' s actions and 
intentions. The three remaining elements are his motivations, his personality 
and psychological profile, and his comparison with other "criminal" leaders, 
past and present. The chapter further argues that Liberalism underpins this 
construction - Milosevic was seen as posing a fundamental threat to liberal 
peace and values. Since not all Western authors subscribe to the view of 
Milosevic as a criminal leader, this chapter also looks at some alternative 
viewpoints in the literature. 
Chapter 2 argues that Milosevic' s construction as a criminal leader can be 
linked to, and understood in the context of, broader developments in the field 
of International Relations. It focuses on four particular developments - the 
growing prominence of the Liberal paradigm, the normative tum within the 
discipline, changing attitudes towards war - in particular the criminalization of 
war - and, finally, the erosion of the principle of sovereign immunity. It is 
within the context of these developments, moreover, that other leaders besides 
Milosevic - such as Saddam Hussein and Charles Taylor - have been 
criminalized. The final part of this chapter, therefore, seeks to develop a 
general concept of the criminal leader. Using the criminalization of Milosevic 
as a starting point, it argues that there are four key dimensions of a criminal 
leader - a behavioural dimension, a character dimension, an institutional 
dimension, and a policy dimension. Emphasizing that the concept of the 
criminal leader is externally constructed, it maintains that the policy dimension 
is the most important. 
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Chapter 3 is concerned with the question of how one should study a "criminal" 
leader. It focuses on the work of scholars who have studied the regimes of 
Hitler and Stalin from below. According to the concept of a criminal leader 
developed in chapter 2, both Hitler and Stalin can be considered as archetypal 
criminal leaders. Bottom-up research of their regimes is, therefore, used to 
support the thesis' contention that the criminal leader must be studied not only 
"from above", but also "from below". The concept of the criminal leader 
developed in chapter 2 is consequently modified, through the addition of a 
fundamental fifth dimension - a domestic dimension. 
Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter. It focuses on Milosevic' s speeches, 
which are analyzed both thematically and chronologically. It argues that the 
existing Western literature fundamentally misrepresents these speeches, 
through highly selective quoting. MiloseviC's reference at Gazimestan, on 28 
June 1989, to the possibility of "armed battles" in the future, is a classic 
example. It further argues that the speeches can only be seen as providing 
evidence of Milosevic' s "criminal" leadership and "criminal" intent if they are 
thus misrepresented. On the basis of the speeches that Milosevic gave during 
his final two years in power, the image of him that emerges, it is contended, is 
not as a criminal leader, but rather as a desperate leader. He was clinging like a 
limpet to power, but the rock to which he was clinging was progressively 
crumbling. 
Chapters 5 to 8 analyze the interview data gathered. A short introductory 
section precedes these chapters. It proyides the reader with key information 
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about the interviewees, the interviews, and the sampling strategies used. It also 
discusses some anticipated criticisms of the interview data, for example certain 
biases and imbalances in the interview sample. 
In order to find out how domestic views of Milosevic fit with the dominant 
Western view, chapters 5 and 6 concentrate on the key element in Milosevic' s 
construction as a criminal leader - his actions and intentions. These chapters 
explore the degree to which there is support among the Serbian interviewees 
and the non-Serbian interviewees for the five key claims that Western literature 
makes with respect to Milosevic' s actions and intentions. 
Chapter 5 deals with four of these five claims - (i) that Milosevic is the person 
most responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia; (ii) that he planned 
these wars in advance, with the purpose of creating a "'Greater Serbia"; (iii) that 
Serbian crimes committed during these wars were planned and premeditated; 
and (iv) that Milosevic used violence to achieve his aims. The chapter 
concludes that, overall, the national minority interviewees do support these 
claims, while the Serbian interviewees do not. 
Chapter 6 concentrates on the fifth key claim that Western literature makes vis-
a-vis Milosevic' s actions and intentions - the claim that he incited ethnic 
hatred. The experiences and opinions of the interviewees from national 
minority groups in Serbia playa particularly important role in this chapter. On 
the basis of the interview data, the chapter argues that the main fonn of 
discrimination that Serbia' s national minorities suffered, with the exception of 
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the Kosovar Albanians, was social discrimination, rather than State or 
institutional discrimination. It further argues that the particular circumstances 
of the nineties were the primary cause of this social discrimination. The tinal 
part of this chapter addresses the remaining elements in Milosevic' s 
construction as a criminal leader - his motivations, his personality and 
psychology, and his comparison with other "criminal" leaders. The chapter 
concludes that, overall, the national minority interviewees support Milosevic' s 
construction as a criminal leader, although not as a racist, whereas the Serbian 
interviewees do not. The Serbian interviewees, it is argued, regard Milosevic 
above all as a "bad" leader. 
Chapter 7 explores this image of Milosevic as a ""bad" leader. It argues that, 
according to the Serbian interviewees, Milosevic was a bad leader in four 
particular senses. Firstly, he cared only about himself and his power, and not 
about the Serbian people. Secondly, he was an incompetent leader who lacked 
ability. Thirdly, he surrounded himself with "'bad" people. Finally, the 
consequences of his rule - both for the Serbian people and for the country -
were very bad. This chapter also examines a second image of Milosevic that 
emerges from the Serbian interview data - as a victim. It argues that Milosevic 
is viewed as a victim of the people around him, in particular his wife Mira; as a 
victim of himself and his own weaknesses; and finally as a victim of Western 
powers. Given that Milosevic is currently standing trial in The Hague, the fact 
that the Serbian interviewees do not regard him as a criminal leader is \cry 
significant. In particular, it has important implications for the Tribunal's stated 
goals of achieving peace and ''justice'', 
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Chapter 8, the final chapter in the thesis, explores the attitudes of both the 
Serbian interviewees and the national minority interviewees towards The 
Hague Tribunal. It argues that the national minority interviewees support both 
Milosevic's normative and legal criminalization, whereas the Serbian 
interviewees generally support neither. In order to help explain the differences 
in opinion between the Serbian interviewees and the national minority 
interviewees, it is suggested that the two groups of interviewees are working 
with fundamentally dissimilar frames of reference. The Serbian interviewees 
judge Milosevic primarily in a domestic context, in which war plays only a 
marginal role. In contrast, the national minority interviewees judge Milosevic 
in a much broader, regional context, in which war is central. 
The conclusion to the thesis summarizes the main findings of the research, and 
explains how the different parts of the thesis fit together. It discusses the 
contributions that the thesis makes, whilst also acknowledging its limitations. 
It emphasizes how the thesis contributes to existing Western literature on the 
Milosevic regime, in three particular ways. Firstly, through its rich interview 
data, the research makes a valuable empirical contribution to a literature that is, 
overall, empirically weak. It makes a second important empirical contribution 
to the existing literature through its analysis of MiloseviC's speeches. Thirdly, 
through its emphasis and exploration of the view from below, it makes a 
worthy methodological contribution to a literature that is heavily top-down in 
its approach. 
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It is also underscored, however, that the importance of the research and its 
implications extend beyond area studies. Firstly, by virtue of its eclecticism, 
particularly the attempts to bring together area studies and social history, the 
thesis contributes to methodological debates in international history about 
history "from below" and the value of bottom-up approaches. Secondly, 
through its efforts to contextualize and to develop the concept of the criminal 
leader, the thesis contributes to a broader discussion in international politics 
and IR about who is a criminal leader, what defines a criminal leader, who 
determines when a leader should be deemed criminal, and whether and when a 
criminal leader should be put on trial. 
The second half of the conclusion addresses some broader issues. It discusses 
some possible implications of criminalizing leaders. It also considers how the 
concept of the criminal leader might evolve in the future, and how the current 
"War on Terror" might affect it. It asks if the criminal leader is becoming less 
significant in a world where certain "rogue" states and terrorist organizations, 
such as AI-Qaida, are seen as posing the biggest threat. 
Finally, some suggestions as to future research will be made. These 
suggestions, based on the thesis and its findings, will be mainly qualitative but 
also quantitative and comparative, in order to underscore that the thesis lends 
itself to different types of research. 
*** 
Part I 
The Criminal Leader; 
Deconstructing, Defining and Developing the Concept 
*** 
Chapter 1 
The Criminalization of Siobodan Milosevic· , 
An Overview of Western Literature 
Introduction 
Slobodan Milosevic was born in the town of Pozarevac, on 20 August 1941. His 
parents, who both committed suicide, were from Montenegro. Milosevic studied 
Law at the University of Belgrade, receiving his degree in 1964. He began his 
career at Technogas, a major gas company, and rose to become its general director. 
From 1978 until 1983, he held the post of president of Beogradska banka, one of 
the largest banks in Yugoslavia. 
Milosevic then embarked upon a political career. In 1984, he became Chairman of 
the City Committee of the League of Communists of Belgrade, and two years later 
he was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League 
of Communists of Serbia. On 8 May 1989, he was elected President of the 
Presidency of Serbia, and he was elected President of Serbia in December 1990. 
After serving two terms as President of Serbia, he was elected President of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 15 July 1997. He stepped down from 
this position on 6 October 2000, after being defeated by Vojislav Kostunica in the 
September 2000 FRY Presidential elections. Since July 1990, he has been the 
President of the SPS. 
Today, Milosevic is standing trial in The Hague, facing charges of war crimes. 
crimes against humanity and genocide. He is the first fonner head of state to be 
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indicted by an international tribunal for alleged crimes committed while in office. I 
Although the trial is still in progress, it is clear that for Milosevic' s many critics. 
his guilt is already established. In their view, Milosevic is unquestionably a 
criminal leader. The main aim of this chapter, therefore, is to explore how the 
image of Milosevic as a criminal leader has been constructed in the West. 
Rather than focusing on one particular type of scholarship, this chapter will 
examine the views of a diverse range of Western authors - academics (such as 
Gow, Gallagher and Ramet), journalists (for example, Bass, Glenny, Silber and 
Little, and LeBor) and dramatis personae (including Sell and Zimmermann). The 
purpose of this is to illustrate how widespread the view of Milosevic as a criminal 
leader actually is - it should not be associated with only one specific type of 
scholarship. With the notable exception of Florence Hartman, who is French, all 
of the authors associated in this chapter with the construction of Milosevic as a 
criminal leader are British and American. As a suggestion for future research, it 
would be interesting to look at whether other Western authors - for example, 
French and German writers - share the view of Milosevic as a criminal leader. 2 
I The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created on 2S May 
1993 (UN Security Council Resolution 827). Milosevic was indicted by the Tribunal on 27 May 
1999, and extradited to The Hague on 28 June 2001. 
2 Serbia and France have traditionally been allies. However, in January and February 1993, 
M(;c/('cills du MOllde put up thousands of posters in major cities in France. showing Milose\ic and 
Hitler side by side, with the caption, "Speeches about ethnic cleansing - does that remind you of 
anything'?"' (Johnstone, 2002, p.74). Germany, on the other hand, has been the traditional ally of 
Croatia. It has a large Croatian emigre community, and vigorously championed Croatia's right to 
secede from Yugoslavia. The strong anti-Serb tone taken by some German newspapers, therefore. 
was perhaps unsurprising. For example, Reismuller, the editor of the Frankfurter A IIg(,flleine 
Zeitllng, justified Slovenia and Croatia's declarations of independence by describing the "Yugo-
Serbs" as essentially Oriental. ""militarist Bolshe\'iks" who ha\e oono place in the European 
community" (cited in Johnstone, 1999). According to Johnstone ...... what occurred in Germany 
was a strange sort of mass transfer of Nazi identity. and guilt. to the Serbs" (Johnstone. 1999). 
Notwithstanding the broad consensus that Milosevic is a criminal leader, the 
literature does not in fact define the term. One reason for this is that the 
criminalization of leaderships is a relatively new phenomenon. What is clear, 
however, is that the concept of the criminal leader is essentially a normative 
construct, informed by liberal principles. That is to say that while many of the 
writers considered in this chapter support the legal prosecution of Milosevic. they 
also see him as criminal on moral grounds. Thus, the term "criminal leader" is not 
used in this chapter, or in the thesis as a whole, in a strict legal sense. It should, 
however, be emphasized that it is precisely normative judgements of Milosevic's 
actions and intentions that have been used to justify the legal proceedings against 
him in The Hague Tribunal.3 
The chapter comprises three main sections. Section 1 looks at how Milosevic has 
been constructed in the West as a criminal leader. MiloseviC's actions and 
intentions, his motivations, and his personality and psychological profile constitute 
three of the four main elements in his construction as a criminal leader. Linked to 
each of these elements is a particular sub-image of Milosevic - as a dangerous 
warmonger, as a ruthless power-seeker, and as a flawed and psychologically 
impaired individual. The fourth element is a comparative element; Milosevic has 
been frequently compared to other "criminal" leaders. 
3 The Hague Tribunal, and in particular interviewees' attitudes towards it, will be discussed in 
chapter 8. 
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Section 2 explores the theory that underlies the construction of Milosevic as a 
criminal leader. It argues that the portrayal of Milosevic as a criminal leader has 
been heavily influenced by liberal principles and the idea that Milosevic posed a 
threat to liberal peace. Throughout this chapter, it is also argued that Milosevic's 
construction as a criminal leader can be linked to Western, Orientalist stereotypes 
about the Balkans.4 
While this chapter aims to give expression to the "dominant voice" in Western 
literature - the view that Milosevic is a criminal leader - section 3 looks at some 
important alternative viewpoints in the literature. It first looks at two alternative 
portraits of Milosevic - as an improviser, and as an obstacle to the West. It then 
looks at some alternative explanations of the wars in the former Yugoslavia that 
concentrate far less on the role of actors than on the role of circumstances, both 
internal and external. 
Section 1 - The Construction of Milosevic as a Criminal Leader 
Milosevic's construction as a criminal leader comprises four main elements, each 
of which can now be examined in detail. 
.. According to Edward Said, Orientalism is "the whole network of interests inevitably brought to 
bear on (and therefore always involved in) any occasion when that particular entity 'the O r i ~ n t ' ' is 
in question" (Said, 1991. p.3). Moreover, "The Orient was Orientalized not only b e c a ~ s e e It \\3S 
discovered to be 'Oriental' in all those ways considered commonplace by an average mneteenth-
century European, but also because it could be - that is, submitted to being - made Oriental" (Said, 
1991. p.5). 
(i) Milosevii: 's Actions and Intentions 
Milosevic's alleged actions and intentions constitute the key element in his 
construction as a criminal leader. Just as the commission of a crime requires both 
an action (actus reas) and a state of mind (mens rea), so those who criminalize 
Milosevic focus on his actions and intentions, as they see them. 
(aJ Actions 
Concerning Milosevic' s actions, Western literature levels three particular charges 
at him. The first of these is that he was most responsible for the break-up of 
Yugoslavia and for the bloody wars that ensued. The second charge is that he used 
violence to achieve his ends. The third charge is that he incited ethnic hatred. We 
can now look at each of these charges more closely. 
The causes of Yugoslavia's collapse and descent into war were both multiple and 
complex. Nevertheless, conventional wisdom has it that Milosevic was most to 
blame. In the words of Hayden, "orthodox" accounts "presume and then focus on 
the guilt of 'the Serbs' and especially of Slobodan MiloseviC" (Hayden, 2000, 
p.19). Zimmermann, for example, contends that, "The prime agent of 
Yugoslavia's destruction was Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia" 
(Zimmermann, 1996, p. viii); and Sell maintains that, "Yugoslavia did not die a 
natural death; it was murdered, and Milosevic, more than any other single leader, 
is responsible" (Sell, 2002, p.4). 
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Echoing such views, Silber and Little describe Milosevic as "The instigator of 
Yugoslavia's bloody disintegration and the guiding hand behind the wars .... · 
(Silber and Little, 1996, p.385); Bass refers to Milosevic as '"the prime mover in 
the wars of Yugoslavia's disintegration" (Bass, 2003, p.85); and Sudetic describes 
him as "the prime mover in Yugoslavia's slide into nationalist tunnoil. .... 
(Sudetic, 1998, p.77). Gow identifies Milosevic as "The man who had led Serbia 
into a decade of fruitless war and the Yugoslav lands into an abyss of mass murder 
and human misery ... " (Gow, 2003, p.1); and Glenny contends that, "There can be 
no doubt that from an early stage, Milosevic was well-prepared to accept war as a 
solution to the Yugoslav problem" (Glenny, 1993, p.38). 
Reinforcing associations of Milosevic with death and destruction, Hartman refers 
to him as "l'incendiaire des Balkans ... " ("the arsonist of the Balkans") (Hartman, 
1999, p.356); Hazan describes Milosevic as "the Balkan pyromaniac" (Hazan, 
2004, p.69); and Doder and Branson emphasize Milosevic's "remarkable legacy of 
deliberate malevolence and destruction" (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.237). 
Clearly, there is a broad consensus in the literature that Milosevic was most 
responsible for the death of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed. The question 
that remains unanswered, however, is why he was most responsible. Let us turn 
once again to Hayden. He argues that, according to "orthodox" accounts, 
" ... Milosevic roused Serb nationalism to threaten the other peoples in Yugoslavia, 
thus forcing other republics to secede. Then Milosevic activated a plan for a 
Greater Serbia, invading Croatia, then Bosnia ..... (Hayden, 2000, p.19). Thus, it 
38 
seems that nationalism is the key to explaining why Milosevic is deemed the 
person most to blame for what happened in ex-Yugoslavia. Spencer, for example, 
maintains that, "It was in Kosovo that Slobodan Milosevic launched the 
nationalistic chauvinism that led to secession and wars throughout yugoslavia ... ·· 
(Spencer, 2000, p.31); and Zimmermann claims that, "Nationalism was the arrow 
that killed Yugoslavia. Milosevic was the principal bowman" (Zimmermann, 
1996, p.212).5 
More particularly, it is the widespread belief that Milosevic was seeking to create a 
"Greater Serbia" that accounts for the literature's emphasis on his personal 
responsibility for the wars. Gow, for example, argues that, "The Serbian new state 
project6 meant war" (Gow, 2003, p. 118); and Magas maintains that Yugoslavia 
"was destroyed for the cause of a Greater Serbia" (Magas, 1993, p.xiv). Variously 
referred to in the literature as a "dream" (Boatswain, 1995, p.3); a "well-defined 
political objective" (Cigar, 1995, pA); a ""programme" (Gallagher, 2001, p.236); a 
"project" (Gow, 2003, p.2; Hasani, 2000, p.5); a "plan" (LeBor, 2002, p.l36); and 
a "vision" (Sell, 2002, p.151), "Greater Serbia" is a somewhat opaque term that is 
rarely defined, as if its meaning were self-evident. Nevertheless, it is a term that is 
widely used, both in Western literature and in the media. 
5 It is widely believed, however, that Milosevic was never a genuine nationalist. Bennett, for 
example, argues that, "Though he [Milosevic] has played the Serb national card. he is not, and 
never has been, a Serb nationalist" (Bennett. 1995, p.247). Cohen, for his part. maintains that. "In 
practice, Serbian nationalism per se meant very little to Milose\'ic" (Cohen, 2001. p.lSl). 
6 This was a project to "establish new state borders from which unwanted communities would be 
removed - ethnically cleansed" (Gow. 2003, pA). 
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Given this emphasis on a ';Greater Serbia", the wars in former Yugoslavia are 
frequently portrayed as predatory, expansionist wars. MagaS, for example, claims 
that, "It is now clear beyond any doubt that the war taking place in Yugoslavia is 
not an ethnic war but a war of territorial expansion" (Magas, 1993, p.324); and 
Cohen argues that, 
As the imminent dissolution of the Yugoslav socialist federation came more 
clearl y into view during 1990 and 1991, Milosevic turned his attention to 
efforts aimed at ensuring as much territory as possible for any new Serbian 
state (Cohen, 2001, p. 142). 
Realists would argue that the pursuit of territory is not necessarily driven by 
aggressive and revanchist designs. According to Snyder and Jervis, for example, 
"It is important to keep the concepts of the security dilemma and predation 
separate, and to understand that elements of each are present in almost every 
specific situation, albeit in different ways and proportions" (Snyder and Jervis, 
1999, p.19). They continue, 
No individual case is ever entirely of one type or the other. Actors often feel 
they need to expand in order to be secure. Sometimes such beliefs are 
rationalizations for more purely predatory drives; at other times they are not, 
and it is extremely difficult for later analysts, let alone contemporary 
observers, to tell which is which (Snyder and Jervis, 1999, p.20). 
This view, however, is not widely shared in the literature, where the dominant 
thinking is that the pursuit of territory was fuelled by aggressive designs and 
necessarily involved the commission of terrible crimes. Cigar, for example. argues 
that the policy of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Hercegovina was "implemented in a 
systematic manner as part of a broader strategy intended to achieve a well-defined, 
concrete political objective. namely, the creation of an expanded, ethnically pure 
Greater Serbia" (Cigar, 1995, pA). In a similar vein, Go\\' contends that the 
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commISSIOn of crimes against humanity and war cnmes was "integral to the 
Serbian new state project" (Gow, 2003, p.7); and Williams and Scharf refer to 
Milosevi6' s "'reliance on ethno-nationalism and ethnic cleansing as tools for 
accumulating and retaining political power in order to pursue his dream of a 
greater Serbia" (Williams and Scharf, 2002, p.xvii). 
This leads us to the second charge made against Milosevi6 - that he used violence 
to achieve his aims. According to Cohen, for example, "'Violence was always part 
of Milosevi6's equation" (Cohen, 1998, p.188); Cox describes Milosevi6 as 
" ... unleashing great violence in his pursuit of a greater Serbia ... " (Cox, 2002, 
p.205); and Bass describes the Milosevi6 regime as "one of the most murderous 
regimes on the planet. .. " (Bass, 2003, p.86). For their part, Doder and Branson 
claim that when Milosevi6 delivered his famous speech in Gazimestan, on 28 June 
1989, he "'invoked the spirit of violence" (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.4).7 
Moreover, that was not the only occasion on which he did so. Armacost, for 
example, maintains that, 
In March 1998, violence again erupted in the Balkans, this time in Kosovo -
an ethnic cauldron in the heart of the former Yugoslavia. For the third time 
in a decade, the violence was caused by the nationalist politics of Serbia's 
long-standing dictator, Slobodan Milosevi6 (Armacost, 2000, p.vii). 
Armacost's description of Kosovo as "an ethnic cauldron" has strong Orientalist 
overtones. That is to say that it is in keeping with common stereotypes about the 
Balkans as a highly explosive and dangerous region. These stereotypes are firmly 
entrenched. Back in 1904, for example. Edith Durham referred to .. the bubbling 
7 This speech will be examined in chapter 4 and, it is argued. does not support Doder and Branson's 
claim. 
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edge of the ever-simmering Eastern Question" (Durham, 1904, p.1); and William 
Sloane, in 1914, wrote of the "seething, boiling mass of Balkan politics" (Sloane. 
1914, p.229). More recently, Colonel Bob Stewart claimed that, ""After the war 
[World War Two] ended, Tito managed to keep the country united until his death 
some ten years ago. Since then, the powder keg has been waiting to explode 
again" (Stewart, 1994, p.6). 
It is suggested that portrayals of Milosevi6 as a violent and brutal leader are linked 
to such stereotypes about the violent and dangerous nature of the Balkans. As will 
be seen in section 2, US policymakers often relied upon such stereotypes during 
the early nineties, in order to justify America's non-intervention in the former 
Yugoslavia. During the NATO bombing, however, Milosevi6, not the region, was 
portrayed as violent. Speaking on 15 April 1999, for example, President Clinton 
referred to " ... the Milosevi6 vision - rooted as it is in hatred and violence ... " 
(cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.855). 
We can now look at the third and final charge made in the literature against 
Milosevi6 - that he incited ethnic hatred. This marks a significant shift in 
emphasis away from the idea of "ancient Balkan hatreds"g to the idea that inter-
ethnic hatred was deliberately fostered and encouraged. Gompert, for example, 
argues that, "Milosevi6 injected into the Serbs the venom of ethnic hatred that had 
8 The idea that hatred is endemic to the Balkans is another Orientalist stereotype. In recent times. it 
is perhaps most associated with Robert Kaplan, according to whom, " T \ \ ' e ~ t i e t h - c e n t u r ~ ~ history 
came from the Balkans. Here men haw been isolated by poverty and ethmc rivalry, doommg them 
to hate. Here politics ha\e been reduced to a level of near anarchy that from time to time in history 
has flowed up the Danube into Central Europe. Nazism. for instance, can claim BJlkan origins" 
(Kaplan. 1994, p.xxiii). 
been absent in modem Yugoslavia" (Gompert, 1996, p.143); and Ramet contends 
that, "Milosevic built his power on a foundation of hatred and 
xenophobia ... " (Ramet, 2002, p.308). She further claims that, of all the ex-
Yugoslav republics, "only Milosevic's regime relied on the inculcation and 
nurturing of hatred in the first place to develop support" (Ramet, 2002, p.351). 
For his part, Zimmennann refers to "the ethnic hatred sown by Milosevic and his 
ilk ... " (Zimmennann, 1996, pAl); while Duncan and Holman compare Milosevic 
to Russia's Vladimir Zhirinovsky, claiming that the latter's "blatant appeals to 
racism bear a striking resemblance to those of MiloseviC's Serbia" (Duncan and 
Holman, 1994, p.208). 
It is striking that the racism of the late president of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, is 
rare I y remarked upon. 9 According to Hammond, 
While the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was routinely condemned 
as an ultra-nationalist, comparatively little attention was given to the 
political doctrines of Croatian president Franjo Tudjman and Bosnian leader 
Alija Izetbegovic, both of whom had espoused an exclusivist nationalism 
prior to the conflict (Hammond, 2002, p.183). 
Zimmennann emphasizes Tudjman's nationalism, arguing that, "Unlike Milosevic, 
who was driven by power, Tudjman betrayed an obsession with Croatian 
nationalism" (Zimmennann, 1996, p.75). He also describes Tudjman's regime as 
"a narrow-minded, crypto-racist regime hostile to Serbia and to the Yugoslavia 
that it erroneously believed Serbia controlled" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.246). For 
Zimmermann, however, "Tudjman's saving feature, which distinguished him from 
9 On 17 March 1990, for example, Tudjman declared, "Thank God my wife is not a Jew or a Serb" 
(cited in Gallagher. 2001, p.266); and Holbrooke has spoken of Tudjman's "deep hatred of the 
Muslims ... " (Holbrooke, 1999, p.162). 
Milosevic, was that he really wanted to be seen as a Western statesman. He 
listened to Western expressions of concern and ... often did something about 
them ... " (Zimmermann, 1996, p.77). Commenting on this statement, Hudson 
remarks, "In some senses, Zimmermann has hit upon the core of the issue. 
Tudjman could be backed because he was essentially pro-Western, whereas 
Milosevic had to be broken, because he was not" (Hudson, 2003, p.70). 
(b) Intentions 
We have seen that Western literature heavily blames Milosevic for the wars in the 
former Yugoslavia. However, he is accused not only of being most responsible for 
those wars, but also of actively planning them, and thus intending for them to 
happen. Gow, for example, argues that although war was "highly likely and in the 
circumstances even inevitable, it was MiloseviC's Belgrade that saw in 
Yugoslavia's disarray a perfect opportunity to redraw the map; that planned and 
instigated war ... " (Gow, 2003, p.9). LeBor asserts that, "War was a deliberate 
choice for the Milosevic regime ... " (LeBor, 2002, p.328). He also argues that, "It 
was in Croatia and Bosnia that Milosevic and his allies were planning the 'armed 
battles' of which he had spoken at Kosovo in 1989" (LeBor, 2002, p.139).10 
Zimmermann accuses Milosevic of "devising and pursuing a strategy that led 
directly to the breakup of the country and to the deaths of over 100,000 of its 
citizens" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.212); and Hartman claims that intercepted 
10 On 28 June 1989, Milose\'ic delivered a speech in Koso\'o. in which he referred to possible 
armed battles in the future. It will be argued in chapter .t. however, that undue significance has 
been attached to these words. in order to reinforce the image of \ 1 i1ose\'ic as a warmonger. 
telephone conversations between Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan 
Karadzic, "revelaient I' existence d' un plan precis II visant a creer par la violence 
une Grande Serbie" ("revealed the existence of a precise plan which envisaged the 
creation, by violent means, of a Greater Serbia") (Hartman, 1999, p.152). 
Milosevic is accused not only of planning the wars, but also of planning the crimes 
committed therein. These crimes were not simply a by-product of the wars. They 
were carefully planned in advance; they were premeditated. Cigar and Williams, 
for example, argue that, "The atrocities committed by Serbian forces were part of a 
planned, systematic and organized campaign to secure territory for an ethnically 
'pure' Serb state by clearing it of all non-Serb populations" (Cigar and Williams, 
2002, p.21); and Malcolm maintains that ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was 
a central part of the entire political project which the war was intended to 
achieve, namely the creation of homogeneous Serb areas which could 
eventually be joined to other Serb areas, including Serbia itself, to create a 
greater Serbian state (Malcolm, 2002, p.246). 
Spencer, referring to the NATO bombing in 1999, claims that, "Milosevic may 
actually have wanted the bombing because it gave a cover for the ethnic cleansing 
that he had planned in advance" (Spencer, 2000, p.36); and Williams and Scharf 
contend that Serbian crimes committed in Kosovo were "premeditated atrocities 
designed to terrorize the civilian population" (Williams and Scharf, 2002, p.174). 
\ \ Hartman is referring here to the so-called "RAM" plan. In his testimony to The Hague Tribunal, 
on 23 October 2003, Ante Markovic, the former Federal Prime Minister, referred to the existence 
of "a RAM programme", but admitted that. "I don't know what it was" (\ LlIkovic, 2003). 
Such views, however, are not confined to Western literature. President Clinton, 
for example, speaking on 15 April 1999, expressed the view that, "The tragedy in 
Kosovo is the result of a meticulously planned and long-premeditated attack on an 
entire people simply on the basis of their ethnicity and religion" (cited in 
Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.850). For its part, the International Crisis 
Group (lCG), in its report of 11 May 1999, referred to Milosevic's "grotesque 
campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo ... " (lCG, 1999, p.i). 
In Milosevic' s trial in The Hague, the Prosecution has similarly stressed that 
Serbian crimes committed during the wars in former Yugoslavia were planned and 
premeditated. In her opening statement on 12 February 2002, for example, the 
chief prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, argued that, "Some of the incidents reveal an 
almost medieval savagery and the calculated cruelty that went far beyond the 
bounds of legitimate warfare" (Del Ponte, 2002). Fellow prosecutor Geoffrey 
Nice referred to "MiloseviC's criminal plans" (Nice, 2002). 
Milosevic's intentions are fundamental to the charge of genocide. Article II of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (1948) defines 
genocide as, 
Many of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing 
members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] t c) 
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Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group" (Camegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997, p.4). I2 
Thus, if Milosevic is to be found guilty of genocide, the Prosecution must show 
that he had genocidal intent - the specific intent to destroy the Bosnian ;vluslims as 
a people. However, 
Since the prosecution has not been able to present unequivocal e\'idence of 
genocidal intent - a military order calling for the liquidation of all of the 
Bosnian Muslims, for example - the experts say that based on earlier rulings, 
they have serious doubts that the judges will issue a guilty verdict (Sullivan, 
2004). 
It is interesting to note, for example, that Milosevic's initial indictment for 
genocide, issued on 22 November 2001, was watered down in a later, amended 
indictment released on 22 November 2002. For example, the original indictment 
claimed that Milosevic, acting alone or as part of a joint criminal enterprise 13, 
planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted the 
planning, preparation, and execution of the destruction, in whole or in part, 
of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat national, ethnical, racial or 
religious groups, as such, in territories within Bosnia and 
Hercegovina ... (The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Slobodan Milosevic, 
2001). 
It specifically mentioned eighteen such territories. In contrast, the amended 
indictment makes no mention of the Bosnian Croats, and instead refers only to 
"the Bosnian Muslim national, ethnical, racial or religious groups". It also names 
only eight, rather than eighteen, specific territories (The Prosecutor of the Tribunal 
against Slobodan Milosevic, 2002). 
I ~ ~ In a landmark decision in April 2004, The Hague Tribunal found the Bosnian Serb genera\. 
Radislav Krstic, guilty of aiding and abetting the crime of genocide in Srebrenica, the scene of the 
worst massacre in Europe since World War Two. It was the first time since the Nuremberg trial" 
that an international court had established a case of genocide 011 European soil. 
13 More about this concept will be said in chapter 2. 
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Notwithstanding that Milosevic's trial is still in progress, various commentators 
freely use the word "genocide". Back in 1996, Cohen, for example. referred to 
"the leadership responsible for directing Serbia's calculated program of genocide" 
(Cohen, 1996, p.135). Even some Western politicians have had no qualms about 
using the term "genocide". Speaking in March 1999, for example. the British 
Defence Secretary, George Robertson, stressed that it was imperative to intervene 
in Kosovo, in order to stop "a regime which is bent on genocide"; while President 
Clinton referred to "deliberate, systematic efforts at. .. genocide" in Kosovo (cited 
in Edwards, 2004). Lady Margaret Thatcher, moreover, also speaking during the 
NATO bombing campaign, declared, 
Weare not dealing with some minor thug whose local brutalities may offend 
our sensibilities from time to time. Milosevic's regime and the genocidal 
ideology that sustains it represent something altogether different - a truly 
monstrous evil. .. (cited in Williams and Scharf, 2002, p.205).14 
Use of the word "genocide" has also frequently appeared in Western media. 
According to Edwards, "A Nexis database search showed that in the two years 
1998-1999, the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Washington Post, Newsweek 
and Time used the term 'genocide' 220 times to describe the actions of Serbia in 
Kosovo" (Edwards, 2004). 
In Anglo-Saxon legal systems, one is innocent proven until guilty. In the case of 
Milosevic, however, the opposite is apparently true - he is guilty until proven 
innocent. 
14 According to Hume, "During the Kosovo conflict, the Nato governments and their a l l ~ e s s in the 
media tended to use the rhetoric of genocide to substitute for the lack of much hard eVIdence to 
support stories of Serb atrocities against ethnic Albanians" (Hume. 2000, p.73) . 
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(ii) Milosevic 's Motivations 
In law, a person's motivations are irrelevant to establishing whether he is guilty or 
innocent. However, when we look at how Milosevic has been constructed as a 
criminal leader, we see that his motivations are treated as relevant. Western 
literature portrays Milosevic as a man motivated by power, to the point of being 
obsessed with it. Hockenos, for example, describes Milosevic as "A tyrant who 
appeared addicted to power. .. " (Hockenos, 2003, p.1S4); Di Giovanni refers to 
MiloseviC's "insatiable appetite for power" (Di Giovanni, 2004, p.73); Judah 
describes Milosevic as "an opportunistic and a cynical leader who was only 
interested in power" (Judah, 2000a, p.xii); and Cohen argues that Milosevic' s 
"most compelling interest" was "the retention of power at any cost" (Cohen, 2001, 
p.xiv). What is interesting is that this pursuit of power is not seen as rational, but 
as criminal. 
What made Milosevic's pursuit of power "criminal" was the fact that it was so 
ruthless and cold-blooded. Silber and Little, for example, argue that on 9 March 
1991,15 "it became clear that Milosevic would not hesitate to use force against his 
own people in order to preserve power" (Silber and Little, 1996, p.119); and 
Hartman describes Milosevic as "un tyran sanguinaire pret a sacrifier des centaines 
de milliers de vies sur I' autel de ses ambitions" ("a bloody tyrant prepared to 
sacrifice hundreds of thousands of lives on the altar of his ambitions") (Hartman, 
1999, p.14). Even more scathing in their attack, Doder and Branson contend that, 
15 This was the start of demonstrations against the regime, organized by Vuk Drasko\ic. the leader 
of the Serbian RCllcl\'(z/ .\/ovement (SPO). 
"Slobodan Milosevic is the Saddam Hussein of Europe, doomed to \\Teak havoc 
and go to war - as he has done repeatedly already - in order to preserve his o\\'n 
power and distract his people's attention from repression and poverty"' (Doder and 
Branson, 1999, p.10). 
In his trial in The Hague, Milosevic has similarly been portrayed as power-hungry. 
In her opening statement on 12 February 2002, for example, Carla Del Ponte told 
the Tribunal that, " ... the search for power is what motivated Slobodan Milosevic" 
and that, 
... Milosevic did nothing but pursue his ambition at the price of unspeakable 
suffering inflicted on those who opposed him or represented a threat for his 
personal strategy of power. Everything, Your Honours, everything with the 
accused Milosevic was an instrument in the service of his quest for power 
(Del Ponte, 2002). 
(iii) Milosevic 's Personality and Psychological Profile 
Few of the Western authors who have written about Milosevic have actually met 
him. Claims about his personality and psychology are, therefore, highly 
speculative. Nevertheless, his alleged character and psychological traits form part 
of his criminalization. In the words of Glenny, "The drive towards war in 
Yugoslavia could not have been as dynamic as it was had it not been for the 
extraordinary personality of Slobodan Milosevic, the most paradoxical of 
dictators" (Glenny, 1993, p.31). 
Milosevic is portrayed in the literature as having various negative character traits. 
such as mendacity. Doder and Branson, for example. rcfer to Miloscyic's 
"consummate capacity for lying, intrigue and secrecy" (Doder and Branson, 1999, 
p.6); and Sell maintains that, "One of the few constants in Miloseyic' s personality 
is mendacity" (Sell, 2002, p.173). In a similar vein, Zimmennann refers to 
Milosevic's "habitual mendacity" (Zimmennann, 1996, p.24), and describes 
Milosevic as "one of the most duplicitous politicians the Balkans has ever 
produced ... " (Zimmermann, 1996, p.249). 
Narcissism is another negative character trait often attributed to Milosevic.1 6 
According to Doder and Branson, for example, "The psychologists surmise that he 
lives in a narcissistic, self-centred place where he is the sun and everything 
revolves around him" (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.l 0); and Sell claims that, 
US psychologists who have studied Slobodan Milosevic closely describe 
him as having a malignant narcissistic personality. They see him as strongly 
self-centred, vain, and full of self-love. He is also completely indifferent to 
almost anyone or anything else around him (Sell, 2002, p.173). 
Much is also made of the fact that Milosevic was, apparently, rather reclusive. 
Volkan, for example, argues that, "Most of the time Milosevic keeps to himself 
and has perhaps suffered episodic depression" (Volkan, 1997, p.240); and Scharf 
and Schabas infonn us that, "Slobodan is said to have been a solitary child. 
Patterns of abandonment surrounded the young Milosevic and could be seen as 
16 According to Cashman, "Narcissism is a highly complex personality construct made up of 
several factors, including a disposition to exploit and manipulate others. J reveling in leadership 
and authority roles. attitudes of self-importance, superiority and grandiosity, egotism. a lack of 
empathy for others, physical vanity. and a hypersensitivity to the evaluation of others" (Cashman, 
1993, pA 1). 
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factors in the fonnation of a hardened, isolated individual" (Scharf and Schabas, 
2002, p.5).17 
It is suggested that MiloseviC's reclusive nature is emphasized as a way of 
showing him to be somehow "'abnonnal". This image of him is strong in the 
literature. Doder and Branson, for example, describe Milosevic as "one warped 
and malevolent man" (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.284). Ramet claims that, 
" ... the Serbian leader is suffering from an acute personality disorder" and 
"displays symptoms characteristic of paranoid schizophrenia and psychopathic 
hostility" (Ramet, 2002, p.310). She also refers to his "arguably paranoid-
psychopathic personality traits" (Ramet, 2002, p.351). 
Even MiloseviC's relationship with his wife, Mira Markovic, is portrayed as being 
somewhat peculiar and out of the ordinary. Di Giovanni, for example, maintains 
that, Milosevic and Mira had "an unnaturally close relationship" (Di Giovanni, 
2004, p.153). 
What is interesting is that whereas badness and madness are usually treated as two 
very separate things, Milosevic is associated with both. Hartman, for example, 
describes him as "un dictateur fou" ("a mad dictator") (Hartman, 1999. p.402). 
Similarly, President Clinton, speaking on 2 June 1999, claimed that, "Ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo was not a response to bombing. It was the ten-year method of 
17 In criminal law cases. facts about a defendant's childhood and upbringing are sometimes 
introduced as mitigating circumstances. In contrast, information about l\lilose\iC's childhood has 
been used to reinforce \'ery negative images of him. 
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Mr Milosevic's madness" (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.l074).18 In 
addition, Milosevic is often associated with irrationality. Cohen, for example, 
argues that, " ... Milosevic had cemented his power precisely by unleashing the 
irrational" (Cohen, 1998, p.190). Such claims can be related to Orientalist 
stereotypes about the Balkans itself. In the words of Burgess, "The Balkans 
epitomises the supposed unpredictability, indeed, positive irrationality of the 
region. There, human behaviour apparently follows little recognisable pattern" 
(Burgess, 1997, pAO). 
(iv) Criminalization through Comparison 
The final element in Milosevic's criminalization is a comparative one. He is often 
compared to other "criminal" leaders, past and present. Doder and Branson, for 
example, describe him as the "Saddam Hussein of Europe" (Doder and Branson, 
1999, p.10). Tony Blair has also compared Milosevic to Saddam Hussein. 19 In his 
speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, on 22 April 1999, for example, Blair 
told his audience that, 
Many of our problems have been caused by two dangerous and ruthless men 
- Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic. Both have been prepared to 
wage vicious campaigns against sections of their own community. As a 
result of these policies, both have brought calamity on their own peoples 
(Blair, 1999). 
18 According to Filredi, "When colonial nationalists were not depicted as self-serving scoundrels. 
they were dismissed as mentally unstable" (Filredi, 1994, p.117). The same argument can be made 
in relation to "criminal leaders". 
19 James Bissett, the Canadian Ambassador to Yugosla\ia between 1990 and 1992. howe\,er, 
disagrees with such comparisons. In his words, "Few would argue that Siobodan \Iilosevic was a 
benign and lovable leader, but compared to Saddam Hussein he \\as a pussycat" (Bissett, 2001b). 
For his part, Richard Holbrooke has compared Milosevic and the former warlord 
and president of Liberia, Charles Taylor. According to Holbrooke, "Taylor is 
Milosevic in Africa with diamonds" (cited in Beigbeder, 2002, p.207). 
Milosevic is most frequently compared, implicitly or explicitly, to Hitler and 
Stalin. Speaking in June 1999, for example, the British Foreign Secretary, Robin 
Cook, argued that, "the appalling mass deportations we saw from Pristina, 
particularly the use of railways, is evocative of what happened under Hitler and 
again under Stalin" (cited in Dunne and Kroslak, 2001, p.36).20 Hartman describes 
Milosevic as "Ie maitre du regime Ie plus meurtrier d'Europe depuis Hitler" ("the 
master of the deadliest regime in Europe since Hitler") (Hartman, 1999, p.14); and 
Magas argues that, 
Milosevic has justified the annexation and wholesale incorporation of other 
republics and provinces by his concern for the fate of Serb minorities. This 
is how Hitler once justified the annexation of Austria, the partition and 
occupation of Czechoslovakia, and the attack on Poland (Magas, 1993, 
p.321 ). 
Similarly, Ramet claims that, "Milosevic's biography shares some points III 
common with the biographies of other dictators and extreme nationalists" (Ramet, 
2002, p.309); Bennett contends that, "comparisons with both Hitler and Stalin are 
not far-fetched" (Bennett, 1995, p.247); and Zimmermann argues that MiloseviC's 
tactic of using mass rallies to dispose of anti-Milosevic governments in Kosovo, 
Vojvodina and Mortenegro "was right out of Hitler's and Mussolini's play books" 
(Zimmermann, 1996, p.52). 
20 Booth describes such comparisons as "mindless" (Booth, 2001. p.316); and Hume argues that, 
"Whatever crimes Milosevic is guilty of, his regime bears no sensible comparison with the Third 
Reich" (Hume, 2000, p.77). 
We have now seen how the image of Milosevic as a criminal leader has been 
constructed. To end this section, it is necessary to say something about the 
Serbian people. Have they too been criminalized? Most frequently, the Serbs 
have been portrayed as victims of Milosevic.21 Benson, for example, argues that, 
'The Serbs made up the peasant element in the social structure of Bosnia ... Like 
their kin in Kosovo, the Serbs were backwoodsmen, easy meat for nationalist 
demagogues like Radovan KaradZic and Milosevic ... " (Benson, 2001, p.144). 
Hartman also views the Serbian people as victims, arguing that they were 
brainwashed like members of a cult (Hartman, 1999, p.181); and Judah maintains 
that, "Whole communities became pawns to be pushed across the board like so 
many chess pieces, but the kings grew rich in the process" (Judah, 2000a, p.xii). 
However, not everyone regards the Serbs as innocent. Gutman, for example, 
refers to "the Serb conquest of Bosnia" and describes this as "a well-executed 
blitzkrieg" (Gutman, 1994, p.ix); and Hockenos claims that, "The inaction of the 
West in the face of Serbian aggression has set a worrisome precedent" (Hockenos, 
1994, p.314). By using the adjectives "Serb" and "Serbian", these authors thereby 
imply that the entire Serbian nation was implicated in these crimes. Indeed, as will 
be seen in the data chapters, there is a widespread feeling among the Serbian 
interviewees that the Serbian nation is on trial in The Hague, notwithstanding the 
21 As will be seen in the data chapters, this is how many of the Serbian interviewees \iew 
themsel \'cs. 
55 
Prosecution's repeated insistence that it is concerned solely with individual 
responsibility, and not with collective responsibility.22 
Others are more explicit in their condemnation of the Serbs. Cohen, for example, 
maintains that, "As a people, the Serbs cannot escape responsibility: they 
massively backed Milosevic' s nationalist upheaval and they voted him into office 
in the first 'free' elections of December 1990" (Cohen, 1998, p.194). For his part, 
Gallagher argues that, 
Milosevic would not have found it so easy to promote Serbian hegemony if 
this concept had not been particularly appealing to many in Serbia proper, as 
well as the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, and the republic of 
Montenegro ... (Gallagher, 2001, p.236). 
The demonization and criminalization of the Serbs, however, was most 
pronounced in Western media. For example, in April 1999, Newsweek published 
an article by Rod Nordland, entitled "Vengeance of a Victim Race", in which the 
author claimed that, "The Serbs are Europe's outsiders, seasoned haters raised on 
self-pity" (cited in Johnstone, 2000). For his part, Thomas Friedman, a columnist 
for the New York Times, wrote on 23 April 1999 that, 
Like it or not, we are at war with the Serbian nation (the Serbs certainly 
think so), and the stakes have to be very clear: Every week you ravage 
Kosovo is another decade we will set your country back by pulverizing you. 
You want 1950? We can do 1950. You want 1389? We can do 1389 too 
(cited in Edwards, 2004). 
22 Speaking on 12 February 2002, for example, Carla Del Ponte emphasized that, "The accused in 
this case, as in all cases before the Tribunal, is charged as an individual. He is prosecuted on the 
basis of his individual criminal responsibility. No state or organization is on trial here today. The 
indictments do not accuse an entire people of being collectively guilty of the crimes, even the crime 
ofgenocide ... Collecti\e guilt forms no part of the Prosecution case" (Del Ponte. 2002). 
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Other authors argue that just as the Serbs were not innocent victims, neither were 
publics throughout the former Yugoslavia. Fromkin, for example. argues that, 
Ethnic hatred may have been aroused or inflamed within the past few years 
by government-controlled television, but the gunpowder had to ha\e been 
already there: lighting a match, as the politicians did, would not have ignited 
an explosion all by itself (Fromkin, 1999, p.161). 
In a similar vein, Hammel argues that, "While politicians have manipulated, their 
publics have not been blameless. Many, but not all, members of those publics 
share the blame, for without them the politicians have no discontents to exploit'" 
(Hammel, 2000, p.29). 
Section 2 - Liberalism and the Criminalization of Milosevic 
Fiiredi describes how the British Empire criminalized its anti-imperialist 
opponents for reasons of self-interest. In short, "By criminalizing and discrediting 
its opponents, London could justify the use of emergencies and special measures 
to deal with them" (Fiiredi, 1994, p.l 09). Today, it is Liberalism that underlies the 
criminalization of leaders. It is argued that Milosevic has been criminalized 
because everything that he appeared to represent was seen as antithetical and 
hostile to liberal values and ideals. 
We particularly see this when we look at the rhetoric of British and US 
policymakers, a rhetoric that portrayed Milosevic and his regime as a threat to 
such fundamentals as freedom, democracy, and liberal peace. Speaking on 2 June 
1999, for example, President Clinton declared that, "The killing Mr Milosevic 
unleashed in the former Yugoslavia a decade ago is now the last major barrier to a 
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Europe whole, free and at peace .. .It threatens all the progress made in Europe 
since the end of the Cold War" (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.l075). 
Liberal values were invoked most explicitly as a way to justify foreign 
intervention in the former Yugoslavia. For example, at the start of the war in 
Kosovo, in March 1999, President Clinton informed the nation that by bombing 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, "we are upholding our values, protecting our 
interests, and advancing the cause of peace" (cited in Chomsky, 1999, p.3). At the 
end of the war, moreover, he triumphantly proclaimed that, "I can report to the 
American people that we have achieved a victory for a safer world, for our 
democratic values, and for a stronger America" (Clinton, 1999). In his speech to 
the Economic Club of Chicago, on 22 April 1999, Tony Blair also underscored the 
importance of upholding liberal values, declaring, "This is a just war, based not on 
any territorial ambitions but on values" (Blair, 1999). 
Portrayals of Milosevic and his policies as evil further emphasized the threat that 
he and his regime posed to liberal peace and values. For example, US Secretary of 
State, Madeleine Albright, speaking on 1 February 1999 about the situation in 
Kosovo, declared, "that this kind of thing cannot stand, that you cannot in 1999 
have this kind of barbaric ethnic cleansing. It is ultimately better that democracies 
stand up against this kind of evil" (cited in Chomsky, 1999, p.3). Similarly, in his 
speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, on 22 April 1999, Tony Blair vowed 
that, "If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely 
more blood and treasure to stop him later" (Blair, 1999). 
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To conclude this section, it is argued that Liberalism heavily underlies the 
construction of Milosevic as a criminal leader. Liberalism strongly influenced 
British and US policy towards the former Yugoslavia, particularly the decision to 
intervene in Kosovo in 1999. It is interesting to note, however, that during the 
early nineties, when the dominant mood among policymakers was against 
intervention, it was not so much Milosevic who was regarded as the problem, but 
the region itself. As Mazower argues, "Those who opposed Western intervention 
in the Balkans tended to blame Milosevic less than long-run cultural determinants 
of behaviour in the region" (Mazower, 2000, p.128). 
Cautioning against foreign involvement in the former Yugoslavia, for example, the 
former U.S Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger argued that, 
If people are intent on killing each other under conditions in which it is 
almost impossible for the outside world to do anything without losing itself 
many lives, then my answer is: 'I'm sorry, but they are going to have to kill 
each other until they wear themselves out and have enough sense to stop 
(cited in Fleming, 2000, p.1219). 
Speaking on 28 March 1993, the U.S Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
expressed similar views. He said, 
Let me put that situation in Bosnia in just a little broader framework. It's 
really a tragic problem. The hatred between all three groups - the Bosnians 
and the Serbs and the Croats - is almost unbelievable. It's almost terrifying 
and it's centuries old. That really is a problem from hell (cited in Cohen. 
1998, p.243). 
As Bert argues, "Where one stood on intervention. therefore, tended to determine 
how one defined the nature of the war" (Bert, 1997, p.97). 
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Section 3 - Some Alternative Views in the Western Literature 
Notwithstanding the broad consensus in Western literature that Milosevic IS a 
criminal leader, of course not everybody subscribes to this view. This final 
section, therefore, will consider some alternative viewpoints. It will begin by 
outlining two alternative portraits of Milosevic in Western literature - as an 
improviser, and as an obstacle to the West. It will then look at some alternative 
explanations of the wars in the former Yugoslavia that emphasize the causal role 
of circumstances, both internal and external. 
(i) Two Alternative Portraits of Milosevic 
(a) Milosevic as an Improviser 
Some authors maintain that Milosevic was above all an improviser, rather than a 
warmonger. According to Johnstone, for example, "Despite a confident fac;ade, 
Milosevic was improvising, while Tudjman knew exactly what he wanted" 
(Johnstone, 2002, p.27). Similarly, Crnobrnja maintains that, ··It can be argued 
convincingly that Serbia had no clear strategy as events unravelled" (Crnobrnja, 
1996, p.227); and Marshall argues that, "Most people believe that Milosevic' s idea 
of strategy was to stumble from one crisis to the next, trying to buy himself time 
with short-term solutions to long-term problems" (Marshall, 2002, p.l07).23 
War was not, therefore, something that Milosevic planned. Rather, it was 
something that became necessary or advantageous as events progressed. Gordy, 
23 As will be seen in the interview data chapters (in particular, chapters 5 and 7). many of the 
Serbian interviewees hold similar views. 
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for instance, argues that once the anny discredited itself by using force against 
anti-regime demonstrators in March 1991, war became necessary as .. the only 
means of preserving a power that had been openly challenged and exposed" 
(Gordy, 1999, p.37). For her part, Di Giovanni highlights the usefulness of war to 
the regime. She argues that, in many ways, Milosevic "was addicted to war. 
Shortly after the Slovenian conflict began, a precedent was set: every time 
MiloseviC's popularity plummeted, he launched a new war to temporarily revive 
it" (Di Giovanni, 2004, p.157). 
Just as Milosevic did not plan the wars, neither did he have real control over them. 
Hammel, for example, argues that, "An outstanding feature of the catastrophe was 
the speed with which criminal elements came to playa role, running guns, looting 
(often with the assistance of the anny), feathering their nests with blackmarket 
profits" (Hammel, 2000, p.34). That so many of those engaged in fighting and 
perpetrating heinous deeds were motivated by the prospect of looting and 
plundering is significant. In particular, it undermines the argument, made by 
people such as Gow and Cigar, that the commission of ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity was an integral part of the Serbian state project to create a 
"Greater Serbia". 
The fact, moreover, that war served the interests of particular groups meant that it 
was difficult to stop. The longer it continued, the more it took on a momentum of 
its own, independent of the decisions and actions of political leaders. In the words 
of Woodward, "Even if political leaders wish to reverse course and sign cease-tire 
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agreements in good faith, and citizens desperately want an end to the fighting. the 
momentum of such wars [nationalist wars] becomes increasingly difficult to stop" 
(Woodward, 1995, p.245). 
(b) Milosevic as an Obstacle 
According to Gowan, the West's role in the disintegration of Yugoslavia "has 
largely been overlooked in Western literature" (Gowan, 1999, p.p.I8). A very 
welcome contribution to the existing Western literature, therefore, has been made 
by various authors, mainly although by no means exclusively on the political Left, 
whose work emphasizes the West's involvement in the break-up of Yugoslavia. 
Brown, for example, maintains that, "What destroyed Yugoslavia and divided the 
several peoples against each other was ... as so often before in their history, the 
intervention of powerful outside forces with their own interests". He adds that, 
"Milosevic was more the victim than the victor in that tragic process" (Brown, 
2005, p.176). 
For these authors, Milosevic was seen in the West as a problem not because he 
was a criminal leader, but because he was an independent leader who refused to 
obediently follow the West - more particularly, the United States - and comply 
with all its demands. Milosevic was therefore viewed, especially in Washington, 
as a serious obstacle, and consequently made to pay the price. 
Hudson is one academic that adopts this line of argument. She points out that, in 
1984, the Reagan Administration introduced a National Security Di\'ision 
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Directive on United States Policy towards Yugoslavia, "the objecti\Oes of which 
included expanded efforts to promote a 'quiet revolution' to overthrow Communist 
governments and parties, while re-integrating the countries of eastern Europe into 
the orbit of the World market" (Hudson, 2003, p.57).24 Milosevic, howe\er, stood 
in the way of such re-integration, by "resisting full freemarket reform and 
integration into western institutions" (Hudson, 2003, p.2). As a consequence, 
The demonization of Milosevic was eventually to know no bounds, far 
outstripping the attacks and criticisms of leaders that could be considered 
responsible for, or to have condoned, similar terrible and tragic events, such 
as Tudjman or Izetbegovic (Hudson, 2003, p.69). 
Hudson further maintains that the United States and the European Union used the 
Yugoslav presidential elections, in September 2000, "finally to achieve what they 
had been trying to do for over a decade, and had failed to do through bombing - to 
satisfy their own economic and strategic goals in the post-Soviet period". These 
included "the removal of a government in Belgrade which had not only a socialist 
economic orientation but also a strategic orientation away from NATO and 
towards Russia" (Hudson, 2003, p.138). 
Parenti similarly holds that Milosevic frustrated the US in the realization of its 
objectives, and consequently became a target. He argues that, 
In my opinion, Milosevic's real sin was that he resisted the dismemberment 
of Yugoslavia and opposed a U.S imposed hegemony. He also attempted to 
spare Yugoslavia the worst of the merciless privatisations and rollbacks that 
have afflicted other former communist countries (Parenti, 2003). 
2-1 It was similarly during the 1980s that "enmity towards Tito, and nen towards Yugoslavia, \\ as 
taken up by an element of the British Right. These were the journalists and academics who backed 
the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in opposition to Communism in eastern Europe o o. 
They denounced Yugoslavia both as a Communist state and as an example of an unworkable. 
artificial federation, a microcosm of the proposed European Community" (West. 1996. p.3}5). 
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Emphasizing how the West's VieW of Milosevic changed over time, Parenti 
maintains that, 
At first, the West viewed the ex-banker as a Serbian nationalist who might 
be useful to them. As late as 1995, the Clinton administration accepted 
Milosevic as a negotiating partner and guarantor of the Dayton Accords in 
Bosnia, even praising him for the many concessions he made. Only later, 
when they saw him as an obstacle rather than a tool, did US policy makers 
begin to depict him as having been all along the demon who . started all four 
wars' (Parenti, 2000, p.177). 
Chomsky likewise takes the view that Milosevic presented an obstacle to 
American foreign policy objectives. He claims that, "Serbia was an annoyance, an 
unwelcome impediment to Washington's efforts to complete its substantial 
takeover of Europe" (Chomsky, 1999, p.137). He continues, "As long as Serbia is 
not incorporated within US-dominated domains, it makes sense to punish it for its 
failure to confonn - very visibly, in a way that will serve as a warning to others 
that might be similarly inclined" (Chomsky, 1999, p.137). 
(iO Alternative Explanations o/the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia 
We saw in section 1 that central to the construction of Milosevic as a criminal 
leader is the claim that he bears greatest responsibility for the wars in the fonner 
Yugoslavia. In Western literature, however, there are some alternative 
explanations of the wars that focus less on individuals and more on circumstances. 
Some of these explanations primarily emphasize internal, domestic circumstances, 
and we can distinguish between, on the one hand, Orientalist explanations that 
stress the violent nature of Balkan history and the existence of ancient hatreds and, 
on the other hand, Realist explanations that concentrate on the disintegration of the 
Yugoslav State and its consequences. Other explanations, which can be described 
as structuralist, mainly underscore external, international circumstances. The two 
sets of circumstances are not mutually exclusive, however, and some authors, such 
as Woodward, emphasize both. 
(aJ Internal, Local Circumstances 
Historically, accounts of events in the Balkans have been heavily Orientalist, 
emphasizing the inherently problematic and conflict-ridden nature of the region as 
a whole. For example, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in his book 
Through Savage Europe, Harry De Windt argued that the term "savage" 
"accurately describes the wild and lawless countries between the Adriatic and 
Black Seas" (De Windt, 1907, p.16). Later, in 1940, John Gunther described the 
Balkan Peninsula as "an unstable pyramid of nationalist hatreds and of minority 
hatreds within nations"(Gunther, 1940, p.438). 
For some, ancient hatreds and the Balkan's violent history lay at the heart of the 
recent wars in the former Yugoslavia. Describing the war in Bosnia, for example, 
Winchester claims that, "This was selective, spiteful fighting, in which soldiers 
and civilians with pure hatred in their hearts set about the destruction of personal 
enemies, the settling of old scores" (Winchester, 1999, p.87). Hupchick describes 
the war between Serbia and Croatia as pitting "the highly Westemized Catholic 
Croats against the still somewhat Byzantine and Turkified Orthodox Serbs in a 
struggle having cultural roots traceable through a millennium" (Hupchick, 1994. 
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p.17); and Owen argues that, "History points to a tradition in the Balkans of a 
readiness to solve disputes by the taking up of anns and acceptance of the forceful 
or even negotiated movement of people as the result of war. It points to a culture 
of violence ... " (Owen, 1996, p.3).25 
Whereas Orientalist explanations of the wars see hatred as endemic to the Balkans, 
Realist explanations link that hatred to a security dilemma created by the collapse 
of the Yugoslav State. Ignatieff, for example, argues that, "There is one type of 
fear more devastating in its impact than any other: the systematic fear which arises 
when a state begins to collapse. Ethnic hatred is the result of terror which arises 
when legitimate authority disintegrates" (Ignatieff, 1993, p.16). 
For Woodward too, the break-up of the Yugoslav State is the starting point for any 
analysis of the wars in former Yugoslavia. She argues that, 
While the collapse of Yugoslavia was an extremely complex process, its 
dynamic, and thus an analysis of its causes, can actually be captured usefully 
by the concept of a security dilemma. Although the Yugoslav federal 
government continued to function up to the second half of 1991, its authority 
and especially its enforcement power had declined so much during the 
1980s ... that the context of its dissolution could be said to resemble the 
conditions of anarchy in which a security dilemma in international relations 
is said to occur (Woodward, 1999, p.80).26 
25 According to Neier, "The idea that historical developments are impervious to external efforts to 
mitigate their brutality powerfully influenced key figures at various times during the Balkan wars" 
(Neier, 1998, p.147). 
26 Walter also views the wars in ex-Yugoslavia through the prism of a security dilemma. She 
argues that while the fighting between Serbs, Croats and Muslims in the early 1990s can, in part, be 
ex.plained by their desire to secure greater control of territory, "it can also be explained by the fear 
and vulnerability they felt as the Yugoslav federation began to disintegrate" (Walter. 1999. p.2). 
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(b) External, International Circumstances 
Some authors focus on external circumstances and their impact on Yugoslavia. 
Woodward, for example, argues that had internal events within Yugoslavia not 
been accompanied by the collapse of the Cold War international order, the 
outcome of these internal events might have been other than war (Woodward, 
1995, p.16). Thus, for Woodward, "change from the outside, in the foreign 
economic and strategic environment on which the country's stability had come to 
depend" was critical to Yugoslavia's breakdown (Woodward, 1995, p.22). 
Liotta also emphasizes international circumstances. She argues that, " ... what 
happened in Yugoslavia was inseparable from international change and 
interdependence", and that "contrary to much current belief, the process of 
Yugoslav disintegration was not confined to the Balkans but was itself a reflection 
of wider political disintegration at the end of the twentieth century" (Liotta, 200 I, 
p.82). 
She adds that, "The break-up of Yugoslavia by political disintegration was 
inseparable from the processes of larger European fragmentation in the wake of 
the Cold War" (Liotta, 200 1, p.265). 
Explanations of the wars in former Yugoslavia that focus on circumstances have 
two particular merits. Firstly, they provide us with the broader context within 
which Yugoslavia unraveled, even if they are prone to over-simplify history. 
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Secondly, they are less likely than actor-based approaches to demonize one 
particular side in a conflict. 
However, such explanations are not unproblematic. For example, those that 
attribute the wars to the existence of ancient ethnic hatreds feed Orientalist 
stereotypes about the Balkans as a region dominated by violence and turmoil. 
They also suggest that because of historical and cultural factors, Yugoslavia's 
demise and the subsequent wars were to a certain extent inevitable. This is over-
simplistic and unhelpful. As Cox argues, "History does not automatically generate 
conflicts; human beings do" (Cox, 2002, p.136). It also discourages in-depth 
analysis of what happened in the former Yugoslavia, because if events were 
inevitable, it is unnecessary to spend time analyzing them.27 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to show how and why Milosevic has been constructed as a 
criminal leader. However, this construction, it is argued, is problematic for five 
main reasons. Firstly, because it requires us to see Milosevic as the person most 
responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it encourages reductionist, over-
simplistic accounts of these wars.28 Not only do these accounts fail to do justice to 
the complexity of factors involved. They also demonize Milosevic to the extent 
27 For Byman and Pollack, "Recognizing the importance of individuals is necessary to explode one 
of the most pernicious and dangerous myths in the study of International Relations: the cult of 
inevitability" (Byman and Pollack, 2001, p.145). 
28 According to Post, Walker and Winter, the fact that we often \'iew a nation's foreign policy in 
terms of the personalities of its leaders perhaps "reflects our human tendency to reduce complexit: 
to simplicity, attributing the causes of other people's behavior to their internal dispositions rather 
than to their situations" (Post. Walker and Winter, 2003, p.l). 
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that fundamental aspects of his leadership - such as his popularity and degree of 
control over the situation - are heavily neglected. As Woodward points out, the 
argument that Milosevic was exclusively to blame for everything "ignores the 
conditions that make such leaders possible and popular. .. " (Woodward, 1995, 
p.IS). 
There can be no denying that Milosevic bears some of the responsibility for the 
break-up of Yugoslavia and the wars the ensued. However, Milosevic-centric 
explanations that place exclusive blame on him should be rejected. To cite Byman 
and Pollack, 
Within the discipline of International Relations, the study of individuals can 
be only one part of a larger whole. Ignoring their role is foolish, but so too is 
ignoring the influence of other forces such as systematic factors, domestic 
politics and bureaucratic pressures (Byman and Pollack, 2001, p.146). 
Secondly, the portrayal of Milosevic as a criminal leader can be objected to on 
practical grounds. The aforementioned Milosevic-centrism that it both entails and 
encourages "led people to ascribe so much power to the man that foreign 
governments came to rely on him to end the wars and therefore could not risk his 
fall from power, even while they accused him of crimes against humanity" 
(Woodward, 1995, p.IS). This resulted in the irony that Milosevic was seen in the 
West as both a warmonger and a peacemaker. 
At the same time, Milosevic' s construction as a criminal leader encouraged the 
simplistic and naive belief that Serbia could only move forward once he \\'as no 
longer in power. Yet, as Hawthorne argues, "We need to disabuse o u r s e l n ~ s s of the 
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illusion that if we simply sweep away a problem, its replacement will necessarily 
constitute a sea change" (cited in Satloff, 2002, p.90). 
Thirdly, the portrayal of Milosevic as a criminal leader relies upon extremely 
speculative claims about his intentions. As we saw in section 1 of this chapter, 
two particular claims regarding Milosevic' s intentions are central to his 
construction as a criminal leader. The first is that he planned the wars in fonner 
Yugoslavia, and thus intended for them to happen. The second claim is that 
crimes committed by the Serbs during the wars were planned and premeditated. 
However, since Milosevic "did not sign anything, did not note anything, and did 
not write any reports" (Stevanovic, 2004, p.177), it is extremely difficult to say 
anything concrete about his intentions. In the words of Stevanovic, "Researching 
him is like chasing an illegal activist who has destroyed all incriminating 
evidence" (Stevanovic, 2004, p.2). Furthermore, claims made about MiloseviC's 
intentions rest upon "the dubious assumption that historical development can be 
explained by recourse to intuitive understanding of the motives and intentions of 
leading actors in the drama" (Kershaw, 1993, p.67).29 
The fourth reason why the image of Milosevic as a criminal leader is problematic 
is that just as many of the claims made about his intentions are merely conjectural, 
so many of the general claims made about him are unsubstantiated. For example, 
29 In his work on the Hitler regime, Kershaw stresses that we cannot rely solely on a person' s 
intentions to explain complex events. He maintains that, "Hitler's 'intentions' are indispensable to 
explaining the course of development in the Third Reich. But they are not an adequate explanation 
in themselves. The conditions in which Hitler's 'will' could be implemented as go\ernment policy 
were only in small measure fashioned by Hitler himself, and moreover, made the ultimate failure of 
his aims and the destruction of the Third Reich almost ineyitable" (Kershaw, 1993. p.79). 
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in his book The Serbian Project and its Adversaries; A Strategy of War Crimes, 
Gow consistently refers to a "Serbian project to establish new state borders from 
which unwanted communities would be removed - ethnically cleansed" (Gow, 
2003, pA). Yet, he provides no hard evidence for the existence of such a project. 
Numerous other authors similarly fail to support their claims with evidence. 
LeBor, for example, refers to " ... Milosevic's plan for a Greater Serbia" (LeBor, 
2002, p.136), but provides no evidence that such a plan existed. He does mention 
the so-called "RAM" plan, but even then is forced to concede that, " ... no copy of 
the RAM plan has yet been produced as evidence" (LeBor, 2002, p. 3 51). For his 
part, Doubt contends that, "It is widely known that Milosevic is the person most 
responsible for the war for a Greater Serbia and its brutalities throughout former 
Yugoslavia, starting perhaps with the attack on Vukovar in 1991" (Doubt, 2000, 
p.IO). By beginning with the words "It is widely known that. .. " Doubt thus 
absolves himself of the need to provide evidence for his claim. It is as if what he 
is saying is an indisputable truth that requires no elaboration. 
Unfortunately, this is a common trend in the literature, where many authors tell the 
same story about Milosevic. If these authors feel that they are reiterating known 
facts, this perhaps explains why they often fail to support these "facts" with hard 
evidence. MiloseviC's speeches, for example, are a heavily neglected, yet 
extremely important primary source. We shall find out in chapter 4 whether and to 
what extent they support the image of Milosevic as a criminal leader. 
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Finally, the construction of Milosevic as a criminal leader can be objected to on 
the grounds that it fundamentally neglects the experiences and opinions of 
ordinary people who experienced Milosevic' s "criminal" leadership at first hand. 
Arguing that the "criminal" leader must be studied both from the top down and 
from the bottom up, this thesis seeks to demonstrate the value of exploring how 
ordinary people in Serbia perceive Milosevic. In so doing, it provides the reader 
with important alternative images of Milosevic. In short, an exploration of the 
view from below can provide us with, to borrow a term from Scott, the "hidden 
transcripts" that we are so rarely given access to (Scott, 1990). 
Now that we have looked at how Western literature has constructed Milosevic as a 
criminal leader, it is useful to look at the wider picture. Chapter 2, therefore, is 
concerned with exploring particular developments in the field of International 
Relations that together both provide us with the broader context within which to 
situate the criminalization of Milosevic, and help us to formulate a general concept 
of the criminal leader. 
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Chapter 2 
The Criminal Leader and IR 
Introduction 
This chapter is not specifically concerned with Milosevic. Instead, it has two 
very particular objectives. The first is to explore how the idea of the "criminal 
leader" can be linked with certain developments in the field of International 
Relations. The second objective is to develop a general concept of the criminal 
leader which is based around the construction of Milosevic as a criminal 
leader, but which can also be applied outside the particular case of Milosevic. 
The chapter comprises five main sections. Sections 1-4, which are devoted to 
the first of the two aforementioned objectives, discuss four important and inter-
related developments in IR. Section 1 explores how Realism has been 
challenged in the post-Cold War world. It argues that Liberalism has become 
increasingly influential in IR, with the result that explanations of war now 
focus less on structural factors than on '"rogue states" and '"criminal leaders". 
Section 2 looks at a second important, yet related development in IR. This is 
the distinctive normative tum within the discipline, manifested by an emphasis 
on ethics and human rights. 
Section 3 explores how attitudes towards war have changed. There has been a 
gradual shift away from the view that war is normal, necessary and rational 
towards the perception that war is abnormal, unnecessary and irrational. At the 
same time, there is now a widespread belief that today's wars are more violent 
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and brutal than previous wars. In light of these changing perceptions of war. it 
is not surprising that war leaders are now more likely to be seen, particularly in 
the West, as criminals rather than as heroes. 
Section 4 looks at how the sovereIgn immunity of state leaders, a well-
established principle in international law, is gradually being eroded as a result 
of all the above developments. This has meant that leaders can be criminalized 
not only in theory but also in practice, as the trial of Milosevic demonstrates. 
Finally, section 5 is devoted to the second key objective that guides this chapter 
- namely, to develop a general concept of the criminal leader, using the two 
literatures discussed in the present chapter and in the previous chapter. It 
emphasizes that the concept of the criminal leader is both externally 
constructed and essentially contested. 
Section 1 - Changing Explanations of War; From Structure to Agency 
Milosevic-centric explanations of the wars in the former Yugoslavia can be 
seen as part of a broader trend in IR. That is to say that following the end of 
the Cold War, agency-based explanations of war have become increasingly 
important. 
During the Cold War, the Realist paradigm dominated IR. With its emphasis 
on structure, Realism constituted a powerful explanation in a world defined by 
key realist concepts, such as the balance of power and security dilemmas. and 
shaped by two superpowers. With the end of the Cold War, however. it can be 
74 
argued that Realist and Neorealist explanations of war have become less 
powerful. To cite Chandler, " ... since the end of the Cold War, structural 
explanations for conflict have again gone into decline and war is much less 
likely to be understood within an international framework of power politics" 
(Chandler, 2002a, p.168). On the one hand, Realism and Neorealism's ability 
to explain war has weakened as the nature of war has changed. On the other 
hand, the growing influence of the Liberal paradigm has challenged Realism's 
pre-eminence within the discipline. 
(i) From Inter-State to Intra-State War 
For realists, states constitute the main actors in IR. Thus, Realism is concerned 
with explaining war between states. However, "Nearly all scholars of anned 
conflict recognize that since 1945 intrastate violence has been a much more 
prevalent phenomenon than interstate war" (Ayres, 2000, p.1 09). Research by 
Wallensteen and Sollenberg, for example, shows that between 1989 and 2000, 
there were one-hundred-and-eleven anned conflicts in the world. Of these 
conflicts, ninety-five were intra-state and just seven were inter-state conflicts 
(Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2001, p.632). 
Furthennore, wars today increasingly occur inside failed states. l In the words 
of Kaldor, "The most important difference between the new wars and earlier 
wars is that new wars do not presuppose the existence of states" (Kaldor, 1997, 
I According to Snow, "The failed states are those in which governance has broken down and 
virtual anarchy (often taking the fonn of extremely brutal rule by elements utterly lacking 
legitimacy) has persisted across time ... The prototypical failed state ... is Somalia" (Snow, 1996, 
p.lOO). 
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p.9). It can be argued, therefore, that Realism has less explanatory power 
today than it did during the Cold War. To cite Holsti, 
Key analytical concepts such as balances of power, hegemony, alliances, 
deterrence, power projection and a whole range of geopolitical ideas ... 
derive from the European and Cold War experiences. Their releyance to 
post-1945 wars is highly problematic (Holsti, 1996, p.14). 
One particular key Realist concept, however, has been invoked to help explain 
today's conflicts. This is the concept of the security dilemma. According to 
realists, the security dilemma confronts all states in the absence of a world 
government. In short, because the international system is anarchical, states 
cannot trust each other. As a consequence, in the words of John Herz '"A 
vicious circle will arise - of suspicion and countersuspicion, competition for 
power, armament races, ultimately war" (cited in Doyle, 1997, p.27). 
Barry Posen was the first to utilize the security dilemma as an explanation for 
ethnic conflict. He applies the concept to "the special conditions that arise 
when proximate groups of people suddenly find themselves newly responsible 
for their own security" (Posen, 1993, p.27). This occurs when central authority 
collapses, as in failed states, resulting in a self-help situation much like that in 
the anarchical international system. In this self-help situation, various groups 
within the state are forced to provide for their own security. 
Posen heavily downplays the role that political elites play in generating 
conflict. For him, ..... very little nationalist rabble-rousing or nationalistic 
combativeness is required to generate very dangerous situations" (Posen, 1993, 
p.29). Rather, in his view, 
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the security dilemma and realist international relations theory more 
generally have considerable ability to explain and predict the probability 
and intensity of military conflict among groups emerging from the 
wreckage of empires (Posen, 1993, p.43). 
Thus, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, according to Posen, can be vie\\'ed 
through the lens of a security dilemma. 
Other authors have similarly used the security dilemma to explain ethnic 
conflict, by emphasizing the role that fear - created by the security dilemma -
plays in generating such conflict. According to Simons, for example, 
Fear, not hatred, is the prime motivator in ethnic conflicts ... Whenever 
citizens feel threatened by too much insecurity, they seek protection from 
the state. Should the state fail them, because officials are either inept or 
corrupt, individuals take matters into their own hands (Simons and 
Mueller, 2001, p.188). 
In a similar vein, Lake and Rothchild maintain that intense ethnic conflict is 
most often caused by collective fears of the future that "arise when states lose 
their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of 
protection for groups". Under this condition, they argue, "physical security 
becomes of paramount concern" (Lake and Rothschild, 1996, p.43). 
For some, however, it is problematic to see fear as the primary cause of ethnic 
conflict. Toft, for example, argues that, 
Although the security-dilemma explanation is logically quite powerful. 
we can find many cases in which fear was not the motivating factor for 
ethnic violence .. .It does not address other motivations, such as greed or 
aggressiveness (Toft, 2003, p.8). 
According to Angstrom and Duyvesteyn, who apply the concept of the security 
dilemma to the conflict in Liberia between 1989 and 1992, "The security 
dilemma fails to explain the outbreak of yiolence in both phases of the Liberian 
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conflict. It fails primarily because the violence was motivated by reyisionist 
goals rather than security fears" (Angstrom and Duyvesteyn, 2001, p.207). 
They conclude that, "the explanatory power of realism in internal conflicts is 
limited to explaining the escalation and continuation of violence rather than its 
outbreak" (Angstrom and Duyvesteyn, 2001, p.218). 
F or his part, Gagnon argues that, "The dominant realist approach in 
international relations tells us little about violent conflict along ethnic lines, 
and cannot explain the Yugoslav case" (Gagnon, 1994/5, p.132). 
(iz) The Rise of the Liberal Paradigm 
Realism has been challenged from below by the nature of today's wars. 
However, it has also been challenged from above by the Liberal paradigm and 
its increasing influence in the post-Cold War world.2 Indeed for some, the end 
of the Cold War marked the victory of liberal democracy. Thus, in his 1989 
article, "The End of History?" Francis Fukuyama argues that, 
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the 
passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history3 
as such: that is, the endpoint of man's ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government (Fukuyama, 1989, p.4). 
In his book, "The End of History and the Last Man", Fukuyama further 
develops this thesis, claiming that, 
2 According to Legro and Moravcsik, some so-called '"realists" are in fact liberals in sheep's 
clothing. In the authors' view, Realism '"is in trouble" because "so-called defensive and 
classical realists ... seek to address anomalies by recasting realism in forms that are theoretically 
less determinate, less coherent, and less distinctive to realism" (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999, 
f·6) . 
. That is to say, "history understood as a single, coherent, e\'olutionary proCeSS. when taking 
into account the experience of all peoples in all times" (Fukuyama, 1992, p.xii). 
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the only fonn of government that has survived intact to the end of the 
t,,:enti.eth ~ e n t u r y y has been liberal democracy. What is emerging 
vlctonous, III other words, is not so much liberal practice as the liberal 
idea.4 That is to say, for a very large part of the world, there is now no 
ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge 
liberal democracy ... (Fukuyama, 1992, p.4S). 
While we may not have reached the "end of history", Liberalism has become 
increasingly important. Indeed, it might be argued that within British IR - if 
not in US IR - there has been a paradigm shift in favour of Liberalism. For 
example, according to one of America's most influential realists, John 
Mearsheimer, "Today, almost every British international relations theorist is an 
idealist. 5 I cannot identify a single realist theorist in Albion" (Mearsheimer. 
2004). He adds, 
I believe it is a thoroughly admirable irony that E.H Carr, a realist, was 
hired to fill a chair named after Woodrow Wilson, a liberal whose ideas 
Carr deeply disliked, and that Ken Booth6, a dedicated idealist, was hired 
to fill a chair named after Carr (Mearsheimer, 2004). 
The growing influence of the Liberal paradigm, not only in British IR but also 
in the United States, is very important for how we explain war. Realism, for 
example, is not concerned with the internal organization of states. According 
to the prominent neorealist Kenneth Waltz, 
It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside 
states. If the aims, policies and actions of states become matters of 
exclusive attention or even of central concern, then we are forced back to 
the descriptive level; and from simple descriptions, no valid 
generalizations can logically be drawn (Waltz, 1979, p.6S). 
-t According to Fukuyama, " ... the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of 
ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world" (Fukuyama, 
1989, p.4). 
5 Following E.H Carr, Mearsheimer uses the term "idealist", rather than ·'liberal". 
6 Professo; Ken Booth is E.H Carr Professor and head of the International Politics department 
at the Unin.'rsity of Wales, Aberyst\\yth. 
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In a similar vein, Mearsheimer maintains that, ", .. the keys to war and peace lie 
more in the structure of the international system than in the nature of the 
individual states" (Mearsheimer, 200 I, p.l 0). 
In contrast, Liberalism focuses on the unit level, rather than on the systemic 
level. Thus, for liberals the internal organization of states is extremely 
important. In short, '"Liberalism gives rise to an ideology that distinguishes 
states primarily according to regime type: in assessing a state, liberalism first 
asks whether it is a liberal democracy or not" (Owen, 2001, p.145). This is a 
key question because liberal democracies, according to Liberalism, do not go 
to war with each other. 7 Fukuyama, for example, argues that, 
... there is substantial empirical evidence from the last couple of hundred 
years that liberal democracies do not behave imperialistically toward one 
another, even if they are perfectly capable of going to war with states that 
are not democracies and do not share their fundamental values 
(Fukuyama, 1992, p.XX). 8 
States that are not liberal democracies, therefore, pose a threat to liberal peace. 
Accordingly, as the Liberal paradigm has become increasingly influential in 
IR, explanations of war have shifted away from an emphasis on the anarchic 
structure of the international system towards an emphasis on illiberal states. 
To cite Litwak, 
Since the end of the Cold War, one of the main objectives of American 
foreign policy has been the containment of 'rogue' or 'outlaw' states. 
Senior U.S policy-makers have asserted that these countries - North 
Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya - constitute a distinct category of states 
(Litwak. 2000, p.xiii). 
7 This notion can be traced to Immanuel Kant's work "Perpetual Peace" (1795), in which he 
argued that perpetual peace could be established through the creation of a "pacific federation" 
of liberal republics, "an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war" 
(cited in Doyle, 1997, p.257). 
8 Mansfield and Snyder, hO\\'e\'er, emphasize that, " ... countries do not become mature 
democracies owrnight. !\tore typically, they go through a rocky transitional period ... In this 
transitional phase of democratisation, countries become more aggressive and \var-prone, not 
less. and they do fight wars \\'ith democratic states" (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995. p.5). 
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A more recent development in IR is the idea that individual leaders cause war. 
Brown, for example, contends that, '"Most major internal conflicts are triggered 
by internal, elite-level actors - to put it bluntly, bad leaders ... Bad leaders are 
usually the catalysts that tum potentially volatile situations into open warfare" 
(Brown, 1996, p.571). We saw in the previous chapter that Milosevic is widely 
deemed to bear greatest responsibility for the wars in ex-Yugoslavia. In a 
similar vein, it has been argued that, '"The conventional Western response to 
the human crisis in Iraq is that it is solely the fault of their once convenient and 
former ally of the Iran-Iraq war era, President Saddam Hussein" (Halliday, 
2004, p.268).9 Thus, Saddam, like Milosevic, has been vilified and 
criminalized. 
With regards to the Gulf War, for example, Keeble argues that, 
Central to the manufacture of the war was the propaganda focus on the 
demonised personality of Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq. He was 
personally represented as a global threat, a monster, an evil madman 
daring to challenge the New World Order, the new Hitler (Keeble, 2000, 
p.65). 
The cases of Milosevic and Saddam are not unique, however. As Duffield 
argues, 
The condemnation of all violent conflict by liberal peace means that the 
leaders of violent conflicts are automatically problematised. By their 
own actions, they risk placing themselves beyond the limits of 
cooperation and partnership. This is regardless of whether they are guilty 
of war crimes, as many are, or defending themselves from dispossession 
or exploitation, which some may be (Duffield, 2001, p.129). 
The fact that war leaders are increasingly deemed as outlaws and criminals can 
be linked to another important development, namely the normative tum that 
has accompanied the growing influence of Liberalism in contemporary IR. 
9 According to Halliday. "This i:-; simpli:-;tic, dishone:-;t, and irresponsible" (Halliday. 2004, 
p.26S). 
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Section 2 - The Normative Turn in IR 
Throughout the Cold War era, moral questions were heavily marginalized. As 
Chandler argues, ""During the Cold War and most of the history of international 
relations, the research agenda was dominated by rationalist approaches which 
subordinated morality to the interests of power" (Chandler, 2005, p.149). IO In 
a similar vein, Smith and Light argue that, in the past, 
Policy-makers, steeped in realism, tended to scoff at normative 
theory ... and at those who suggested that it should inform government 
policy. National interests, they insisted, should be the basis of foreign 
policy; discussing ethics was inappropriate (Smith and Light, 2001, p.2). 
When the Cold War ended, however, "the research focus shifted away from 
fixed identities and narrow material interests to one which emphasised the 
power of norms and ideas" (Chandler, 2005, p.152). 
Normative issues now play an increasingly prominent role in IR. In the words 
of Gelb and Rosenthal, "Values now count in virtually every foreign policy 
discussion ... The cases where ethics must be factored in these days are startling 
in number and complexity" (Gelb and Rosenthal, 2003, p.3). In their view, 
humanitarian intervention, as in Kosovo in 1999, "is perhaps the most dramatic 
example of the new power of morality in international affairs" (Gelb and 
Rosenthal, 2003, p.3). Thus, "For the government, as Blair made clear from 
the start, the war over Kosovo was a moral crusade" (Hume, 2000, p.70). 
10 The Realists' subordination of morality to power is exemplified by Machiavelli's work "The 
Prince", in which he argues that, "A prince should care nothing for the accusation of cruelty so 
long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal; by making a very few examples he can be more 
truly merciful than those who through too much tender-heartedness allow disorders to arise 
\\"hence come killings and rapine" (Machiavelli. 1993, p.9]). It should be noted that not all 
Realists share such views. E.H Carr, for example, maintains that, "any sound political thought 
must be based on elements of both utopia and reality" (Carr, 1939, p.118). In his view, 
however. "The fatal dualism of politics will always keep considerations l1f morality entangled 
with considerations of power" (Carr, 1939, p.30]). 
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Many of the NGOs involved in humanitarian work, such as Ox/am and 
Medecins sans Frontieres, have themselves embraced this nonnative trend. To 
cite Chandler, "'The desire to politicise involvement in aid provision without 
sacrificing their neutral and "non-political' status led NGOs to seek to justify 
their strategic choices through the language of morals and ethics rather than 
politics" (Chandler, 2002a, p.28). 
Another example of the normative turn in IR is the notion of an '"ethical foreign 
policy". This idea is often linked to a speech delivered on 17 July 1997 by the 
late Robin Cook, in which he declared that, "'Our foreign policy must have an 
ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the 
democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves. We will put human rights 
at the heart of our foreign policy" (cited in Brown, 2001, p.16). Thus, 
according to Hammond, today Western governments, having lost the stable 
framework of the Cold War, "couch their foreign policy in the language of 
human rights and morality" (Hammond, 2002, p.191). 
The normative turn in IR has also had an important impact in the media world, 
giving rise to what has been termed "journalism of attachment". Hammond, 
for example, who particularly associates this "'journalism of attachment" with 
the former BBC war correspondent Martin Bell and CNN's Christiane 
Amanpour, argues that, 
A striking feature of media coverage of post-Cold War conflicts has been 
the emergence of a "journalism of attachment' or 'advocacy journalism', 
which explicitly rejects neutral and dispassionate reporting in favour of 
moral engagement and seeks to influence Western public opinion and 
policy (Hammond, 2002, p.176). 
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Not only does this "journalism of attachment" lack impartiality. It also tends to 
over-simplify today's wars, by means of its strong moral reductionism. Thus. 
according to Hume, '"In Bosnia, a generation of crusading journalists set the 
pattern for seeing the complex conflicts in the Balkans as a simple morality 
play, to be understood and reported in terms of God against Evil" (Hume, 
2000, p.76). Similarly, '"Like Bosnia, Rwanda became a morality play, 
presented in simple, black-and-white terms" (Hammond, 2002, p.186). 
The rise of this '"journalism of attachment" can help to explain why Western 
media vilified the Serbs during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. To cite 
O'Ballance, the Serbs were "demonised and drenched in odium" by the end of 
1991 (O'Ballance, 1995, viii). More importantly, it helps to explain why the 
blame for the wars was overwhelmingly placed squarely on the shoulders of 
Slobodan Milosevic. In the words of Little, '"Suddenly it was OK to describe 
Mr Milosevic as the driving force of the war. Suddenly it did not sound 
"unbalanced' or "partisan' to lay the blame squarely on the shoulders of one 
regime" (cited in Hammond, 2002, p.182). 
If there has been a shift towards a more normative agenda in IR, there has also 
been a shift in attitudes towards war. Today, war is increasingly viewed as 
illegitimate, irrational, and even criminal. 
Section 3 - Changing Attitudes Towards War 
Historically, war has been seen as something normal. As Howard argues. 
"War has been throughout history a normal way of conducting disputes 
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between political groups" (Howard, 1983, p.7). This is no longer the case, 
however. In the words of Mueller, "'Over the last century or two, war in the 
developed world has come widely to be regarded as repulsive, immoral, and 
uncivilized" (Mueller, 1990, p.9). 
Attitudes towards war have changed in a second important respect. The 
traditional Clausewitzean view of war as a rational instrument of national 
policy has become far less acceptable. Instead, war today is widely viewed as 
something irrational. Finally, there exists a widespread belief that today's 
conflicts are far more violent and brutal than previous conflicts. 
(i) War is Illegitimate 
As Gelb and Rosenthal argue, "From the dawn of human history, there have 
been laws about the initiation and conduct of war" (Gelb and Rosenthal, 2003, 
p.2). For example, in 1863, the US War Department promulgated the Lieber 
Code, to govern the conduct of the United States Army during the Civil War. 
The following year, in Geneva, twelve European governments signed the first 
international agreement on war, the Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. In 1928, the Kellog-Briand 
Pact codified the principle that unilateral aggression is illegitimate, and 
renounced war as an instrument of policy except in self-defence; and four 
Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1949, explicitly designating certain acts 
as war cnmes. 
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Just as we have witnessed the increased regulation of warfare, we ha\'e also 
seen attitudes towards war change, particularly as a result of the two World 
Wars. According to Mueller, for example, 
The experience of the First World War clearly changed attitudes war in 
the developed world. In an area where war had been accepted as a 
fixture for thousands of years, the idea now gained currency that war was 
no longer an inevitable fact of life and that major efforts should be made 
to abandon it (Mueller, 1991, p.1). 
Furthermore, "World War Two substantially destroyed the notion that war was 
admirable and desirable, and eventually war romanticism died out in the 
developed world" (Mueller, 1990, p.220). Indeed, at the end of the Second 
World War, the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg explicitly 
criminalized war. It declared that, 
War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the 
belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of 
aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme 
international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it 
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole (cited in Green, 
2000, p.11). 
Changing attitudes towards war can be linked to several factors. One factor is 
developments in warfare and technology, which have increased the lethality 
and sheer destructiveness of war. Even in 1925, Winston Churchill observed 
that war was now "the potential destroyer of the human race ... Mankind has 
never been in this position before" (cited in Mueller, 1991, p.17). 
Developments in warfare have undermined the notion that war is something 
normal. In the words of Von Strandmann, 
Over the last 140 years, major wars have changed so much in character 
that the notion of normality for all types of conflict seems 
inadequate ... The tremendous development in destructive power and the 
increasing awareness of it has rendered the term 'normal' meaningless 
for potentially major conflicts after 1945 (von Strandmann, 1991, pA 7). 
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Another factor is Liberalism and its growing influence in the post-Cold War 
world. For realists, war is a rational response by states to the security dilemma 
that the anarchical international system creates. In contrast "Liberalism was 
and is, in large part, an expression of revulsion against illegitimate violence: 
that of tyrants at home and of aggressors abroad" (Hoffman, 1995, p.160). 
Consequently, "' .. .liberalism has made an important contribution to challenging 
the position of war as a standard feature of international political life" 
(MacMillan, 1998, p.281). This is because, 
Part of liberalism, at least, has become internalised: war is increasingly 
perceived to be a human choice, a cultural practice that has social and 
political roots rather than being an integral part of political life, a factor 
of racial identity, or an immutable feature of an anarchic international 
system. There is, then, preliminary evidence that societal consciousness 
regarding the legitimacy of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello I I has 
evolved as liberal principles have become more firmly established 
(MacMillan, 1998, p.89). 
(ii) War is Irrational 
Traditionally, war has been viewed as a rational instrument of national policy, 
as a contest for power between states. In his famous treatise On War (1832), 
for example, Clausewitz argued that, "' ... War is not merely a political act, but 
also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying 
out of the same by other means" (Clausewitz, 1982, p.119). Today. in contrast, 
wars are often portrayed as irrational. In the words of Collins, "Analysts of 
these 'New Wars' stress the irrational and uncontrollable nature of modem 
conflicts, alleged to be driven by a dangerous internal dynamic" (Collins, 2002. 
p.158). 
II The initiation of war and conduct in \\'arfare. respectively, 
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According to Keane, for example, "Some of today's conflicts appear to lack 
any logic or structure except that of murder on an unlimited scale" (Keane, 
1996, p.137). For his part, Snow argues that today's internal wars 
are somehow different from the wars we have traditionally thought of as 
civil conflicts. They seem, for instance, less principled in political terms, 
less focused on the attainment of some political ideal. They seem more 
vicious and uncontrolled in their conduct. .. these wars often appear to be 
little more than rampages by groups within states against one another 
with little or no apparent ennobling purpose or outcome; they are, indeed, 
uncivil wars (Snow, 1996, p.l). 
It is suggested, however, that the labelling of these conflicts as irrational has 
less to do with their actual nature than with our own limited understanding of 
them. As Brown argues, "Unfortunately, the causes and consequences of 
internal conflict are not well understood" (Brown, 1996, p.ix). One reason for 
this is that the context within which these conflicts occur is unfamiliar and 
uncertain - the post-Cold War world. This world does not have the clear 
structure that characterized the Cold War world, and thus arguably appears 
more confused and complex. To cite Litwak, "It is a telling sign of our 
collective confusion about the 'post-Cold War era' that we are able to 
characterize the current period of international relations only in terms of what 
preceded it" (Litwak, 2000, p.19). 
A second reason is that wars today occur mainly within states, rather than 
between states, which arguably makes them more difficult for outsiders to 
understand. Consequently, there is a tendency to dismiss these wars, and those 
who take part in them, as irrational. This is a fundamental distortion and 
oversimplification, as certain authors are keen to emphasize. In his discussion 
of the wars in the fonner Yugoslavia, for example, Gagnon asks, "\\,hy is there 
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the focus on irrationality and emotion, rather than on the clearly strategic 
rationales behind the wars themselves?" (Gagnon, 2004, p.7).12 In his view. 
there was nothing irrational about these wars. Rather, 
The evidence shows quite clearly that the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s 
were the result of certain parts of the elite creating wars for their own 
purposes ... the violence was planned and carried out in very strategic 
ways by conservative elites in Belgrade and Zagreb, working closely 
with allies in the war zones (Gagnon, 2004, p.179). 
For her part, Seaton argues that, 
a discussion of the instrumental rationality of some groups who further 
and prosper from the savage civil conflicts is so at odds with how the 
wars have been described that it has frequently been ignored. 
Consequently the conflicts appear all the more strange and irrational - in 
other words, ethnic (Seaton, 1999, p.57). 
The leaders of these conflicts are similarly portrayed as irrational. We saw in 
the previous chapter that Milosevic has been described as "'mad" and 
"'irrational". Saddam Hussein has been depicted in a similar way. According 
to Mearsheimer and Walt, for example, 
... the Bush administration deems Saddam Hussein reckless, ruthless, and 
not fully rational. Such a man, when mixed with nuclear weapons, is too 
unpredictable to be prevented from threatening the United States, the 
hawks say (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003, p.l). 
The authors, however, reject such portrayals of Saddam. They maintain that, 
"' ... a careful look at Saddam' s two wars shows his behavior was far from 
reckless. Both times, he attacked because Iraq was vulnerable and because he 
believed his targets were weak and isolated" (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003. 
p.2). 
12 In 1992, for example, the US Acting Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, described the 
contlict in the former Yugoslavia in the following terms - "This war is not rational. There is 
no rationality at all about ethnic conflict. It is gut, it is hatred; if s not for any set of values or 
purposes: it just goes on. And that kind of warfare is most difficult to bring to a hale (cited in 
Valentino, 2004, p.238). 
Post similarly highlights how "Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq, has been 
characterized as 'the madman of the Middle East'''. Like Mearsheimer and 
Walt, Post sees this characterization of Saddam as highly problematic. In his 
VieW, 
This pejorative diagnosis is not only inaccurate but also dangerous. 
Consigning Saddam to the realm of madness can mislead decision-
makers into believing he is unpredictable when in fact he is not. An 
examination of the record of Saddam Hussein's leadership of Iraq for the 
past 34 years reveals a judicious political calculator who is by no means 
irrational but is dangerous to the extreme (Post, 2003, p.335). 
What is interesting is that although the "criminal" leader often acts rationally, 
his rationality is usually denied. On the one hand, he is portrayed as irrational. 
On the other hand, actions that are in fact rational are presented as evidence of 
the criminal leader's badness. David, for example, argues that, 
In one sense, the Milosevics of the world are 'bad' in that they 
exacerbate hatreds to further their own ends. But can we really expect 
leaders to act in ways that would undermine their tenure in office? ... The 
bad leaders model simply begs the question of when you get bad leaders 
and what does 'bad' really mean when it may just indicate leaders who 
are rational and self-interested (David, 1997, p.566). 
(iii) War is More Violent Than in the Past 
The belief that today's wars are more violent and brutal than previous wars can 
help to explain why these wars are widely seen as illegitimate and irrational. 
Some authors attach the prefix "new" to today's wars, in order to emphasize 
that they are qualitatively different from earlier wars. To cite Henderson and 
Singer, 
In the past decade ... there has been a growing tendency to suggest 'new 
types' of wars and to urge that these 'new' wars are quite unlike and 
appreciably different from all wars we have known and studied, and thus 
must be examined and described as a separate genus (Henderson and 
Singer, 2002. p.165). 
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Keane, for example, argues that, " ... at least some of today's battles are best 
described as a new type of uncivil war. .. " (Keane, 1996, p.137); and Kaldor 
uses the term '"New Wars". According to her, '"The new wars can be 
contrasted with earlier wars in terms of their goals, the methods of warfare, and 
how they are financed" (Kaldor, 1999, p.6).13 For his part, Kaplan refers to 
'"the transformation of war" (Kaplan, 1994). In his view, 
The plethora of short-lived ceasefires in the Balkans and the Caucasus 
constitute proof that we are no longer in a world where the old rules of 
state warfare apply. More evidence is provided by the destruction of 
medieval monuments in the Croatian port of Dubrovnik: when cultures, 
rather than states, fight, then cultural and religious monuments are 
weapons of war, making them fair game (Kaplan, 1994). 
Not only are cultural and religious monuments '"fair game", however. Today's 
wars are seen as being particularly brutal on the grounds that they specifically 
target civilians. Snow, for example, argues that many of these wars '"are hardly 
wars at all, because the 'combat' consists primarily of one or more sides 
terrorizing and savaging innocent civilians rather than engaging each other 
militarily" (Snow, 1996, p.155).14 Similarly, the Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict maintains that, 
These internal conflicts commonly are fought with conventional weapons 
and rely on strategies of ethnic expulsion and annihilation. More 
civilians are killed than soldiers (by one estimate at the rate of about nine 
to one), and belligerents use strategies and tactics that deliberately target 
women, children, the poor, and the weak (The Carnegie Commission, 
1997, p.xvii). 
The fact that today' s wars challenge classical Realist notions about war can 
perhaps help to explain why it is that they are widely seen as more \'iolent and 
13 These "new" wars are also of longer duration than previous wars. According to Collier. 
"The expected duration of a civil war is currently about eight years - double what it \\as before 
the 1980s. Wars therefore do more damage now and thus more powerfully provoke further 
contlict" (Collier. 2003. p.42). 
14 Daalder argues that the wars in Croatia and Bosnia "exacted a high cidlian tl)1I because the 
Serb tactic of choice \\'3S to exploit their advantage in heavy weapons by shelling urban areas 
relentlessly" (Daalder, 1996. p . .'i-+). 
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brutal than previous conflicts.ls Not only do wars today occur mainly within 
states rather than between states. They also frequently occur in situations 
where the state in question no longer has the monopoly of organized violence. 
As Kaldor argues, "The new wars arise in the context of the erosion of the 
autonomy of the state and in some extreme cases the disintegration of the state" 
(Kaldor, 1999, pA). 
An important consequence of this is that, "In the 1990s, most of the fighting is 
done by irregulars - the casualties of collapsing societies - or by paramilitary 
gangs that combine banditry with soldiery" (lgnatieff, 1999, p.128). This, in 
tum, is significant because, "As war passes out of the hands of the state into 
those of warlords, the rituals of restraint associated with the profession of arms 
also disintegrate" (lgnatieff, 1999, p.128). Thus, according to Ignatieff, the 
"codes of a warrior's honor" have now broken down. Without these codes, 
"war is not war - it is no more than slaughter" (lgnatieff, 1999, p.117). 
If true, this would help to explain why the violence that occurs in today' s wars 
is often seen as uncontrolled and unstructured. Keane, for example, claims 
that in at least some of today' s "uncivil" wars, the basic ground-rules are swept 
aside. Thus, ..... on the ground and in the air the law of battle is 
straightforward: kill, rape, pillage, bum, destroy everything that moves, 
breathes or twitches" (Keane, 1996, p.139). For his part, Shawcross argues 
that, "' ... at the end of the eighties, Liberia exploded in an orgy of uncontrolled 
15 Stedman, howewr, maintains that, --Civil wars today are no more bloody than those past. 
The U.S ci\'il war cost upwards of 600,000 li\'es: the Spanish civil \\"ar of the 1930s and the 
Nigerian ci\'il war of the late 1960s killed on similar scales" (Stedman, 1993. pA). 
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and undirected factional violence where drugged young men in carnival masks 
killed each other" (Shawcross, 2000, p.195). 
The erosion of the State's monopoly of organized violence has had another 
important consequence - the lines between war and crime have become 
increasingly blurred. To cite Van Creveld, '"Once the legal monopoly of force, 
once claimed by the state, is wrested out of its hands, existing distinctions 
between war and crime will break down ... " (cited in Kaplan, 1994). This has 
given rise to the notion of '"criminal" wars. To cite Kalyvas, "Most versions of 
the distinction between old and new civil wars stress or imply that new civil 
wars are characteristically criminal, depoliticised, private and predatory ... " 
(Kalyvas, 2001). 
Thus, Snow describes the war in Sierra Leone as a '"criminal insurgency" 
(Snow, 1996, p.78); and Shawcross contends that by 1998, '"Almost a third of 
sub-Saharan Africa's countries were consumed by wars - civil, international, 
guerrilla or merely nihilistically criminal" (Shawcross, 2000, p.322). 
If war is seen as abhorrent, repulsive and irrational, it is logical that leaders 
who are deemed to be the cause of war will be looked upon in the same way. 
Furthermore, if today's wars are regarded as criminal, it follows that their 
leaders will be similarly viewed. In the words of Duffield, "Following the 
experience of Bosnia and Rwanda, a new trend has emerged involving a 
recognition that leadership may not be as anarchic as often depicted: instead, it 
is theorized as criminal" (Duffield, 200 L p.130). 
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The gradual erosion of the principle of sovereign immunity. however, means 
that the criminalization of leaders need not be confined to the realm of theory. 
It can now also occur in practice, in the fonn of prosecution in a court oflaw. 
Section 4 - The Erosion of the Principle of Sovereign Immunity 
The Treaty of Versailles (1919) contained a provision requiring that Kaiser 
Wilhelm II of Gennany be prosecuted. This, however, did not happen because 
""Most European governments were not willing to have a precedent established 
that their heads of states, especially monarchs, would be held criminally 
accountable' (Bassiouni, 2004, p.ix). As Lord Slynn of Hadley pointed out in 
the Pinochet case, the notion of State or Head of State immunity is ""a well 
established principle of international law" (Lord Slynn, 1998). 
This concept of sovereIgn immunity, however, is slowly being eroded. 16 
According to Jones and Powles, for example, it was at the end of the 1990s 
that, " ... impunity was first seriously called into question - by the Pinochet 
case, the Rome Treaty for the ICC i7, the Lockerbie proceedings, and the use of 
force to stop atrocities in Kosovo and East Timor" (Jones and Powles, 2003, 
p.xx). For his part, Shawcross argues that, ""Impunity is still the cloak of 
warlords and killers everywhere ... But that is beginning to change. Tentatively, 
a new global legal architecture is being created" (Shawcross, 2000, p.212). 
16 Some argue, however, that what we are witnessing is less an erosion of sowreign immunity 
than an erosion of sovereign equality. According to Chandler, for example, ..... it may be that 
we are seeing a redistribution of so\'ereign power: or rather. the acceptance of so\ereign 
inequality" (Chandler, 2002a. p, 121). More about this will be said in chapter 8. 
17 The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established by treaty on 17 July 1998. and the 
Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002. 
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The doctrine of individual criminal responsibility was incorporated into Article 
7 of the Nuremberg Charter and Article 6 of the Tokyo Tribunal Charter. In 
the Nuremberg judgement, it was said that those who commit acts which are 
condemned as criminal by international law 
cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be 
freed from punishment in appropriate proceedings ... the very essence of 
the Charter is that individuals have international duties which transcend 
the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State. 
He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in 
pursuance of the authority of the State if the State is authorizing action 
moves outside its competence under international law (Jones and Powles, 
2003, pA23). 
In recent years, the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility has been 
reaffirmed. Thus, for example, Article 7(2) of the Charter of the ICTY and 
Article 6(2) of the Charter of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) provide that, "The official position of any accused person, whether as 
Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not 
relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment" (Jones 
and Powles, 2003, pA22). According to Lord Slynn of Hadley, therefore, 
There is thus no doubt that States have been moving towards the 
recognition of some crimes as those which should not be covered by 
claims of State or Head of State or other official or diplomatic immunity 
when charges are brought before international tribunals (Lord Slynn, 
1998). 
The notion of sovereign immunity is being eroded not only in theory, but also 
in practice. In September 1998, for example, the ICTR sentenced Jean 
Kambanda former Prime Minister of Rwanda, to life imprisonment for crimes , 
against humanity. In March 1999, the House of Lords, overruling the High 
Court's decision that Augusto Pinochet was protected from prosecution hy 
traditional sovereign immunity, ruled that Pinochet had no sovereign immunity 
and could, therefore. face prosecution. 
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Giving his decision in the case, Lord Millett stated that , 
In future, those who commit atrocities against civilian populations must 
expect to be called to account if fundamental human rights are to be 
properly protected. In this context, the exalted rank of the accused can 
afford no defence (Lord Millett, 1999). 
According to Economides, "This was a significant shift in the direction of 
endorsing the concept of holding individuals of all rank and status responsible 
for their criminal actions and violations of agreed conventions and treaties in 
international law" (Economides, 2001, p.116). Two years later, on 28 June 
2001, Slobodan Milosevic was extradited to the ICTY. In short, the nonnative 
construct of the "criminalleader" is now assuming a more legalistic aspect. 
It must be emphasized, however, that just as "'leadership' is an essentially 
contested concept" (Elgie, 1995, p.2), so too is the concept of the criminal 
leader. While there is a strong consensus that Milosevic is a criminal leader, 
there is far less consensus about what makes a criminal leader in general tenns. 
It is, therefore, important to try and develop the concept, using MiloseviC's 
construction as a criminal leader as a starting point. To cite Gerring, ..... the 
more contexts in which a given concept makes sense, the better that concept 
will be (ceteris paribus)" (Gerring, 2001, p.54). 
Section 5 - Developing the Concept of the Criminal Leader 
It is argued that the four particular developments in IR that this chapter has 
explored provide us with the two key dimensions of a criminal leader. In 
section 1, it was claimed that there has been a shift in IR towards agency-based 
explanations of war. We saw in chapter L for example, that Western literature 
holds Milosevic most responsible for the wars in the fonner Yugoslavia. Thus. 
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we can conclude that a defining element of the criminal leader is his behaviour: 
the criminal leader causes war. This behavioural dimension, comprising 
actions and intentions, is crucial. 
Sections 2 and 3 addressed two further developments in IR - the normative 
tum within the discipline, and changing attitudes towards war. These 
developments are important in terms of the standards we use to judge leaders 
and their conduct. In chapter 1, for example, it was argued that Milosevic' s 
construction as a criminal leader is heavily influenced by liberal norms and 
values. The conclusion we can draw is that the criminal leader is an externally 
constructed concept, driven by Western liberal norms. This policy dimension 
of the criminal leader concept is so important that it can be seen as its 
constitutive element. 
Finally, section 4 looked at how the principle of sovereign immunity is being 
slowly eroded. This important development further demonstrates that the 
criminal leader is an externally constructed concept, not just in normative terms 
but also in legal terms. It is primarily Western powers that decide whether and 
when a criminal leader should be put on trial, how he should be tried, and what 
crimes he should be tried for. 18 
18 In 1991, for example, the Gennan foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. submitted to 
the twelve EC states the idea of an international court to judge Saddam Huss('in. "But \·ery 
quickly the political will of Europe and the United States to mow fo.rwar? slackened ... The 
West abandoned the idea, granting de facto immunity to a man responsIble tor \\ar CrImes and 
gcnocidc" (Hazan, 2004. p.l0). 
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We have thus identified the two key dimensions of a criminal leader - a 
behavioural dimension and a policy dimension. There are, however, two other 
important dimensions to discuss - a character dimension and an institutional 
dimension. 
Dimensions of a criminal leader 
(i) Behavioural dimension 
(ii) Character dimension 
(iii) Institutional dimension 
(iv) Policy dimension 
This refers to actions and intentions 
This refers to motivations, and to 
personality and psychology 
This is about regime type 
This is about who decides whether and 
when a leader is "criminal" 
MiloseviC's actions and intentions playa crucial role in his construction as a 
criminal leader. His motivations, personality and psychology are also 
important elements in his criminalization. For the purpose of developing a 
general concept of the criminal leader, these different elements can be 
subsumed under the headings of behaviour and character. 
Chapter 1 did not specifically refer to the institutional and policy dimensions. 
However, it identified both a comparative element in Milosevic' s construction 
as a criminal leader (his comparison with other "criminal" leaders) and a 
theoretical element (the construction's Liberal underpinnings). Both of these 
elements can be incorporated within the broader institutional and policy 
dimensions of the criminal leader concept. 
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We can now explore each of the four dimensions in turn. Throughout, 
reference will be made to certain leaders who, according to the concept we are 
developing, can be considered as criminal leaders, most notably Saddam 
Hussein. It is important to emphasize that the concept of the criminal leader 
has not been defined elsewhere. The concept of the criminal leader developed 
below, therefore, is necessarily an ideal type. It constitutes, however. an 
important basis for further research. 
(i) The Behavioural Dimension - Actions and Intentions 
The behavioural dimension is crucial - actions and intentions define a criminal 
leader. First and foremost, the criminal leader causes war. Moreover, the wars 
that he initiates are illegitimate. They are wars of aggression and territorial 
expansion that threaten regional stability. Adolf Hitler and Saddam Hussein 
can thus be considered as archetypal criminal leaders. In a speech to the 
United Nations, on 12 September 2002, for example, President Bush 
emphasized that, 
Twelve years ago, Iraq invaded Kuwait without provocation. And the 
regime's forces were poised to continue their march to seize other 
countries and their resources. Had Saddam Hussein been appeased 
instead of stopped, he would have endangered the peace and stability of 
the world (Bush, 2002c). 
Similarly, in a speech delivered on 26 February 2003, Bush claimed the Iraqi 
people were living under ""a dictator who has brought them nothing but war. 
and misery, and torture" (Bush, 2003a). These words recall a speech given by 
Bill Clinton in March 1999, at the start of the Kosovo war, when he described 
Milosevic as ..... a dictator who has done nothing since the Cold War ended but 
l)l) 
start new wars and poor gasoline on the flames of ethnic and religious 
division" (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.730). 
Linked to the criminal leader's responsibility for war, he is also responsible for 
war crimes - that is, crimes that are intimately attached to a state of armed 
conflict - and other human rights violations. Examples include Charles Taylor, 
the former President of Liberia, and the leaders of Rwanda during the genocide 
of 1994-95. A leader who violates human rights is not necessarily a criminal 
leader. Various African leaders, past and present - such as Uganda's former 
president Idi Amin (1971-1979), Haiti's former president Jean-Claude "Baby 
Doc" Duvalier (1971-1986), and Zimbabwe's President Mugabe - are 
commonly regarded more as corrupt dictators than as criminal leaders. In the 
case of Mugabe, however, it can be argued that this is beginning to change and 
that he is being increasingly criminalized. 19 
A leader who violates human rights is more likely to be deemed criminal when 
these violations constitute war crimes - in other words, when they occur in the 
context of a war that the criminal leader has provoked. In some cases, 
however, the scale and gravity of human rights abuses for which a leader may 
be deemed responsible are such that his criminalization does not depend on 
these abuses occurring in a war situation. The example of Saddam Hussein 
illustrates this point. In a speech delivered in Sedgefield. on 5 March 2004, for 
19 Some would argue, however, that Mugabe's construction as a criminal leader is based less 
on his human rights violations than on his refusal to co-operate \\"ith the West. Elich, f\lr 
example, claims that, "The process of land reform is at root a struggle for justice and a 
challenge to the Western neoliberal model. The refusal to serve \\' estcrn interests is what 
motivates US and British hostility" (Elich, 2005). This underscores the policy dimension llf 
the criminal leader. 
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example, Prime Minister Blair referred to Saddam' s '"appalling brutalisation of 
the Iraqi people ... " (Blair, 2004). 
The case of Augusto Pinochet further demonstrates that a nexus between 
human rights violations and war is not essential to establishing a criminal 
leader. Giving his judgement in the Pinochet case, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
emphasized that, 
There is no real dispute that during the period of the Senator Pinochet 
regime appalling acts of barbarism were committed in Chile and 
elsewhere in the world: torture, murder, and the unexplained 
disappearance of individuals, all on a large scale. Although it is not 
alleged that Senator Pinochet himself committed any of those acts, it is 
alleged that they were done in pursuance of a conspiracy to which he was 
a party, at his instigation and with his knowledge (Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, 1999). 
It should be emphasized, however, that Western powers are - and have always 
been - likely to tum a blind eye to a leader's human rights violations if policy 
considerations require this. Herman, for example, remarks that, 
Pol Pot was a Communist enemy .. .Indonesia under Suharto and since his 
ouster has been a US client state and Western ally. It is a notable fact 
that both the media and human rights groups have found the Indonesian 
abuses in East Timor less noteworthy, less deserving of indignation and 
less the basis of urgent calls for humanitarian intervention than the 
abuses of Pol Pot (Herman, 2002, p.xii). 
In chapter 1, we saw that the literature accuses Milosevic of inciting ethnic 
hatred. Although this does not directly define a criminal leader in the way that 
causing war and committing/supporting war crimes do, it is indirectly 
important. This is because the incitement of hatred will often facilitate and 
accelerate both the descent into war and the commission of war crimes therein. 
Hitler's fostering of anti-Semitism is one obvious example. Another is the 
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hatred that Rwanda's Hutu leaders stimulated vis-a-vis the country's Tutsi 
minority. 
In some instances, the criminal leader's personal, visceral hatred of other 
groups lies behind his efforts to cultivate and promote ethnic animosity, as in 
the case of Hitler's profound loathing of Jews?O In other instances, however. 
the criminal leader incites hatred to serve his personal ends. Thus, hatred 
serves an instrumental purpose. For example, in Rwanda, "the leaders who 
engineered the slaughter had shaky claims to power, which they attempted to 
bolster by fomenting conflict between groups" (Kressel, 1996, p.118). 
Let us now tum to the intentions that underlie and fuel the actions of a criminal 
leader. Whilst it is often difficult to decipher a person's precise intentions - in 
most cases, we can only speculate - intentions are nevertheless a key element in 
defining what constitutes a criminal leader. Firstly, the actions of a criminal 
leader are not simply unintended consequences of his policies. Rather, they 
flow from his malignant intentions. 
Secondly, deliberate defiance of the international community helps to define 
the criminal leader. Saddam Hussein exemplifies this. In a speech delivered 
on 5 March 2004, for example, Prime Minister Blair referred to "Saddam' s 
programme to develop long-range strategic missiles in breach of UN rules" 
(Blair, 2004). For his part, in a speech to the United Nations, on 12 September 
2002, President Bush emphasized that, "Iraq has answered a decade of UN 
20 Carr. for example, refers to Hitler's "paranoid hatred of Jewry" (Carr. 1987, p,69): and 
Kershaw \\Tltes of Hitler's "anti-.Te\\·ish paranoia'" (Kershaw, 1987. p.230), 
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demands with defiance" (Bush, 2002c). Later, in a press conference about 
Iraq, held on 6 March 2003, Bush declared, "These are not the actions of a 
regime that is disarming. These are the actions of a regime engaged in a wilful 
charade. These are the actions of a regime that systematically and deliberately 
is defying the world" (Bush, 2003b). 
In short, a leader who co-operates with the West is highly unlikely to be 
deemed crimina1.21 Thus, his determination to portray himself as a Western 
statesman helps to explain why the former president of Croatia, Franjo 
Tudjman, was not branded a criminal leader, at least not while he was alive. 
However, it can be argued that Tudjman, who died from cancer in December 
1999, has been posthumously criminalized, in particular for his involvement in 
Operation "Storm" C'Oluja,,).22 
For example, on 19 February 2004, The Hague Tribunal amended its original 
indictment against Ante Gotovina, the overall operational commander of the 
Croatian forces deployed as part of Operation "Storm".23 According to the 
amended indictment, "During and after Operation Storm, at all times relevant 
to this Amended Indictment, Ante Gotovina, with others including ... President 
21 Not only political co-operation, but also economic co-operation is important. To cite 
Duffield, "'a state's willingness to adopt neo-liberal economic policy and co-operate with 
lender demands" provides "a fresh, if superficial, way of distinguishing the good from the 
bad ... " (Duffield, 1998, p.88). 
22 Croatian forces launched Operation ··Storm" on -+ August 1995, with the aim of re-taking the 
Krajina region in Croatia. Three days later, the Croatian government announced that the 
Operation had been successfully completed. Some 200,000 Krajina Serbs had been forced to 
flee their homes in what amounted to the largest single act of ethnic cleansing in the \\ars in 
former Yugosla\·ia. 
~ 3 3 After four years on the run, Gotoyina was arrested in a restaurant in Tenerife's Playa de Las 
Americas resort, on 8 December 2005. Gotovina had been number three on the Hague 
Tribunal's most wanted list. after Mladic and Karadzic. His arrest thus marks a significant 
breakthrough for the Tribunal. 
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Franjo Tudjman, participated in a joint criminal enterprise ... " (The Prosecutor 
of the Tribunal against Ante Gotovina, 2004). This re\-ised indictment thus 
explicitly criminalizes Tudjman as a participant in such an enterprise. 24 In 
contrast, the original indictment makes no mention at all of any joint criminal 
enterprise. 
This poses a key question: at what point does a leader become criminal? In 
1995, for example, when Milosevic helped to negotiate the Dayton Accords 
that brought an end to the three-year war in Bosnia, he was not seen as a 
criminal leader. Rather, he was hailed as a '"man of peace". Thus, the Hague 
Tribunal's initial indictment against Milosevic was confined to allegations 
about crimes in Kosovo; it made no mention of crimes committed in Bosnia. 
To cite Bissett, 
It would not do to have the man Madeleine Albright hailed as "a man of 
peace' at the time of the Dayton Accords indicted for crimes in Bosnia 
after he had played such a pivotal role in bringing about an end to the 
bloodshed there (Bissett, 2001a). 
Subsequently, however, Milosevic was criminalized and indicted, inter alia, for 
crimes allegedly committed in Bosnia, notwithstanding that these crimes had 
already occurred at the time of the Dayton peace negotiations. What is 
important to emphasize, therefore, is that the concept of the criminal leader is 
externally constructed, a point to which we shall return. 
24 In the trial judgement of Prosecutor wrsus Krnojelac. on 15 r-.lardl 2002, a joint criminal 
enterprise was described as "an understanding or arrangement amounting to an agreement 
between t\\'o or more persons that \\"ill commit a crime" (r-.kttraux. 2005. p.287). 
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(ii) The Character Dimension - Motivations and Psychology 
It will be recalled from the previous chapter that according to the literature. 
what primarily motivated Milosevic was a lust for power. Similarly, we can 
argue that one of the features of a criminal leader is an extreme hunger for 
power that knows no bounds. Prepared to go to any lengths to win and 
maintain power, a criminal leader is often cruel and ruthless. He puts his own 
interests first, whatever the cost for his own people. For example, in a speech 
delivered in Texas, on 8 April 2002, Prime Minister Tony Blair argued that, 
The regime of Saddam is detestable. Brutal, repressive, political 
opponents routinely tortured and executed: it is a regime without a qualm 
in sacrificing the lives of its citizens to preserve itself, or starting wars 
with neighbouring states, and it has used chemical weapons against its 
own people (Blair, 2002a). 
As a consequence of his insatiable appetite for power and the extremes to 
which it propels him, a criminal leader appears as a hardened individual with 
little or no feeling for others. In short, he displays a total lack of humanity. 
Speaking to the House of Commons on 24 September 2002, for example, Tony 
Blair described Saddam Hussein as "a cruel and sadistic dictator" (Blair, 
2002b). For his part, David Crane, a prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and a former Pentagon lawyer, described Charles Taylor, the indicted 
war criminal and former president of Liberia, as "a regional monster" (cited in 
Bravin and Block, 2003, p.AlS). 
In addition to the motivations and personality of a criminal leader, the third 
element relating to character is his psychology. His mental state is somewhat 
ambiguous, and while this does not define him as criminal, it sets him apart as 
somehow abnormal. His abhorrent and ruthless behaviour so offends our own 
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sensibilities that we do not want to try and rationalize it. Instead, we prefer to 
see the behaviour as irrational. What is interesting, however, is that a criminal 
leader's impaired mental state does not in any way excuse his criminal 
behaviour. In short, madness does not mitigate badness; rather, it simply 
reinforces it. The example of Hitler particularly illustrates this. To cite 
Kressel, "'Most psychologists and psychiatrists agree that, in some sense, Hitler 
was nuts" (Kressel, 1996, p.132). 
(iii) The Institutional Dimension - Regime Type 
In developing the concept of the criminal leader, we have thus far focused on 
the leader himself - on his behaviour and his character. A third important 
dimension, however, is an institutional dimension, focused on regime type. 
The fundamental point here is that the regime of a criminal leader is non-
democratic, and for liberals non-democratic regimes pose a major threat to 
international peace and security.25 In short, "'The liberal view is that not 
democracies but authoritarian states launch mass killing" (Mann, 2001, p.70). 
Speaking on 26 February 2003, for example, President Bush declared that, 
"The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because 
stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage 
the peaceful pursuit of a better life" (Bush, 2003a). Hence, by definition, non-
democratic regimes and, by extension, their leaders represent a potential threat 
to liberal peace, and may thus be deemed criminal. 
25 Speaking on 8 April 2002. for example, Tony Blair argued that in the absence of d e m o c r a c ~ : :
..... regimes act unchecked by popular accountability and pose a threat; and the threat spreads 
(Blair.2002a). 
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It should be noted that the concept of "criminal regimes" is more developed 
than the concept of criminal leaders. The former are characterized by their 
links with terrorist organizations. Rotfeld, for example, argues that, 
... the main threat to international security today are dictatorial and 
criminal regimes (mainly outside the OSCE area) that support, finance 
and shelter international terrorist networks on a global as well as regional 
and local scale (Rotfeld, 2003). 
Although not in all cases, the regime of a criminal leader may be deemed 
"criminal" in this particular sense. For example, both President Bush and Tony 
Blair have consistently emphasized Saddam Hussein' s links with terrorist 
groupS.26 
What is interesting is that following the wars in Kosovo and Iraq, there have 
been calls for Bush (as well as his predecessor, Clinton) and Blair to be put on 
trial for war crimes. Velko Valkanov, for example, the founder and chairman 
of the International Committee to Defend Slobodan Milosevic (ICDSM), 
maintains that, "If any people should be tried for crimes against peace and 
humanity, these are first and foremost the leaders of the United States and other 
NATO member states" (Valkanov, 2005). This, therefore, raises a fundamental 
question: can the leader of a democratic regime be criminal? 
Whilst this is possible in theory, it is argued that the realities of international 
politics make this unlikely. That is to say that because liberal democracies 
generally stick together - according to the democratic peace thesis. they do not 
go to war against each other - it is very improbable that they would construct 
~ 6 6 In a press conference on 6 March 2003, for example, President Bush argued that. "Iraq 1 ~ ~ a 
country that has got terrorist ties. If s a country with wealth. If s a country that trams 
terrorists. a country that could am1 terrorists" (Bush. 2003b). 
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one of their own as criminal. This brings us to the key dimension of the 
criminal leader concept - the policy dimension. 
(iv) The Policy Dimension - The Concept is Externally Constructed 
It is argued that the criminal leader is an externally constructed concept. 
Ultimately, therefore, there are no hard and fast rules as to what constitutes a 
criminal leader. In view of this, perhaps the crucial question that we need to 
ask ourselves is not what makes a criminal leader, but rather who decides when 
a leader is criminal. 
Let us take the example of Charles Taylor who, in 2003, was indicted on 
seventeen counts of crimes against humanity. On the basis of the three 
dimensions of a criminal leader explored in this section - namely, behaviour, 
character and regime-type - Taylor can be considered as a criminal leader. 
However, it can be argued that he has not been criminalized in the way that 
Milosevic and Saddam Hussein have been, for example, and although he is an 
indicted war criminal, the United States has appeared in no hurry to put him on 
trial. According to a columnist for the Washington Post, 
Taylor poses a clear and present danger to West Africa and U.S interests. 
Yet the State Department continues to respond to congressional inquiries 
with bland assurances that everything is fine and Taylor is no longer a 
problem. It's not true (Farah, 2005). 
The journalist emphasizes that Taylor has not only escaped answering for his 
crimes so far, but "may be given an opportunity to repeat them if the United 
States does not ace (Farah, 2005). 
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The case of Saddam Hussein is also very useful for highlighting that the 
criminal leader is externally constructed. What is interesting about Saddam is 
that while he is widely considered a criminal leader, he has been criminalized 
for his actions during the nineties, but not for his behaviour during the eighties. 
For example, during the Iran-Iraq war, "Washington, fully aware that Saddam 
was using mustard and nerve gas against Iranian civilians, calculated that it 
was better to keep backing him as the lesser of two evils"(Prison Planet, 2004). 
What this shows is that the criminalization of leaderships is closely linked to 
policy considerations. During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam was useful to the 
United States and thus was not deemed criminal, despite committing heinous 
crimes. During the nineties, however, Iraq had become a ""rogue state" and 
Saddam had become a major threat to the American people, to the "civilized" 
world, and to freedom itself - in short, a criminal leader. After the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1991, for example, Margaret Thatcher and President 
George Bush 
publicly evoked the necessity of trying Saddam Hussein. This public 
effort was an attempt, among other things, to criminalize the master of 
Baghdad and thereby legitimize in the name of universal morality ... the 
validity of the Gulf War campaign against this tyrant (Hazan, 2004, p.9). 
In the case of Saddam Hussein, there is an overlap between the concept of a 
criminal leader and the concept, also externally constructed, of a "rogue state". 
According to President Bush, rogue states 
(i) brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for 
the personal gain of the rulers; (ii) display no regard for international law. 
threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties tn 
which they are party; (iii) are determined to acquire weapons of mass 
destIuction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as 
threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of these regimes: 
(iv) sponsor terrorism around the globe; and (v) reject basic human 
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values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands 
(Bush, 2002b). 
However, as with the concept of the criminal leader, what ultimately counts is 
the policy dimension. Thus, a state that meets the above criteria is not a rogue 
state until it is constructed as such. In other words, the criteria are not rigid. 
For example, ""a country such as Syria that generally met them was 
nevertheless not described as a "rogue state' because of its strategic 
importance" (Chancellor, 2002b). 
Just as certain states are grouped together as "rogue states" or, more r e c e n t l y ~ ~
as constituting an "axis of evil,,27, so too certain leaders are grouped together as 
criminal, through the use of comparison.28 We saw in chapter 1 that 
comparison is an important element in MiloseviC's criminalization. However, 
for the purposes of developing a more general concept of the criminal leader. 
what is important to note is that the origin of such comparisons is external, 
rather than intemal.29 This comparative element can, therefore, be considered 
as part of the policy dimension of the criminal leader. 
To conclude, it is argued that policy considerations are inextricably bound up 
with the criminalization of leaders, that it is powerful Western states that 
decide whether and when a leader is to be deemed criminal and that, as a result, 
27 In his State of the Union Address, delivered on 29 January 2002, President Bush argued that 
states such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea "constitute an axis of e"il. anning to threaten the 
peace of the world" (Bush, 2002a). . 
28 On 8 April 2000, for example, the headline of The Globe and MaIl (Tnnmto) read. 
--Zimbabwe's Hitler Wages War of Land" (Gowans. 2002). . 
21l As we shall see in the data chapters, the inter\'ie\\"ees o\"erall do not support the use ,)j such 
Cl)mpansons. 
110 
the concept of the criminal leader is not of universal application. Instead. it 
only applies in certain cases. 
Conclusion 
The concept of the criminal leader developed in this chapter is only an ideal 
type. It is based upon a particular case-study - the criminalization of Slobodan 
Milosevic - but this case-study cannot tell us everything. Future case studies 
of other '"criminal" leaders, such as Saddam Hussein would therefore be , , 
extremely valuable and would help us to develop the concept further. Given 
that the criminal leader is externally constructed, however, perhaps the key 
point to be made here is that it is likely to remain an essentially contested and 
rather slippery concept without clear parameters. 
If defining the criminal leader is problematic, so too is the question of how one 
studies a criminal leader. We saw in chapter 1 that Western literature takes a 
very top-down, leader-centric approach in its construction of Milosevic as a 
criminal leader. Other leaders who fit the concept of the criminal leader 
developed in this chapter, such as Hitler and Stalin, have also traditionally been 
studied in a similar way. As we shall now see, however, this is beginning to 
change as importance is increasingly being given to the view from below. In 
keeping with this, the main argument that chapter 3 seeks to make is that the 
criminal leader should be studied both from the top down and from the bottom 
up. 
1 1 1 
Introduction 
Chapter 3 
Studying Criminal Leaders; 
The Case for a Bottom-Up Approach 
A key aim of this thesis is to explore whether and to what extent ordinary 
people in Serbia support the dominant Western image of Milosevic as a 
criminal leader. This particular chapter seeks to demonstrate the importance, 
in both theory and practice, of examining the view from below, through posing 
and answering the question of how one should study a criminal leader. 
The present chapter focuses on two particular leaders who, according to the 
dimensions of a criminal leader outlined in chapter 2, can be considered as 
archetypal criminal leaders - Hitler and Stalin. Traditionally, studies of the 
Hitler and Stalin regimes have concentrated on the two leaders themselves), 
while devoting little attention to the ordinary people who lived under these 
regimes. 2 However, this has begun to change as a new wave of scholars, 
including Stephen Kotkin, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Detlev Peukert, and Ian Kershaw, 
have sought to challenge orthodox historiography. Rejecting narrow, leader-
centric approaches as inadequate, these scholars emphasize the importance of 
exploring the view from below. 
Influenced by the work of these individuals, this chapter argues that a 
comprehensive study of the criminal leader requires us to focus not only on the 
I There are a vast number of studies focusing on the leadership and personalities of Hitler and 
Stalin, including William Carr's Hitler: A Study in Personality and Politics (1978), and Alan 
Bullock's Personalitv and Power: The Strange Case of Hitler and Stalin (1995), 
2 Accordil1!..! to P e t e r ~ o n , , "The natural tendency of historians has been to shine their tlashlights 
~ ) f f knowledge at the figure of the 'Ieader', perforce ignoring the vast gray world of the 
. followers'" (Peterson, 1969, p.3). 
I I ~ ~
leader himself, but also on the ordinary people who directly experienced his 
"criminal" leadership. Their voices should also be heard. As Shkilnyk 
maintains, '"There is no evidence more powerful than that drawn directly from 
what people say in their own words about their life experiences" (cited in 
Magid, 1991, p.64). Thus, four chapters of the thesis are devoted to exploring 
the opinions that ordinary people in Serbia have of Milosevic. 3 Few Western 
authors have sought to interview ordinary people. Those who have conducted 
interviews as part of their research have typically interviewed elites. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will begin by 
explaining why the view from below is important for studying criminal leaders. 
It will then demonstrate this, using examples of bottom-up research vis-a-vis 
the Hitler and Stalin regimes. Section 2 will examine some of the main 
criticisms of this type of research. Finally, in order to highlight the value of a 
bottom-up perspective more generally, section 3 will provide some examples 
of such research vis-a-vis the former Yugoslavia. 
Section 1 - Hitler, Stalin, and the View From Below 
It is argued that we cannot study a criminal leader simply by focusing on the 
leader himself. Rather, we must also consider the view from below. There are 
four main reasons for this. The first reason relates to the nature of leadership 
itself. In short, leadership is a relationship. To cite Mazlish, 
. ~ ~ The thesis' concern to gi\'e a voice to those - both Serbs and national minorities i l ~ ~ Sl'rbia -
whom we seldom hear is shared by scholars from the Subaltern Studies Group. ObJectmg to 
the fact that hitherto Indian history has been \\Titten from a colonialist and elitist point of \'lew,. 
these scholars - such as RanaJit Guha and Partha Chatterjee - seek to rewrite the hls\()ry 01 
colonial India from the distinct point of\'iew of the masses. 
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'" the leader does not exist, fully fonned, before the encounter with the 
group he is to lead. He discovers himself, fonns and takes on his identity 
as a particular kind of leader in the course of interacting with his chosen 
group. He also finds a public style, which may be quite separate from his 
private style. It is a creative encounter (Mazlish, 1986, p.276). 
Thus, we cannot adequately study a criminal leader if we ignore one half of the 
leadership relationship - ordinary people. This can give us only a very narrow 
and incomplete picture. The thesis, therefore, favours an interactionist 
approach to leadership.4 In the words of Elgie, 
For interactionists, the extent to which leaders are able to influence the 
decision-making process is considered to be contingent upon the 
interaction between the leader and the leadership environment in which 
the leader operates (Elgie, 1995, p.7). 
The ordinary people who either support or challenge the leader are clearly a 
fundamental part of this leadership environment that cannot be ignored. 
The second reason for looking at the view from below relates directly to the 
concept of the criminal leader. Chapter 2 emphasized that this is an externally 
constructed concept. It is, therefore, important to examine whether and to what 
extent external views of the leader are congruent with domestic views. What 
the interview data reveals is an important discrepancy between external 
(Western) and domestic (Serbian) views of Milosevic. As we shall in chapter 
7, the Serbian interviewees in the sample view Milosevic above all a "bad" 
leaders, not as a criminal leader. 
4 According to Tucker, there are two ways of approaching leadership. The first is to a p p r ~ a c h h
it as "an interactional process, a relation between leaders and followers". The second way IS to 
approach leadership as "a kind of activity that leaders seek to perfonn in their capacity as 
leaders"(TuckeLI981,p.24). . , . 
5 Central to this concept is the idea that Milosevic cared only about hlmseit and hiS power. and 
not about the Serbian people he ruled. 
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A third important reason for exploring the view from below is that, in order to 
make an informed assessment of a particular regime, it is not sufficient to 
concentrate solely on leadership. This is to address only one dimension of 
regime type and to ignore the three additional dimensions of regime type 
highlighted by Linz and Stepan - pluralism, ideology and mobilization (Linz 
and Stepan, 1996, p.4I). The Western literature reviewed in chapter 1 
essentially focuses only on the leadership dimension. By examining the view 
from below, the present research, in contrast, also addresses a second 
dimension of regime type - pluralism. The term "pluralism", as used in this 
context, should not be understood in its strict sense. The thesis is not looking 
at civil society in Serbia, but it is concerned with ordinary people and their 
opinions of Milosevic. 
The final reason for examining the VIew from below is that just as good 
research requires us to use more than one source, so it requires us to consider 
more than one perspective. Confining ourselves to a narrow top-down 
perspective is inadequate. The view from below is a particularly valuable 
perspective to explore, because it can provide important and fresh insight, 
thereby adding complexity and richness to conventional top-down approaches. 
In his work on Rwanda, for example, Pottier argues that bringing ordinary 
people back into the frame allows us "a new way of viewing the situation" 
(Pottier, 2002, p.3). For him, the complex voices of those with nuanced 
stories to telL such as refugees and survivors of genocide, constitute "an 
antidote to the easy readings that obliterate context and detaiL .. "' (Pottier, 
2002. p.202). The fact that the Western literature examined in chapter 1 
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heavily neglects the view from below makes the "'insider" view of ordinary 
people in Serbia even more important to explore. 
These four reasons explain why, in theory, the view from below is important 
for studying criminal leaders. In order to demonstrate the value of the view 
from below in practice, the remainder of this section will explore the bottom-
up tum in studies of two particular leaders - Hitler and Stalin - who can be 
seen as '"crucial cases" in the study of criminal leaders. 6 
The concern of the scholars whose research forms the focus of this section is to 
produce a more bottom-up account of the Hitler and Stalin regimes. Their 
argument is that we cannot study these regimes without considering the micro 
level of everyday life. Their work, therefore, explores and seeks to reconstruct 
the everyday life experiences of ordinary people who lived under these 
regimes, using a variety of sources. These include interviews and oral history, 
archives, diaries and letters, photographs and newspapers. 
It should be emphasized at the outset that the argument these scholars make is 
not about criminal leaders and how we should study them. However, since 
both Hitler and Stalin can be regarded as criminal leaders - according to the 
dimensions of a criminal leader set out in the previous chapter - bottom-up 
research vis-a-vis their regimes can be used for the purpose of illustrating and 
supporting the argument that we cannot study the criminal leader by focusing 
6 According to Gerring, "A basic version of a crucial case is that the case is chosen because it 
has come to define. or at least to exemplify, a concept or theoretical outcome". For example. 
"France is a crucial case in the study ofrevolution" (Gerring. 200 L p . .219). 
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only on the person of the leader himself. The research discussed in this section 
supports each of the four above-made arguments in favour of examining the 
view from below. 
In Germany, the birth of the Alltagsgeschichte7 movement, in the mid-1970s, 
had a significant impact on traditional historiography of the Hitler regime. 
Intent on developing a more qualitative understanding of ordinary people's 
circumstances and everyday lives, Alltag historians, such as Alf Ludtke, focus 
not on structures, class antagonisms or economic fluctuations, but rather on 
values, beliefs, mentalities and lifestyles. The French Annales School, which 
developed in the 1920s, offered an important model. In a similar vein, the so-
called "Revisionists", such as Sheila Fitzpatrick and Ronald Grigor Suny, have 
re-examined and challenged traditional historiography on the Stalin regime, by 
shifting the focus away from the State and the person of Stalin to the sphere of 
everyday life. 
At the beginning of this section, it was argued that one of the reasons why 
studies of the criminal leader should include the view from below is that we 
should not restrict ourselves to one particular perspective - a top-down 
perspective. The above-mentioned "historians of everyday life", "social 
historians" and "Revisionists" similarly emphasize the importance of exploring 
different perspectives. For example, they regard a narrow focus on the State as 
inadequate. As Andrle argues vis-a-vis the Stalin regime, 
., .once it is accepted that the state was not monolithic in its practices of 
policy implementation, that it struggled to control the population with 
7 "The h i ~ t o r y y of eH'ryday life". 
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only a mixed success, and that its policies were replete with unintended 
effects, then the history of the Stalin era is no longer adequately 
represented by the study of political dictatorship, its ideology and its 
power apparatus alone (Andrle, 1994, p.198). 
What is important is not the State per se, but rather the interconnections 
between the practices of the State and everyday life, between the macro and 
micro levels. Kotkin, for example, describes his work on the USSR as "an 
inquiry into the minutiae of urban life and how certain ways of thinking and 
accompanying social practices fit into the grand strategies of Soviet state 
building during the formative period of the 1930s" (Kotkin, 1995, p.23). 
It was also argued at the beginning of this section that since leadership is a 
relationship, the study of criminal leaders requires that we explore both halves 
of that relationship - the leader and his followers. Similarly, the new wave of 
scholarship on the Hitler and Stalin regimes emphasizes that we should not 
only focus on the person of the leader. To cite Bessel, 
No longer is it possible to regard the horrific history of Nazi Germany as 
the product of a few demonic politicians (or even more pointedly, 'the 
will of a single madman') who entranced millions of Germans and sent 
them down a path towards war and mass murder (Bessel, 1987, p.xiv). 
Similarly, Peterson contends that Hitler "did not operate in a vacuum; there 
were millions of others involved. One reality cannot be understood without the 
other" (Peterson, 1969, p.430). For his part, Voegelin maintains that, 
Therefore one cannot in any way isolate Hitler and analyze him as a 
single personality. Instead, one can see the phenomenon of his rise to 
power only in connection with a disposition of the German people. which 
brought Hitler into power (Voegelin, 1999, p.59). 8 
8 Meier makes a similar argument vis-a-vis Milosevic and the Serbian people. He contends 
that, "There had to be a predisposition in the political thinking of a large part of the Serbian 
people to 'solutions' along the lines of what he represented. This . i ~ ~ turn leads. one III the 
conclusion that the problem is not .Milosevic at all, but rather the pohtIcal dISPl1SltlOI1S among 
peopk in Serbia itself' (Meier, 1999, p.44). 
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What all of this means in practice, according to Peukert, is that a study of 
everyday life in the Third Reich includes the interaction between the Nazi 
system and the people - interaction rather than domination of "top" over 
"bottom". Thus, we must look not only at "the shaping of life-styles by the 
demands of the system", but also - in the other direction - at "the impact that 
was made on the Nazi movement by prevailing attitudes, expectations, and 
forms of behaviour" (Peukert, 1987, p.25).9 
What is clear, therefore, is that those who adopt a more bottom-up approach to 
the Hitler and Stalin regimes do not confine themselves to exploring only one 
of the dimensions of regime type identified by Linz and Stepan - leadership. 
For example, various scholars look at a second dimension - mobilization. 
They examine how the regimes of Hitler and Stalin mobilized the masses. 
According to AndrIe, for example, "The activities of Stalin's state were largely 
defined by mobilizing people ... ". Thus, the Stalinist regime can be described 
as "a mobilization regime" (AndrIe, 1994, p.198). For his part, Schoenbaum 
refers to the Hitler regime's "mobilization of disaffection" (Schoenbaum, 1966, 
p.15). 
Finally, it was argued that exploring the view from below is important in terms 
of allowing us to ascertain the degree to which external and domestic views of 
the externally constructed criminal leader coincide. At the same time, the new 
insight that we gain from examining the view from below can make us 
9 Similarly, Kershaw maintains that, " ... it is reasonable to ask to what extent popular opinion 
and 'popular opposition' influenced Nazi policy, whether in fact it had any impact at all on the 
Nazi leadership, or whether the regime could ignore it altogether" (Kershaw. IllS), p.378). 
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question and re-evaluate our opinions. A parallel can be drawn here with 
bottom-up research on the Hitler and Stalin regimes. 
Such research particularly questions and problematizes the idea that ordinary 
people were merely the victims of these regimes. In other words, it seeks to 
demonstrate that this concept of victimized masses is flawed and of limited 
validity. Instead, it assumes, and endeavours to show that the relationship 
between State and society was far more complex than a simple 
oppressor/victim relationship. According to Fitzpatrick, for example, 
no political regime, including Stalin's, functions in a social vacuum. 
There were social pressures and constituencies influencing Stalinist 
policy formation ... More importantly, there were social constraints, social 
responses and informal processes of negotiation between the regime and 
social groups that had a very significant impact on policy implementation 
- that is, on Stalin's 'revolution from above' in practice (Fitzpatrick, 
10 1986, p.372). 
F or his part, Peukert argues that, 
Active consent - popular approval of Nazi policies - was conditional 
upon the regime'S ability, by invoking a constant supply of genuine or 
ostensible achievements, to meet peoples' basic everyday needs for 
security, progress, and a sense of meaning and purpose in life (Peukert, 
1987, p.76). 
By emphasizing the reciprocal nature of regime/society relations, these 
scholars thus portray ordinary people as actors in their own right, rather than 
simply as passive victims. I I Indeed, for the Revisionists and Alltag historians, 
we do a great injustice to ordinary people if we portray them merely as victims. 
10 Toft makes a similar argument in more general terms. She emphasizes that, " ... leaders 
maneuver within boundaries whose areas are determined by forces beyond their control. This 
is a crucial point because it counters the tendency to see leaders as always forming public 
opinion ex nihilo, rather than representing a preexisting public opinion" (Toft. 2 0 ~ 3 , , p . ~ . f ) . .
Western literature on the Milosevic regime, with its emphasis on dlte mal1lpulatlOn. 
exemplifies such a tendency. . 
II Goldhagen, however, takes the argument one stage further. According to hiS controversial 
thesis. ordinary German people were "Hitler's willing executioners" (C;oldhagen. 1997. p.-l54). 
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To cite Ludtke, "It is obvious that the historical actors were (and are) more 
than mere blind puppets or helpless victims" (Ludtke, 1995, p.5).12 
These scholars are, therefore, interested III understanding active passive 
resistance to, or support for, these regimes. According to Peukert, rather than 
explain popular support for a system of ideology in terms of elite manipulation, 
we must instead "explain what were the fundamental needs and activities in 
which the population's active consent, or passive participation, took roof' 
(Peukert, 1987, p.68). In other words, rather than starting at the top and 
working down, we should instead begin at the bottom and work up. 
Although the present research has been influenced by the work of Revisionist 
and Alltag scholars, it cannot claim to be social history. For example, it does 
not seek to reconstruct the everyday lives of ordinary people who lived through 
the Milosevic years; and while it aims to provide the reader with some insight 
into what everyday life was like during this period, in particular economically, 
it is more concerned with exploring the views and opinions that ordinary 
people in Serbia have of Milosevic, in order to find out whether they 
themselves see him as criminal. 
However the thesis shares the concern of social historians to do justice to the , 
view from below. As Kotkin argues, "there is no substitute for letting people 
speak in their own words as much as possible" (Kotkin, 1995, p.21). In this 
12 Western literature tends to portray the Serbian people as Y i c t i m ~ ~ of :--. liloseyic and h i ~ ~
propaganda. Cohen, for example. describes the Serbs as being "delirious" and " b . r a i l 1 \ ~ · a ~ I H : d " "
(Cohen, 1998, p.194); and Me1choir contends that the Serbian nation was "majOntalrement 
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way, it seeks to redress an important top-down imbalance in the existing 
Western literature. While Suny rightly claims that, "For too long Russian 
history has been written not only from the top down, but with the bottom left 
out completely" (Suny, 1987, p.3), we could easily replace the words "Russian 
history" with "Western accounts of the Milosevic regime". In attempting to 
redress this imbalance, the thesis makes a significant contribution to the 
existing Western literature by providing important insight into domestic views 
of Milosevic. 
This section has argued the case for using a bottom-up approach. It has also 
sought to demonstrate the value of such an approach, using examples of 
bottom-up research vis-a-vis two particular leaders, Hitler and Stalin, who can 
be seen as paradigm cases of the criminal leader. While such research 
constitutes a welcome addition to a traditionally, leader-centred historiography, 
it has also been heavily criticized. 
Section 2 - Some Criticisms of "Everyday Life" Approaches 
Contemporary studies of everyday life during the Hitler and Stalin regimes 
have proven very controversial. The main criticisms fall into four groups. 
(i) Moral Criticisms 
Moral criticisms are perhaps the most numerous and the most significant. The 
critics' basic contention is that the emphasis on "ordinariness" and "ordinary, 
everyday life" detracts from the more brutal and violent aspects of the regime. 
aveuglee par r orientation destructrice du leader serbe" ("overwhelmingly blinded bv the 
destructi\"e tendenc ies of the Serb leader") (Melc hair, 1993. pA 7). 
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According to advocates of the "totalitarian" version of the Stalin era 13, 
revisionist arguments "sanitize" the Stalinist regime by highlighting the 
"trivial" elements of everyday life and government social policy, at the expense 
of the dreadful atrocities perpetrated by the regime. 
Kenez, for example, claims that consciously or unconsciously, revisionists ,ode_ 
demonize Stalin and his Politburo, so much so that Stalinism disappears as a 
phenomenon. In their presentation, the politics of the 1930s was humdrum 
politics" (Kenez, 1986, p.396). Meyer similarly claims that by questioning the 
degree of control that Stalin actually possessed, the revisionists are to some 
extent absolving the dictator from blame (Meyer, 1986, pA04). 
It is, however, over-simplistic to argue that by focusing on the sphere of 
everyday life, we thereby "sanitize" the regimes of Hitler and Stalin. In the 
words of Norbert Elias, "an attempt to explain is not necessarily an attempt to 
excuse" (cited in AY90berry, 1999, p.7). In the case of Milosevic, for example, 
we do not gloss over his crimes by exploring the everyday life experiences of 
ordinary people. On the contrary, we thereby gain fresh insight into his crimes. 
The interview data, analyzed in chapters 5-8, tells us about Milosevic' s crimes 
against his own people and about what the interviewees consider to be his 
biggest crimes. Not only is this information important in helping us to make 
13 In the aftennath of World War Two, studies of the Stalin era developed around the 
totalitarian model. Exemplified by Merle Fainsod's case study of Smolensk province, in 1958. 
this approach focused on the issue of state control and its extension over more and mo:e areas 
of thought and action. Thus. for Fainsod, " ... Stalinism spelled the development ot a full-
blown totalitarian regime in which all the lines of control ultimately converged in the hands of 
the supreme dictator" (Fainsod. 1959, p.12). 
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sense of the interviewees' opinions of Milosevic. It is also important because 
the existing Western literature typically focuses on Milose\'ic' s crimes against 
Bosnian Muslims, Kosovar Albanians and other non-Serbs, telling us little 
about what the Serbian people themselves suffered. 
(ii) Methodological Criticisms 
Approaches that focus on everyday life are also flawed, according to the critics. 
on the grounds that their methodology is too vague. Decisions about what 
should be included in the analysis are highly SUbjective, with the risk that only 
a very impressionistic and selective picture of a situation can be g i v e n . l ~ ~
Kenez, for example, heavily criticizes Fitzpatrick's decision to avoid looking at 
the terror perpetrated by the Stalinist regime. Fitzpatrick justifies this on the 
grounds that it would be moralistic to look at the terror. Kenez, however, 
rejects this argument, maintaining that if the emphasis on terror betrays a 
certain moral dimension, so too does the denial of its significance (Kenez, 
1986, p.399). 
Others criticize everyday life approaches as lacking scientific rigour. Wehler, 
for example, criticizes Alltagsgeschichte as a kind of "bland, conventional 
oatmeal" dished up as historical science (cited in Ludtke. 1995, p.lO), and 
Kocka argues that Alltagsgeschichte is "fundamentally unscientific". In his 
eyes, history as a science is based on the conception of what is basically ;J 
14 Even those who practice an e\eryday life approach concede that that t h ~ r e e are problems 
regarding the quality of the data. For example, in her study of p o ~ ~ l a r r opmlOn l.n .. Stahmsl 
Russia, Davies admits that much of the data can only Yleld a rather IInpresslOmStl\.: pl\:ture 
(Da\il's. 1997, p.16). 
124 
unified history. The mass of myriad individual (hi)stories is far less significant 
(cited in Ludtke, 1995, p.9). 
Yet, judgements about whether or not something is scientific are themselves 
highly subjective, and closely related to one's theoretical position. For 
example, some quantitative researchers dismiss qualitative research as "soft" 
and unscientific. IS Douglas, however, maintains that, "The only valid and 
reliable (or hard scientific) evidence concerning socially meaningful 
phenomena we can possibly have is that based ultimately on systematic 
observations and analyses of everyday life" (Douglas, 1971, p.12). This is 
because social actions "must be studied and explained in terms of their 
meanings to the actors themselves" (Douglas, 1971, pA). 
(iii) Conceptual Criticisms 
Some criticize everyday life approaches on the grounds of the particular 
terminology used. The very term "everyday life" is somewhat vague and ill-
defined. What exactly should it include? As one might expect, scholars' views 
on this are extremely diverse. For example, Fitzpatrick understands 
"everyday" to mean primarily the sphere of family life. Others, however, look 
primarily at work-life and at the behaviours and attitudes generated at the 
workplace I 6, while scholars of everyday life under totalitarian regimes often 
15 There is an overlap between some of the criticisms made of t'\'eryday life approaches and 
criticisms of qualitative research in general. For example, the criticism that ..... one weakness 
of 'everyday history' is its preoccupation with the minutiae of narrative, \\'hich has pre\'ented 
historians of plebian concerns from ascertaining the representativeness of their data and from 
determining the context of their findings" (Jackson, 1990, p,244) is a criticism that is 
frequently made about qualitative research, 
16 For example, Steve A. Smith (1987), 
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concentrate on active and passive resistance to those regimes I7• As to the term 
"'ordinary, everyday people", Ludtke himself acknowledges that this is "as 
suggestive as it is imprecise" (Ludtke, 1995, p.3). 
Problems of terminology clearly exist, but these can be minimized if authors 
clearly define what they mean by terms such as "everyday life". It should also 
be pointed out that problems of terminology are not specific to everyday life 
approaches. For example, it is striking how many Western authors use terms 
such as "'Serbian nationalism" and ""Greater Serbia" without ever actually 
defining them. 
(iv) Practical Problems 
Finally, in addition to the above criticisms, there are potential practical 
problems involved in doing bottom-up, everyday life research, thus glvmg 
further ammunition to the critics. For example, practitioners of ""everyday 
history" typically use a rich variety of sources, including oral history, memoirs, 
letters, diaries, old photographs, archives, newspapers, pamphlets and 
statistical compilations. However, as AndrIe argues, ""The canvas is broader, 
the dangers of over-generalization greater, and the material more fragmented" 
(Andrle, 1994, p.x). 
As well as being fragmented, the material can also be unavailable, inaccessible. 
or very limited. In his study of everyday life in Magnitogorsk, for example, 
Kotkin admits that "the greatest deficiency of the source base of the present 
17 For example. Sarah Davies (1997). 
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monograph is ... the failure to uncover any diaries or personal letters, and thus 
to reach people's intimate thoughts" (Kotkin, 1995, p.373)18. Similarly, 
Liidkte points out that "It is rare to find letters or documents written by the 
individuals themselves (or consciously passed on, handed down to others)" 
(Liidtke, 1995, p.13); and Kershaw explains that, 
One of the greatest general difficulties in trying to establish patterns of 
development in political attitudes during the Third Reich is that direct, 
authentic expressions of opinion in their original form are few and far 
between (Kershaw, 1983, p.6). 
In their concern to give a voice to the masses, scholars from the Subaltern 
Studies Group have also encountered difficulties in finding adequate sources. 
Guha, for example, suggests that one way of combating elitist bias in the 
literature "could perhaps be to summon folklore, oral as well as written, to the 
historian's aid". He goes on to point out that, 
Unfortunately, however, there is not enough to serve for this purpose 
either in quantity or quality ... For one thing, the actual volume of 
evidence yielded by songs, rhymes, ballads, anecdotes, etc, is indeed very 
meagre, to the point of being insignificant, compared to the size of 
documentation available from elitist sources in almost any agrarian 
movement of our period (Guha, 1997, p.14). 
Micro-level research is also very labour-intensive and time-consuming. Good 
contacts are essential, and the researcher must be very flexible, patient and 
resourceful. He/she must also be prepared for many disappointments along the 
way. Nevertheless, it is argued that the practical difficulties are outweighed by 
the satisfaction and rewards that one can get from doing this type of research. 
These rewards can be both academic - for example, making an important and 
original contribution to an existing literature - and personal, such as learning 
new skills and making new friendships. 
18 In the present resc.'arch, attempts to gain accc.'ss to diaries ,,'ere similarly unsuccessful. 
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Thus far, this chapter has argued, and sought to show, that the view from below 
is both an important and necessary perspective to explore in the study of 
criminal leaders. However, the value and usefulness of a bottom-up approach 
is not confined to the specific case of the criminal leader. The final section of 
the chapter, therefore, will look at some more general examples of bottom-up 
research, relating to the former Yugoslavia. This thesis both situates itself 
within this particular body of research, and makes a worthy contribution to it. 
Section 3 - Examples of Bottom-Up Research vis-a-vis the Former 
Yugoslavia 
In view of the emphasis that this thesis places on the view from below, it is 
extremely encouraging that other researchers working on the former 
Yugoslavia have similarly acknowledged the importance of this particular level 
of analysis and have sought to make a more bottom-up contribution to the 
existing literature. This section will survey some of the research that has been 
undertaken so far, before making some suggestions as to future micro-level 
research. 
Those who have adopted a more bottom-up approach tend to come from the 
disciplines of sociology and social anthropology. An early example of micro-
level research in the field is Joel Halpern and Barbara Kerensky Halpern"s 
ethnographical study of a Serbian village, Orasac, during the 1970s. 
Underscoring the importance of the view from below, the authors argue that, 
"With urban life in Serbia having grown in significant measure out of village 
traditions, by looking at the Yillage here we are looking in a yery specific way 
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at the genesis of the modem Serbian nation" (Halpern and Kerensky Halpern, 
1972, pA5). 
More recently, Tone Bringa followed a Muslim community in Bosnia over a 
period of six years. Sharing the concern of the Subaltern Studies Group and 
social historians to give a voice to those who are seldom given the opportunity 
to speak, Bringa explains, 
This book is concerned with the voices behind the headlines the lived , 
lives behind the images of endless rows of refugees and war victims 
deprived of past and future, defined by others solely in terms of what 
they have lost - as refugees (Bringa, 1995, p.5). 
Bringa clearly sees the villagers in her study as victims. For her, these people 
bear no responsibility for the war. As she argues, 
Neither my material nor this book can or intends to explain the war for 
the simple reason that the war was not created by those villagers who are 
the focus of this account. The war has been orchestrated from places 
where the people I lived and worked among were not represented, and 
where their voices were not heard (Bringa, 1995, p.5).19 
For his part, Mart Bax has spent more than a decade conducting research in 
Medjugorje, a peasant village in the southwest of Hercegovina. For him, 
moreover, there is a clear need for further research focusing on the view from 
below. In his words, 
The conclusion seems obvious that for a better comprehension of the 
present-day problems in Bosnia Hercegovina, attention should be more 
intensely and systematically devoted to processes and developments on 
the lower levels of social integration (Bax, 1995, p.xix). 
Ger Duijzings similarly adopts a bottom-up approach, declaring that, 
19 This thesis seeks to portray the Serbian people neither as victims nor as perpetrators" Rather, 
it aims to demonstrate that by examining the \"ie\\"s and opinions that ordinary people ha\"e of 
Milosevic. and by exploring their everyday life experiences during his years in power. we can 
thus "ain a richer. more tex.tured understanding of Milose\ic's leadership and regime. 
:=-
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The anthropological approach adopted in this study is identifiable in the 
perspective . from below', looking at wider developments from the 
viewpoint of small communities which have been affected by events and 
decisions that are far beyond their control (Duijzings, 2000, p.209). 
Highlighting the importance of exploring the view "from below", Duijzings 
points out that the concerns and objectives of the masses are not necessarily the 
same as the concerns and objectives of the elite. He maintains that, 
While all Serb politicians share the idea that Serbian rule over the 
province [Kosovo] is an almost inalienable and sacrosanct right. .. it is my 
own experience that many ordinary Serbs appear to be less adamant and 
more pragmatic. They are indifferent to the teachings of the Kosovo 
myth, they are too much occupied with their daily struggle to 
survive .... (Duijzings, 2000, p.205). 
What this suggests is that elite theories that portray the masses as being like 
sponges, soaking up the ideas that filter down to them from the top echelons of 
society, are over-simplistic and reductionist. 
One such idea is Serbian nationalism. Western literature tends to focus on the 
nationalism of elites, such as Dobrica Cosic and Vojislav Seselj, and various 
elitist institutions, such as SANU and the Serbian Orthodox Church. What it 
fails to do, however, is to look at what nationalism means to ordinary Serbian 
people. Research conducted by Alvin Magid, between 1983 and 1984, thus 
constitutes a rare exception. Magid's interviews with ordinary Serbs challenge 
the assumption, often made in Western literature, that if a person is a Serb 
nationalist, he/she therefore supports the creation of a "Greater Serbia". For 
example, one interviewee, an artist, told Magid, "I am not a fierce Serbian 
nationalist with a delusive urge to construct a latter-day 'Great Serbia· ... I am a 
Serbian cultural nationalist, not an advocate of Serbian political nationalism" 
(Magid, 199 L p.296). 
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Another interviewee, a low-level factory supervisor, expressed a similar yiew-
1 know it is neither possible nor desirable for any part of Yugoslavia to 
control all the other parts. We have some Serbian nationalists who wish 
it could be otherwise; they dream the madman's dream of a "Great 
Serbia' at the center of Socialist Yugoslavia, as its political head and 
brain. 1 myself am a proud Serb but 1 do not have that mad dream 
(Magid, 1991, p.391). 
What we might draw from this is that, if we are to gain a deeper understanding 
of Serbian nationalism - which the literature rarely defines - it is necessary to 
look at how nationalism is understood by ordinary Serbian people and at how 
nationalism manifests itself at the level of both elites and masses. It is also 
necessary to discard, or at least to rigorously re-examine, the simplistic idea 
that all Serbian nationalists seek a "Greater Serbia". 
Aleksander Pavkovi6 focuses on the national ideologies involved in the 
creation and fragmentation of Yugoslavia. He himself does not adopt a 
bottom-up approach, explaining, "I do not explore, in any systematic way, the 
extent to which these ideologies were accepted - and how they were 
interpreted - by their rank-and-file supporters" (Pavkovi6, 2000, p.x). 
Acknowledging the importance of the view from below, however, he adds, 
"This question, 1 think, warrants a separate comparative study of this crucial 
period in the spread of national ideologies" (Pavkovi6, 2000, p.x). At the same 
time Pavkovi6 dedicates his book to "the victims of the wars in Yugoslavia , 
whose voices and suffering it fails to record" (Pavkovic, 2000, p.xi). Thus, we 
see that, like Bringa, Pavkovic views ordinary people primarily as victims, 
rather than as actors. 
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Continuing with the theme of nationalism, Ana Devic suggests that studies of 
nationalism should incorporate the sphere of everyday life (Devic, 2002). 
Devic is concerned with the everyday grievances of ordinary Serbs, in 
particular with their increasing sense of powerlessness20, and it is within this 
context that she situates the mobilization of ethnicity. For the author, what is 
important is not elite manipulation per se, but rather the context - "'the 
grievances that the ordinary inhabitants of Yugoslavia had experienced in their 
everyday lives" - within which this manipulation occurred (Devic, 2002). 
For his part, Eric Gordy underscores the importance of everyday life in helping 
to explain how the Milosevic regime remained in power. In Gordy's view, 
the regime's strategies of self-preservation can be found in everyday life 
- in the destruction of alternatives. Specifically, the regime maintains 
itself not by mobilizing opinion or feeling in its favor, but by making 
alternatives to its rule unavailable (Gordy, 1999, p.2). 
He discusses the regime's destruction of political alternatives, infonnation 
alternatives, musical alternatives, and its destruction of sociability, and thus 
conceptualizes the domain of everyday life as a contested space. As he argues, 
The destruction of alternatives is a struggle of the state against the 
society, in which the state seeks to assure that alternatives to its rule 
remain unavailable, while social actors try to keep channels of 
infonnation, expression and everyday activity open (Gordy, 1999, p.206). 
Thus, ordinary people are participants in, rather than simply victims of, this 
struggle, which "cannot be 'won' by either side" (Gordy, 1999, p.206). 
~ ( ) ) Through this emphasis on the "powerlessness" of ordinary Serbs, they are once again 
presented to us as victims, rather than actors. In contrast, as we have seen, bottom-up re.search 
on the Hitler and Stalin regimes is far less likely to portray ordinary people merely as nchms. 
Peukert, for example. argues that while it would be unjust to condemn a whole g ~ ~ e r a t . i o n n of 
Gem1ans, "this generation \\'as undoubtedly implicated in guilt, either through partiCipatIOn or. 
at least, through failure to offer resistance" (Peukert, 1987, p.22). 
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In recent years, some prominent academics in Belgrade have conducted 
important bottom-up research in Serbia. In late 2001 and early 2002, a team 
led by Zagorka Golubovic, Ivana Spasic and Borde Pavicevic conducted 303 
in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens in nineteen Serbian cities and towns. 
as part of a project entitled Politika i svakodnevni iivot; Srbija, 1999-2002 
("Politics and Everyday Life; Serbia, 1999-2002"). The authors conclude that, 
This study has provided us with elements to build a more realistic picture 
of the citizens of Serbia - how they experience their everyday in the 
context of contemporary political events, how they perceive the recent 
past and the present, how they see themselves within these frameworks, 
and what attitudes they assume towards the future (Golubovic, Spasic, 
Pavicevic, 2003, p.306). 
These three academics are highly respected, and their book has generated 
considerable interest among other scholars in Belgrade. It is, therefore, to be 
hoped that there will be further research, concentrating on the lives and 
experiences of ordinary people, in the very near future, like the research 
undertaken by staff at the War Documentation Centre in Belgrade. They have 
produced two books, Ratovanja ("'Warfare") (2003) and Sudbine Civila ("The 
Fate of Civilians") (2004), which contain a series of interviews with ordinary 
people about the wars in the former Yugoslavia. 
A further example to note of recent research that addresses the view from 
below is the work of two respected Belgrade journalists, Dragan Bujosevic and 
Ivan Radovanovic. Their book, The Fall of Milosevic; The October 5th 
Revolution (2003), is "the outcome of conversations with 60 people -
politicians, police, soldiers, and members of the public - who were in Belgrade 
that day" (Bujosevic and Radovanovic. 2003, p.v). 
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The present thesis makes a further important bottom-up contribution to the 
literature. Limited time, limited resources and difficulties in finding 
appropriate sources meant that it was not possible to perform the very detailed, 
micro-level research undertaken by scholars such as Kotkin and Peukert. The 
thesis does not reconstruct everyday life during the Milosevic years, as social 
historians would do. However, it does attempt, through the use of rich, 
qualitative interview data, to give the reader some sense of what life was like 
during the Milosevic years, thus gesturing towards an everyday life approach. 
By exploring the views and opinions that ordinary people in Serbia have of 
Milosevic, the thesis also provides an original and valuable bottom-up view of 
Milosevic's leadership. 
It is argued that further research focused on the view from below would prove 
extremely fruitful. Such research vis-a.-vis the Milosevic regime, for example, 
could help us to gain a better understanding of why people in Serbia either 
supported or opposed the regime. It could also enrich our knowledge about 
certain groups in Serbia, such as ethnic minorities, who have received little 
attention in Western literature. We know very little, for example, about what 
life was like for minorities living under the Milosevic regime. Knowing more 
about this could give us new insight into the character of the regime, which has 
been variously described in the literature as ""nationalist-authoritarian" (Gordy. 
1999, p.8; LeBor, 2002, p.159); as an "'unusual dictatorship" (Cox, 2002, 
p.163); a ""television dictatorship" (Doder & Branson, 1999, p.68); and as a 
"soft" dictatorship (Cohen. 2001, p.xiv) that developed into a "desperate hard-
boiled dictatorship" (Cohen, 2001, p.345). 
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Another group that Western authors have tended to overlook is the Kosovo 
Serbs.21 This is, therefore, an area where micro-level, bottom-up research 
could be very valuable. For example, the suffering of the Kosovar Albanians 
has been extensively chronicled. In contrast, we know very little about what 
everyday life was like for the Kosovo Serbs, either before or during the 
Milosevi6 era.22 
We also know very little about what everyday life is like today for those Serbs 
who have remained in KOSOVO.23 It would be extremely interesting to explore 
the effects of war and population displacement on Serbian areas in Kosovo, 
such as Kosovska Mitrovica and Gracanica. The population of both areas has 
swollen, due to an influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing from 
other parts of Kosovo. The Serbian village of Gracanica, for example, used to 
have a population of 4,000 people. Today, however, it has a population of 
10,000. This has created problems such as over-crowding and increased 
traffic. 
It would also be useful to look at how well the new arrivals have been 
integrated into these Serbian areas. In Kosovska Mitrovica, for example, one 
female interviewee said that there is some level of distrust between the town's 
21 Some academics in Serbia, however, have conducted research on this topic. For example, 
The Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and Metohija; Results of the suner 
conducted in 1985-1986, written by Ruza Petrovic and Marina Blagojevic, was published in 
Belgrade in 1992. Later, in 2003, a book written by Mario Brodar was published, with the title 
Nada, Obmana, Slom; Politicki ~ i v o t t Srba na KosOl'lI i Metohiji (198:"-1999) ("'Hope, 
Delusion, Ruin: The Political Life of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija "). 
22 For example, ..... television in 1998-9 mostly showed Koso\a as an exclusively .\lbanian 
society, with the Serbs more or less exclusi\ely seen as part of an repressive foreign military 
apparatus" (Pettifer, 2005, p.156). 
2J Today, only 100,000 Serbs remain in Koso\·o. The Kosovar Albanians constitute 90% l1f the 
population of Kl1S0H). 
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original inhabitants and those who moved there from other parts of Kosovo. 
More generally, to what extent have refugees been integrated into Serbian 
society as a whole? This is another topic that should be researched. 
Finally, it is suggested that we could gain a deeper understanding of Serbian 
nationalism - which the literature does not adequately define - by using a more 
bottom-up approach. To cite Jonathan Glover, 
... once we go beyond economic interests or the interests of c o l o n i z e r s 2 ~ , ,
we can see the psychological needs that are met by the sense of 
nationhood and by the nation-state. A deeper explanation of nationalism 
requires exploration of other needs (Glover, 1997, p.13). 
A particularly interesting area of inquiry would be to look at the relationship 
between social exclusion and Serbian nationalism. Are those who are socially 
excluded more likely to embrace extreme forms of nationalism? A study of 
grassroots supporters of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) could help us to 
answer this. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by focusing on some of the academics that have studied the 
Hitler and Stalin regimes from the bottom up, rather than from the top down. 
Whilst acknowledging that this type of research has proven controversial and 
has been heavily criticized, as we saw in section 2, it was argued that the view 
from below is extremely important for studying criminal leaders; in particular, 
it gives us an '"insider" perspective on the particular '"criminal" leader in 
question. This, in tum, has important implications for the concept of the 
~ 4 4 We can replace the word "colonizers" with the word "elites" 
1.36 
criminal leader developed in the previous chapter. This concept, it is argued. 
should now be modified to include an additional, fifth dimension - a domestic 
dimension - the importance of which the interview data chapters will seek to 
demonstrate. 
A clear case has been made for studying criminal leaders "from below". 
However, it is necessary to emphasize that like any approach, a bottom-up 
approach has certain limitations; these will be discussed in the introduction to 
the data chapters. As the present chapter has, therefore, made clear, exploring 
the view from below does not mean that we should ignore or neglect the view 
from above. The two perspectives are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they 
complement each other. Thus, as argued at the end of chapter 2, the criminal 
leader must be studied both from below and from above. 
The thesis gives particular weight to the view from below, not least because 
Western literature dealing with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia has 
tended to heavily neglect this valuable perspective. However, in constructing 
Milosevic as a criminal leader, Western literature has also neglected a 
particular top-down perspective. That is to say that while speculating about 
MiloseviC's intentions, it has in fact paid little attention to what he himself 
actually said. Chapter 4, therefore, will analyze Milosevic' s main speeches, 
with the aim of finding out whether his words and the way in which he 
presented himself as a leader are consistent with the dominant Western image 
of him as a criminal leader. 
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*** 
Part II 
Is Milosevic a Criminal Leader? 
Analysis of Milosevic's Speeches 
and 
Qualitative Interview Data 
*** 
Introduction 
Chapter 4 
Milosevic in His Own Words· , 
An Analysis of His Main Speeches 
Western literature focuses heavily on the person of Milosevic, yet it pays little 
attention to his speeches, which have not been systematically analyzed. l When 
his speeches are referred to, they are fundamentally misrepresented through 
highly selective quoting. Particular sentences or paragraphs from two or three 
speeches are typically cited, totally out of context, and given an interpretation 
that becomes problematic when the speeches are taken as a whole. 
Milosevic's speeches constitute an important pnmary source and should, 
therefore, be examined in detail. For the purposes of the present research, the 
value of these speeches is three-fold. Firstly, they allow us to assess whether 
there is any evidence in what Milosevic actually said to support two specific 
claims that Western literature makes - that he incited ethnic hatred and planned 
the wars in ex-Yugoslavia. In particular, studying his speeches enables us to 
ascertain whether Milosevic possessed "criminal" intent. 
Secondly, analysis of Milosevic' s speeches provides us with insight into a 
neglected aspect of his leadership - how he saw and presented himself. 
lOne possible explanation is that the speeches are not readily accessible. Milose\'ic' s main 
speeches are contained in two particular books. The first of these books, Les Annees Decisi\'es 
("Decisive Years"), published in 1990, covers the speeches that Milose\'ic made between 1984 
and 1990. It is also available in Serbian, under the title Godine Raspleta (1989). The second 
book, Od Ga::iJllL'stana do S('veningena ("From Gazimestan to Scheveningen"), is a collection 
of Milose\'ic's main speeches from 1989 to 2000. It \\as published in Belgrade in 2001. Some 
of Milosc\'ic's speeches are available in English, ho\\'e\'er. The book The Kosovo Conflict: . ~ ~
Diplomatic Historl' through Documents (2000), edited by Auers\\ald and Auerswald, and the 
wcbsite \ Y \ \ ' \ L 8 S ~ b o d a n - m i l o s ~ \ ' i c . o r g g are two examples, These were the t(.lllr principal SllurcC's 
used for this chapter. 
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Chapter 1 looked at how Western liberals see Milosevic. Chapters 5 to 8 
examine how the Serbian and national minority interviewees view him. In 
addition to these external and domestic perspectives, however, it is also 
important to explore how Milosevic portrayed himself and how he appealed to 
the masses. How he presented himself as a leader is especially significant, 
given the strong tendency of Serbian citizens to 
define, favour or reject a certain political option on the basis of a 
prominent individual. At that, an equally strong impression may be 
gathered on the basis of one statement only, of public appearance, 
manner of presentation, perceived temperament, even physical 
appearance (NDI, 2003, p.l7). 
Thirdly, there are various precedents m other literatures for examining the 
speeches of particular individuals, including Cesar Chavez, Che Guevara, the 
Sandinista leaders, Eisenhower, Tony Blair, and members of the Ba'th party in 
Iraq. A frequently invoked reason for doing so is that these individuals are 
thereby allowed to "speak for themselves".2 Given that Milosevic gave few 
interviews and rarely appeared in public, allowing him to speak for himself is 
very important. 
The speeches will be examined thematically, but also chronologically, in order 
to show how Milosevic's rhetoric changed over time. Narrow, Milosevic-
centric approaches that focus on Milosevic's actions and intentions are 
problematic because their heavy emphasis on agency means that insufficient 
attention is given to the role of circumstances. Just as it is inadequate to 
examme Milosevic's leadership solely from the top down, so it is 
unsatisfactory to neglect the context within which he exercised his leadership. 
2 In his bl10k about the speeches of Che Guevara, for example, Deutschmann says, "This 
book ... has a simple purpose: to let Che' s ideas speak for themselves" (Deutschmann, 1987, 
p.7). 
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Milosevic's actions and intentions were influenced and affected by 
circumstances, and we can clearly see this by analyzing his speeches 
chronologically. 
The chapter comprises three main sections. The first section will focus on the 
two speeches that have received the most attention in Western literature, 
namely MiloseviC's Kosovo Polje speech, in April 1987, and his Gazimestan 
speech, in June 1989. Section 2 will concentrate on the speeches that 
Milosevic made between 1990 and 1998. It will explore both the major themes 
that emerge, and the type of language used. Finally, section 3 will analyze the 
speeches that Milosevic made in 1999 and 2000. It will argue that these are 
fundamentally different, thematically and stylistically, from his earlier 
speeches. Throughout the chapter, there will also be a small number of 
references to some of the speeches that Milosevic made during the eighties, in 
order to illustrate or accentuate certain points. 
Before we proceed to an analysis of Milosevic' s speeches, it should be noted 
that, according to some commentators, what Milosevic said and what he 
actually did in practice were not necessarily the same things. Sell, for example, 
claims that, "'While he claimed to want to preserve Yugoslavia, he was in fact 
pumping arms into the hands of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia ... " (Sell, 
2002, p.7); and Doder and Branson maintain that, ..... while preparing for war, 
he [Milosevic] talked of peace" (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.75). Does this 
mean that Milosevic' s speeches are unreliable? 
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While it is tempting, especially for Milosevic' s many detractors, to claim that 
he was a liar, this is over-simplistic, for three main reasons. Firstly, if one 
carefully reads Milosevic' s speeches, one gets the clear impression that he was 
someone who liked to keep his options open as much as possible. If, therefore, 
he was declaring his support for Yugoslavia while at the same time supplying 
arms to Serbs outside Serbia, this could simply mean that he wanted to be 
prepared for all eventualities. 
Secondly, events may intervene to produce a mismatch between what a person 
says and what he/she actually does. To assume that any mismatch was 
deliberate on Milosevic' s part attaches too much weight to his intentions and 
too little weight to circumstances. In short, " ... an 'intention' is not an 
autonomous force, but is affected in its implementation by circumstances 
which it may itself have been instrumental in creating" (Kershaw, 2000, p.90). 
Thirdly, true/false dichotomies are not necessarily appropriate for analyzing 
political discourse, because, "The discourse of politicians is a story they are 
telling about themselves and about how they would like to be perceived by the 
relevant audiences" (Gagnon, 2004, p.xx). So, for example, "When Milosevic 
claimed to be a peacemaker, he was not establishing a truth but rather was 
telling a story, creating an image that was meant to influence the behavior of 
various domestic audiences" (Gagnon, 2004, p.xx). Thus, his speeches can 
provide useful insight into his calculations about how to win popular support, 
and into his understanding of the values, thinking and hopes of the Serbian 
people. 
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Section 1 - Milosevic's Kosovo Polje and Gazimestan Speeches 
Two particular speeches have received considerable attention - Milosevic' s 
Kosovo Polje speech and his Gazimestan speech. For many, these speeches, 
particularly the latter, reinforce the image of Milosevic as a criminal leader 
who deliberately destroyed Yugoslavia and plunged the country into war. 
(i) Milosevic 's Speech at Kosovo Polje, 25 April 1987 
In April 1987, Ivan Stamboli6, the Serbian President, sent Milosevi6, his 
protege, to Kosovo Polje, in order to try and defuse the growing tensions in the 
province between Serbs and Albanians. Upon his arrival, Milosevi6 witnessed 
the spectacle of angry and aggrieved Serbs. They were demonstrating not only 
against the Albanians, but also against the Communist State, which they 
believed had failed to protect them. They demanded protection, and Milosevic 
responded. To cite LeBor, "Fearful of the crowd, but aware he should try and 
take command of the situation, he declared, 'No one should dare to beat you 
again! '" (LeBor, 2002, p.82). 
This famous sentence is widely seen as extremely significant. For some, it 
symbolized Milosevi6' s transition from Communist apparatchik to nationalist 
demagogue. Sell, for example, claims that after that night in Kosovo, 
Milosevi6 "reinvented himself as a charismatic nationalist"' (Sell, 2002. pA). 
Similarly, Maas contends that, "MiloseviC's transition from socialist to 
nationalist, from apparatchik to dictator, happened at a precise moment, on 24 
April 1987, in an epiphany of mythical proportions" (Maas, 1996. p.208). 
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Despite such claims, the speech that Milosevic gave the next day. to a 
delegation of Serbs, condemned rather than condoned nationalism. He argued, 
for example, that, 
Nationalism always means isolation from others, a withdrawal within 
one's own limits. This also means lagging in development, for without 
cooperation and links in the Yugoslav area and beyond, there is no 
progress. Every nation and nationality that closes and isolates itself 
behaves irresponsibly toward its own development (cited in Auerswald 
and Auerswald, 2000, p.13). 
Nationalists, he maintained, '"must be opposed by every honest man", because 
nationalists were a threat to brotherhood and unity, and "we must preserve 
brotherhood and unity as the apple of our eye" (cited in Auerswald and 
Auerswald, 2000, p.ll). He further contended that if Yugoslavia was to 
become richer and happier, " ... the forces of socialism, brotherhood and unity, 
and progress must be separated from the forces of separatism, nationalism, and 
conservatism" (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.IS). 
He expressed concern about the economic situation in Kosovo, on the grounds 
that, "Kosovo continues to be underdeveloped, unemployment is high, foreign 
loans are high, exports are unsatisfactory, and the number of incomplete 
projects is large" (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.12). He also 
outlined the measures that had been taken to improve the situation, such as 
sustained investment in the material development of Kosovo. 
What is striking is that only one small section of this particular speech is ever 
cited in Western literature. This is the part where Miloseyic told his audience, 
... comrades ... you should stay here. This is your country. Your homes. 
your fields, your gardens, your memories are here. Surely you will not 
leave your land because it is difficult to live there and you are oppressed 
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by injustice and humiliation. It has never been in the spirit of the Serbian 
and Montenegrin peoples to give up before obstacles, to demobilize \\"hen 
they should fight, to become demoralized - to become demoralized when 
the going is difficult. You also should stay here because of your 
ancestors and because of your descendants. Otherwise, you would 
disgrace your ancestors and disappoint your descendants. 
I do not propose, comrades, that in staying you should suffer, carryon, 
and tolerate a situation with which you are not satisfied. On the contrary, 
you should change it, together with all the progressive peoples here, in 
Serbia, and in Yugoslavia (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000. 
pp.13-14). 
These two paragraphs are habitually cited totally out of context, without any 
reference to the rest of the speech. What is more, the short, but significant 
paragraph that precedes them is typically omitted. In this neglected paragraph, 
Milosevic declared, '"Our aim, however, is to get away from hatred. Our goal 
is that all the people in Kosovo should live well. The first thing that I want to 
tell you in connection with this goal, comrades, is that you should stay here" 
(cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.13). He then continued as above. 
It is argued here that when this overlooked preceding paragraph is included in 
the citation, this necessarily gives a different interpretation to the next two 
paragraphs. What Milosevic said suddenly looks more like an attempt to 
defuse, rather than to incite, ethnic tension and hatred. 
Regarding the two paragraphs of the speech that are always quoted, many 
different versions exist. For example, in Cohen's version, Milosevic said, "I do 
not propose, comrades, that in staying you should suffer and tolerate a situation 
in which you are not satisfied. On the contrary, you should change if' (Cohen, 
2001, p.63). This giyes the impression that Milosevic was telling the S e r b ~ ~ and 
M o n t e n e ( ~ n s s to take matters into their own hands, and to change the situation 
~ ~
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themselves, independent of others. Yet, in the version cited abo\'e (and in 
MiloseviC's book Les Annees Decisives), what he actually said was, "You 
should change it, together with all the progressive peoples here, in Serbia, and 
in Yugoslavia". In other words, he regarded the process of change as a 
combined effort, rather than as a uniquely Serbian effort. 
To summanze, it IS argued that this speech has been fundamentally 
misrepresented through selective quoting, in order to reinforce the image of 
Milosevic as a criminal leader who bears greatest responsibility for 
Yugoslavia's demise and descent into bloody war. It is only possible to claim 
that MiloseviC's message '"was one steeped in ethnic nationalism" (Scharf and 
Schabas, 2002, p.l 0) if we rely on just two paragraphs of the speech, omit the 
crucial preceding paragraph, and totally neglect the rest of the speech. 
MiloseviC's words at Gazimestan have been similarly distorted and 
misrepresented. 
(U) Milosevic's Speech at Gazimestan, 28 June 1989 
On the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo (1389), Milosevic addressed a 
crowd of approximately one million Serbs and Montenegrins in Gazimestan. 
Enormous significance has been attached to this particular speech, and it plays 
an important part in MiloseviC's construction as a criminal leader. For many, 
the speech is evidence of the fact that Milosevic not only bears greatest 
responsibility for the wars in the former Yugoslavia, but also that he planned 
those wars. According to Zimmermann, for example, it was a speech laced 
with "\Tiled warnings and threats against those who would block Serbia's 
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national aspirations" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.20); and Naimark describes the 
speech as "a warning of war and sacrifice" (Naimark, 2002, p.152). Moreover. 
extracts of the speech have been used by the prosecution in Milosevic' s trial in 
The Hague, with the aim of showing that he had been planning war as early as 
the summer of 1989 (LeBor, 2002, p.122). 
Like Milosevic's Kosovo Polje speech, however, his speech at Gazimestan is 
always cited in a very selective manner. Only one or two paragraphs of the 
speech tend to receive any attention. Furthermore, these paragraphs are given 
an interpretation that simply does not stand up to scrutiny once the rest of the 
speech is also taken into account. 
At Gazimestan, as in many of his other speeches, Milosevic placed strong 
emphasis on the need for unity. The urgency of achieving unity was 
underscored through a parallel emphasis on the dangers of disunity. He 
maintained, for example, that it was "the tragic disunity in the leadership of the 
Serbian state" that had significantly contributed to the Serbian defeat in the 
1389 Battle of Kosovo (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.31). 
Therefore, it was "the obligation of the people to remove disunity, so that they 
may protect themselves from defeats, failures, and stagnation in the future" 
(cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.33). He further claimed that the 
attainment of unity in Serbia "will bring prosperity to the Serbian people in 
Serbia and each one of its citizens, irrespective of his national or religious 
affiliation" (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.3 1 ). 
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MiloseviC's insistence on the imperative of unity need not be interpreted as 
meaning that all Serbs should be together in an ethnically pure "Greater 
Serbia". He remarked, for example, that, 
Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the 
past, members of other peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is 
not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its 
advantage. National composition of almost all countries in the world 
today, particularly developed ones, has also been changing in this 
direction. Citizens of different nationalities, religions and races have 
been living together more and more frequently and more and more 
successfully (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.32). 
He emphasized socialism, rather than nationalism, and completely downplayed 
national differences. According to him, 
The only differences one can and should allow in socialism are between 
hard working people and idlers and between honest people and dishonest 
people. Therefore, all people in Serbia who live from their own work, 
honestly, respecting other people and other nations, are in their own 
republic (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.32). 
If national differences were unimportant in Serbia, this was also the case in 
Yugoslavia as a whole. Underscoring equality among the different nations in 
Yugoslavia, Milosevi6 maintained that, 
Equal and harmonious relations among Yugoslav peoples are a necessary 
condition for the existence of Yugoslavia and for it to find its way out of 
the crisis and, in particular, they are a necessary condition for its 
economic and social prosperity (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 
2000, p.32). 
This emphasis on national equality was linked to a concern Milosevic 
expressed that Yugoslavia should not be less progressive than developed 
countries. He argued that, 
... Yugoslavia does not stand out from the social milieu of the 
contemporary, particularly the developed, world. This world is more and 
more marked by national tolerance, national cooperation, and e\'en 
national equality (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, p.32). 
He continued, 
lOon 
The modem economic and technological, as well as political and cultural 
development, has guided various peoples toward each other, has made 
them interdependent and increasingly has made them equal as 
well ... Equal and united people can above all become a part of the 
civilization toward which mankind is moving. If we cannot be at the 
head of the column leading to such a civilization there is certainly no 
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need for us to be at its tail (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, 
pp.32-33). 
As to the Serbs themselves, Milosevic portrayed them as both victims and 
heroes. For example, he highlighted the '"tragic disunity" in the Serbian 
leadership at the time of the Battle of Kosovo, and contended that, 
The lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to follow the 
Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of its history. Even in 
the last war, this lack of unity and this betrayal led Serbia and the Serbian 
people into agony, the consequences of which in the historical and moral 
sense exceeded fascist aggression (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 
2000, p.31). 
Counter-balanced against this image of Serbs as victims was a parallel image 
of Serbs as brave heroes. For example, Milosevic claimed that the national and 
historical being of the Serbs had always been liberational, and that they 
liberated not only themselves but others too, when they could. He further 
declared that, 
The Kosovo heroism has been inspiring our creativity for six centuries, 
and has been feeding our pride, and does not allow us to forget that at 
one time we were an army great, brave and proud, one of the few that 
remained undefeated when losing (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 
2000, p.33). 
According to Cohen, 
In these words, two years before Yugoslavia was engulfed in fighting, the 
fate of the South Slav state was foretold. MiloseviC' s message was clear 
enough: the Serbs - an army that in defeat remained undefeated, a p.eople 
that in suicide found redemption - were ready to bury themselves 10 the 
rubble of Yugoslavia in order to liberate themselves from the yoke, real 
or imaginary it hardly mattered (Cohen, 1998, p.432). 
This quote from Cohen is paradigmatic of a strong tendency in the literature to 
misrepresent MiloseviC's Gazimestan speech.3 Such misrepresentation is 
particularly blatant vis-a.-vis that part of the speech in which Milosevic alluded 
to the possibility of future armed battles.4 Significantly, this is very often the 
only part of the speech that receives any attention. What Milosevic said was, 
Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are 
facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot 
be excluded yet. However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, 
they cannot be won without resolve, bravery and sacrifice, without the 
noble qualities that were present here in the Field of Kosovo in the days 
past (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000, pp.33-34). 
Various authors see this reference to possible armed battles as evidence that 
Milosevic was planning war in Yugoslavia. Zimmermann, for example, argues 
that, "For the first time he raised the specter of war ... " (Zimmermann, 1996, 
p.20). Like many authors, however, Zimmermann cites only two sentences 
from the speech - "Six centuries later we are in battles and quarrels. They are 
not yet armed battles, though such things should not be excluded yet" 
(Zimmermann, 1996, p.20). 
F or their part, Doder and Branson maintain that at Gazimestan, Milosevic 
"rattled his saber ... as he identified himself with a holy cause and invoked the 
spirit of violence. Only when the cause was won could the saber be sheathed" 
3 This speech has not only been misrepresented, however. Ramet, for example, claims that 
Milosevic vowed at Gazimestan that, "We shall win despite the fact that Serbia's enemies 
outside the country are plotting against it, along with those in the country" (Ramet, 2002, 
p.310). However, these words did not even appear in Milosevic's Gazimestan speech. 
Milosevic actually made this statement in his "Brotherhood and Unity" speech. deli\ered in 
Belgrade, in November 1988. 
-I Milosevic himself has complained that this part of the speech has been taken completely out 
of context. For example, in his Introductory Statement to The Hague Tribunal, on 13 February 
2002, he said, "You quoted a fragment of a sentence in which I say that we have many battles 
ahead of us. not armed battles. though we must not exclude those either. This is a wry general 
sentence. commonly used by people today. Peace is not a secure and stable category in the 
world today. Why do states have armies otherwise') But you calculatingly lea\'e out 
el'clTthin o eisc" (l\lilosevic, 2002. p.I-+6). 
, b 
149 
(Doder and Branson, 1999, p.4). They proceed to quote the two sentences of 
Milosevic's speech which, taken by themselves, appear to support their 
argument - '" After six centuries, we are again waging struggle and confronting 
battles', Milosevic said unflinchingly, staring straight ahead as if reviewing the 
troops. 'These are not anned battles, though that cannot yet be excluded'" 
(Doder and Branson, 1999, p.4). 
Johnstone, however, adopts a very different VIew of these two oft-cited 
sentences. According to her, "To interpret this patriotic rhetoric, typical of any 
head of state celebrating a historic battle, as a threat or declaration of genocidal 
war is either maliciously dishonest or paranoid" (Johnstone, 2002, p.272). 
For his part, Gil-White maintains that, "It is really necessary to omit reference 
to any other part of the speech, and to ignore the facts of Yugoslavia at the 
time, for the quote - completely out of context - to appear as a threat" (Gil-
White, 2002). The point is, however, that many authors who cite these 
particular sentences fail to refer to the rest of the speech. For example, they 
ignore what Milosevic went on to say next, namely, 
Our chief battle now concerns implementing the economic, political, 
cultural, and general social prosperity, finding a quicker and more 
successful approach to a civilization in which people will live in the 
twenty-first century. For this battle, we certainly need heroism, of 
course, of a somewhat different kind, but that courage without which 
nothing serious and great can be achieved remains unchanged and 
remains urgently necessary (cited in Auerswald and Auerswald, 2000. 
p.34). 
Thus we can see that the chief battle with which Milosevic was concerned was , 
not an anned battle. Rather, it was a battle to realize Serbia's prosperity. 
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It is important to look at Milosevic' s reference to "armed battles" in the context 
of the speech as a whole. However, it is also necessary to consider it in the 
context of his other speeches. What these speeches suggest is that Milosevic 
appeared to regard many things in life as a struggle and a battle. In February 
1986, for example, at the 28 th session of the Municipal Committee of the 
League of Communists of Belgrade, he talked about" ... cette bataille pour une 
nouvelle approche de l' economie ... " (" ... this battle for a new approach to the 
economy ... ") (Milosevic, 1990, p. 73). 
In July 1988, at Drmno, Milosevic maintained that Serbs must mobilize for 
progress. He added, "S'il faut aujourd'hui declarer et mener une guerre, alors 
que ce soit une guerre contre l'inertie, rindifference et la discorde" C'If today 
we must declare and carry out war, then it will be a war against inertia, 
indifference, and disunity" (Milosevic, 1990, p.202). In November of the same 
year, in his "Brotherhood and Unity" speech, Milosevic argued that Yugoslavia 
"est Ie fruit d'un grand combat, nous la defendrons dans un grand combat" Cis 
the fruit of a great struggle, we will defend her in a great struggle") (Milosevic, 
1990, p.233). 
Much later, at the Fourth SPS Congress, in February 2000, he claimed that the 
country was "fighting a battle for freedom and independence" (Milosevic. 
2000a). The key point is that when Milosevic used words such as .. tighe, 
"battle", and "struggle", he was not always using them in a literal sense. For 
him "battles" did not necessarily mean military battles. In his mind, battles , 
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were also associated with positive achievements, such as the realization of 
economic and social prosperity. 
Given that references to "battles" and "war" were not uncommon in 
Milosevic's speeches, it is argued that undue significance has been attached to 
his Gazimestan speech. The speech, taken in its entirety, does not provide 
evidence of Milosevic' s "criminal" intent. It does not support the claim that he 
was planning war in the former Yugoslavia unless one focuses narrowly and 
exclusively on his reference to "armed battles". However, it has proven 
convenient for Milosevic' s detractors to do precisely that, in order to reinforce 
the liberal construction of him as a warmonger and criminal leader. 
Commenting on the Gazimestan speech, for example, Sell remarks, "Sadly, I 
saw the consequences of the wars that Milosevic first threatened in that 
speech" (Sell, 2002, p. xvi). In a similar vein, the International Crisis Group 
contends, "That speech contained the first open threat of violent conflict by a 
Socialist Yugoslav leader. .. " (cited in Gil-White, 2002). 
Now that we have looked at the two speeches that have received the most 
attention in Western literature, we can tum to some of Milosevic' s speeches 
that have been largely ignored. 
Section 2 - MiioseviC's Speeches, 1990-1998 
The Yugoslav crisis and inter-ethnic relations constitute a major theme in the 
speeches that Miloseyic made during the nineties. A second major theme. and 
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one that was also very prominent in the speeches he gave during the eighties. is 
the economy and economic development. 
(i) Yugoslavia and Inter-Ethnic Relations 
Central to Milosevic' s construction as a criminal leader is the charge that he 
bears greatest responsibility for the wars in former Yugoslavia. Consequently. 
his declarations of support for Yugoslavia are often dismissed in the literature 
as mere charades. Zimmermann, for example, argues that, ""Milosevic poses as 
the protector and savior of Yugoslavia. It's all bunk ... Milosevic is not a 
Yugoslav; he is a Serbian imperialist" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.249). 
Zimmermann further contends that, '"He would support unity as long as it 
served his purposes; when it didn't, he was quite prepared to try to tear the 
country apart" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.l 03). 
Equally scathing of Milosevic's expreSSIOns of commitment to Yugoslavia, 
Sell argues that, "'While he claimed to want to preserve Yugoslavia, Milosevic 
was in fact pumping arms into the hands of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, 
preparing an uprising that he knew would destroy Yugoslavia" (Sell, 2002, 
p.7). 
Some authors, however, believe that Milosevic initially did want to preserve 
Yugoslavia, but switched to a Greater Serbia policy once he realized that 
Yugoslavia was finished. Doder and Branson, for example, contend that, 
following the collapse of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, on 22 
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January 19905, Milosevic "knew that his hope to replace Tito as the undisputed 
master of Yugoslavia was a mirage. And so he began to think in tenns of a 
Greater Serbia ... " (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.74). Thomas, for his part, 
regards 1991 as the crucial turning point. He argues that, 
Through 1987-1990, Milosevic' s strategy had been fonnulated within the 
framework of a federal Yugoslavia, in which Serbia under his control 
would play the leading role. From March 1991, however. Milosevic 
became the enthusiastic advocate and executor of . Great Serb' ideas 
(Thomas, 1999, p.86). 
Milosevic's speeches, however, do not support such arguments and make no 
reference to a "Greater Serbia", despite claims that he "chose to base his own 
power on the appeal of 'Greater Serbia'" (Glover, 1997, p.21). Nevertheless, 
by selectively quoting from Milosevic's speeches, particularly the speech that 
he made to Serbia's municipal leaders on 16 March 1991, his critics can 
continue to argue that he was not genuinely committed to preservmg 
Yugoslavia, and was instead planning war. 
Speaking in Bor, in eastern Serbia, on 1 November 1990, Milosevic described 
Yugoslavia as a "zajednicka domovina svih jugoslovenskih naroda" Ca 
communal home of all Yugoslav peoples"). He underscored Serbia's support 
for Yugoslavia and stressed that "Srpski narod je kroz svoju istoriju mnogo 
ulozio u formiranje Jugoslavije" C"The Serbian nation has, throughout its 
history, invested a great deal in the making of Yugoslavia") (Milosevic, 2001. 
p.37). 
5 At this Extraordinarv C o n g r e ~ ~ ~ of the League of C o m m u n i ~ t ~ ~ of Yugosla\-ia. the Sl,wene 
delegation walked out: \\-hich resulted in the C o n g r c ~ ~ ~ being adjourned indefinitely_ It w a ~ ~
never to resume_ 
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In an earlier speech to the Serbian Parliament, on 25 June 1990, he stressed the 
sacrifices Serbia had made for the sake of Yugoslavia. He also claimed, 
however, that these sacrifices were never recognized or rewarded. Instead, 
" ... cette nation s' est vu sans cesse, depuis 1918 jusqu' a nos jours, attribuer 
l'image d'un peuple oppresseur" C' ... this nation has continually, from 1918 
until today, had attributed to it the image of an oppressor nation") (Milosevic, 
1990, p.319). Clearly bitter about Serbia's treatment in Yugoslavia, Milosevic 
further claimed that the provisions of the 1974 Constitution (and of its 
predecessor, the Constitution of 1971) were evidence of a "politique antiserbe" 
("an anti-Serb policy") (Milosevic, 1990, p.318). 
Reform of this Constitution had, therefore, been a priority for Milosevic upon 
coming to power.6 He always stressed that he simply wanted Serbia to have 
the same rights as the other republics, and in his speeches he consistently 
underscored his commitment to the principle of equality. In his speech to the 
Serbian Assembly, on 25 June 1990, for example, he said that the Yugoslav 
Federation was only workable if the equality of all its constituent republics was 
fully respected (Milosevic, 1990, p.316). Similarly, in Bor, on 1 November 
1990, he declared his commitment to Yugoslavia as "Drzava u kojoj su narodi i 
Ijudi ravnopravi" ("A State in which all nations and people are equar"). Not 
only would nations and peoples in Yugoslavia be equal - they would also live 
in peace and harmony (Milosevic, 2001, p.37). 
6 t'.lore about this \\ill be said in chapter 5. 
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Milosevic's speech in Bor, however, is never cited. Instead, great attention is 
often given to a speech that he delivered on 16 March 1991. Only a tiny part of 
this speech, however, is ever quoted. 
Tim Judah first mentions this speech on page five of his book. He writes, 
"Later, he [Milosevic] was to roar, 'If we don't know how to work well. .. at 
least we know how to fight well '" (Judah, 2000a, p.5). Judah gives no further 
details of the speech, and indeed does not refer to it again until page 172 of his 
book. Even then, he quotes from it very selectively. In short, Judah cites only 
those parts of the speech that, taken in isolation, can be used to support the 
argument that Milosevic wanted war. Similarly Thomas, who describes the 
speech as "aggressive", only cites this one particular sentence (Thomas, 1999, 
p.86). 
To put this sentence into context, the day after the resignation of Borisav Jovie, 
the Serbian President of the Federal Presidency, Milosevic called a private 
meeting of Serbia's municipal leaders. In response to a question by the 
municipal leader of Svetozarevo about Serbia's strategy in the event of 
Yugoslavia's break-up, Milosevic replied, 
Da li cemo mi da saopstimo preko radija sta cemo da radimo? Ja mislirn 
da to ne mozemo da ucinimo. A ako treba da se tucemo, bogarni cerno 
da se tucemo. A nadam se da nece biti toliko ludi da se sa nama tuku. 
Jer ako ne umemo dobro da radimo i privredujemo, bar cerno znati dobro 
da se tucemo (Will we announce on the radio what we will do? I do not 
think that we can do that. And if we need to fight. by God we will fight. 
And I hope that they will not be so crazy as to fight us. Because if we 
don't know how to work well and to do business, at least \\'e know how 
to fight well) (Milosevic, 1991, pA 1). 
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Despite the significance that has been attached to these sentences, it is argued 
that they do not allow us to say anything concrete about Milosevic' s intentions. 
He was not finnly committing himself to war. What he was basically saying 
was that if x happens, then y will happen, and this was in keeping with his 
overall style of leadership. He often kept his options open. To cite the 
Belgrade intellectual Aleksa Djilas, '"Milosevic always kept himself in the 
centre, and this gave him room to manoeuvre".7 The fact, moreover, that 
Milosevic was apparently making preparations for war does not necessarily 
mean that he wanted war or that he was planning war, notwithstanding claims 
to the contrary,8 Similarly, the fact that he spoke at Gazimestan, in June 1989. 
about the possibility of anned battles in the future does not necessarily mean 
that he was actually planning these battles,9 
It is necessary to reiterate that context is extremely important when looking at 
Milosevic's speeches. Individual sentences must not be extracted and looked 
at is isolation - they must be analyzed and interpreted within the context of the 
particular speech as a whole. We must also pay attention to comparative 
context. When looking at a particular speech, we should situate it within the 
context of other speeches that Milosevic made. 
For example, while enonnous attention has been given to Milosevic's claim 
that, '"And if we need to fight, by God we will fighC, he did in fact made 
7 Interview, Belgrade, 20 May 2004 
8 Zimmennann for example, describes Milosevic as "devising and pursuing a strategy that led 
directly to the' breakup of the country and to the deaths of OYer 100,000 of it,S citizens:: 
(Zimmennann, 1996, p,212): and Sell refers to "T\1iloseyic's drive to destwy 't ugoslana 
(Sell, 2002. p.l27). . ' . , .. . 
9 LeBor claims that "It was in Croatia and Bosma that T\ 11loseviC and I11S alhes \\ere planmng 
the 'anned battles' of which he had spoken at Kosovo in 1989" (LeBar. 2002. p.J39). 
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similar sorts of comments elsewhere. In his speech in Bor. on 1 NO\'ember 
1990, Milosevic stressed that Serbia would not tolerate violence against Serbs 
living outside Serbia, and warned that there would be "consequences" for the 
perpetrators of such violence (Milosevic, 2001, p.37). Later, in his speech at 
the Sava Centre, on 20 October 1994, Milosevic said that Serbia ..... bi se 
borila, kao sto bi se branila i svaka drZava na svetu, ako bi bila napadnuta" 
(" ... would fight, just as any State in the world would defend itself, if she \vas 
attacked") (Milosevic 2001, p.85). 
These examples suggest that for Milosevic, any military action that Serbia took 
would be purely defensive. Serbia would not be the initiator of such action, but 
would be merely responding to the actions of others. 10 This perhaps helps to 
shed new light on the speech he gave to Serbia's municipal leaders on 16 
March 1991. Was he being aggressive, or was simply saying that Serbia would 
do what was necessary in the circumstances? 
Let us now tum to the theme of inter-ethnic relations. We saw in chapter 1 that 
vanous authors have accused Milosevic of inciting and encouraging ethnic 
hatred. It is argued, however, that Milosevic' s speeches neither expressed nor 
fomented hatred of other Yugoslav nations. Speaking in Pirot, for example, on 
7 September 1990, Milosevic pointed out that Slovenes and Croats could not 
be held responsible for Serbia's economic difficulties (Milosevic. 2001, p.33). 
This is significant because if he had wanted to incite Serbian hatred of 
10 Milosevic repeatedly argued that the Yugosla\' \ \ a r ~ ~ were purely defensiw wars (pr Serbia. 
He also frequently claimed that Serbs had only e\'t'r fought defensi\'e \ \ ' a r ~ ~ .. In his ~ p e e c . h h at the 
Sa\"<J Centre, for example. on 20 October 1994. he declared that. "K.roz ~ I t a \ u u ~ \ ' o J ~ ~ IstonJu. 
Srbija je \'odila iskljuciyo oslobodilacke ratoye" (,Throughout her entire history. Serbia has led 
ex.c1usiwly liberating \ \ a r ~ " ) ) (f\lilosevic, 2001. p.85). 
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Slovenes and Croats, he could have done so by blaming these two nations for 
Serbia's economic problems. What MiloseviC's speeches actually emphasized 
was peace and equality between Yugoslav nations. 
Just as Milosevic underscored equality between the different nations In 
Yugoslavia, he also stressed the importance of equality within Serbia itself. 
Thus, for example, in a speech in Kosovo, in December 1992. he declared, 
"'Residents of Kosovo Polje! I wish to tell you that we adhere to the policy of 
ethnic equality throughout Serbia" (Milosevic, 1992b). In keeping with this 
promise, he called upon Serbs in Kosovo to develop "'unity, understanding, and 
love with all those who live in Kosovo". He did not indiscriminately attack all 
Kosovar Albanians. Instead, he reserved his wrath for the Kosovar Albanian 
leaders and their supporters. He argued that, 
We know that there are many Albanians in Kosovo who do not support 
the separatist policy of their nationalist leaders. They are under pressure, 
intimidated, and blackmailed, but we shall not respond with the like. We 
must respond by offering our hand, living with them in equality, and not 
permitting that a single Albanian child, woman or man be discriminated 
against in Kosovo in any way (Milosevic, 1992b). 
He continued, "We must, for the sake of all Serbian citizens, insist on the 
policy of brotherhood, unity, and ethnic equality in Kosovo" (Milosevic, 
1992b). 
Although Milosevic repeatedly emphasized the value of equality between 
nations, he did, on occasion, declare - or imply - that Serbia was, in fact. 
superior. For example, in the speech that he gave in Belgrade, on 24 December 
1996, he argued that despite all the pressures and misfortunes to \\"hich Serbia 
had been subjected, and which would have destabilized any other country, she 
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had not been destabilized (Milosevic, 2001, p.91). He was thus hinting that 
Serbia was special. Yet, context is very important here. Serbia had. as 
Milosevic pointed out in this speech, been through an extremely difficult 
period, leaving many people feeling disillusioned and hopeless. Thus. it could 
reasonably be argued that what Milosevic was trying to do in this speech was 
to restore a sense of pride and dignity in his people. 
Even if one does not accept that Milosevic was genume m his declared 
commitment to national equality, the fact is that when he spoke about inter-
ethnic relations, he underscored equality and peace, not hatred and violence. 
To conclude this section, it is simply impossible to know what Milosevic really 
wanted and what he genuinely believed. Yet, on the basis of the speeches he 
made in the period 1990-1998, three important observations can be made. 
First, there is nothing in his speeches to support the claim that his objectives 
radically changed in 1990/91, from wanting to preserve Yugoslavia to wanting 
a Greater Serbia. Secondly, there is no evidence in his speeches that Milosevic 
was planning war. Thirdly, his speeches do not support the claim that he 
incited and promoted ethnic hatred. 
While some commentators maintain that there is a lacuna between what 
Milosevic said and what he actually did, it can be argued that there is a gap 
between what these commentators themselves say and do. They are happy to 
comment on Milosevic' s character and intentions, yet few of them have taken 
the time to explore his speeches in detail. 
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(ii) The Economy 
That the economy constitutes such an important theme in Milosevic' s speeches 
is very significant. Firstly, contrary to the image of Milosevic as a warmonger, 
it shows that Milosevic' s priorities were primarily economic development and 
progress, rather than territorial expansion and the creation of a Greater 
S b · II er la. Secondly, MiloseviC's emphasis on economic issues challenges 
claims that he appealed to, and relied upon, ethnic hatred and chauvinism. 
Instead, it suggests that his appeal was more practical than ideological, and that 
what he instilled in people was not ethnic intolerance but the hope of a better 
life. 
In the period 1990-1998, MiloseviC's speeches focused heavily on the 
economy and the need for economic development. In his speech in Pancevo, 
for example, on 10 May 1990, he said that Serbia was resolved upon a 
programme of economic and social reforms (Milosevic, 2001, p.22); and in his 
speech at the Sava Centre in Belgrade, on 20 October 1994, he said that Serbia 
must draw upon all her resources to bring about economic stabilization and 
development, and to raise both community and individual standards 
(Milosevic, 2001, p.84). 
Milosevic was very good at setting targets (the creation of an efficient market 
economy, social and economic prosperity, modernization, advances in 
technology, economic integration with the rest of the world). but he generally 
II The only tYlJe of expansion that Milosevic talked about was economic e x p a n S l ~ ) n , , n ~ t t
territorial expansion. In Dnnno, for example, in July 1988, he maintained that Serbia "dOlt 
mobiliser pour son expansion economique ... " ("must mobilize for her economic expansion") 
(Milosevic. 1990, p.20 1). 
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said very little about how he planned to achieve those targets. For example, in 
the speech he gave on 24 December 1996, in Belgrade, he said that Serbia 
wanted to create numerous rights, including the right of workers to return to 
their jobs, the right of workers to live and to be paid well, the right of peasants 
to be paid on time for their produce, et cetera (Milosevic, 2001, p.91). Yet, he 
did not explain how such rights would be realized. He simply said, "S\'e te 
pravde mi treba da ostvarimo" ("'We need to create all of these rights") 
(Milosevic, 2001, p.92). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Milosevic did not fulfill his grand economic promises. 
However, he himself accepted no responsibility for this failure. Instead, he 
blamed the international community and sanctions. In his Closing Statement to 
the Second SPS Congress, in October 1992, for example, he said, 
Although the crisis we are facing is not only the result of developments 
in Serbia, but largely the consequence of international interests and the 
policy pursued in keeping with those interests, we here in Serbia are 
obliged to do our best in order to weather the crisis as soon as possible. I 
here have first of all in mind the sanctions ... (Milosevic, 1992a). 
He also repeatedly claimed that there were various forces, internal and 
external, seeking to harm Serbia. In Pirot, for example, on 7 September 1990, 
he referred to the existence in Serbia of "konzervativnih, primitivnih i 
rusilackih snaga ... " (,,"conservative, primitive and destructive forces ... r 
(Milosevic, 2001, p.33). In a similar vein, speaking in Belgrade, on 24 
December 1996, he claimed that a strong Serbia was not in the interests of 
many powers outside Serbia, and that these powers were working with a "fifth 
column"12 inside Serbia to destabilize the country (Milose\ic, 2001. p.91). 
12 He \\'as referring here to the Serbian Oppl)sition. namely. the Zajedno r - r o ~ l , t h e r " ) ) coalition. 
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It proved extremely useful for Milosevic to emphasize the existence of these 
enemies and ill-wishers, not least because it provided a way to unite the nation 
behind him. In his speech in Belgrade, on 24 December 1996, for example, he 
declared that despite efforts to weaken and destabilize Serbia, ·'Izaci cemo ne 
slabiji nego jaci, jer se Srbija pod pretnjama i pritiscima uvek ujedini cvrsce i 
snaznije" ("'We will emerge not weaker but stronger, because when threatened 
and pressured Serbia unites more firmly and strongly") (Milosevic, 2001, 
p.92). 
While portraying Serbia as a victim of both internal and external forces, 
Milosevic also promoted the image of brave and courageous Serbia, remaining 
strong in the face of outside pressures. This further served to detract attention 
from his own responsibility for Serbia's economic crisis. For example, in his 
speech at the Third SPS Congress, on 2 March 1996, he said that Serbia "is 
quite understandably very exhausted economically, but even in the course of 
these several difficult years it kept going as best as such grave circumstances 
permitted". He then added, optimistically, "'It is quite understandable to expect 
Serbia's economy to recover rapidly" (Milosevic, 1996). 
In view of his many promises regarding the economy, Milosevic could not 
speak only about Serbia' s economic difficulties. \3 Thus, the opening of a new 
factory, railway, or motorway was heralded as a great event and a sure sign of 
13 As will be seen in the data chapters. many of those intervie\\'ed as part l1f this research argue 
that Milose\'ic did not paint a true picture of the economic situation in his speeches, Rather 
than addressing the economic crisis. he glossed over it. 
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Serbia's economIC recovery.14 On these occasions, Milose\'ic once agam 
promoted the idea of brave and resilient Serbia who, against the odds, had 
made great progress. Thus, for example, on 7 July 1995, he declared that 
Serbia had succeeded in creating "najmodemiju najlepsu podzemnu 
zeleznicku stanicu u Evropi" ("the most modem and most beautiful 
underground railway station in Europe"), despite having been under a total 
international blockade and subjected to unprecedented and continuing pressure 
(Milosevi6, 2001, p.85). 
Similarly, in his Inaugural Speech as Yugoslav President, on 23 July 1997, 
Milosevi6 said that Serbia had suffered numerous "blows" in the preceding six 
years, and that "These blows were brought about by the historical whirlpool 
that engulfed this part of the world" (Milosevic, 1997). He continued, "We 
could not fully protect ourselves from it, but we managed to resist its blows 
more than many other countries in a similar or even more favourable position 
than we were in" (Milosevic, 1997). As we shall see in the next section, the 
idea that Serbia had succeeded where others would have failed and simply 
conceded defeat became an increasingly prominent theme in MiloseviC's 
speeches. 
Throughout the nineties, Serbia was in the grip of an economic crisis, which 
created widespread poverty, fear, and feelings of insecurity and helplessness. 
Given these circumstances, Milosevic' s pronouncements on the economy 
14 On 7 July 1996, for example, Milose,ic opened a satellite ~ t a t i o n n near the \'illage l1f I\'anica. 
He told the gathering that the satellite signified Serbia's "continuing rapid dewlopment and 
movement forward in terms of our connections \\'ith the surrounding c o u r 1 t r i c ~ ~ and the outside 
world" (cited in Thomas, 1999, p . .2.25). 
1 6 ~ ~
would have sounded extremely appealing. Indeed, it is suggested here that 
Milosevic's economic promises were a significant reason for his widespread 
popularity, particularly during the first half of the nineties. This is borne out by 
the fact that his greatest supporters came from low-income social groups, such 
as pensioners, peasants, and housewives. 
Yet, the economy proved to be a double-edged sword for Milosevic. It helped 
to strengthen his grip on power, but also to weaken it, and ultimately it helped 
to bring down his regime. Milosevic' s failure to fulfill his economic promises 
was a major reason why so many Serbs turned against him. IS For example, the 
results of 840 interviews conducted in Serbia by the NDI I6 , in the last week of 
September 1999, showed that 64% of interviewees blamed the Serbian 
government and Milosevic for Serbia's poor economic situation. By contrast, 
only 3% blamed sanctions, and just 2% blamed the NATO bombing (NDI, 
1999).17 
The part that the economy played in Milosevic' s fall from power is further 
evidenced by the results of public opinion polls conducted by TSN Medium 
Gallup, in April, June and August 2000. These polls, which used national 
representative samples, showed that for the majority of respondents, economic 
issues were the most urgent. In April 2000, out of a total of 1088 respondents. 
32.4% selected economic issues as the most pressing. In June 2000, the figure 
J5 According to Professor Vojin Dimitrijevic, from the Belgrade Centre i ( ~ r r Human Rights, 
"Milosevic was immensely popular, until somewhere in 1998. He dIscovered 10 the 
demonstrations of 1996-1997 that, after a long period of peace, the citizens of Serbia now 
realized that the standard of living was lower and lower, that inflation \\as high. that there \ \ ' a ~ ~
general impoverishment" (Interview, Belgrade, 26 May 2004). . 
J6 This is an American-based political institute that has an office 10 Belgrade. 
J 7 Similarly, the Serbian interviewees. as will be seen in chapter -. o\-efwhelmingly blame 
Milose\'ic for Serbia' s economic crisis. 
was 28.9% (out of a total of 1095 respondents); and in August 2000, 45° <> of 
the 1096 respondents selected economic issues as being the most important 
(TNS Medium Gallup, 2000). 
These poll results show that by the late nineties, popular dissatisfaction with, 
and opposition to, the regime were growing. In the final two years of its life, 
the Milosevic regime became more and more desperate. It was increasingly 
running out of options, and thus had to employ new tactics. 
Section 3 - MiioseviC's Speeches, 1999-2000 
The speeches that Milosevic made in 1999 and 2000 were quite different, both 
thematically and stylistically, from his earlier speeches. Two particular themes 
dominated MiloseviC's speeches in these final two years - the NATO bombing 
and the role of the Serbian Opposition. Although these were new themes, they 
were not unrelated to some of the themes in his earlier speeches. For example, 
we have seen that he blamed the international community for many of Serbia's 
problems. In 1999 and 2000, his attacks simply became more specific -
NATO was now the target. Furthermore, while his earlier speeches had 
consistently identified the existence of ill-defined "forces" seeking to harm 
Serbia and her interests, they now identified a far more concrete threat - the 
Serbian Opposition. 
These two new themes effected a change in the style and tone of Milosevic' s 
speeches. The most noticeable change was in the type of language he used. In 
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contrast to his earlier speeches, Milosevic' s speeches in 1999 and 2000 \\ere 
characterized by strong colonial-type language. 
The tone of his speeches also became more dramatic, and more complex. 
Some speeches had a triumphant tone, created by Milosevic' s repeated claims 
that "small Serbia" had defeated the mighty NATO. Other speeches had an 
aggressive and confrontational tone, produced by Milosevic's increasingly 
bitter attacks on the Serbian Opposition. Finally, in the speeches that 
Milosevic made shortly before the fall of his regime, on 5 October 2000, the 
tone was increasingly desperate. 
(i) The NATO Bombing 
In many of the speeches he made in 1999 and 2000, Milosevic bitterly 
condemned the NATO alliance and its "'aggression" against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. In Leskovac, on 11 October 1999, for example, 
Milosevic accused NATO of committing genocide against Serbs and other non-
Albanians in Kosovo, with the help of Albanian criminals, terrorists, and drug-
dealers (Milosevic, 2001, p.131). He also described NATO as an armada of 
the most heavily armed murderers in the world, "koje ne znaju ni koga ni zasto 
ubijaju ... " ("who do not know either who or why they are they killing") 
(Milosevic, 2001, p.130). 
Later, at the Fourth SPS Congress, on 17 February 2000, he referred to the 
NATO war as a "disgraceful and cruel war" (Milosevic. 2000a). and claimed 
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that, "In 1999, new Fascism focused on little Serbia, with a tendency of 
singling out several streets with maternity hospitals" (Milosevic, 2000a). 
Milosevic's speeches also emphasized how Serbs had bravely defended the 
country against the NATO "aggressor". In his New Year message in January 
2000, for example, he declared that Serbs had heroically defended the 
fatherland in front of the whole world (Milosevic. 2001, p.I34). 18 The irony is 
that while Milosevic consistently stressed the courage with which Serbs had 
defended their country, the reality is that few Serbs had been willing to fight, or 
to sacrifice themselves for the sake of Kosovo. For example, a poll taken by 
the independent newspaper Nedeljeni Telegraf, on 11 March 1998, showed that 
more than 70% of those asked were against sending a close relative to fight in 
Kosovo (Liotta, 1999, p.32). 
According to Milosevi6, Serbs had been forced to defend not only their 
country, but also their freedom. During a visit to the Zastava factory in 
Kragujevac, for example, on 15 September 2000, he declared that the NATO 
alliance '"ima za cilj kolonizaciju nase zemlje, Balkana i celog sveta, 
verovatno" ('"has as its objective the colonization of our country, of the 
Balkans, and probably of the entire world") (Milosevic, 2001, p.152). Later, in 
his Address to the Nation, on 2 October 2000, he claimed that, "These imperial 
powers do not want peace or prosperity in the Balkans. They want this to be a 
zone of permanent conflicts and wars which would provide them with an alibi 
18 According to a female interviewee in Belgrade, "t\lilosevic assured us every night that we 
had \H)fi the \\'ar and that we had \H)11 against NATO [laughs]. \\·ell. \\hat can you s a ~ " ) ) The 
country was destroyed completely, but \'ie \\'011 [laughs], What was \\\)rse than the bomblllg 
\\as the pwpaganda that came after" (G). 
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for maintaining a lasting presence" (Milosevic, 2000b). The following month, 
at the Fifth SPS Congress, on 25 November 2000, he described NATO's 
presence in Kosovo as a new and contemporary form of colonization 
(Milosevic, 2000c). 
Such language constituted an important stylistic change in Milosevic speeches. 
The tone of MiloseviC's speeches also changed, becoming increasingly 
triumphant, even nationalistic. For example, in his Closing Statement to the 
Fourth SPS Congress, he proclaimed, "The entire world is aware that in this 
war we have offered resistance in all ways - by arms, media and morally. And 
that in all of the three ways we were superior" (Milosevic. 2000a). Similarly, 
in a speech in N egotin, on 12 September 2000, Milosevic claimed that Serbs 
had demonstrated to the world their superiority as a civilization (Milosevic, 
2001,p.150). 
At the same time, however, Milosevic also portrayed the Serbs and Serbia as 
victims. In Leskovac, for example, on 11 October 1999, he declared that 
during the past ten years, Yugoslavia, and especially Serbia, had suffered every 
possible social and natural misfortune, including "i ratovi i izbeglice i sankcije 
i zemljotresi i poplave i neprekidni politicki i medijski pritisci" ('"wars and 
refugees and sanctions and earthquakes and floods and constant political and 
media pressure ")(Milosevic, 2001, p.132). Later, in his Closing Statement to 
the Fourth SPS Congress. he referred to the "tyrants" tormenting Serbia 
(Milosevic. 2000a). 
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In his trial in The Hague, Milosevic has continued to promote the image of 
Serbia as a victim, indeed an eternal victim. In his Introductory Statement on 
13 February 2002, for example, he argued that, 
What you are trying to prove here is that there is great suffering in war. 
that people die, that people suffer, that victims suffer greatly. Well 
everyone knows that, especially us, since we were the victims of most 
wars in Europe (Milosevic, 2002, p.212). 
(ii) The Serbian Opposition 
Sell writes that, 
Toward the end, Milosevic thought he was much more secure than he 
actually was, according to insiders, and this sense of complacency may 
have contributed to the relative ease with which Milosevic fell under 
pressure of street demonstrations in October 2000 (Sell, 2002, p.181). 
Others share this view. Professor Svetozar Stojanovic, from the University of 
Belgrade, for example, argues that when Milosevic called early elections l9, this 
was '"a crucial mistake" and '"another of his self-delusions". According to 
Stojanovic, '"Milosevic somehow persuaded himself, and was persuaded by his 
wife, that his standing among the Serbs was so high that he would defeat 
everybody in the elections, although he did not have to call those elections"?O 
In a similar vein, Milorad Vucelic, the current vice-president of the SPS and 
the former director of Radio Television Serbia (RTS), argues that, 
In the end, Milosevic lost touch with reality. He called elections a year 
early because he believed he had never been stronger. This is what the 
people around him were telling him. He also believed that the 
Opposition would not be able to unite against him?l 
19 Milose\ic's mandate did not expire until July 2001. but he called elections for 24 September 
2000. 
20 Intenie\\. Belgrade, 29 June 2004 
21 Intenil'\\'. Belgrade, -" June 2004 
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Notwithstanding these arguments, the fact that MiloseviC's speeches 
increasingly attacked the Serbian Opposition, and sounded more and more 
desperate, suggests that he may have been aware of his own vulnerability. It is 
also significant that whereas Milosevic had always made very few public 
appearances and rarely gave interviews22 , in the second half of 1999 he 
suddenly began to appear in public far more frequently. For example, three 
days before the election he had scheduled for 24 September 2000, he made two 
campaign appearances in one day, for the first time since coming to power in 
1989. This again may suggest that he knew he needed to try and regain his 
former popularity. 
In his earlier speeches, Milosevic had avoided making direct attacks on his 
political opponents. As Thomas argues, "Milosevic rarely insulted opposition 
leaders, preferring to regard them as politically irrelevant" (Thomas, 1999, 
p.75). When Milosevic did refer to the Opposition, he generally did so in a 
non-hostile way. For example, in 1992, in his Closing Statement to the Second 
SPS Congress, he simply commented that while the Party "has no reason to 
avoid or shirk from such criticism" by the Opposition, at the same time "it is 
not the task of the ruling party to make unprincipled concessions to opposition 
parties, nor to determine its programme, organisation and personnel policy 
according to the criteria set by its political adversaries" (Milosevic, 1992a). 
22 Borisa\' Jo\'ic. a close Milosevic associate, recalls how l\lilose\'ic never wanted to walk 
through the streets of Belgrade and al\\'ays asked, "Zasto nam to trebaT ("Why do we need 1\) 
do that?") (Jo\'ic, 2001, p.IS), 
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However, as Milosevic's regime became less secure23 , it increasingly targeted 
the Opposition. This is particularly well illustrated by MiloseviC's Closing 
Statement to the Fourth SPS Congress. In that speech, he declared that Serbia 
did not have an opposition. She simply had "a group of bribed weaklings and 
blackmailed profiteers and thieves" who were exploiting the situation and 
manipulating the Serbian people (Milosevic, 2000a). Later, on 21 September 
2000, in rallies in Belgrade and Montenegro, "he delivered slashing attacks on 
the Opposition, calling them "rabbits, rats, and even hyenas' who wanted to 
tum Serbia into a 'permed poodle' and had "the loyalty of dogs' to the NATO 
masters "who bribe and pay them'" (Sell, 2002, p.337). 
Milosevic attacked the Opposition in two main ways. Firstly, he portrayed it as 
totally incompetent. For example, at the Fourth SPS Congress, he argued that 
in those towns where local governments had been set up "as branch offices of 
some Western governments", there was no longer any public transport (and if 
there was, it was too expensive for people), the streets were not cleaned, 
corruption was rampant, et cetera. He further claimed that these local 
authorities had committed evil against the Serbian people, "because they 
became the present-day janissaries" (Milosevic, 2000a).24 
Secondly, Milosevic accused the Opposition of serving the interests of foreign 
powers. For example, in his Address to the Serbian Nation, on 2 October 2000, 
he claimed that, "For a long time there has been a grouping among us which, 
23 By mid-2000, according to Cohen, the Milosevic regime was "debilitated and angst-ridden" 
(Cohen, 200 I, p.XY). .,' 
.'4 The brutal behaviour of the janissaries in the Pashahk ot Belgrade, dunng the Ottoman 
occupation, was a major catalyst for the First Serbian Uprising (1804-18 U). led by 
Karadjordje. 
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under the guise of being pro-democratic, have in fact represented the interests 
of the governments attacking Yugoslavia, especially Serbia" (Miloseyic, 
2000b). He further argued that the real leader of the Democratic Opposition of 
Serbia (DOS) was not Vojislav Kostunica, but rather Zoran Dindic, who 
"collaborated with the military alliance that attacked our country" (Milosevic. 
2000b). 
This speech, Milosevic' s first televised address to the Serbian people since the 
end of the Kosovo war, was made on the day of the run-off election with 
Kostunica.25 The very fact that Milosevic spent the entire speech attacking the 
Opposition shows just how vulnerable he was feeling (and with good reason, 
given that just three days later his regime was spectacularly toppled). In short, 
the speech was "a desperate address by a desperate man", trying desperately to 
cling on to power (Cohen, 2001, pA22). 
In this 2 October 2000 speech, Milosevic said nothing at all about his own 
policies, other than "It is precisely our politics which guarantees peace and 
theirs [the politics of the Opposition] which guarantees lasting conflict and 
violence ... " (Milosevic, 2000b). Instead, Milosevic spent the entire speech 
describing what life would be like in Serbia if the opposition were to come to 
power. The irony is that while he stressed all the dreadful and unpleasant 
things that would happen, many of these things had already happened - under 
his rule. 
25 Kostunica and other opposition leaders refused to participate in run-otT election:-;. and in:-;tead 
called for a series of protest meetings throughout Serbia. 
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F or example, he warned that, 
All countries finding themselves with limited sovereignty and with 
~ o v e ~ e n t s s . controlled by foreign powers speedily become 
Impovenshed III a way that destroys all hope for more just and humane 
social relations (Milosevic, 2000b). 
Yet, the majority of people in Serbia were already very pOOr.26 He also 
claimed that if the Opposition came to power, there would be a large socio-
economic divide between a poor majority and a rich minority. Again, 
however, such a divide already existed. For example, in 1993, according to 
one survey, the richest 100/0 in Serbia had at their disposal 37% of national 
income, while the poorest 100/0 had only 1.6% of it (Nikolic, 2002, p.88). 
Having painted a picture of what life would be like if the Opposition were in 
power, and having spoken about invasions and colonization, at the end of his 
speech Milosevic said, "Citizens, you must make up your own minds whether 
to believe me or not" (Milosevic, 2000b). It was almost as if he anticipated 
that many people would not believe what he was telling them. As if to prove 
his trustworthiness and credibility, he continued, 
My motive in expressing my opinion in this way is not personal; not at 
all. I was twice elected president of Serbia and once president of 
Yugoslavia. It should be clear to all, after the past ten years, that NATO 
isn't attacking Serbia because of Milosevic; it is attacking Milosevic 
because of Serbia (Milosevic, 2000b). 
This final claim was a last-ditch attempt by Milosevic to convince the Serbian 
people that he himself was not the problem. 
It has emerged from this analysis that there was a clear relationship between 
how secure Milosevic felt and how he treated the Opposition. \\'hen his 
26 As wi II be seen in chapters 5 and 7, many of the Serbian interviewees emphasize how poor 
they were during the 1\1 ilose\iC years. 
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position was very secure, he rarely mentioned the Opposition, and certainly did 
not attack it. Yet, as his position became more and more untenable, the 
increasingly united Opposition became a major target for him. Milosevic tried 
desperately to discredit the Opposition in every way he could, in particular by 
claiming that it was serving the interests of foreign powers. 
The problem for Milosevic, however, was that his growing sense of insecurity 
and desperation was reflected in his speeches, and in this way he perhaps 
contributed to a growing disillusionment with his regime. When he came to 
power, Milosevi6 appeared strong and confident, and this was arguably another 
reason why he had such strong popular appeal. It is normal for people, and not 
just Serbs, to want a strong and capable leader. If a leader appears weak and 
vulnerable, people are less likely to support him. 
By the end of the nineties, after everything the country had been through, the 
Serbs needed a leader who could take the country forward, a leader with fresh 
ideas and vision. Yet, Milosevi6 did not offer this - he could only attack the 
Opposition. His objective was to discredit the Opposition yet, paradoxically. 
he may have done the very opposite. The extent to which, in his Address to the 
Serbian Nation on 2 October 2000, he concentrated on the Opposition, was 
very revealing. He evidently regarded the Opposition as a formidable threat, 
and if it was a threat, then it was not simply a group of ""bribed weaklings. 
blackmailed profiteers and thieves". as Milosevic had claimed at the Fourth 
SPS Congress. 
175 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by looking at the two Milosevic speeches that have 
received the most attention in Western literature - his 1987 Kosovo Polje 
speech and his 1989 Gazimestan speech. It argued that through selective 
quoting and neglect of context, both speeches have been strongly 
misrepresented, to create and reinforce the image of Milosevic as a criminal 
leader and warmonger. 
Section 2 looked at some of the speeches that Milosevic gave between 1990 
and 1998, focusing on two recurrent themes - Yugoslavia and inter-ethnic 
relations, and the economy. It was argued that these speeches do not support 
claims that Milosevic wanted to create a "Greater Serbia", just as they do not 
substantiate claims that his regime fostered intolerance and ethnic hatred. It 
was also contended that excessive focus on, and misrepresentation of, one 
particular speech - the speech that Milosevic gave on 16 March 1991 - has 
served to reinforce the view of him as a criminal leader who planned the wars 
in the former Yugoslavia. Regarding the economy, it was argued that 
Milosevic's attractive economic promises help to explain both his initial 
popularity and growing unpopularity, and that he appealed to citizens on the 
basis of economic issues, rather than on the basis of nationalism and ethnic 
hatred. 
Finally, section 3 concentrated on the speeches that Milose\'ic gave during his 
last two years in power. It argued, and demonstrated, that these speechl?s \\crc 
thematically and stylistically different from r.vlilosevic·s earlier speeches, and 
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suggested that these changes can be attributed to the regime's grO\\lng 
desperation and sense of vulnerability. Milosevic' s increasing attacks on the 
Serbian Opposition, which he had previously tended to ignore, show that he 
had come to view it as a fundamental threat to his position.27 It was also 
during his final two years in power that Milosevic' s speeches became more 
overtly nationalistic, in particular by emphasizing Serbia' s superiority vis-a-vis 
the West. To say that there were elements of nationalism in Milosevic' s 
speeches should not, however, be taken to mean that they encouraged war and 
hatred; they did not. 
In the introduction to this chapter, it was argued that an important reason for 
analyzing MiloseviC's speeches is that they enable us to see how Milosevic 
portrayed himself as a leader, a dimension of his leadership that has received 
little attention in Western literature, and how he sought to win popular support. 
Now that we have examined his speeches, the following points can be made. 
The first and most important is that Milosevic did not in any sense portray 
himself as a war leader. Apart from the war in Kosovo in 1999, Milosevic 
never mentioned the wars in his speeches, except indirectly when he referred to 
Serbian refugees. 28 Just as he never referred to the wars directly, so he never 
actually declared Serbia' s war aims. To cite Tanner, ""Time and time again the 
n This is particularly significant gi\'en that. "In the history of Serbia the Opposition only ever 
\\'lm l)nt' eJection, that of 1888" (Stevanovic, 2004, p.5"7). . ) . 
28 For example, in his Closing Statements to the Second SPS C ~ n g r ( ' s s s and ~ o o the ,Fourth "I " 
<. 'ongTl'ss. ~ l i l o s e \ ' i c c talked about the assistance that Serbia had given to Serbian refugel's 
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complaint was raised that Serbia' s goal in the war had never been stated. No 
one knew what frontier the Serbs were fighting" (Tanner, 2001, p.2 70). 29 
Secondly, Milosevic portrayed himself as a strong, competent leader who 
would modernize Serbia and bring prosperity to its citizens. His speeches were 
not fluffy and ruminative. They typically called for action of some sort. To 
cite Judah, "What Mr Milosevic really likes to do is to make speeches about 
building high-speed railway lines. He likes to talk about being . constructive' 
and 'resolute'" (Judah, 2000b, p.33). Thus, 
In the early stages of his rise, Milosevic successfully developed the 
image of a young, decisive and modem leader who would lead Serbia 
away from the shibboleths and stagnation of self-management socialism 
into a more dynamic and prosperous future (Sell, 2002, p.51). 
Thirdly, we have learnt that Milosevic did not start to make direct attacks on 
the Serbian Opposition until 1999, when he felt increasingly vulnerable. By 
avoiding such attacks until this time, Milosevic portrayed himself as being 
somehow above politics. He presented himself as a statesman, rather than as a 
politician, and this perhaps helps to explain why he continued to inspire trust. 
For example, survey research conducted in 2000, by the Office of Research of 
the US Department of State, showed that even as late as the period March 1998 
to June 2000, Milosevic remained the most trusted leader in Serbia (Cohen. 
2001, p.361). 
Fourthly, particularly in his later speeches, Milosevic portrayed the Serbs. and 
by extension himself as a victim of Western, imperial powers. In his trial in 
29 At the same time, ~ I I iIoseyic did not conduct himself as a war leader. For example, he never 
\'isited Serb soldiers at the front or \\'ounded soldiers in hospital, and during the war in Kp,,()yo .. 
in 1999. "He did not ewn think of \'isiting the Kosovo he had so courageollsly defended or ot 
taking a walk in the Belgrade that loyed him so" (Ste\anlwic. 2004. p.IS7). 
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The Hague, he has continued to present himself as a victim. For example. in 
his Introductory Statement, on 13 February 2002, he spoke of "my crucifixion 
here ... " (Milosevic, 2002). As we shall see in chapter 7, a significant number 
of the Serbian interviewees also regard Milosevic as a victim who was 
sacrificed on the altar of Western interests. 
Finally, as we have seen, the economy constituted a major theme of 
Milosevic's speeches. It can, therefore, be argued that what Milosevic 
primarily appealed to in his speeches was not nationalism or chauvinism, a 
critical point in view of the literature' s claim that he incited ethnic hatred. 
Rather, what he mainly appealed to was peoples' hopes for a better and more 
prosperous life.3o In other words, his appeal was more practical than 
ideological. 
At the same time, by portraying himself as a strong and able leader who would 
take Serbia's economy in hand, he was also thus appealing to Serbian political 
culture, in particular authoritarianism3l , a "fatalistic attitude" towards change 
(Mihailovic, 1997, p.26), "the century-old propensity of the Serb people to 
follow authoritarian leaders" (Pribicevic, 1997, p.114), and the notion that 
30 The fact that Milosevic failed to fulfill his economic pledges, in the eyes of the Serbian 
interviewees, helps to explain why so many of them emphasize his poor mismanagement of the 
economy and economic crimes, as will be seen in chapter 7. According to the interviewees. 
rather than giving them a better life, Milose\ic actually made them extremely poor. 
,\ The Serbian psychologist Bora Kuzmanovic understands authoritarianism primarily as "an 
uncritical attitude towards authority and the principle of hierarchy in social relations - i.e. as 
authoritarian submissiveness and, at the same time. authoritarian dominance and 
aggressiveness to\\ards those \\'ho violate conventional norms" (Kuzmanovic: 19Q:;. ~ . l " - l ) . .
Vujo\ic similarly defines authoritarianism as "the uncritical bestowal l)t trust In and 
submission to a supreme leader" (\"ujovic, 2000, p.124). 
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Serbs are eternal victims.32 That Milosevic appealed to peoples' wants. needs 
and values helps to explain why he initially enjoyed strong popular support. 
In the introduction to this chapter, a second important reason was given for 
analyzing Milosevic's speeches. It was argued that this analysis would allow 
us to find out whether there is anything in what Milosevic actually said that 
supports two of the particular claims, central to his construction as a criminal 
leader that Western literature makes about him. The first of these claims is that 
he incited ethnic hatred and intolerance; the second is that he planned the wars 
in the former Yugoslavia. Having examined the speeches, it is argued that they 
do not support either of these claims. Only if we deal with the speeches in a 
highly selective, partial and context-oblivious manner is it possible to argue 
that certain speeches - or rather particular sentences - substantiate these claims. 
However, when the speeches are systematically analyzed, and when certain, 
oft-cited sentences are looked at in both the context of the particular speech as 
a whole, and in the context of other speeches more generally, they do not in 
any way lend weight to MiloseviC's construction as a criminal leader. More 
specifically, they do not provide any evidence of his "criminal" intent. Thus, 
on the basis of analysis ofMilosevic's speeches, the question of whether he is a 
criminal leader can be answered in the negative. 
32 Ramet refers to the Serbs' "victim complex" (Ramet, 1995, p.119). The Serbian O r t h o d o ~ ~
Church has played an important role in nourishing this idea of Serbs as victims. Fat?er NikolaJ 
Velimirovic, for example, one of the most influential Serbian Orthodox theologIans of the 
twentieth-century, claimed that, "Since the ancient people of Is:aeL I see ~ o o o t h ~ r r ~ l ( · o ~ l . e e In the 
world's history with a more tragical fate than that of the SerbIan people (VehmlfOnc, 1916, 
p.75). 
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Milosevic's speeches clearly constitute a valuable primary source that provides 
fresh insight into his leadership. Speeches, however, are intended for an 
audience, in this case Serbian citizens. Thus, now that we have explored the 
speeches themselves, we can tum our attention to the recipients of these 
speeches - ordinary people in Serbia. 
Leadership is a relationship that should be studied both from the top down and 
from the bottom up. This bottom-up perspective is especially valuable for 
studying a criminal leader. As emphasized in the preceding chapters, this is an 
externally constructed concept. It is important, therefore, to look at how 
Milosevic is seen by ordinary people - both Serbs and national minorities - in 
Serbia. Do they themselves see him as a criminal leader? This is a question 
that the interview data chapters will now seek to answer. 
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An Introduction to the Interview Data Chapters 
The following four chapters are based on the results of eighty-seven 
qualitative, semi-structured interviews. These interviews took place bet\\'een 
May and September 2004 in four main areas of Serbia - Belgrade, Vojvodina 
(Novi Sad, Subotica, Kikinda), Central Serbia (Cacak, Kragujevac). and South 
Serbia (Nis, Novi Pazar). Two interviews were carried out in Milosevic's 
hometown of Pozarevac, in eastern Serbia. In addition, some interviews were 
conducted in Kosovo, in both Serbian areas (Kosovska Mitrovica, Gracanica) 
and Albanian areas (Pristina, VucitmlVushtri). 
This short introductory section to the data chapters will begin by giving the 
reader essential information about the interviewees. It will then discuss 
sampling strategies and how the interviews were conducted. Finally, it will 
address some anticipated criticisms of the interviews. 
The Interviewees 
In total, there are ninety interviewees I in the sample, of which sixty-three men 
and twenty-seven women. The interviewees fall into three main groups. Since 
the thesis aims to generate a more bottom-up account of Milosevic' s leadership 
and regime, the vast majority of the interviewees are not elites, but "ordinary" 
people, defined as persons who, as individuals, have little direct influence on 
national affairs and policy-making. The non-elite interviewees can, in tum, be 
divided into two main groups - Serbs and national minorities. 
I Two of the interviews were group interviews, There were three intef\ie\\'ees in l10e group. 
and t\\'o intervie\\'ees in the other group. 
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The Serbian group comprises forty-nine interviewees, of which thirty men and 
nineteen women. Of these interviewees, twenty-five are under the age of 35 
(sixteen men and nine women). Fourteen interviewees are between the ages of 
35 and 50 (eight men and six women). Ten interviewees are over 50 (six men 
and four women). 
Seventeen of these forty-nine interviewees are from Belgrade (ten men and 
seven women), seven interviewees are from Vojvodina (five men and two 
women), seven interviewees are from Central Serbia (six men and one 
woman), three interviewees are from Southern Serbia (two men and one 
woman), two interviewees are from the town of Pozarevac (one male and one 
female), and eight interviewees are from Kosovo (four men and four women).2 
Finally, two interviewees are refugees from Croatia (one male and one female), 
and three interviewees are refugees from Bosnia (one male and two females). 
Of these forty-nine interviewees, thirty have been to university/are studying at 
university, and nineteen have not been to university. Of the thirty interviewees 
who have been to university/are at university, twenty-four speak English. Of 
the nineteen interviewees who have not been to university, only six speak 
English. In total, thirty interviewees speak English and nineteen do not. 
In the second, national minority group, there are eighteen interviewees -
fourteen men and four women. Ten interviewees are under the age of 35; six 
interviewees are between the 3ges of 35 and 50; and t\\"O interviewees are over 
2 -1\\"0 of these i n t e r v i e \ n ~ e s s art' now livlIlg as lOPs in Belgrade. 
the age of 50. Within this sample group, there are five Albanians - four men 
and one woman. Four of the interviewees are Kosovar Albanians. The fifth 
interviewee is an ethnic Albanian living in Belgrade. 
There are five ethnic Hungarian interviewees, four men and one woman. Three 
of the interviewees have two Hungarian parents. The fourth interviewee has a 
Hungarian father and a Serbian mother. The fifth interviewee has a Hungarian 
father and a Croatian mother. These last two interviewees will be classed as 
ethnic Hungarians because in the former Yugoslavia, a person's nationality is 
determined by the nationality ofhislher father. 
There are three Muslim interviewees, two men and one woman. The male 
interviewees are from the Sandjak of No vi Pazar, and the female interviewee is 
a Bosnian Muslim from Sarajevo. 
In the sample, there are also four Roma interviewees, three men and one 
woman, and one male Slovak interviewee. 
Of these eighteen national minority interviewees, eleven have been to 
university and seven have not. All of them speak English, except three of the 
four Roma interviewees. 
Since all of the non-elite interviewees were promised anonymity, only their 
initials will be used in the following chapters. 
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The third and final group of interviewees are ""elites'", defined as individuals 
who occupy posts of political command, as well as individuals who can 
directly influence policy-makers. The decision to include some elites in the 
interview sample, notwithstanding the thesis' emphasis on the view from 
below, was based on two particular considerations. Firstly, since it was 
anticipated that there would be gaps in the knowledge of the non-elite 
interviewees, it was felt that interviewing some elites would be important for 
giving us a more detailed picture of Milosevic and his leadership. Secondly, 
given that it was not possible to interview Milosevic himself, it was judged that 
the next best option would be to interview some elites who personally knew 
and/or worked with him. 
In this elite group, there are a total of twenty-three interviewees, of which 
nineteen men and four women. Six of the interviewees are former ministers or 
colleagues of Milosevic. Vladislav Jovanovic became the Foreign Minister of 
Serbia in August 1991. In April 1992, he took up the post of Foreign Minister 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), a position he occupied until 
August 1995. Zivadin Jovanovic served as the Federal Minister for Foreign 
Affairs between January 1998 and November 2000. He became a member of 
the main board of the SPS in 1996, and became one of the four vice-chairmen 
of the Party. 
Dr Oskar Kovac was a member of the Federal Government of Yugoslavia from 
1986-1989, and a member of the commission for economic refonn that 
Milosc\ic set up at the beginning of the 1990s. Kovac was abo deputy Prime 
Minister in Milan PaniC's government, in 1992. Today, he works at the 
Economics Faculty in Belgrade. Professor Kosta Mihailo\'ic was also a 
member of the above-mentioned commission for economic reform. and one of 
the authors of the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts (SANU). 
Professor Mihailo Markovic served on the committee for political reform that 
Milosevic created in 1989. Markovic was also the vice-president of the SPS 
from 1990 until 1992. Milorad Vucelic is the current vice-president of the 
SPS, and the former director of Radio Television Serbia (RTS). 
Six of the elite interviewees work in the media. Sasa Mirkovic is the general 
manager of B-92, an independent radio and television station in Belgrade. 
Janko Baljak is a documentary producer at B-92. Aleksander Nenadovic is the 
former editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper Politika. Vladimir Milic is a 
journalist at TV Mreza, a production company in Belgrade. Ljiljana Smailovie 
is a journalist for the weekly newsmagazine NIN in Belgrade. She has spent a 
considerable amount of time covering Milosevie' s trial in The Hague. Zoran 
Milesevic is the owner and director of VK TV in Kikinda. 
Six interviewees are academics. Aleksa Djilas is a Belgrade intellectual and 
the son of the famous dissident Milovan Djilas. Vojin Dimitrije\'ic is a 
Professor of International Law and the director of the Belgrade Centre for 
Human Rights. Mihailo Pantie is a Professor of Literature at the Philological 
Faculty in Belgrade. Dr Branka Prpa is a historian and the current director of 
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the Historical Archives in Belgrade. Professor Svetozar Stojanovic works at 
the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory in Belgrade. He was a special 
advisor to President Cosic and Prime Minister Panic from 15 June 1992 to the 
end of May 1993. Professor Ljubinka Trgovcevic was a member of the 
Serbian Parliament from 1984 until 1986, and a member of the Serbian 
Presidency when Ivan Stambolic, Milosevic's former mentor, was President of 
Serbia. Today, she is Vice-Dean of the Political Science Faculty in Belgrade. 
Three interviewees are politicians. Goran Svilanovic, Serbia's Foreign 
Minister from November 2000 until April 2004, is the current president of the 
Civic Alliance Party (GS). Nikola Lazic is the International Secretary of the 
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). Branislav Kovacevic is a member of the 
League for Sumadija party, and a candidate for the post of mayor of 
Kragujevac. 
The final two elite interviewees are experts on national minorities. Vladimir 
Djuric is a Legal Advisor at the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights. 
Marija Vujnovic is Project Manager at the Ministry for Human and Minority 
Rights. 
All of the elite interviewees, with the exception of one, are Serbian.3 Eighteen 
speak English and five do not. 
3 Dr Kovac is an ethnic Hungarian. Howe\,er, since he was selected ~ o r r i n t e n ' i ~ \ \ ' i n g g on .the 
basis of his economic knowledge and expertise. rather than because he IS an ethI1lc Hunganan, 
he \\ill be treated for these purposes as an elite inten·ie\\·ee. 
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Since there are no major differences between the elite interviewees and the 
non-elite Serbian interviewees in terms of how they perceive Milosevic. the 
two groups of interviewees are not treated separately in the following data 
chapters. However, as we might expect, the opinions of the Serbian 
interviewees (elite and non-elite) fundamentally differ from those of the 
national minority interviewees. Consequently, the interview data chapters deal 
with them separately. 
Sampling Strategies 
How were these three groups of interviewees selected? The main sampling 
strategy used to find ordinary Serbian people to interview was snowball 
sampling. This type of sampling is very practical, and it is particularly useful 
when one first enters the field and faces the daunting task of having to locate 
people to interview. In snowball sampling, the researcher asks the interviewee 
if he or she knows anybody who might agree to be interviewed. If the 
interviewee gives the names of three people, the researcher will contact each of 
them and, hopefully, arrange to interview them. These three interviewees will 
then be asked to suggest the names of other possible interviewees. The process 
continues until the requisite number of interviewees is found. In just one 
month, snowball sampling produced the initial target number of twenty-five 
interviewees. However, this type of sampling also has important limitations, as 
wi 11 be discussed. 
A second type of sampling used was purposive sampling. In purpOS\\C 
sampling, what is important is the relevance of the sample. The researcher 
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seeks to select infonnation-rich cases that will answer the research question s 
posed. In this case, purposive sampling was mainly used to find elite 
interviewees, in particular interviewees who personally knew Milosevic, and it 
proved very effective. Ten of the twenty-three elite interviewees in the sample 
knew Milosevic, and seven of these ten interviewees used to work closely with 
h· 4 1m. 
Purposive sampling was also used to find national minority interviewees. For 
example, contact was sought, and later established, with an NGO in Belgrade 
that works with Roma. Thanks to this NGO, Roma Heart, it was possible to 
visit two Roma settlements in Belgrade and to speak to some Roma people. In 
order to establish contact with other national minority groups, it proved 
necessary to travel out of Belgrade, to Vojvodina, to the Sandjak of Novi 
Pazar, and to Kosovo. 
The third and final sampling strategy used was opportunistic sampling. That is 
to say that any new opportunities that arose were always taken advantage of. 
For example, the invitation by one of the directors of Sloboda5 to attend a 
meeting of Sloboda activists was viewed as a good opportunity to establish 
contact with some Milosevic supporters who, up until that point, had been 
notably absent in the sample. A group interview with three Milosevic 
supporters followed from this meeting. The news that Sloboda would be 
4 For anyone undertaking this type of research, it is essential to haw good contacts. Being 
fortunate enough to haw these contacts, as a result of previous trips to S e r b i ~ , , mean.t that 
gaining access to important public figures. such as politicians and former foreign mllllsters. 
was very easy. Trying tl) arrange intervie\\'s with public figures in the UK would undoubtedly 
be far more difficult. 
5 "Sloboda" (""The Ireedom Association") is an NGO in Belgrade. It is helping M i l l l ~ k v i c c with 
his defence in fhe Hague. 
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holding a Vidovdan6 rally in the centre of Belgrade, on 28 June 2004, was seen 
as another valuable opportunity to meet some Milosevic supporters. As a 
result of attending this rally, two more Milosevic supporters were found and 
subsequently interviewed. 
The Interview Process 
An interview guide was drawn up prior to entering the field. When it was 
piloted, with the aid of six acquaintances in Belgrade, some small 
modifications were made. In particular, questions relating to very specific past 
events, such as the mass rallies of the late eighties, were taken out. The 
piloting showed that these events happened too long ago for people to be able 
to say very much about them. 
The final interview guide that was used for the interviews comprised twenty-
seven questions, grouped into eight main topics - (i) everyday life during the 
Milosevic years, (ii) Milosevic's leadership, (iii) Milosevic's speeches, (iv) the 
wars in the former Yugoslavia, (v) regime/society relations, (vi) the Media, 
(vii) the Hague Tribunal, and (viii) the present and the future. No interviewee 
was ever asked all twenty-seven questions, however. It was considered more 
important to allow interviewees to freely express their opinions and to discuss 
what mattered most to them. 
The interviews were kept as informal as possible, in order to put the 
interviewees at ease and encourage them to speak openly. Some of the most 
6 Vidovdan commemorates the Battle of Koso\'o in 1389. This battle. which was a defeat for 
Serbia. is Ol1e of the most important e\ents in Serbian history. 
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successful and useful interviews were conducted in very social and infonnal 
settings, for example in coffee shops and on cafe terraces. The interviews \\"ith 
elites were generally more formal, and most frequently took place in 
interviewees' offices. 
Most of the interviews lasted approximately one hour, but some were closer to 
two hours. The elite interviews tended to be slightly longer than the non-elite 
interviews. Two interviews were group interviews, with two and three people 
respectively. The rest of the interviews were conducted with just one person at 
a time. Most of the interviews were tape-recorded, although this was not 
always possible or appropriate, particularly in cases where interviewees were 
clearly very nervous. 
Some Anticipated Criticisms of the Interview Data 
Overall, the interviews were very successful, generating rich empirical data and 
thereby making an important contribution to the existing Western literature on 
the Milosevic regime. However, certain criticisms can be anticipated. Some of 
these will be standard criticisms of qualitative research in general, such as 
issues of validity and representativeness. We shall address these standard 
criticisms first, before considering some more specific anticipated criticisms. 
According to Silverman, ""Validity' is another word for truth. Sometimes one 
doubts the validity of an explanation because the researcher has clearly made 
no attempt to deal with contrary cases" (Silverman. 2000, p.175). Some critics 
191 
also question the validity of qualitative research by claiming that its findings 
are anecdotal. In the words of Bryman, 
There is a tendency towards an anecdotal approach to the use of data in 
relation to conclusions or explanations in qualitative research. Brief 
conversations, snippets from unstructured interviews ... are used to 
provide evidence of a particular contention. There are grounds for 
disquiet in that the representativeness or generality of these fragments is 
rarely addressed (cited in Silverman, 2000, p.177). 
Regarding the issue of validity, it is important to highlight that the researcher in 
the present case did make efforts to deal with contrary cases, namely by 
including some national minorities in the interview sample. As to the charge of 
anecdotalism, it should be emphasized that the interview data has been treated 
in a comprehensive and holistic manner. The following four chapters 
incorporate all eighty-seven interviews into the analysis, and aim to display the 
full richness and complexity of the data by presenting the variety of viewpoints 
expressed on anyone particular issue. As will be seen, moreover, the findings 
of the research are supported by various Serbian public opinion surveys. 
Thirdly, it is important to point out that some of the existing Western literature 
itself suffers from anecdotalism. This is particularly true of journalistic 
writings, which are very common. Prominent examples of anecdotalism are 
the various unsubstantiated claims made about Milosevic, such as '"War was a 
deliberate choice for the Milosevic regime ... " (LeBor, 2002, p.328), and 
'"There is no doubt that the paramilitaries functioned as one piece of 
Milosevic's carefully planned strategy to create a Greater Serbia" (SelL 2002. 
p.325). 
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Let us now tum to the more problematic issue of representativeness. 
According to Silverman, "the problem of 'representativeness' is a perennial 
worry of many qualitative or case study researchers" (Silverman, 2001. p . .249). 
First of all, it is extremely difficult for qualitative researchers to generate a 
representative sample, since the number of interviewees is typically quite small 
(ninety interviewees is a relatively large number for a qualitative study). More 
importantly, however, most qualitative researchers are not seeking to achieve a 
strictly representative sample.7 Rather, the aim is to produce a sample that will 
enrich and deepen our understanding of a particular phenomenon or problem, 
and/or to generate new insight by offering a fresh perspective. To cite Gaskell, 
"The real purpose of qualitative research is not counting opinions or people but 
rather exploring the range of opinions, the different representations of the 
issue" (Gaskell, 2000, pAl). 
It is, however, recognized that in the present case, there are important issues 
relating to the interview sample. One anticipated criticism is that there is not 
enough diversity in the total sample. Certainly, one of the trade-offs of using a 
snowball sampling strategy is that certain groups are likely to be over-
represented in the sample while others are under-represented. For example, 
there are sixty-three male interviewees and twenty-seven female interviewees 
in the total interview sample. In other words, the number of male interviewees 
is more than twice the number of female interviewees. 
7 To cite Jennifer Mason, "The key issue for qualitati,e sampling is therefore ho\\ to f o c u ~ . .
stralL'gically and meaningfully, rather than how to represent" (f\1ason, 2002. p.136). 
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Some might argue that this over-representation of male interviewees weakens 
the interview sample and the overall research findings. What is important to 
note, however, is that there are no significant differences between the attitudes 
of the male and female interviewees towards Milosevic. 
We can group these attitudes into four main categories - very critical, criticaL 
mildly critical, and supportive. Interviewees who are very critical of Milosevic 
hold him directly responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Those 
who are critical of Milosevic accuse him of caring only about himself and his 
power, and not about the Serbian people. Interviewees who are mildly critical 
of Milosevic emphasize his weaknesses and mistakes, for example his 
stubbornness, his failure to make long-term plans, and his neglect of PR work. 
Finally, there is a small, fourth group of interviewees who express support for 
Milosevic.8 Among the non-elite Serbian interviewees, 23.3% of men and 
15.80/0 of women are very critical of Milosevic; 43.3% of men and 47.3% of 
women are critical of him; 20% of men and 26.30/0 of women are mildly 
critical of Milosevic; and 13.3% of men and 10.5% of women express support 
for him. 
Just as there is a gender bias in the total interview sample, there is also an age 
bias. The under-35 age-group is over-represented, and the over-50 age-group 
is under-represented. For example, of the forty-nine non-elite Serbian 
interviewees. only ten are over 50. One practical reason for this is that the 
8 It is important to point out, howewr. that these c a t e g o ~ e s s - particularly the wry critical and 
critical categories - are not necessarily mutually exclUSive. 
older generation in Serbia typically do not speak English.9 \Vhat the interview 
data shows, however, is that interviewees over the age of fifty are the least 
critical of Milosevic. Of those interviewees who are very critical of Milose\'ic, 
28%> are under the age of thirty-five; 14.3% are between the ages of thirty-fi\e 
and fifty; and only 10% are over fifty. In contrast, of those interviewees that 
express support for Milosevic, 80/0 are under the age of thirty-fiye: 7.1 % are 
between the ages of thirty-five and fifty; and 30% are over fifty. The fact that 
pensioners were among Milosevic' s strongest supporters IO is thus reflected in 
the interview data, despite the under-representation of those over the age of 50. 
Although the total interview sample may not be evenly balanced, its strength is 
that it includes two particular groups of people who have received little 
attention in Western literature - ordinary Serbs and national minorities. The 
inclusion of these two groups makes the sample far more representative and 
more diverse than a sample that includes only elites, the social group that 
Western literature typically focuses most heavily upon. Ideally, there would 
have been more national minority interviewees in the sample. That there are 
only eighteen reflects the fact that it proved far more difficult to find non-Serb 
interviewees. However, what we learn from these eighteen interviewees about 
their experiences of life during the Milosevic years, a very under-researched 
area, is extremely valuable. 
A final anticipated criticism of the interviews relates to the fact that that there 
is a preponderance of English-speaking interviewees in the sample. Of the 
9 Today, many Serbian children learn English in schooL Older generations. howevt'r. \\ere 
more likely to learn Russian. 
10 This point wi 11 be discussed more in chapter 7. 
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ninety interviewees in the total sample, sixty-three speak English and twenty-
seven do not. This, it might be argued, constitutes a significant bias, since the 
opinions of these English-speaking interviewees are unlikely to reflect popular 
opinion as a whole. Certainly, it does appear that there are attitudinal 
differences between English-speaking interviewees and non-English speaking 
interviewees. In particular, interviewees who do not speak English are less 
critical of Milosevi6 than interviewees that do speak English. For example, of 
the forty-nine non-elite Serbian interviewees in the sample, seven are mildly 
critical of Milosevi6. Of these seven interviewees, five do not speak English 
and two do. Of the same forty-nine interviewees, six express support for 
Milosevi6. Of these six, only two speak English; and of the four interviewees 
who admit that they used to support Milosevi6, only one speaks English. 
However, in response to those who might argue that far more non-English 
speaking interviewees should have been included in the sample, the following 
points should be made. Firstly, forty-five of the total eighty-seven interviews 
took place in Belgrade, chosen as a main base for practical reasons, and many 
people in Belgrade do speak English, particularly young people. 
Secondly, the use of a snowball-sampling strategy tended to produce 
interviewees that spoke English. If the first interviewee had some knowledge 
of English, it was quite likely that he or she would know other people who 
spoke English. 
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Thirdly, employing a professional interpreter is very expensive, even in Serbia. 
Since resources were limited, therefore, this was simply not a realistic option. 
In those cases where the interviewees did not speak English, friends or 
colleagues translated. Four of the interviewees were conducted in Serbian 
without any assistance. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that gaining the trust and confidence of 
interviewees was always a key priority, since it was felt that this would 
encourage people to speak openly. In those cases where interviewees spoke 
English, this desired trust was usually established. However, in those cases 
where it was necessary to rely upon a third person to translate, the possibility 
of developing any kind of rapport between interviewer and interviewee was 
significantly lessened. In such cases, the primary interaction was between 
interviewee and translator, while the interviewer was an outsider. In short, 
where the interviewer and interviewee were able to directly communicate, 
without the aid of a third party, this created more suitable interview conditions 
than was the case when a translator was involved. The use of a translator lent 
an air of formality to the interview, and preserved a certain distance between 
interviewer and interviewee. 
Let us now tum to some more specific anticipated criticisms of the interview 
data. Firstly, some might argue that the interviews are of limited value because 
they are retrospective. Milosevic came to power in 1989 and fell from powcr in 
2000. The interviews were conducted in 2004. This raises an obvious 
question: how reliable are peoples' memories': Of course, it is incyitable that 
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interviewees will not be able to remember everything. As Weiss argues, "The 
vagaries of respondent memory make for reports in which some observations 
are crystal clear while others are obscured or distorted or blocked" (\\' eiss. 
1994, p.149). 
What is striking, however, is the vividness of recall when interviewees talk 
about their everyday life experiences during the Milosevic years. Asked the 
question, "Could you tell me something about what everyday life was like for 
you during the nineties?" many of the interviewees give highly detailed 
descriptions of both their lives and, in some cases, of their feelings at the time. 
The fact that the interviewees' recollections and descriptions are very similar is 
an important indication of their reliability. 
Furthermore, the thesis seeks to deal with this issue of the interviews being 
retrospective through triangulation. It uses public opinion poll data and other 
sources, such as the website of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting 
(IWPR) and the website Free Serbia, in order to contextualize and add weight 
to the interview data. 
It is also important to stress that while interviewees may not remember 
everything, gaps in memory can themselves be highly significant. In 
particular, they can be seen as coping mechanisms. Jansen' s study of five post-
war Croatian villages, for example, shows how 
largely homogeneous narratives of past and present relied on ~ t r a t c g i c s s of 
vagueness and selective amnesia. In a context of danger and P l ) \ ~ r t y , ,
such ways of coping allowed people not to be implicated in pntcntlally 
threatening debates (Jansen. 2002. p.88). 
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A second possible criticism of the interviews is that because they are 
retrospective, they can only tell us how the interviewees feel ~ b o u t t
Milosevi6 today, not how they felt about him during the 1990s. This 
raises the important question of whether the opinions that the 
interviewees hold today are likely to resemble those they held when 
Milosevi6 was in power. It is significant, for example, that only six of 
the forty-nine non-elite Serbian interviewees actually express support for 
Milosevi6 today (and four interviewees admit that they used to support 
him). 
Since it is likely, given Milosevi6' s initial levels of popularity, that more of the 
interviewees would have actually supported Milosevi6 in the past, it may be 
inferred that their opinions of him have fundamentally changed. HO\\'e\'er, 
because the data does not tell us what the interviewees thought about Milosevic 
during the 1990s, we have nothing against which to compare their current 
opinions and thereby ascertain in detail precisely how their opinions of him 
have changed. Certainly, this is an important limitation of the data. 
On the other hand, it should be emphasized that no Western academic 
undertook this type of bottom-up research when Milosevic was in power. The 
present research makes an important contribution to the existing Western 
literature, but it cannot compensate for research that, regrettably, was not done 
a decade ago. 
It should also be underlined that the image of Milosevic as a criminal leader is 
relatively recent - in 1995 for example, the international community saw 
Milosevi6 as a peacemaker. Thus, in order to explore whether and to what 
extent ordinary people in Serbia support this image of ~ ~ lilosevic as a criminal 
leader, it makes most sense to examine how they yiew him today, The 
interyicws themselyes could be made the basis for future quantitati\'e research, 
for example surveys. Such research would allow us to find out how 
representative the opinions of the interviewees actually are. 
Thirdly, the interview data raises the important Issue of \\'hether the 
interviewees are always telling the truth. For example, it is quite likely that 
more interviewees in the sample used to support Milosevic than are willing to 
admit. To conclude from this, however, that many of the interviewees are 
simply lying is over-simplistic. As Dean and Whyte argue, 
... the interviewer is not looking for the true attitude or sentiment. He 
should recognize that informants can and do hold conflicting sentiments 
at one time and they hold varying sentiments according to the situations 
in which they find themselves (Dean and Whyte, 2003, p.258). 
The very fact that many of the Serbian interviewees view Milosevic both as a 
"bad" leader and as a victim highlights this. 
It is also important to emphasize that, "Respondents tend to gIve socially 
approved answers to our questions, to over-report their virtuous actions and 
under-report their vices ... " (Aldridge and Levine, 200 I, p.I 03). In the present 
case, the fact that the interviewer is a female from the UK might, according to 
some, increase the likelihood of interviewees giving what they consider to be 
socially desirable answers. For example, is it likely that many interviewees 
would want to admit to an interviewer whose country bombed Serbia and 
Kosovo just six years ago - precisely because of Milosevic - that they support 
or used to support Milosevic? 
It is impossible to know whether and to what extent the interviewer" ~ ~
nationality has affected the answers that the interviewees give. It would he 
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interesting to find out if a researcher from, for example Hungary or Bulgaria, 
would receive similar answers. What can be said, however, is that every etTort 
was made to gain the trust of the interviewees. For example, as previously 
noted, the interviews were deliberately kept as informal as possible. The use of 
a snowball sampling strategy, moreover, meant that the interviewees knew 
something about the interviewer in advance, from those who had already been 
interviewed. It is true that on a couple of occasions, the interviewer was 
accused (although not by any of the interviewees) of bombing the Serbs. The 
majority of Serbs, however, are able to differentiate between the British 
government and an individual British researcher. 
In some respects, moreover, the nationality of the researcher (and perhaps also 
her gender) was arguably an advantage. Given that the Serbs were so heavily 
demonized in the West during the nineties, many of the interviewees seemed 
only too happy to have the opportunity to speak, and to give their side of the 
story, to a Western researcher. 
Finally, some might argue that there is little value in interviewing ordinary 
people, on the grounds that ordinary people have only limited knowledge and 
opinions that simply reflect those of the elite. Some of the interviewees 
themselves admit this. To quote a female interviewee in Belgrade, for 
example, '"Ordinary people don't know anything except what is \\·ritten in the 
papers" (MY). For his part, a male interviewee in Novi Sad ex.plains, ··It is 
very difficult to make sense of the Milosevic years, because e\er!1hing was 
happening behind closed doors" (OK); and a male ethnic Albanian interviewee 
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in Belgrade concedes, "I don't know much about Milosevic's politics ... 1 feel 
that I can only talk about my own experiences" (lG). 
At the same time, there is a tendency for interviewees to try and appear more 
knowledgeable than they may actually be. They do this by making 
unsubstantiated claims, often based upon rumour and hearsay. 11 One male 
interviewee in Belgrade, for example, claims that the American Administration 
was planning war in the former Yugoslavia. He also maintains that Tudjman 
paid the Clinton Administration to give military help to Croatia in 1995 (SZ). 
A female interviewee in Cacak, moreover, claims her son-in-law told her that 
Vuk Draskovic, the leader of the opposition SPO, helped Tudjman to win the 
elections in Croatia (VS). How would ordinary people know about such 
things? 
Certainly, there are gaps in the knowledge that ordinary people have, and they 
do sometimes make factual errors. For example, several interviewees confuse 
Milosevic's 1987 Kosovo Polje speech with his 1989 Gazimestan speech. 
However, this does not mean that there is no value in interviewing ordinary 
people. Firstly, any research that gives a voice to ordinary people is to be 
welcomed, given the existing Western literature's heavy neglect of the view 
from below. 
Secondly, while ordinary people will not necessarily have detailed factual 
knowledge, they can give us some important insight into what everyday life 
II A c c o r d i n ~ ~ to the sociology of rumour, rumour becomes more important in insecure. times, 
when p e o p l ~ ~ feel that ewnts are beyond their control. Rumour thus becomes mdlcatl\"e \)1 
social crisis. 
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was like during the Milosevic years, thus filling a significant lacuna in the 
existing Western literature. 
Thirdly, while ordinary people do not always perceive and understand things 
correctly, the errors they make are themselves important. For example, they 
are very relevant in helping to explain inter-ethnic tensions, which are often 
fuelled by misunderstanding and the fear that this induces. 
Finally, any gaps in the knowledge of ordinary people can be easily filled if we 
also include some elites in the interview sample. The knowledge and expertise 
of elites will complement and add texture to the picture painted by ordinary 
people. 
Now that the reader has important information about the interviewees and the 
interviews, let us now tum to the interview data itself, which is analyzed in 
chapters 5 to 8. 
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Chapter 5 
Domestic Views on an External Construction. , 
Part I - The Wars in the Former Yugoslavia 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter, and of the chapters that follow, is to explore the 
images that ordinary people in Serbia, both Serbs and national minorities, have 
of Milosevic, and to find out whether and to what extent they themselyes see 
him as a criminal leader. 
We saw in chapter 1 that the most important element in Milosevic's 
construction as a criminal leader is his actions and intentions. Using the data 
from eighty-seven semi-structured interviews, the present chapter and the 
chapter that follows will look at whether and to what degree the interviewees 
agree with the five key claims that Western literature makes with respect to 
Milosevic's actions and intentions. 
This chapter will concentrate on four of these claims, namely the claims that 
Milosevic (i) was most responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia, (ii) 
planned the wars, (iii) planned and premeditated the crimes committed by 
Serbian forces during these wars, and (iv) used violence to achieve his aims. 
Chapter 6 will deal with the fifth key claim made in the literature - that 
Milosevic incited ethnic hatred. It will also address the three remaining 
elements in Milosevic' s construction as a criminal leader - his motiyations. his 
personality and psychological profile, and his comparison with other 
"criminal" leaders. 
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In this chapter, as in the following three chapters, the interview data will be 
complemented by public opinion poll data. These public opinion polls \\"ere 
conducted between 1990 and 2005 by five polling agencies in Belgrade - the 
Agency for Applied SOciological and Political Research (,"ArgumenC), J{arten 
Board International, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Strategic 
Marketing and Media Research Institute (SMMRI), and TNS Medillm Gallup. 
The interview data will be also be supplemented with factual information from 
the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), Radio Free Europe, Free 
Serbia, and other similar sources. 
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1 provides some factual 
information about Milosevic' s policies that serves as an important backdrop 
against which to view the interview data. This section focuses on two 
particular policy issues that concerned Milosevic - the status of Serbia and its 
two autonomous provinces under the provisions of the 1974 Yugoslav 
Constitution, and the position of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and 
their right to self-determination. It argues that while Milosevic' s concerns 
were legitimate, they have been misconstrued as evidence of his determination 
to build a "Greater Serbia". More broadly, it maintains that in constructing 
Milosevic as a criminal leader, Western authors have fundamentally 
misrepresented his actions and intentions. 
Each of the remaining four sections addresses one of the particular claims 
made in the literature regarding Milosevic' s actions and intentions. Section 2 
explores whether the interviewees agree with the claim that it is Milosevic who 
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was most responsible for the wars in ex-Yugoslavia. Section 3 focuses on the 
claim that Milosevic planned the wars. Section 4 is concerned with the claim 
that the crimes Serbian forces committed during the wars were planned and 
premeditated, a claim that raises important questions both about the character 
of the wars, and about Milosevic' s level of control over the paramilitaries who 
committed the worst crimes. Finally, section 5 deals with the claim that 
Milosevic used violence to achieve his aims, by exploring interviewees' 
opinions about what constituted Milosevic's biggest crimes. 
As we shall see, there is a clear divide with respect to each of the above claims 
between the Serbian interviewees and the national minority interviewees. 
Section 1 - MiioseviC's Policy Concerns 
We saw in chapter 1 that central to the construction of Milosevic as a criminal 
leader is the notion that he bears greatest responsibility for the wars in the 
former Yugoslavia, and that he planned these wars in pursuit of a "Greater 
Serbia". Before we examine how the interviewees themselves assess 
Milosevic's responsibility for the wars and the extent to which his policies 
contributed to the wars, it is important to first provide the reader with some key 
information about Milosevic' s policies. 
This section, therefore, will focus on two particular issues that concerned 
Milosevic - (i) the position of Serbia and its autonomous provinces under the 
1974 Yugoslav Constitution, and (ii) the position of Serbs li\'ing in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina. It is argued here that while Milose\ic' s concerns 
regarding these issues were both legitimate and justified. his many detractors in 
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the West have chosen to overlook this. Thus, Milosevic' s acts of curtailing the 
autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and of anning the Serbs in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, are widely viewed as aggressive acts. In this way. the 
image of Milosevic as a criminal leader is reinforced. 
(i) Serbia and the position of its Autonomous Provinces 
A new Yugoslav Constitution was promulgated on 21 February 1974. Under 
this Constitution, "If all the republics were sovereign states, representing their 
complete territory, it was clear that Serbia did not possess that attribute" (Pesic, 
2000, p.31). This is because Serbia alone had autonomous provinces - Kosovo 
and Vojvodina - within her borders. These autonomous provinces, moreover, 
were equal to the republics in everything but name. What this meant was that, 
... S e r b i a ~ ~ according to the provisions of the 1974 Constitution, had 
within her political borders two political entities that, for all practical 
purposes, had political equality and full representation in the federal 
bodies. This considerably weakened the position of Serbia both within 
its own boundaries and in negotiations at the federal level (Crnobrnja, 
1996, p.94). 
For example, laws approved in Serbia had to be confirmed in the provincial 
parliaments, but legislation passed in the latter did not go to the Serbian 
parliament for approval. I In the judicial system, the court of appeal beyond the 
Supreme Court of Kosovo (or Vojvodina) was not the Supreme Court of 
Serbia, but that of the Yugoslav Federation. Thus, the provinces could block 
Serbia's passage of laws for the entire territory, yet Serbia could not block the 
laws of its own autonomous provinces, even though they were nominally part 
I A parallel can be drawn here with the so-called "West Lothian Q u e ~ t i o n " . . ~ h i ~ ~ r e f e r ~ ~ to a 
question posed by Tam Dalyell, MP for the Scottish constituency of \\' ~ ~ t t Lothian. dunng the 
debate over Scottish devolution in the 1970s. If power over Scottish a f t a l r ~ ~ w a ~ ~ devolved tl) a 
Scottish Parliament, how could it be right, Dalyell asked, that Scottish MPs at \ \ ' e ~ t m i m s t e r r
could \'ott' on issues affecting England, while English 1\ IPs could not vote on Scottish 1 ~ ~ U I . ? S . .
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of the Serbian republic. As Spencer notes, ..... there are few other countries in 
the world in which the third tier of government is so powerful" (Spencer, 2000. 
p.13). 
In short, Serbia's position under the 1974 Constitution meant that "40 per cent 
of the population who were of non-Serbian nationality made decisions about 
'narrower Serbia'" (that is to say, Serbia without the autonomous provinces) 
(Pesic, 2000, p.31). 
This was clearly a very unsatisfactory situation, and one that Milosevic - upon 
coming to power - sought to rectify, by amending Serbia' s own Constitution. 
According to the new Serbian Constitution, 'The territory of the Republic of 
Serbia is a single whole, no part of which may be alienated" (Article 4 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 1990). Under this Constitution. Kosovo 
and Vojvodina were still autonomous, but they were strictly units of territorial 
autonomy, without state functions (Article 6 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Serbia, 1990). 
From the perspective of Milosevic, and indeed of many Serbs, it was necessary 
to reduce the autonomy of the two provinces. in order for Serbia to attain a 
position analogous to that of the other republics in the Yugoslav Federation. 
Milosevic's many critics, however, have chosen to see something far more 
ominous in these constitutional changes. namely an aggressiye assertion of 
Serbia's authority that heralded the start of Milosevic' s drive for a "Greater 
Serbia". 
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It is interesting to note that while much is made in Western literature of the fact 
that Milosevic curtailed the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, far less 
attention is paid to the actions of his counterpart in Croatia, Franjo Tudjman. 
vis-a-vis the Serbian population in Croatia. To cite Hayden, ..... rather than 
reassure the Serbs of Croatia, the HDZ government [of Franjo Tudjman] 
embarked on courses on action that could not have been more alienating to the 
Serbs of Croatia had they been intended as such" (Hayden, 2000, p.69). 
For example, Croatia's new Constitution, promulgated on 22 December 1990, 
relegated the Serbs to the status of a minority. According to this Constitution, 
The Republic of Croatia is hereby established as the national state of the 
Croatian nation and a state of members of other nations and minorities 
who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, 
Hungarians, Jews and others (Radan, 2002, p.175). 
Furthermore, under Tudjman, an official document called a Domovina (a fonn 
providing proof of Croatian origin) was introduced, and this became an 
instrument of differentiation between Croats and non-Croats when it came to 
jobs and privileges. Such details, however, are scarcely mentioned in much of 
the Western literature on the former Yugoslavia. 
(ii) The Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Right to Self-
Determination 
According to the 1981 census, 1,958,000 Serbs (or 24% of all Serbs) Ii \ed 
outside the territory of the Socialist Republic of Serbia (Cohen, 1998, p.139). 
In Croatia, Serbs accounted for 12.2% of the population, and in Bosnia-
Hercegovina Serbs made up 31.4% of the population. When Croatia and 
Bosnia-Hercego\'ina seceded from Yugoslavia, by in\'oking their light to ~ d f f
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determination, this raised the fundamental question of whether the Serbs in 
these two former Yugoslav republics also had a right to self-determination. 
According to Hannum, 
Perhaps no contemporary norm of international law has been so 
vigorously promoted or widely accepted as the right of all peoples to 
self-determination. Yet the meaning and content of that right remain as 
vague and imprecise as when they were enunciated by President 
Woodrow Wilson and others at Versailles (Hannum, 1996, p.27). 
As Radan points out, "The critical question for self-determination relates to the 
meaning of 'peoples'" (Radan, 2002, pA). In the case of the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, however, the meaning of "people" was heavily contested. While 
the seceding republics claimed that "people" was to be understood in a 
territorial sense, the Serbs "maintained that the right to self-determination 
belonged to ethnic nations, encompassing, in particular, Serbs in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina" (Dimitrijevic, 1995, p.59). 
Unhelpfully, the 1974 Constitution was very vague on the question of self-
determination. It essentially fudged the issue, instead of clarifying it. To cite 
Dimitrijevic, " ... it remained unclear whether the subjects of this right were 
ethnic nations, as opposed to peoples in the sense of inhabitants of a state or 
territory ... " (Dimitrijevic, 1995, p.58). 
Article 5 of the Constitution stated that, "The frontiers of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia may not be altered without the consent of all the 
Republics and Autonomous Provinces" (Constitution of the SFRY, 1974). 
However, Article 3 of the Constitution vested sovereignty not in the republics. 
but in the people - "'The Socialist Republics are states based on the sovereignty 
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of the people ... " (Constitution of the SFRY, 1974). Furthermore, in its 
preamble, the Constitution referred to " ... the right of every nation to self-
determination, including the right to secession ... " (Constitution of the SFRY, 
1974). Thus, it can be argued that the preamble to the 1974 Constitution 
'"recognized a right of secession not to the Federate Republics, but to the 
constituent peoples, without in any case regulating if' (Bernardini, 2005). 
According to the traditional rules of legal interpretation, however, ..... the 
provisions of preambles are not binding but rather are to be used as aids in 
interpretation, while those of the operative articles are legally binding" 
(Hayden, 2000, p. 71). This distinction was important with respect to the issue 
of whether the republics of Yugoslavia possessed a right under the Federal 
Constitution to secede. 
While the constitutional position was far from clear, the seceding republics 
justified their secession from Yugoslavia on the basis of the right to self-
detennination.2 On 20 February 1991, for example the Slovenian Assembly 
passed a resolution by which Slovenia disassociated itself from Yugoslavia. 
This disassociation, as opposed to secession, was justified "on the basis of the 
penn anent and inalienable rights of self-determination of the Slovene nation, 
which is one of the basic principles of international law" (Radan. 2002. p.172). 
2 Hudson emphasizes that the Croatian and Slovene declarations of. indepen?ence, i ~ ~ 1991. 
were illegal under international law, because the international frontiers of '\ u g \ . l . ~ ; J a n a a we:e 
recognized under the Final Act at Helsinki, in 1975. This stated that changes to \ ugos\a\"la ; ~ ~
frontiers could not be made \\'ithout .. the consent of the governments and Pl'llpks c\l!lcerned 
(Hudson, 2003, p.86). 
.2 1 1 
On 11 January 1992, in its Opinion 2, the Badinter Commission3 gaye its 
answer to the key question of whether the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina themselves had a right to s e l f - d e t e n n i n a t i o n : ~ ~ Opinion 2 dealt 
with the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina as a minority and, as such. 
held that they did not have a right to self-detennination. Yet, as Radan argues, 
The Serbs had the same constitutional status under the 1974 Constitution 
of the SFRY as did the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, namely that of 
constituent nations ... It follows that as Croats, Bosnian Muslims and 
Serbs were constituent nations within the SFRY, one could not 
discriminate between their rights to self-detennination. If the Croats and 
Bosnian Muslims of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, in the exercise of 
their right to self-detennination, had the right to their own states at the 
expense of the borders of the SFRY, then logically the Serbs of Croatia 
and Bosnia-Hercegovina, in the exercise of their right to self-
detennination, had the same right at the expense of the borders of Croatia 
and Bosnia-Hercegovina (Radan, 2002, p.219). 
Furthennore, if the Serbs did not have a right to self-detennination because 
they were a minority, "How could the borders of the SFRY have been changed 
by the exercise of the right to self-detennination by groups fonning sections of 
the SFRY's population?" After all, "These groups were minorities in the 
context of the SFRY in that none of them was the largest national group within 
that state, just as the Serbs were not the largest group in either Croatia or 
Bosnia-Hercegovina" (Radan, 2002, p.217). 
3 The Badinter Commission was set up by the European Community in 1991. Composed of the 
presidents of the constitutional courts of five EC countries. the ~ o ~ i s s i ~ n ' s s role was to 
consider legal questions arising from the break-up of YugoslaVia, mcludmg the Issue of 
recognition. ..' 
4 On 21 December 1990 Serbs in the Knin region of Croatia proclaimed the formation of a 
Serb Autonomous D i s t r i ~ t t of Krajina (SAD Krajina). Two further autonomous districts -. of 
Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem, and of Western Slavonija - ~ e ~ e e formed soon after., On 
28 February 1991, SAD Krajina passed a resolution on the d i s a s s . o c l a t I ~ n n of SAD KraJma t r l ) t ~ ~
Croatia, justified on the basis of "the internationally r e c o g ~ l s e d d nght of pe?ple ~ o o s e l ~ ~
determination". Similarly, in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Republrka Srpska proclaimed Its 0\\ n 
Constitution on 28 February 1992, the preamble of which stated that ,the .Serb Repubhc \ \ ' a ~ ~
based upon "the inalienable and unassignable natural right of the Serbian people to sdt-
determination" (Radan, 2002, p.189). 
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Just as Milosevic had sought to make Serbia constitutionally equal to the other 
Yugoslav republics, by limiting the autonomy of the two autonomous 
provinces, so he and the SPS maintained that the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina had the same right to self-determination as the Croats, Slovenes, 
Bosnian Muslims, and Macedonians. To cite Obradovic, 
With the collapse of the SFRY, the SPS emphasized that the same right 
of a people to self-determination according to which the Sloyenes, 
Bosnian Muslims and Macedonians had decided to break away from 
Yugoslavia, allowed the Serbian people, on the territory where they 
constituted a majority, to decide to remain within the common Yugoslay 
state (Obradovic, 2000, p.434). 
The fact that Milosevic was simply insisting on equal rights for the Serbs 
outside Serbia was frequent! y overlooked. Instead, after Croatia's secession 
from Yugoslavia, Milosevic' s '"subsequent insistence, after the secession 
occurred, on the right to self-determination for Serbs in their ethnic territory, 
was wrongly interpreted as a bid to create a Greater Serbia" (Mihailovic and 
Krestic, 1995, p.81). That so many Western authors, as we saw in chapter 1, 
maintain that Milosevic was seeking to create a '"Greater Serbia", supports this. 
To conclude this section, it is argued here that the construction of Milosevic as 
a criminal leader misrepresents his actions and intentions. The following four 
sections will examine how the interviewees assess Milosevic' s actions and 
intentions and whether and to what extent they support the main claims that , 
Western literature makes with respect to Miloseyic' s actions and intenti'JI1s, as 
set out in chapter 1. 
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Section 2 - Milosevic Was Most Responsible for the \Vars 
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the question all intelyiev,;ees 
were asked was, '"Who do you consider was most responsible for the wars in 
the former Yugoslavia?" They were not asked who was most responsible for 
'fi 5 speci IC wars. In giving their answers, the interviewees similarly did not 
distinguish between different wars. 
(i) The Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees 
The Western, liberal view that Milosevic was most responsible for the wars in 
the former Yugoslavia is one that few of the Serbian interviewees share. Some 
of them argue that while Milosevic was responsible for the wars, he was no 
more responsible than any of the other leaders in Yugoslavia. According to 
one female refugee from Croatia, for example, 
... I think that you cannot divide Milosevic' s responsibility from that of 
the other presidents. If you talked only about his responsibility for the 
wars on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia, and only about him, you would 
have only one side of the story. That is the problem. And if you are 
talking about the responsibility of all of them, then it enables you to have 
a whole picture (S). 
The majority, however, do not regard Milosevic as being most responsible for 
the wars. Instead, they identify two particular culprits - political elites in the 
former Yugoslavia and/or the international community. Since the opinions of 
the national minority interviewees are very different, they will be treated 
separately at the end of this section. 
5 Slovenia was the first former Yugoslav republic to descend into war. The \var started on 27 
June 1991, two days after Slovenia had declared her independence, and lasted just ten d a ~ ~ s. 
Next it was the turn of Croatia, whose bloody war ended in early 1992, follo\\mg an a g r e e m e ~ t t
between Serbs and Croats negotiated by Cyrus Vance, the US St'cretary of State. ~ n n 6 ~ p n l l
1993 war began in Bosnia-Hercegovina. It was brought to an end with the slgnmg \.)\ the 
D a y t ~ n n Acco;ds, on 21 November 1995. The final war took place in Koso\o. N.\rO::" 
se\'t'nty-eight day bombing campaign, referred to by many Sl'rbs as "the ~ ~ A TO aggress ll1n . 
started on 24 March 1999. 
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(a) The Responsibility of Politicians in All Former Yugoslav Republics 
There is a widespread belief among the Serbian inteniewees that political 
elites throughout the former Yugoslavia bear the greatest responsibility for the 
country's demise and descent into bloody war. According to one female 
Kosovo Serb interviewee in Gracanica, for example, "Yugoslavia could have 
been more like Czechoslovakia, but the politicians in the various republics 
decided to have a war. It was 'funny' to see them shaking hands while people 
were killing each other in the streets" (ALD). 
These politicians are seen as caring only about their own power. A male 
interviewee from Cacak, for example, argues that, "The reason for the break-up 
of Yugoslavia was the ambition of politicians in every Yugoslav republic. 
They all tried to gain as much power as possible" (L). For her part, a female 
refugee from Croatia maintains that, "The aim of all politicians was the same -
to divide people. When you divide the people, then of course you can rule over 
them until the end - for as long as you like" (S). 
Such views are in keeping with the results of research by Argument, conducted 
between 12 and 19 February 2001, on a representative sample of 910 adult 
citizens of Serbia. As in the present research, the respondents were asked who 
was most responsible for the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and 75% of them 
answered political leaders. The international community was identified as the 
second main culprit (Gredelj, 2001, p.248). 
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This emphasis on the responsibility of politicians and political leaders is in 
keeping with the top-down, elite-centred approaches that characterize so much 
of Western literature on the break-up of Yugoslavia. Such approaches are 
problematic. They focus on a very small group of actors and can thus become 
over-simplistic and reductionist. Stone, for example, argues that, "Close study 
of the political maneuvrings of the elite may conceal rather than illuminate the 
profounder workings of the social process" (Stone, 1971, p.62). This narrow 
focus, moreover, means that the view from below is often neglected. The 
masses are portrayed as naIve and gullible. To cite Ivanovic. "Some consider 
the public to be like empty land - an uncultivated field where just about 
anything can be sown" (Ivanovic, 1999, p.92). 
It is, therefore, somewhat paradoxical that so many interviewees implicitly 
support this heavy focus on elites. This may attest to feelings of powerlessness 
and insignificance, to be discussed more in chapter 7. However, it may also be 
a convenient way for them to avoid the painful task of self-scrutiny and self-
reflection. 
(b) The Responsibility of the International Community 
A prevalent belief among the Serbian interviewees IS that the West was 
involved in, and indeed wanted, the break-up of Yugoslavia. According to one 
male interviewee in Belgrade, 
If you analyze the standpoints of European c o u n t r i ~ s , , ~ o u u can see that t l ~ e e
breakdown of Yugoslavia was wanted. They dldn t \\:ant such ~ ~ ~ bIg 
country... Irs much easier to control s m a l l ~ r r countnes than bIgger 
countries. Imagine having to control Yugoslana as a whole. rathcr than 
having to control Sloyenia and Croatia separately (SC). 
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Another male interviewee in Belgrade, and a Milose\'ic supporter, adopts a 
similar line of argument. He maintains that, "'Yugoslavia was a very developed 
country, but some political circles in Europe wanted to break the links between 
Yugoslav people". Intelligence services, he claims, had an interest in making 
Yugoslavia a smaller country (DB). 
For one female interviewee in Belgrade, the problem was less Yugosla\'ia's 
size than her socialist orientation. The interviewee argues that, "Yugosla\'ia 
belonged to the bloc of Socialist countries. All socialist countries had to be 
knocked down. And it was the tum of Yugoslavia" (MM). 
If the international community is widely seen as being most to blame for the 
wars in ex-Yugoslavia, one particular country is consistently deemed to be 
especially responsible - Germany.6 According to a male interviewee in Cacak, 
for example, "Foreign countries - above all Germany, but also Great Britain 
and France - helped to bring about war in former Yugoslavia"' (V). A male 
interviewee, and Milosevic supporter, in Belgrade similarly highlights 
Germany's role, arguing that, " ... the so-called international community - in 
the first place Germany, Austria and the Vatican - is mainly guilty for war 
starting" (DB). 7 
6 Gennany, an ally of Croatia during WWIL strongly pushed for the recognition of SIOYenia 
and Croatia, who had declared their independence on 25 June 1991 and 26 June 1991 
respectively, For example, on 24 August 1991, the Gennan Ministry issued a statement saying, 
that if the bloodshed continued unabated, Bonn would "seriously re-examine" the question l)j 
extending recognition to Slovenia and Croatia within their existing frontiers" (Tanner, 2001. 
p,2S.t), On 15 January 1992, the EC recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent states 
7 Various Western commentators similarly emphasize the responsibility of Western powers, 
Thomas, for example, argues that, "'The dissolution of YugoslaVia had much to do with the 
political intrusions of the Western powers, especially Gernlany and. the U n i t e ~ . . States, in 
support of their bvoured ethnic groups and to advance their 0\\11 policy agendas (Thomas. 
200J, p . .t) 
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Such views are echoed by some of the elite interviewees. Dr Oskar KO\ac. for 
example, from the Economics Faculty of the University of Belgrade. maintains 
that, even after the war in Slovenia, the descent into further wars could have 
been stopped, "But at that point, the Germans twisted the hands of the French 
and the British, and then the European Union decided that they wanted to 
disintegrate Yugoslavia once and for all". 8 
For his part, Vladislav Jovanovic, a former Foreign Minister of Serbia and later 
of the FRY, refers to Germany, together with Austria and the Vatican, as 
"revanchist forces" with a policy of animosity towards Yugoslavia as a 
common state;9 and Professor Mihailo Markovic lO, a former vice-president of 
the SPS, claims that, 
Germany desired to correct the history of the First and Second World 
Wars. That's why Genscher, the foreign minister, so strongly supported 
Croatia and Slovenia - Germany's natural allies. And Genscher went out 
of his way to ensure that Croatian and Slovenian sovereignty would be 
accepted by the European Community, against the recommendations of 
the Badinter Commission. II 
(c) The Responsibility of Milosevic 
In response to the question of who was most responsible for the wars in ex-
Yugoslavia, only a small minority of the Serbian interviewees answer 
Milosevic. Opinion poll research by SMMRI on perceptions of truth in Serbia, 
in the second half of April 2001, supports this finding. While 64.6° ° of the 
2171 respondents agreed (only 8.2% disagreed) with the statement "There 
8 Interview, Belgrade, 7 May 2004. 
9 Interview. Belgrade, 24 May 2004. 
10 Interview, Belgrade, 11 June 2004. . 
lIOn 11 January 1992. the Commission ruled that Croatia did not fulfil the n e ~ ( ' ~ ~ a r y y cntena 
for recognition, including human rights guarantees for the Serbs lmng In ( r\)atla lSl'rbs made 
up 120 '0 of Croatia' s population). By this time. howeyer., Gemlany had already recogmzed 
Croatia's independence, c h o o ~ i n g g not to ,,'ait for a decisil1!l trom the Comm 1:-;:-; Il)f1. 
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would have been no wars if we had had wiser politicians in Serbia at the 
beginning of the nineties" (SMMRI, 2001, p.17), they did not hold I\1ilose\ic 
most responsible for the wars. Rather, asked to evaluate which factors 
contributed most to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of war. 
77.8% answered Croatian nationalism, 73.5% said the United States, and 
72.3% answered NATO interests (SMMRI, 2001, p.15). 
Those interviewees that do hold Milosevic most responsible for the wars 
nevertheless qualify this in various ways. A male interviewee in Cacak, for 
example, argues that Milosevic was most responsible for the wars, but adds 
that, " ... someone made a profit from that war. Maybe Milosevic, Tudjman, 
maybe other foreign forces - I don't know" (lB). 
A male interviewee and former Milosevic supporter in Pozarevac also 
considers Milosevic to be most to blame for the wars. In this interviewee's 
opinion, "Milosevic should just have let the other republics leave the 
Federation, without starting a war. He should not have used force to make 
people stay where they did not want to be, or to go where they did not want to 
go ". However, he further contends that, '"Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic 
were as one personality. If none of them had been on the political scene at the 
time, war would have been avoided" (BM). 
This view is echoed by a male interviewee from Novi Sad. who maintains that. 
"Milosevic was most responsible for the wars in former Yugoslavia, but all the 
leaders of the former Yugoslav republics were also responsible. All of them 
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wanted war. War was their instrument for staying in power" (VC). In a 
similar vein, a male refugee from Sarajevo, now living in Novi Sad, claims 
that, "They all wanted war. Milosevi6, Tudjman, Izetbegovi6 - they all wanted 
war. They all knew that war would make it easier for them to get what they 
wanted. In a normal situation, they couldn't get it all, but in war they got it all" 
(GM). 
The argument most frequently made by the Serbian interviewees is that 
Milosevi6' s own responsibility for the wars was no greater than that of any 
other leader, either in the former Yugoslavia l2 or in the West. A female 
interviewee in Belgrade, for example, claims that, "He's guilty like everybody 
involved in the war" (LC). A male interviewee in Ca6ak similarly contends 
that, "Milosevi6 is guilty like Tudjman, Izetbegovi6, Chirac, Clinton, Major, 
Kohl, Yeltsin, Boutros-Ghali, et cetera" (V). 
The belief that Milosevi6 was no more responsible for the wars than was 
anyone else is one that some of the elite interviewees share. Nikola Lazic, for 
instance, the international secretary of the DSS, argues that, "Milosevic was 
personally responsible, but so were the others. The thing is that a number of 
the leaders in the region used national feelings to create conflicC. 13 For his 
part, Zivadin Jovanovic, a diplomat and former Federal Minister for Foreign 
Affairs maintains that historical distance is necessary to pass judgement both , 
on Milosevic and on everybody else. He further argues that, 
12 According to Gordy, on the question of who caused the wars i ~ ~ ~ l o v ~ n i a , , C ~ o a t i a , , Bosnia-
Hercegovina and Kosovo. "a very strong current of public O p l ~ l O ~ . . In s e r b l ~ ~ r e g a r ~ ~ ~ the 
political leaders of other Yugoslav states as at least equally responsible (Gordy, _003, p.- I) 
13 Interview. Belgrade, 28 ~ l a y y 2004. 
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I must ~ i s m i s s s the whole accusation against Milosevic as the man most 
r e s ~ o n s l b l e e for the Yugoslav crisis and its development, including the 
~ e m b l e e wars. He bears some of the r e s p ? n ~ i b i 1 i t y , , but his responsibility 
IS not greater than that of others both InsIde and outsl'de "\." I' 
. ..' I ugos ana. 
Any poh.cy that tnes to Isolate the responsibility of one party is not a 
good pohcy.14 
(iiJ The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees 
In contrast to the Serbian interviewees, the majority of the national minority 
interviewees underscore the culpability of Milosevic and his regime. 
According to one male Kovovar Albanian interviewee in VuCitm. for example, 
"Milosevic's regime and Mira Markovic 1 5 as a backstage player were the most 
responsible for the wars in former Yugoslavia" (LF). A male ethnic Hungarian 
interviewee in Subotica similarly regards Milosevic as primarily responsible, 
on the grounds that "he had the most power" (MB). 
One male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar holds Milosevic and the Serbian 
authorities in Belgrade most to blame, on account of their failure to negotiate 
with Croatia and Slovenia. The interviewee argues that Milosevic was less 
interested in negotiating than he was in controlling Yugoslavia (NV). A 
female Bosnian Muslim interviewee in Pristina similarly claims that Milosevic 
was the most responsible because he was not willing to negotiate (1).16 
14 Interview, Belgrade, 17 May 2004. 
15 Mira Markovic is the wife of Milosevic. The couple were high-school s\\"eethearts and 
remained inseparable. Mira, a devout Marxist, taught Philosophy at Belgrade University and 
led the Yugoslav United Left (JUL). As will be seen in chapter 7, many of the interviewees 
emphasize Mira's very negative influence on her husband. . 
16 It is often claimed that Milosevic negotiated in bad faith. Speaking on 8 October 1998, tor 
example, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright argued that. '"Time and time again. 
Milosevic has promised us to do things that he has no intention of doing" (cited in Judah. 
2000b, p.184). According to some, however, it was Alija lzetbegovic. the Bosnian president. 
who was particularly unreliable in negotiations. Burg and Shoup, for e x ~ m p l e ~ ~ claim that. '"He 
was notoriously indecisiw and prone to change his mind \\"hen dealing \\Ith I I 1 t e m a t l \ ~ I 1 a a1 
negotiators" (Burg and Shoup, 2000. p.67); and the journalist t-.lartin Bell claims ~ ~ a t t the 
Bosnian government "had a habit of backing away from conCeSSl()l1S already made (Bell. 
1996. p.2S4). 
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Some of the national minority interviewees, however, make the same point that 
various Serbian interviewees make. They argue that while Milosevic was most 
responsible for the wars, other politicians were not blameless. One male ethnic 
Hungarian interviewee in Csantaver, for example, maintains that, ··Milosevic 
was fifty percent responsible, but he needed Tudjman and Izetbegovic. He 
could not do everything by himself' (SS). A male Slovak interviewee in Novi 
Sad similarly argues that, '"Politicians from Croatia, Bosnia, and from Serbia 
were all responsible, not just Milosevic" (JG). 
Rather than blaming other politicians in the former Yugoslavia, some of the 
national minorities hold the Serbian people themselves responsible for the 
wars. One male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar argues that, "Responsibility 
lies not only with Milosevic. It lies with the people, above all with the Serbs, 
because they were blind" (AD). For his part, a male ethnic Hungarian 
interviewee in Novi Sad claims that, 
There is something in the Serbs' tradition, some kind of militarism that is 
closer to the East, the Arabic East, than to Europe. There is something 
militant, and the kind of passion that Serbian people had during the 
nineties was very strong, very strong (AN). 
Not surprisingly, it seems that few Serbs would agree with such views. In a 
survey conducted in February 2001 by Argument, for example, 910 adult 
citizens of Serbia were asked who was least to blame for the wars in former 
Yugoslavia. The most popular response given was ordinary citizens (79°'0) 
(Gredelj, 2001, p.248). 
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Section 3 -Milosevic Planned the Wars 
Central to Milosevic' s construction as a criminal leader is the claim that he 
planned the wars in ex-Yugoslavia, with the purpose of creating a ""Greater 
Serbia". As will be seen, the Serbian interviewees and the national minorit\' 
interviewees have very different opinions with regard to these two inten\'oyen 
claims. 
(z) The Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees 
Among the Serbian interviewees, there is little support for the claim that 
Milosevic planned the wars. Indeed, only two interviewees - a male from 
Kikinda (RP) and a male from Novi Sad (VC) - explicitly argue that Milosevic 
planned the wars. A third interviewee, also a male from Novi Sad, explains, ""I 
don't know if Milosevic planned the wars. But he was so stupid that he 
provoked them in many ways" (OK). 
The majority OpInIOn IS that Milosevic did not plan the wars. Various 
interviewees emphasize that Milosevic did not have any long-term plans. A 
male interviewee in Belgrade, for example, contends that, "Milosevic had a 
very short-term view. He didn't think about the long-term" (SZ). Similarly, 
Professor Ljubinka Trgovcevic, the Vice-Dean of the Political Science Faculty 
in Belgrade, argues that, "Milosevic knew only what he had to do tomorrow, 
not after tomorrow. He only thought several hours and one day ahead, but not 
more".)7 
17 IntL'n'icw, Bdgradt', 19 July ~ 0 0 4 , ,
2 2 ~ ~
To some degree, such VIews can also be found in Western literature, in 
particular among those authors, like Crnobrnja (1996) and \1arshall (2002) 
who, as will be recalled from chapter 1, regard Milosevic primarily as an 
improviser. According to the "'Milosevic as improviser" view, while Milosevic 
did not actually plan the wars, they nevertheless proved very useful to him. 
Echoing this, a male interviewee in Belgrade argues that, 
Milosevic hid a lot of things - he hid how bad the economy was at that 
time. He was trying to turn peoples' attention from daily life to war. 
You always heard news from the war, from the war areas, and you cannot 
ask 'Where is my payment? Where is my salary?' if you know that 
somebody is dying on the front line. He was turning the attention of 
people to something else (SZ).18 
Another male interviewee in Belgrade similarly claims that, 
Milosevic divided society, and he put society in a permanent war 
situation. And in that permanent war situation, you always have 
enemies. And in those circumstances, he described himself as a 
protector, a leader, as a fighter. He was always fighting. He was always 
creating the situation in which our society, our country was in jeopardy. 
It's quite a common pattern in history. When you are a dictator, the 
easiest way to stay in power is by creating enemies (RJ). 
Just as there is little support among the Serbian interviewees for the claim that 
Milosevic planned the wars, so too the claim that he was seeking to create a 
Greater Serbia receives little endorsement. A male interviewee in Novi Sad, 
for example, argues that, "'Greater Serbia was just a story for people, for the 
world" (A); and a male interviewee in Cacak contends that, "Milosevic was not 
trying to create a Greater Serbia. No, that was a mask for people ... Milose\'ic 
only wanted to rule - nothing else" (IB). According to a female Kosovo Serb 
interviewee in Kosovska Mitrovica, moreover, --If Milosevic had wanted to 
18 I\lore about the economic :-;ltuation will be :-;aid in :-;ection ~ ~ and in chapter 7. 
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create a Greater Serbia, then he would have had an anny of professionals. like 
L .. , 19 h h eglJa s anny, rat er t an an anny of young and inexperienced men" (SK). 
Milorad Vucelic, the current vice-president of the SPS, claims that, "Milosevic 
never believed in a Greater Serbia. He was a Leftist. He was not a 
chauvinist".20 Vucelic further maintains that, "There was never any plan to 
create a Greater Serbia. This idea was created by the secret services of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, in 1908".21 In his introductory statement to The 
Hague Tribunal, on 13 February 2002, Milosevic similarly argued that, 
.' ... 'Greater Serbia' is not a Serbian project at all, but a product of Austro-
Hungarian policy of Balkan conquest and the propaganda serving that goal, 
which the Serbs were in the way of' (Milosevic, 2002, p.214). 
(iO The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees 
In contrast to the Serbian interviewees, the widespread OpInIOn among the 
national minority interviewees is that Milosevic did plan the wars In ex-
Yugoslavia. This view is particularly prevalent among the Kosovar Albanian 
interviewees. According to a male interviewee in VuCitm, for example, 
At Gazimestan, in 1989, Milosevic was trying to mobilize the Serbs for 
war and to impose his ideas on the whole of Yugoslavia. After 
Gazimestan, the Kosovar Albanians knew that there would be war, but 
they expected it to start in Kosovo, not in Slovenia (AR). 
19 Legija, whose real name is Milorad Lukovic, \\·as the head of the " ~ e d d Berets". a special 
operations unit in Serbia formed in the mid-1990s. He is a c . ~ u s ~ . d d of havmg mastermmded t h ~ ~
assassination of Serbia's former Prime Minister, Zoran DJmdJIC. w h ~ ~ \ ~ a s s m u ~ d e r e d d on L. 
March 2003. After Djindjic's assassination, Legija \\·ent on the run, untIl tmally gl\lng hllllself 
up to the police on 2 May 2004. 
~ ( ) ) Interview, Belgrade, 5 June 2004. 
21 InttTvic\\, B e l ~ r a d e , , 5 June 200-+. 
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The interviewee adds that "Milosevic planned all th . C" 
' e wars III Lonner 
Yugoslavia and he intentionally allowed ordinary criminals to be involved in 
these wars. These criminals got their share" (AR).22 
Another male Kosovar Albanian interviewee, also in Vucitm, argues ... It is my 
opinion that the politics Milosevic led was all set up in advance. He could not 
have done everything in two or three years without preparation" (IL); and a 
male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica contends, "I think that 
Milosevic was planning something - I don't know what. But I don't think he 
planned everything that happened ... " (RK). 
A male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade, however, believes that the 
wars in ex-Yugoslavia were inevitable. He argues that, 
There had to be some sort of breakdown, something had to go wrong. 
Communism was falling apart and there had to be some sort of a 
consequence. In a more civilized country, with not so many bad 
memories of World War Two, things might have happened differently, 
like in Czechoslovakia. They didn't have a war there. They just decided 
not to live together anymore, and all at once you had two countries 
instead of one. But in Yugoslavia, people are different. People are not 
very well educated about things. People are very, very easily 
manipulated by the media - often they do not acknowledge the existence 
of other sources.23 I think that's the reason why it happened this way. 
Something had to happen, and war came because of the people, because 
it was a very easy thing to do (IG). 
~ ~ ~ According to LeBor, "MiIosevic knew where to look for recruits to carry out the dirty work 
of the Bosnian and Croatian wars: among ultra-nationalist criminals and football fans. These 
were the core of the paramilitary groups who carried out many atrocities" (LeBor, 2002, 
p.186). Similarly highlighting the important role that football hooligans played in the wars. 
Colovic maintains that "these wars can be described as the \"andalistic. destructive campaigns 
of hooligan-fans, t a k e ~ ~ over by the state for the aims of its \\"ar policy ... " «('olovic. 2002. 
p.283). . 
23 In research by SMMRI on perceptions of truth, in April 2001. the 21'" 1 Serb,lan rL'spondents 
were asked if they had eyer been in a position where a newly-disc\.wered fact. trl)m any snurce 
of infomlation about any event related to the \\"ars in Croatia. Bosnia l)r !\.l)S\.)\ l) had caused 
them to c h a n ~ e e their ~ p i n i o n n about the responsibility of the warring sides. S55% l)f 
respondents a n ~ , , \ \ " e r e d d no, and only J..t.5°o ans\\cred yes ( S \ I ~ I R L L 2001. p.5S). 
The interviewee adds, 
Of course, someone gained something out of it, and I guess that 
Milosevic was the one who started it all. I can imagine Tudjman and 
Milosevic sitting together in a games room, having a beer and having 
some great fun together (IG). 
While there is a strong belief among the national minority interviewees that 
Milosevic planned the wars in the former Yugoslavia, there is also virtually 
unanimous support for the literature's claim that Milosevic was trying to create 
a Greater Serbia. A male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in VuCitrn for , 
example, maintains that, "Milosevic wanted a Great Serbia, taking in Bosnia-
Hercegovina and also part of Croatia, This led to wars in former Yugoslavia". 
The interviewee adds, "Milosevic started the wars to make a Great Serbia"(IL). 
In a similar vein, a female Muslim interviewee in Pristina contends that, 
"Milosevic wanted a big Serbia. It's very simple - a big Serbia"(I). 
A male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar also believes that Milosevic was 
seeking a Greater Serbia. He argues, 
I think that of course Milosevic wanted to create a kind of Great Serbia 
or something like that, a very similar idea to the idea that Seselj 2 ~ ~ had. 
But it was a kind of smoother way ... Milosevic was more subtle than 
Seselj. He was clever, you know. He did it is a silent way (AD). 
Section 4 - Serbian Crimes Committed During the Wars were Planned 
We saw in chapter 1 that one of the reasons why, according to Western 
literature, Milosevic is a criminal leader is that he planned Serbian crimes 
committed during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. However, one feature of 
these wars is that it was paramilitary groups who committed many of the worst 
24 Vojislav Sdeij, currently awaiting trial in The Hague, is the leader of the far-right SRS. 
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atrocities.
2s 
A fundamental question, therefore, is whether and to \\'hat extent 
Milosevic controlled these paramilitaries. Once again, the Serbian interviewees 
and the national minority interviewees have very different opinions on this. 
(i) The Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees 
According to one male interviewee in Belgrade, "It's just not possible" that the 
paramilitaries were acting independently. The interviewee maintains that , 
"The paramilitaries were together with the Army. It's not possible that some 
very high centre of power wasn't even informed about what was happening" 
(IZ). 
Some of the interviewees, however, emphasize that Milosevic did not, and 
could not control the paramilitaries. A male interviewee in Belgrade, for 
example, explains, 
I don't think he had any control, because when you give authorization to 
the warlords - there were thousands of them - there is absolutely no 
control. .. And those warlords were not under any control. They just did 
what they did (NS).26 
A male Kosovo Serb interviewee in Kosovska Mitrovica similarly argues that, 
"During the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Milosevic was not controlling the 
paramilitaries. He can only be tried for the acts of the regular police and the 
regular army" (ZT). 
25 The UN Commission of Experts identified 83 paramilitary groups on the t e I T I l \ l , f ~ ~ of, ~ h e e
former Yugoslavia - some 56 were Serbian, 13 \\'ere Croatian, and l--l were Bosman. , I he 
estimated size of these forces was 20,000-40,000. 12,000-20,000 and --l,000-6.00? fespectl\ely 
(Kaldor and BojiCic, 1997, p,160). T\\'o of the most notorious Serbian paranulttary groups 
were Arkan's " T i ~ e r s " " and SeSelj's "Cetniks", " . 
26 Echoing this, Sikavica argues that, "Paramilitary leaders asked nobody' s permissIOn bet(lf,-' 
going into action ... " (Sikayica. 2000. p,143). 
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Milosevic himself has always denied having any influence mer Arkan, the 
most notorious of the paramilitary leaders. According to Richard Holbrooke, 
the former US Special Envoy to the Balkans, "Milosevic dismissed Arkan as a 
'peanut issue' and claimed he had no influence over him" (Holbrooke, 1999, 
p.190). 
Others interviewees argue that the nature of the wars was such that it was 
simply impossible to have real control. A male interviewee in Kikinda, for 
example, maintains that, 
You can't have control in a war like that. It's not World War Two. You 
had all those paramilitary groups and everything, and the folks defending 
themselves in mixed ethnic villages. I am certain that Milosevic knew 
what was happening. He probably couldn't control even 50% of that, but 
he had information about everything ... He must have known what was 
happening. But I don't think he could control, for example in Republika 
Srpska27 or wherever, those paramilitaries. You can't control them (RP). 
Another male interviewee, a refugee from Croatia, argues, ""I don't think that 
anyone could control the war. You know, it was something that was happening 
by itself'. He adds, "Never was anything planned on the Serbian side. Serbs 
are chaotic, you know" (DNO). 
The nature of the wars in the former Yugoslavia is important for a second 
reason. The literature's claim that Serbian crimes were planned and 
premeditated implies that the wars were fuelled by Serbian aggression. Indeed. 
various authors explicitly argue this. Williams and Scharf, for example, refer 
to ""Serbia's aggression against neighboring states" (Williams and Scharf. 
2002, p.34). They also refer to ·'the new campaign of Serbian ethnic 
27 Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader. proclaimed the t':\istence of an independent 
Repuhlika S11Jska (Bosnian Serb republic) on 7 April 1992. 
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aggression" in Kosovo, in 1998 (Williams and Scharf 2002 p 57) H "" 
, ". owe\ er. 
several of the Serbian interviewees stress that the wars were civil wars. 
According to Professor Stojanovic, 
I don.'t. understand peoP.le. who say they were not civil wars. Simply by 
defimtIOn, they were CIVIl wars, simply because what are ci\'il \\"ars? 
Civil wars are wars among citizens of one country. So when the wars 
broke out, they didn't break out between existing independent states, but 
between different parts and citizens of one country. When the West 
recognized the independence of the republics, this did change the 
character of the wars, but only on paper. It is really cynical to say that 
since you recognize someone, this changes the character of the war. I 
mean, simply by proclaiming that something is a reality doesn't mean 
that there is a new reality.28 
Not only were the wars civil wars. They were also wars in which Serbs were 
defending themselves. A male interviewee in Belgrade, for example, argues 
that, "We were just defending, all the time. We were just defending. The 
others attacked us" (SZ). Another male interviewee, also in Belgrade, 
maintains that in Croatia and in Bosnia, 
The Serbs were basically fighting for their right to live. And Serbia was 
helping that fighting, but we had no other options. A Serbian poet, 
Matija Beckovic, called those Serbs who lived in Croatia and Bosnia ·the 
remnants of a slaughtered people'. And that is really true (RJ). 
Vis-a-vis the war in Kosovo, a male interviewee in Cacak maintains that, .. It 
was legal Serbian police who were in Kosovo, and they did not liquidate 
anybody. They were defending their territory, and that is normal. It is normal 
to defend your country" (V). A male Kosovo Serb interviewee, in Kosovska 
. . 29 H Mitrovica, contends that Kosovo was a battle agamst terronsm. e argues, 
28 Interview, Belgrade, 29 June 2004. . _ , 
29 The first anned attack on Serbian policemen in Kosovo occurred 10 I\.lay 1993. The h r , ~ t t
organized attack took place in August 1995, when ~ ~ bomb was thrown in,to a police stalll)n 10 
Decani and the police were assaulted with automatIc weapons. In t h ~ ~ wmter. of 1997-98, the 
Kosol'o Liberation ..lImy (Ushtria Clirimtare e Koso\'es), led by Hashim T h ~ ~ I , , announced the 
start of the battle for Kosovo's unification with Albania. and s t e p p ~ d d up Hs attacks on both 
police and civilians. From 1997, the Drenica region of Kosovo (Srbma. KllIla and Glogo\ac) 
\\'as controlled by the KLA, not by the Serbian state. 
~ 3 0 0
"There was some use of extra force and illegal force, but Milosevic had to fight 
against terrorism in that way. The problem is that the West does not want to 
admit that terrorism exists in Kosovo and that the victims are Serbs" (ZT). 
On this latter point, it is important to note that Washington initially regarded 
the Kosovo Liberation Army as a terrorist organization. For example. at press 
briefings in both Pristina and Belgrade, on 23 February 1998, the special U.S 
representative for former Yugoslavia, Robert Gelbard, declared that the KLA 
was "a terrorist group beyond any doubt" (cited in Johnstone, 2002, p.236). 
The turning point in the international community's attitude towards the KLA 
came in January 1999. 
On the morning of 15 January 1999, Serbian police encircled the village of 
Racak, in pursuit of KLA fighters who had recently killed five policemen and 
two Albanian civilians (the KLA attacked not only Serbs, but also Albanian 
"collaborators" - those who chose Kosovo's autonomy within Serbia). That 
evening, the Serbian Interior Ministry announced that the operation had been a 
success and that several dozen terrorists had been killed. The next day, 
William Walker chief of the oseE Observer Mission, went to the scene, and , 
promptly declared that, "Yugoslav security forces are directly responsible for 
the massacre of 45 civilians" (cited in Udovicki, 2000. p.332). 
Doubts about Walker' s version surfaced almost immediately. and a Finnish 
forensics team subsequently concluded that there was no execution at close 
range at Racak: that the tooth marks on the corpses \\"Cre caused hy animals 
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that had access to the bodies overnight, probably stray dogs; and that it was 
misleading to speak, as Clinton had done, of "innocent men. women and 
children", since there was just one woman and one adolescent boy among the 
dead - all the others were men (Johnstone, 2002, p.243). Significantly, by the 
time that the Finnish conclusions were actually published, NATO had already 
bombed Serbia. 
To conclude, whereas the literature emphasizes both the criminal nature of the 
wars and of the crimes committed therein, the interviewees in contrast , , 
underscore the defensive nature of the wars. If the wars were thus fought for a 
legitimate purpose, it follows that the crimes committed during the conflict 
were themselves legitimate, at least to some degree. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the key Serbian figures in these wars are seen 
less as criminals than as heroes. In the second half of April 2001, for example, 
2171 Serbian respondents polled by SMMRI were asked to evaluate the 
behaviour of the Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic and his anny. 46.3% of 
respondents said that this behaviour was excellent, while only 28.5% said that 
it was bad (SMMRI, 2001, p.20). 
As part of the same research, the respondents were asked to identify the 
greatest defenders of the Serbian nation during the wars of the nineties. The 
four most popular answers were Mladic (41.80%), the Bosnian Serb leader 
Radovan Karadzic (28.50%), the assassinated paramilitary leader Arkan 
(23.70(%). and Milosevic (17.1 0%) (SMMRI, 2001. p.29). 
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In a separate survey carried out by the newspaper Vesti, on 22 October 2003, 
75% of the 300 Serbs polled (in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia) said that they 
would not alert police if they met Mladic on the street. Indeed, half of the 
respondents said that they would actively help him to avoid arrest. Moreover, 
more than half of those polled said that Mladic, indicted by the Hague Tribunal 
for genocide in Bosnia, was "'the biggest Serbian hero" of modern times.3o 
Only 14.5% of respondents said that they would denounce Mladic to the police 
or support his extradition to The Hague; and half of these said that they would 
be motivated by material award, not by any desire to see justice done (Tribunal 
Watch, 2003). 
(ii) The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees 
In contrast to the Serbian interviewees, there is a general belief among the 
national minority interviewees that Milosevic did control the paramilitary 
groups responsible for some of the worst crimes. A male Kosovar Albanian 
interviewee in VuCitm, for example, argues that, "'Milosevic personally did not 
commit crimes, but he was in charge, both of the regular army and of the 
paramilitaries" (LZ). Another Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vucitm also 
believes that Milosevic controlled the paramilitaries, adding, "After a while, 
you could see how it was planned. It was all planned in advance how the 
Albanians would be removed from Kosovo" (IL). 
30 In a recent address at Goldman Sachs in London, on 6 October 2005, Carla Del Ponte, the 
chief prosecutor at the Hague Tribunal, noted that, "Ratko Mladic ... is still seen as a hero by 
many Serbs, both in the Serb part of Bosnia and Hercegovina and in Serbia and i\!ontenegrcl". 
What is interesting is that whereas Del Ponte implied that it was wrong for .the Serbs to ~ e e e
Mladic as a hero, she pointedly commented that Operation "Storm" agamst the SerbIan 
Krajina, in 1995, was a "success", and that the indicted Croatian \\·ar crim,i,nal. Ante G o t o v l ~ a , ,
"was one of the commanders and, quite naturally, he is rewred as a hero (Del Ponte, 200)). 
As prniously noted, Gotovina was finally arrested in Spain on 8 December 2005. 
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According to a male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica howeve 
, r, 
Milosevic did not have control of the paramilitaries during the Bosnian war. 
The interviewee argues, 
I was involved in the war in Bosnia, and nobody was in control - there 
was no kind of strategy, no kind of anything. That was a stupid war. 
There were many different armies fighting in Bosnia. Milosevic used the 
paramilitaries, but he did not control them (RK). 
Also in contrast to the Serbian interviewees, the national minority intenoiewees 
essentially view the wars as wars of Serbian aggression. According to one 
female Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Pristina, for example, "Milosevic led 
his people into war. He was trying to annihilate everything"' (TO). Another 
interviewee, a Muslim in Novi Pazar, describes how, during the wars, the 
Serbian army had its guns pointed towards Novi Pazar, with the purpose of 
frightening the town's Muslims.3l He recalls, '"Wherever you looked, you only 
sawall the guns. They were pointing at you all the time" (AD). In the view of 
one male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, the only time during the 
nineties that Serbia was actually defending herself was in 1999, when NATO 
was bombing her (MB). 
Section 5 - Milosevic Used Violence to Achieve His Ends 
The literature's claim that Milosevic used violence to achieve his objectives 
encourages us to focus on violent crimes, such as ethnic cleansing, and on the 
context within which such crimes were committed - war. Indeed, as was 
argued in chapter 2. one action that defines a criminal leader is his commission 
of war crimes. However. this means that other types of crimes, such as 
economic crimes, tend to receive far less attention. The concem of this section, 
1\ t'-.luslims make up 80% of the population of Novi Pazar. Serbs constitute the remainder of 
the population. 
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therefore, is to focus on the domestic context and to find out what the 
interviewees consider to be Milosevic' s biggest crimes. It is interesting to note 
that Saddam Hussein, another "criminal" leader with whom Milose\ic is 
sometimes compared, has been criminalized largely on the basis of what he did 
to his own people. Those who criminalize Milosevic, in contrast, focus on his 
crimes against other nationalities, rather than on his crimes against the Serbian 
nation. 
(i) The Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees 
According to the Serbian interviewees, Milosevic is guilty of four main crimes. 
Firstly, he badly treated the Serbian people. Secondly, he cared only about 
himself. Thirdly, he was incompetent; and fourthly, he destroyed the country. 
Thus, for the overwhelming majority of the Serbian interviewees, Milosevic' s 
biggest crimes were against Serbs and against Serbia. Such a belief has had a 
significant impact on Serbian interviewees' attitudes towards The Hague 
Tribunal, as will be seen in chapter 8. 
A frequently expressed OpInIOn among the Serbian interviewees is that 
Milosevic's biggest crime was making the Serbian people poor. While he and 
the people around him lived like kings, ordinary Serbs lived like paupers.32 
According to a male interviewee in Kragujevac, for example, one of 
MiloseviC's greatest crimes was the fact that in 1993, the interyiewee and his 
wife, a lawyer, could only buy apples and toilet paper with their two salaries 
,2 According to Vujoyic. " ... 1993 was a year of major i ~ p o v ~ r i s h m e n t . . . " " ( V u j . O Y ~ c . . 1995a. 
p.86). For example, ·· ... in the course of 1993, and especially In the_second halt of t h ~ ~ )ear. 
large numhers of people were partially or completely unable to fulfil man) \ ~ t t their hitherto 
nom1al requirements" (Vujo\"ic. 1995a, p.108). 
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(MA).33 Another male interviewee, in Cacak, maintains that, "Milosevic is 
guilty for what he did to the Serbian people - for robbing and humiliating 
them. That is what Milosevic should be blamed for, not for war" (V).34 
Many interviewees stress that Milosevic did not simply rob them of their 
money and dignity. He also robbed them of a part of their lives. In the words 
of one female interviewee in Belgrade, "Milosevic' s greatest crime was 
wasting ten years of our lives ... ·' (MV). This is a widely-held belief among 
the Serbian interviewees, and one that helps to explain why so many of them 
now want just to forget Milosevic. In the words of one female interviewee in 
Belgrade, 
I'm not interested. I'm not at all interested in him any longer. When I 
see his face on television, I just switch the channel. It's too much, you 
know, for us. I stopped being interested in anything about Milosevic on 
the day that he was driven to The Hague. That's the end of the story for 
us (G). 
This strong desire among interviewees to forget Milosevic accounts for the 
complete indifference that some of them express towards his trial. One female 
refugee from Croatia considers that she lost the best years of her life, as did her 
friends who had to join the anny, and because of this she refuses to watch 
Milosevic's trial. She explains, "I just don't want to let him take this part of 
my life. If I were now to take a look at the trial everyday, I would somehow 
feel that he is taking away this year of my life, and I don't want that" (S). 
3.1 Serbia's fourth largest city, Kragujevac, known as " t h ~ ~ val,ley l1f the ~ t a r v i n g " ~ ~ w a ~ ~ o n ~ q ~ f f
the areas worst affected by the economic crisis, In the penod trom March 1 ~ 9 4 4 to . larch 1 " 
for example, 1350 inhabitants of the city only sUl\'ived thanb to the ~ ( ) U p p k i t c h e l 1 ~ ~ proVIded by 
the Red Cross (T\lilicevic. 1998). , ' 
q T\lore about Milose\'ic's economic "crimes" will be ~ a l d d m chapter 7. 
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A female interviewee in Belgrade similarly feels that it would be counter-
productive for her to watch the trial. She argues, 
I think that people l ~ k e e me, of my age, lost enough. We lost ten years. 
We lost the. normal hves that our parents had, and that generations before 
us had. I thInk that we should move on and do something with our lives if 
we can, if we have the opportunity. So I don't want to go back and think 
about what he's doing now or how he's performing (LC). 
Another group of interviewees maintain that Milosevi6' s greatest crime was 
betraying his own people. A male interviewee in Kikinda highlights 
Milosevi6' s treachery towards the Serbs in Croatia, arguing that, "He promised 
help, and he didn't help" (RP).35 This sense of betrayal was no doubt 
compounded by the fact that, as we saw in section 1, Milosevi6 had initially 
championed the rights of the Serbs in Croatia. 
There is no doubt that Milosevi6 could have done more to help the Kraj ina 
Serbs. The most likely explanation for his failure to do more is that, by 1995, 
the cost to Serbia - and to Milosevi6' s regime - of continued support for the 
Krajina Serbs had become too great. For example, 
If Serbia defended the Krajina Serbs, it would be declaring war on an 
internationally recognised sovereign state. An all-out-war with Croatia 
would certainly have triggered a furious diplomatic backlash. Milosevi6 
wanted sanctions lifted, not tightened (LeBor, 2002, p.230). 
If Milosevic betrayed the Krajina, however, it can be argued that his Croatian 
counterpart, Franjo Tudjman, callously betrayed Vukovar, a town in eastern 
Slavonia that was under siege from the Yugoslav Army for three months in 
35 On 4 August 1995, Croatian forces launched Operation "Stonn" in .order to recover the 
Krajina, forcing some 200,000 Serbs to flee their ancestral homes .. For hiS part, l'.hlosevlc dId 
nothing to help the Krajina Serbs, and there was no media campaign In Belgrade demandIng 
the defence of the Krajina. Indeed, on 5 August 1995, the day that the Krajina fell, "Belgrade 
Television showed a circus festival in Monte Carlo" (LeBor, 2002, .p.230). Thus. a . c ~ o r d l l 1 ~ ~ Il) 
MacDonald "One of the most tragic aspects of the war in Croatia was i\hlosenc s cymcal 
handling of'the Croatian Serbs after they were no longer useful to him" (:\lacDonald. 2002. 
p.204). 
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1991. According to Gow, "Vukovarcouldprobablyhav hid . d fi . 
e e out In e Inltely. 
had there been a commitment to its defence but the pol't' 1 '11 .. 
, 1 lca WI was absent 
(Gow, 2003, p.240). 
The reason why this political will was absent, in Gow's view. is that if Zagreb 
had sent military support to Vukovar, this would have gone against the grain of 
Croatia's '"victim strategy". The key to this strategy was to force international 
recognition of Croatia's independence, and "the more Croatian towns were 
attacked, the more likely it became that international support for Croatia would 
grow" (Gow, 2003, p.239).36 Interestingly, Tudjman's betrayal of Vukovar 
receIves little attention in Western literature. Croatian television, howe\'cr, 
recently showed a documentary entitled "Vukovar Izdan" (Vukovar 
Betrayed).37 
A male Kosovo Serb interviewee in Kosovska Mitrovica underscores 
MiloseviC's betrayal of the Kosovo Serbs.38 For this particular interviewee, 
Milosevic's greatest crime was the fact that today, there are very few Serbs 
36 If Tudjman did nothing to defend Vukovar, so the Izetbegovic government did nothing to 
defend Srebrenica, which "has aroused the strong suspicion of a calculated sacritice" 
(Johnstone, 2002, p.112). 
37 The documentary, by the Croatian journalist Denis Latin, was shown on 21 November 2005, 
Based on analysis of recorded conversations between Tudjman and the Croatian commander 
Mile Dedakovic, it claims that Tudjman refused to send troops to Vukovar, in order to preserve 
Croatia's international image as a victim. For the same reason, it argues, Tudjman refused tl) 
allow Vukovar to be evacuated. Children that had been evacuated were returned to \'UkO\:Jf 
two days before the start of fighting. This is contrary to the Fourth Geneva COnl'ention (llqll). 
Article 17 of which stipulates, '"The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to conclude local 
agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas, of wounded, sick. intinn. and 
aged persons, children and maternity cases ... ,. (www.icrc.org). 
38 According to some commentators, Milosnic simply used the Koso\'o Serbs tl)r his own 
purposes. Glenny. for example. maintains that, "Milose\'ic's sudden conversil)n tl) the plight l)f 
the Serbian and Montenegrin minority in Kosovo in 1987 was cynical"' (Glenny, 2000, p,62 7 ). 
Dj ilas, however, maintains that, "Milose\'iC's sympathy for the plight of the Serbs III K l)Sl)\ 0 
was genuine. He was not simply a monster only interested in power. as many of his opponents 
characterize him" (Djilas, 1993, p.94). 
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living in Kosovo (ZT).39 Another male Kosovo Serb intervie\\'ee. also in 
Kosovska Mitrovica, similarly condemns Milosevic for his treatment of the 
Kosovo Serbs. The interviewee maintains that Milosevic committed his 
greatest crime when he signed the Kumanovo Agreement, in 19994°, b C ( ; ' 1 U ~ e e
"When Milosevic decided to sign the Kumanovo Agreement, he ga\'e the green 
light to ethnic cleansing by Albanians and NATO. It was a joint operation" 
(RN). 
Closely linked to the charge that Milosevic' s greatest crimes were bringing 
suffering and misery to the Serbian people, and betraying them, is the claim 
that his biggest crime was caring only about himself. In the words of one 
female Serbian interviewee in Novi Pazar, "I don't feel that Milosevic 
respected people. He respected only himself and his own family" (SM). A 
similar opinion is expressed by a female interviewee in Belgrade, according to 
whom Milosevic's biggest crime was that, "He was thinking of himself. His 
power led him. And I think that everything he did was for his family and not 
for the people in the country" (LC). A female refugee from Bosnia concurs, 
arguing that MiloseviC's greatest crime was his ego (NM).41 
Many of the interviewees, however, regard Milosevic not simply as an egoistic 
and power-hungry leader, but also as an incompetent leader, as will be seen in 
chapter 7. For some interviewees, it was this incompetence that constituted 
MiloseviC's greatest crime. Thus, for one male Kosovo Serb intcnic\\cc, now 
39 Kosovo has a population of 2 million, of \\:hich only 100,000 are Serbs. The Koso\'ar 
Albanians are now the majority in Kosovo. 
40 Under this agreement, the Serbian police and army left KOSl1\'l) and KFOR ll)l)k OveL 
41 This notion that t\ 1 ill1se\'ic cared only about power will be discussed more III chapter 7. 
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living as an lOP in Belgrade, Milosevic's biggest crime was that "He did not 
have any knowledge about politics" (SP). For one male refugee from Croatia. 
Milosevic's most important crime was that, '"He had no plan, and that was a 
disaster" (DNO). 
Finally, there are a group of interviewees who maintain that Milosevic' s 
greatest crime was committed against Serbia herself, and particularly against 
the country's economy.42 For example, one male interviewee in Novi Sad 
maintains that, 
Apart from war, MiloseviC's biggest cnme was his destruction of 
Serbia's economy. Because of Milosevic, Serbia will not achic\'e 
anything in the next twenty to thirty years, and the next generation will 
also suffer. When babies are born in Serbia, they already owe two 
thousand Euros (AS).43 
Other interviewees argue that thanks to Milosevic, Serbia went backwards 
rather than forwards. Thus, for one male interviewee in Cacak, "Milosevi6's 
biggest crime is that by the time Serbia is ready to enter the EU, the EU will no 
longer exist. He took Serbia backwards" (L). A male interviewee in Belgrade 
similarly indicts Milosevic and maintains that, '"Two hundred years of effort 
was put back in ten years. He destroyed everything that we did in two hundred 
years" (NS). 
It is quite striking that only three of the Serbian interviewees identify \\ar as 
Milosevic's greatest crime (Ve, AS and OK). Interestingly. all three are young 
males from Novi Sad. Another male interviewee. in Belgrade. argues that 
42 An overview of MiloSevic' s economic policie:o; will be given in chapter '. . . 
41 Echoing this, Markovich maintains that, ..... the scope of economic destruction dunng the 
rule of Slobodan Milosevic is of :o;uch magnitude that. under pre:o;ent en1l101111C trend". two 
decades \\'ill be needed to recover from it" ( ~ I a r k o v i c h , , 2004. p.124). 
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MiloseviC's politics was his biggest crime, since it comprised \\'ars and \'ictims 
(ZG). Furthennore, only one interviewee, a young male in Belgrade, considers 
that Milosevic's biggest crimes were committed outside of Serbia (Il). 
According to a female interviewee in Belgrade, people in Serbia simply do not 
want to focus on Milosevic' s crimes outside of Serbia. She argues, "If s a part 
of him that most people ignored -the wars with Croatia, the ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo and the constant harassment in Kosovo by the police and the Army. 
That's something people don't want to see ... " (MJ). 
The results of research by Argument support this. In February 2001,910 adult 
citizens of Serbia were asked the question, "What is Milosevic guilty of and 
what should he be tried for"? The respondents focused overwhelmingly on 
Milosevic's crimes in Serbia and against Serbs. The four most popular 
answers given were stealing the votes in the 2000 election (59%), abuse of 
office and power for personal and family benefit (56%), using unfair and unjust 
electoral rules and procedures (47%), and causing an increase in crime, 
corruption and bribery in Serbia (46%). Only 4000 answered war crimes in 
Kosovo, and only 37% answered war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina (Gredelj, 2001, p.253). 
It is also significant that more than half (52.50°0) of the 2171 adult citizens of 
Serbia surveyed by SMMRI, in April 2001, were not able to state a single 
crime committed by Serbs. In contrast. 8 2 . 5 ~ 0 0 of the respondents were able to 
name one or more crimes committed against Serbs (S\l\lRL 200}' p.25). 
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Moreover, according to research by SMMRI in August 2004, 71 % of the 1245 
respondents said that the Serbs had carried out fewer crimes than the Croats, 
Albanians and Muslims during the wars in the former Yugoslavia (1991-95). 
Of this percentage, 25% also said that the Serbs had committed fewer crimes 
than the Slovenes (SMMRI, 2005, p.15). In similar research in April 2005. 
74% of the 1205 respondents said that the Serbs had committed fewer crimes 
than the Croats, Albanians and Muslims during the wars, of which 24° <> also 
thought that Serbs had carried out fewer crimes than the Slovenes (SMMRI, 
2005, p.15). 
To cite Nikolic, "It has to be emphasized that the majority of the Serbian 
people is not ready to meet face-to-face with the crimes committed by Serbian 
military and paramilitary units in Bosnia and Hercegovina and in Kosovo" 
(Nikolic, 2002, p.138). 
At the end of World War Two, Yugoslav peoples did not have the opportunity 
to talk about, and to try and come to terms with, all of the terrible atrocities that 
had occurred during the war.44 Afraid that discussion of these crimes might 
destabilize the new Yugoslavia, Tito ensured that they were simply swept 
under the carpet. According to one female interviewee in Belgrade, this was a 
huge mistake. She explains, 
I personally think that it was a big, big m i s t a ~ e e that _ we ne\er had 
something like a truth and reconciliation commltte.e after t h ~ ~ Second 
World War. Not now, but after the Second World \\ ar. EYen fIfty years 
~ ~ ~ The Serbs suffered greatly in World War T\H) , For example, r e ~ e a , r c ~ ~ c.onducted 
independently by a Serb historian, Bogoljub Kocovic, and a Croat. VladImIr " " l ' r a l ~ ~ \ \ Ie. 
indicates that during the war bet\\'een 295,000 and 334.000 Serbs dIed o? the l L ' r n t l ~ r y y l)t the 
I I d S f r C · f' (NDH) an <\xis puppet st'lte ruled b\ the faSCist U ~ t a s e e leader. lU ('/I{'I/ en! fa e C? loa Ul ,. , . . , , 
:\nte Pawlic (Cohen. 1998, p.37). 
ago, t.hat war was not over, because nobody ever put a full stop on it. 
And It was just like it was somewhere under the carpet. and then it 
exploded (G). 
In the same way, if Serbs are unable to face up to what happened during the 
nineties and to acknowledge that there was great suffering on all sides. and if 
other nations in the former Yugoslavia are similarly fixated on their own 
suffering, it might be argued that this does not bode well for the future stability 
of the region. In the words of Stambolovic, "The point is that there can be no 
thinking of the future without considering responsibility for the pase 
(Stambolovic, 2002, p.69). 
On the other hand, it might be argued that endless discussion of the past and of 
the crimes committed, can in fact impede, rather than facilitate, progress. With 
reference to Bosnia, for example, Chandler contends that, "The international 
focus on war crimes has created a deeply divisive atmosphere, which is hostile 
to local attempts at reconciliation" (Chandler, 2005). 
(ii) The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees 
In contrast to the Serbian interviewees, the national minority interviewees 
overwhelmingly see war and its terrible consequences as Milosevic' s biggest 
cnmes. One male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vucitm, for example, 
argues that, "Milosevic' s biggest crime was refuelling nationalism and starting 
the wars in former Yugoslavia. After that, a sequence of happenings occurrcd. 
Milosevic personally did not commit crimes, but he \\'3S in chargc" (LF). 
Similarly focusing on Milosevic's direct role in the wars, a male \ l u ~ l i m m
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interviewee in Novi Pazar maintains that, "His greatest cnme was leading, 
controlling and financing war" (NV). 
For one male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, Milose\ic' s biggest 
crime was not starting the wars, but rather failing to stop them. He argues, 
Milosevic allowed so many tragic things to happen while he \\'as in 
power. Nobody can say that he exactly made this war, but I think he 
certainly could have stopped it. This was his major crime. If he were a 
positive person, he would have stopped the war (MB). 
Other interviewees consider that it was the consequences of the wars that 
constitute MiloseviC's biggest cnme. One female KosO\'ar Albanian 
interviewee in Pristina, for example, maintains that, "His greatest crime of all 
was a crime against humanity - the fact that he killed human beings" (TG), 
Similarly, a male Kovovar Albanian interviewee in Vucitm contends that, 
"MiloseviC's biggest crime was the deaths of so many people in Bosnia, 
Croatia and Kosovo" (IL). For a female Bosnian Muslim interviewee m 
Pristina, one crime stands out above all others - Srebrenica (1).45 
Another interviewee, an ethnic Albanian living in Belgrade, similarly considers 
Milosevic's greatest crime to be the destruction of lives, but this i n t e r \ ' i c \ \ ' t ~ c c
uses the term "destruction" in a far broader sense than the other interviewees. 
He argues, 
Milosevic was in a position to do something for his people and 
everybody else. He was an intelligent person, ~ n d d there must ha\,e been a 
moment when he realized that what he was domg was bad for hiS people 
and that he was destroying thousands of lives. He had an o p p l \ ~ u n i t y , , to 
step down - he had a choice. But he made one \\Tong ChOiCC aftcr 
another (IG). 
45 In July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces, led by t ~ ( ' ' indicted war criminal General Ratko \ Iladu:, 
massacred some 7,000 Muslim men in Srebremca. 
Some of the interviewees feel unable to identify one specific cnme that 
Milosevi6 committed. A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Csantaver. for 
example, maintains that, "Everything that Milosevi6 did, right from the very 
beginning, was wrong" (SS). Similarly, a female ethnic Hungarian intervie\\'ee 
in Subotica argues that, "He did everything - everything was his crime" (AK). 
Like the Serbian interviewees, some of the national minorities underscore their 
own particular suffering. Thus, one male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar 
maintains that, "Milosevi6' s biggest victims were the Muslims, of course, 
above all the Bosnian Muslims" (AD). Another male interviewee, an ethnic 
Hungarian in Novi Sad, argues that, thanks to Milosevi6, "1 lost my freedom 
and legal place in Europe. I am the same as Pakistanis and Albanians when 1 
go to Europe now" (AN). 
Some of the national minority interviewees, however, perhaps most 
surprisingly the Kosovar Albanian interviewees, are ready to acknowledge that 
Serbs also suffered terribly because of Milosevi6. One male Kosovar Albanian 
interviewee in VuCitm, for example, argues that, "Milosevi6 was never 
thinking about the interests of the Serbian people. They were his biggest 
victims" (AR). Another male Kosovar Albanian interviewee similarly 
emphasizes that, "Serbs were also victims of Milosevi6 and nobody can blame 
all Serbs for what happened" (lL). 
A female Bosnian Muslim interviewee in Pristina, moreover. maintains that the 
suffering of the Serbs continues today. She argues that "Thanks to f'.liln;cvi6, 
245 
Serbs are unhappy in the Balkans because they are animals for all nationalities" 
(1). Thus, it can be argued that there is a greater willingness on the side of the 
national minority interviewees than there is on the side of the Serbian 
interviewees to acknowledge the suffering of others. 
Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, we have seen that the OpInIOnS of the Serbian 
interviewees and of the national minority interviewees fundamentally differ in 
relation to each of the four claims discussed in sections 2 to 5. What is 
interesting, however, is that despite their very different viewpoints. there is a 
broad consensus among both the Serbian and the national minority 
interviewees that it was unfair for the West to focus solely on, and to demonize 
only Milosevi6. 
According to a female Kosovo Serb interviewee in Gracanica, Croatia's 
President Franjo Tudjman was a strong nationalist dedicated to an ethnically 
pure Croatia, and thus, "I really wonder why the West didn't do something 
against Tudjman and his politics. All leaders should have been portrayed in the 
same way that Milosevi6 was" (ALD).46 The interviewee highlights the West's 
failure to condemn Tudjman when his forces expelled some 200,000 Serbs 
from Krajina in August 1995 (ALD):n 
46 As argued in chapter 1, Tudjman' s actions are often only mildly rebuked. Bennett. for 
example, argues that, " ... Tudjman' s hold on power in the summer of 1990 \ ~ ' a ~ ~ tenuous and 
insecurity accounted for much of the insensiti\'ity of his actions" (Belmett. 19Q). p.141). . 
-17 Some Western commentators make the same point. Parenti, for example, argues that. .. fhe 
massi\'e ethnic cleansing of Krajina Serbs by Croat forces earned hardly a cluck of disappflwal 
from Western leaders" (Parenti. 2000, p.78). 
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The Belgrade journalist Vladimir Milic holds a similar \'iew. According to 
him, 
Milosevic was fairly portrayed in the West. The problem is that 
Tudjman, Izetbegovic and the others were not fairly portrayed. In war. as 
in love, you need two sides ... Milosevic was a 'Butcher of the Balkans', 
but so too were Tudjman, Izetbegovic and the Kosovar Albanian leaders, 
Yet in the eyes of the West, it was only Milosevic who was the 'Butcher 
of the Balkans'.48 
That the national minority interviewees themselves hold similar views is 
particularly interesting, given that they appear to share the dominant Western 
image of Milosevic as a criminal leader. There is a broad consensus among the 
national minority interviewees that when we are considering the causes of 
Yugoslavia's demise and descent into war, the net of blame must be cast much 
wider than Milosevic. In the words of one male ethnic Hungarian interviewee 
in Novi Sad, for example, "Nothing is black and white, and I don't believe that 
Chi rae, or Blair, or any of them, are more innocent than Milosevic was" (AN), 
Another male Hungarian interviewee, in Subotica, contends that, "Western 
portrayals of Milosevic were not fair, because Milosevic alone could not do 
everything. He needed Tudjman and Izetbegovic.49 Everybody was involved" 
(SS). A male Slovak interviewee in Novi Sad similarly considers it unfair that 
so much of the media focus was on Milosevic, given that he could not have 
made the wars in former Yugoslavia by himself. In the interviewee's words, 
"For a fight, you need more than one man. You need two or three people" 
(10). 
4X 
, Interview. Belgrade, 23 May 2004. ,_ 
4<) Izetbegovic receives little attention in \\' estern literature and 1 ~ ~ m o ~ t t frequently p ~ r t r a y e d d a ~ ~
a \'ictim. Some. ho\\'e\'er. are more critical. Holbrooke. for ni1mple. argues that. though he 
paid lip service to the principles of a muItiethnic ~ t i 1 t e . . he \ \ a ~ ~ not the democrat that ~ o m e e
supporters in the West sa\\'" (Holbrooke, 1999, p.97). H o ~ b _ r o o k ( ' ' ab\) c I a l m ~ ~ that Izetbegonc 
exploited the suffering of his people (Holbrooke, 1999. p.l:-:-). 
We have looked at the extent to which the interviewees agree with four of the 
key claims that Western literature makes regarding Milosevic' s actions and 
intentions. Chapter 6 will now examine to what extent the interviewees agree 
with the fifth claim - that Milosevic incited ethnic hatred. This chapter will 
concentrate particularly on the opinions and experiences of the eighteen 
national minority interviewees 
Chapter 6 
Domestic Views on an External Construction. , 
Part II - The Incitement of Ethnic Hatred 
Introduction 
In April 1994, the Croatian government of Franjo Tudjman demanded that all 
"non white" UN troops be removed from Croatia, claiming that only "first-
world troops" were sufficiently sensitized to Croatia's problems (Parenti. 2000, 
pAS). Yet, it is Milosevic, not Tudjman, who is often portrayed in the West as 
a racist. Speaking on national television in February 2000, for example, US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright described Milosevic as a man "who 
decides that if you are not of his ethnic group, you don't have a right to exist" 
(cited in Parenti, 2000, p.187). Linked to this image of Milosevic as a racist is 
the literature's claim, explored in chapter I, that he incited ethic hatred. It is 
the primary concern of this chapter to find out whether the interviewees, III 
particular the national minority interviewees, agree with this claim. 
National minorities' did suffer discrimination in MiloseviC's Serbia. However, 
it is argued that much of this was social discrimination that needs to be 
understood in the context of the specific circumstances of the nineties. In a 
I It is important to note that in Yugoslavia, national minorities were known as "nationalities", 
or "narodnosti". The tenn "nationalities" designated "a group which resided mainly in a 
neighbouring nation or some other country, for example Albanian" (Pupavac, 2000, p.3). The 
tenn "nations", or "narodi", in contrast, "designated a national grouping, resident \'holly. or 
mainly, in Yugoslavia" (Pupavac, 2000, p.3). Article 245 of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution 
stated that, "The nations and nationalities of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall 
have equal rights" (Constitution of the SFRY. 1974). The 1990 Serbian Constitution, 
introduced under Milosevic, similarly emphasized equal rights. Article 13 declared that, 
"Citizens are equal in their rights and duties and have equal protection before the State and 
other authorities. irrespective of their race, sex. birth, language. nationality. religion. political 
or other beliefs, level of education, social origin, property status. or any other persl)nal 
attribute" (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 1990). 
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climate dominated by war, economic crises, high unemployment, and general 
uncertainty, national minorities became an easy and convenient scapegoat. It is 
also argued that while it is convenient to portray Milosevic as a racist, 
reinforcing his comparison with other "criminal'" leaders such as Hitler, the 
interview data reveals a far more complex and nuanced picture. 
The present chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 1 explores the 
opinions of the Serbian interviewees and the national minority interyiewees 
regarding Milosevi6' s speeches. Section 2 examines the views of the Serbian 
interviewees and the national minority interviewees on the Serbian media, 
which Milosevi6 heavily controlled. Section 3 deals with MiloseviC's 
treatment of national minorities, from the viewpoint of the Serbian 
interviewees. Section 4 focuses on the opinions and experiences of the 
national minority interviewees. Finally, section 5 addresses the three 
remammg elements in the Western, liberal construction of Milosevic as a 
criminal leader - his motivations, his character and psychology, and his 
comparison with other "criminal" leaders. 
Section 1 - MiioseviC's Speeches 
(i) The Opinions of the Serbian inten'iewees 
Among the Serbian interviewees, only a tiny minority regard Milosc\ic's 
speeches as aggressive. A male interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, claims 
that, 
Milosevic talked about the same things that Hitler did. The tone of 
Milosevic's speeches was aggressiye. He used to say that Serbs \ ~ ' e r e e
being subordinated by other nations in the region, that members ot the 
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Opposition were traitors, agents of the CIA, et cetera. His rhetoric was 
the same as Hitler's rhetoric (DK). -
A female interviewee in Kikinda recalls watching Milosevic de1iyer his famous 
Gazimestan speech, on 28 June 1989 - "I remember saying to my husband, 
'Look at that lunatic! He will do us harm'" (SU). Another female interyiewee, 
in Belgrade, explains that she did not like to listen to Milosevic' s speeches. 
"He made me nervous whenever I listened to him, because I knew that after 
that, something bad would happen" (DN). 
The majority, however, emphasize that Milosevic' s speeches were fanciful, 
rather than aggressive. A female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, recalls, 
"I had no nerves for listening to Milosevic, because his speeches were always 
the same. Everything was milk and honey. Everything was fine. But it was 
always emptiness inside, emptiness between the lines" (LC). A male 
interviewee in Belgrade similarly argues that, ""The things Milosevic told 
people in his speeches were nonsense. People were dying from hunger, but he 
was telling us that everything was fine and rosy" (SZ). Emphasizing that 
Milosevic's appearances in public and on television were very rare, the 
interviewee adds, 
When he did appear, he told people stories, like Hans Christian 
. .,
Andersen. The only people who believed these stones were penslOners-
who didn't leave the house. If you never left your house and only 
listened to what Milosevic was telling you, then you would think that 
everything was fine, as if you were living in Switzerland (SZ). 
2 Pensioners consistently voted in high numbers for the SPS - 68% in No\'ember 1 9 9 ~ : . . ·F)O" i ~ 1 1
November 1991; 50% in November 1992; and 5::;° 0 in No\ember 1993 (Branko\'lc. 1 9 9 ~ . .
p.88). One explanation is that the older generation is most afraid of change. To cite LaziC. 
"Conservati\'e Serbia fears changes and finds an inferior present more deSlfahk than an 
uncertain future" (Lazic, 1999, p.l 7). f\ ll)re on this point wi II be said in chapter 7. 
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For her part, a female interviewee in Pozarevac maintains that, "Milose\ic had 
a nice story and he could seduce people - he really succeeded in that. He kne\\ 
what moved the Serbian people, and he knew what he needed to do to make 
people adore him" (1). 
Other interviewees regard Milosevic' s speeches as protective. A female 
interviewee in Belgrade, for example, discusses Milosevic's Kosovo Polje 
speech, on 24 April 1987. According to her, "It was a very inspiring speech. 
Milosevic said 'Nobody will touch you any more'. It was like a father 
protecting his sons, you know, and it was not in any way aggressive" (MY). A 
male interviewee in Cacak similarly argues that, "Milosevic' s speeches were 
more defensive than aggressive. He promised people that he would look after 
them. He promised all good things. He was good at lying [laughs] - he was 
good" (lB). 
To summanze, if, as Western literature claims, Milosevic did incite ethnic 
hatred, it was not, according to the majority of the Serbian interviewees, 
through his speeches. 
(iiJ The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees3 
Among the national minority interviewees, there is a more widespread belief 
than there is among the Serbian interviewees that Milosevic' s speeches \\crc 
aggressive. According to a male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, 
. ~ ~ According to the 1991 census, national minority c o m m u n i t i ~ ~ . . account for 2 9 . ) S ~ / o o ~ f f the 
population of Serbia. The three most numerous c o ~ m U ~ l t I e ~ ~ are the. Albamans .. the 
Hungarians. and the Bosniaks f \ l u ~ l i m s s (Federal f \ l i n i ~ t r y y at NatIOnal and Ethmc C o m m u m t I e ~ . .
2001. p.6). 
Milosevic always gave the same speech, but just in a different fonn. His 
speeches were aggressive, but not openly. Milosevic was smart - he 
knew t h ~ t t the international community could listen to, and record, eyery 
one of hIS speeches. So he never said anything for which he could later 
be accused. However, between the lines, his speeches were aggressive. 
For example, he always said things like, ·we appreciate the ril!hts of 
other ethnic groups, but. .. '. He was very skilful (MB). ~ ~
A male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vucitrn explicitly associates 
Milosevic's speeches with the incitement of ethnic hatred. He argues, 
"'Milosevic consumed nationalism and created hatred, until he really spoilt the 
Serbian spirit and soul. Now Serbs have serious problems getting rid of this 
hatred" (AR). 
Other interviewees describe feeling vulnerable and nervous when they heard 
Milosevic speak. A male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in VuCitm, for 
example, claims that Kosovar Albanians felt very afraid when Milosc\·ic 
delivered his speech at Gazimestan, on 28 June 1989 - "'They were caught off 
guard and wondered what was going to happen to them" (LF). The interviewee 
was just fifteen years old at the time, but remembers masses of people 
streaming to Gazimestan, shouting and yelling. He recalls, "It was quite a 
traumatic experience, not just for me but for everybody, especially for older 
people. My grandfather was very afraid, and he kept saying that something 
bad was going to happen" (LF). 
According to another male Kosovar Albanian interviewee. "At Gazimestan. a 
kind of hysteria was generated". He adds. "It is not easy \\·hen you hear Serbs 
saying nasty things about Albanians and threatening them. You have to start to 
be more cautious" (IL). A male Muslim interviewee in ~ o Y i i Pazar similarly 
describes feeling anxious when he heard Milosevic speak. He explains, "It" s 
enough to say, "You, Serbs! You should fight for your own rights!" It"s 
frightening, you know. What should we expect from Serbs when they were 
getting messages like that?" (AD). 
Other interviewees, like many of the Serbian interviewees, argue that 
MiloseviC's speeches were full of half-truths and lies. For example, according 
to a male Slovak interviewee in Novi Sad, "Milosevic painted a pretty picture 
in his speeches. "Everything is beautiful here - just grass, butterflies and 
flowers. And we'll be millionaires next year, same time!'" (10). A male 
ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Csantaver claims that, "'Milosevic"s speeches 
were primitive, manipulative. He talked about Serbia, about Serbs, about how 
everything would be great, about Serbia's achievements, et cetera. The usual 
Communist shit!" (SS). As an example of MiloseviC's manipulation of the 
truth, the interviewee describes how, 
During the NATO bombing, Yugoslav forces hit a bridge in Beska4 
because they didn't want NATO to bomb it. Yugoslav forces made a 
small hole in the bridge, but its structure wasn't damaged. When the 
bridge was repaired and re-opened, we were given the impression that a 
totally new bridge had been built (SS). 
For his part, a male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar argues that, 
Milosevic never said anything against others. His speeches were perhaps 
even polite. But when he spoke, there was no link with reality. It was 
always like that. He used to say that Serbia was a country where. p : o p ~ ~ ~
lived well. People were starving and waiting to buy bread. but Mtlosevlc 
talked about progress in Serbia (NV). 
This again creates an impression of Milosevic as a rather weak leader who was 
forced to resort to half-truths and lies, in order to stay in power. To cite a male 
4 Ncar No\'i Sad. 
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ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Csantaver, "What could he offer to people 
who had been used to living quite well?" (SS). 
Milosevic was nevertheless a skilful orator, according to some of the 
interviewees. A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, for instance, 
argues that, '"Milosevic had great charisma and he knew what to say. He did 
not give long speeches, like Fidel Castro. His speeches were short and 
targeted. He always knew what to say and what people felt, until 1996" (RK).5 
Similarly, a male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vucitrn argues that, 
"Milosevic's speeches were very energetic and convincing. You could see and 
feel his passion" (LF). 
Section 2 - The Serbian Media 
(i) The Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees 
There is a strong emphasis in Western literature on the media's spreading of 
ethnic hatred. Thompson, for example, argues that, "RTS is a lying machine 
designed to inspire, provoke and underwrite nationalist fears and hatreds" 
(Thompson, 1994, p.viii); and Bennett maintains that, "The media, more 
specifically the Serbian media and Serbian journalists, bear huge responsibility 
for the resurgence of nationalist hatred in Yugoslavia in the 1980s ... "(Sennett, 
1995, p.95). 
Some of the Serbian interviewees support such claims. A male interviewee in 
Novi Sad, for example, argues that, 
5 In 1996, huge demonstrations took place all oyer Serbia, in protest at M i l o s e \ · i c · ~ ~ failure to 
rccl\gnize the opposition Zajedno ("Together") coalition' ~ ~ \ictory in the local e l e c t I O n ~ ~
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RTS an.d Politika6 played a big role in the Yugoslav crisis - they pushed 
people mto war. TV Novi Sad was particularly guilty for this. 7 E\'eryda\ 
on television, there were reports about the wars in Croatia and B o ~ n i ~ ~
but none of these reports were objective. They were full of lies. It was 
really disgusting (DK).8 
Another interviewee, a male in Kragujevac, describes how 
RTS told the Serbian people that they were threatened, that it was 
necessary for them to defend their Serbian brothers in Croatia and 
Bosnia. It broadcast terrible pictures of dead and wounded people. 
These pictures made people go and fight for their country. The war 
started from nowhere (MA). 
A female interviewee in Belgrade adds, 
It was funny, because you never expected that kind of propaganda could 
ever exist. But it existed, and it had a lot of influence among the less 
educated people9 and among people who do not live in big cities. It was 
the kind of propaganda that just brainwashed you.1O We were told that 
'All the world is against great Serbs' and that 'great Serbs are fighting 
against the entire world and the New World Order' (G). 
As with Milosevic' s speeches, however, the majority of the Serbian 
interviewees associate the State-controlled media more with the propagation of 
fairytales than with the propagation of ethnic hatred. For example, according 
to a female Kosovo Serb interviewee in Gracanica, 
RTS showed only the bright side of the world. It talked about Milosevic 
and his dedication to the people, about the places he had visited, about 
the things he had done. It claimed that the Serbian economy was 
blooming. It was a fairytale (ALD). 
6 Politika is the oldest and most influential State newspaper in Serbia. 
7 In 1993, for example, Marko Kekovic, the main editor of the n' Sod Sad n ~ w s s ~ r o g r a m m ~ , ,
said, "I, as a journalist, am not ashamed to lie in the interests of the Serbs" (cIted m I\'anonc, 
1999, p,31). , ' ~ ~
8 According to Ivanovic, for example, "RTS covered up the siege and bombmg of Sarajevo or 
almost two months" (Ivanovic, 1999, p,34). .,' 
9 Research has shown that voters with low lewis of education were far more h ~ e l y y to \ole Illr 
the SPS than \'oters with high lewIs of education. In 1991, for example, 5 2 , 3 ~ ' o o o ~ ~ \nlL'rs \ \ ' ~ l h h
low education named the SPS as their preferred party, In contrast. only 21.'+" 0 of voters wIth 
high levels of education chose the SPS (Gordy, 1999, p.56). , . 
10 t\lany of the Serbian interviewees share this \'ie\\', though few of them accept that they 
themsel\'cs were brainwashed. 
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In a similar vein, a male interviewee in Novi Sad argues that, "According to the 
R TS news, everything in Serbia was good, great things were happening, and 
Serbia was a friend of the world. It was all just fairytales" (AS)." 
This perhaps helps to explain why, according to research by SMMRI, in April 
2001,42.5% of the 2171 respondents said that they did not trust RTS and other 
state media. Only 23.2% of the respondents said that they did trust them. e\'en 
though 80.40% said that RTS and other state media were their main sources of 
information during the wars in ex-Yugoslavia (SMMRI, 2001, pp.54-55). 
To sum up, while there is some support among the Serbian interviewees for the 
claim that hatred was disseminated through the media, a more prevalent view is 
that media propaganda was more ridiculous than it was jingoistic. 
(iO The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees 
A significant number of the national minority interviewees accuse the Serbian 
media of spreading hatred and malicious lies. According to a male Kosovar 
Albanian interviewee in VuCitm, for example, "RTS was full of hatred and 
nationalism" CAR). A second male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vucitrn 
describes how he had Serb friends in Belgrade and Nis who were too 
frightened to visit him in Kosovo. He explains, "I asked them to come to 
Kosovo, but they were too scared. They were afraid of being raped or killed, 
II The journalist Vlado Mares echoes such yie\\'s, According to him. "T\\'o worlds co-exist In 
Serbia, First, the Serbia of state-run RTS TV. where all is \\'ell with the country and the people 
eat and li\"e \\"\:,11 under the regime of Slobodan M i l o s ~ Y i c , , Then there I ~ ~ ~ h e e real wOrld: \ \ ~ e r e e
a Belgrade textile worker earned just 1.4 dinars a day In J ~ l ~ ~ - at the offiCial rate. barel) 1_ US 
cents - less than half the cost of a single loaf of state subSidised bread (Mares. 1999), 
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because of the things that RTS was saying about Kosovo and the Albanians" 
(LF). 
A female Muslim interviewee in Pristina similarly argues that the Serbian 
people were not given the truth about the situation in Kosovo. According to 
her, "RTS did all the things that Milosevi6 wanted. If a Serb killed an 
Albanian, RTS told people that another Albanian had killed the victim, because 
of tradition" (I). A male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar adds, ""A lot of 
hatred was created as a result of RTS. It talked about things that never 
happened. For example, it talked about problems in Novi Pazar that did not 
really exist. It was horrible to watch. It was just war propaganda". The 
interviewee emphasizes that, ""Milosevi6 himself never spoke against 
minorities, but others did it for him, like RTS" (NV). 
According to a male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, "The media 
was a great tool to manipulate uneducated people with. People were 
brainwashed" (RK). For his part, a male ethnic Albanian interviewee in 
Belgrade contends that Serbian media during the Milosevi6 period was "the 
most brutal brainwashing machine that was ever invented". He adds, 
What I remember most is some television shows with singers and actors 
and TV hosts and magicians, and funny people jumping around the 
screen and trying to amuse people. And they were all laughing, and they 
looked like they were having the best time of their lives. And the reason 
that I am now frustrated is that, from one point of view, I see those 
people as war criminals, because they took an active part in closing the 
nation's eyes. You know, like "Bread and Games' - the things that the 
Romans did to amuse their people. WelL they didn't gi\'e us any bread, 
but they gave us lots of games. And I can't believe that anybody actually 
watched these shows and enjoyed them, because they wcrc sn absurd. 
While people were dying 300 kilometres from Belgrade, people in 
Belgrade were having fun (lG). 
Such entertainment was the specialty of Pink TV.!2 Interestingly, \\'estem 
literature has tended to neglect Pink TV and to c.ocus l'n t d I t I' I II S ea amos exc USl\"e v 
on RTS. According to a male Serbian interviewee in Belgrade, however, "Pink 
TV was more influential than RTS. The aim of Pink TV was just to entertain. 
and so it was more interesting to people than RTS, which was mainly about 
politics" (ZG). Unlike RTS, however, not everybody in Serbia had access to 
Pink TV. 
Section 3 - Milosevic's Treatment of National Minorities in Serbia 
This section focuses on the opinions of the Serbian interviewees, while the next 
section will concentrate on the opinions and experiences of the national 
minority interviewees. 
The majority opinion among the Serbian interviewees is that the Milosevic 
regime did not mistreat Serbia's national minorities. According to a female 
interviewee in Belgrade, for example, 
Claims that Milosevic mistreated minontIes are laughable. The 
Albanians in Kosovo had their own schools, their own university, and 
they had their own medical centres. They could use our schools, but they 
refused that 13, so Milosevic let them make their own. They refused to 
use our medical centres, so Milosevic gave them their own. And I think 
that was a big mistake (MM). 
A male interviewee in Belgrade claims that, 
Milosevic treated ethnic minorities very well. He \\"as not a fascist. Even 
today, Belgrade has one of the largest Croat communities in the Balkans. 
12 The owner of Pink TV, Zeljko Mitrovic, was on the main board of JUl, the political party of 
Milosevic's wife. 
U Echoing this, Johnstone argues that, "The whole world, all the h u ~ a n n r i g h t ~ ~ ~ h a m p i ( \ n ~ ~ are 
saying that the Albanians have been banned from the schools. That ~ ~ ~ a pure he. They are the 
ones who refuse to attend the schools go,"emed by the program of the Serbian ~ t a t e . . which 
nevertheless guarantees them courses in Albanian history and culture and the U ~ L ' ' \11 their 
language" (Johnstone, 1999. p.20). 
Belgrade has a population of two million people, and there are 100 000 
Croats living in the city. Belgrade also has one of the largest I s I ~ m i c c
communities in the Balkans (NS).14 
A second male interviewee in Belgrade similarly argues that Milosevic treated 
minorities well. According to this interviewee, "Milosevic was trying to 
maintain a picture of Serbia as a multicultural society, and he cared about that 
because he was, in his core, a cosmopolitan, a communist" (RJ). For her part, a 
female interviewee in Kikinda argues that, "'Milosevic discriminated against his 
own nation most of all. His discrimination against minorities was no greater 
than his discrimination against his own people" (SU). 
Several interviewees make the point that a person's nationality was not 
important to Milosevic. According to a female Kosovo Serb interviewee in 
Gracanica, for example, "Milosevic thought that anyone who did not support 
him was his enemy. He destroyed anyone who opposed him. He did not hate 
Albanians" (ALD). A male interviewee in Belgrade likewise argues that, ··It 
wasn't important for Milosevic which nation you belonged to. It was only 
important whether or not you supported him. If you didn't support him, he 
didn't want to see you. Nothing else" (SZ). 
Dr Branka Prpa, the director of the Historical Archives in Belgrade, agrees. In 
her opinion, 
Milosevic was not a nationalist. He was completely indifferent towards 
national belonging. He simply had a very strong will for power. So, if 
he thought that nationalistic ideology was needed for his purposes. he 
14 According to O'Aymery, in the Balkans today 'There are practically no more multi-ethnic 
countries with the exception, ironically, of Serbia ... " (D' Aymery, 200 L p·7)· In co?trast. 
follo\\'ing Operation "Storm", in August 1995. Croatia b e c a m ~ ~ "th.e most 'ethmcally pure state 
in the whole of the former Yugoslayia" (Cedric Thornberry. Cited III Thomas. 2003. p.13). 
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would embrace it. In that sense, he is a very interesting person. He \\-as 
not a fanatic. He just wanted to rule. IS 
A tiny minority, however, claim that Milosevic did persecute minorities. 
According to a male interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, "\1ilosevic 
mistreated minorities, but he never said anything bad about them in his 
speeches. What Milosevic was thinking, Seselj 16 was saying and doing. They 
were a team" (DK). A second male interviewee in Novi Sad similarly argues 
that, "It was not the official policy of the regime to discriminate against 
minorities, but some of the people who were close to Milosevic -like Seselj _ 
organized such discrimination" (VC). The interviewee claims, for example, 
that after Operation '"Stonn" in 1995, Seselj and others helped the Krajina 
Serbs to get their revenge, adding that, '"It was Seselj who organized all of this, 
and Milosevic fully supported him, although never officially (Ve). 
Echoing such views, Professor Vojin Dimitrijevic, from the Belgrade Centre 
for Human Rights, argues that, 
All the incidents against the Croat minority here were mostly carried out 
by the Radicals, by Sese1j and so on, but they were tolerated by the 
Milosevic police. There was no reaction. But somehow Milosevic did 
not allow this to become a system. 17 
These interviewees are clearly of the opinion that it was a deliberate strategy 
on the part of Milosevic to use Seselj and the Radicals to do his dirty work. In 
the words of one male interviewee in Kragujevac, ""The people who worked for 
Milosevic did all of the dirty jobs, while he was always the 'good' guy" (MA). 
15 Interview, New Belgrade, 28 July 2004. 
16 Seselj was the leader of the "White Eagles", a paramilitary ¥ r ~ u ~ , , c o m p r i ~ e d d of " t a t t ~ , , gap-
toothed folk mainly working-class city-dwellers for whom SeselJ s doctnne of S,erb raCial 
superiority \\'-as a co-mpensati;n for all life's petty setbacks" (Tanner, 2001. p_2-l5)_ Sdelj \\as 
transferred to The Hague Tribunal on 24 February 2003. 
17 Interyie\\-, Belgrade, 26 f\ lay 2004 
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Various Western authors also maintain that Milosevic instrumentalized the 
Radicals to serve his own ends. Woodward, for example, argues that, 
Both Serbian president Milosevic and Croatian president Tudjman 
encouraged the presence of right-wing radicals, both within their parties 
and further right, so that they would appear the more moderate and 
stabilizing factor to the international community and to undercut other 
nationalist parties in their opposition (Woodward, 1999, p.355).18 
It might, however, be argued that Milosevic' s reliance on Seselj and the 
Radicals was necessary rather than deliberate, dictated more by circumstances 
than by policy; in short, a sign of weakness. Let us take the issue of 
mobilization. A strong leader should be able to mobilize his people for war, 
stirring in them intense patriotic feelings. Churchill and Thatcher are obvious 
examples. In the case of Milosevic, however, ""The very fact that the vastly 
stronger and better armed Yugoslav Army could not defeat poorly armed 
Croatian troops demonstrated Milosevic' s failure to inspire the Serbs to a 
national crusade" (Doder and Branson, 1999, p.97). In essence, " ... Milosevic 
lacked the political vision and resolution to be a stirring wartime leader" (Sell, 
2002, p.151). 
For example, "Conscription of reservists in Serbia in the summer of 1991 
turned out to be excessively difficult. Hundreds of young men went into hiding 
or fled the country to avoid having to put on a uniform" (Milan Milosevic, 
2000a, p.ll 0).19 In the words of Gagnon, ""the result of this call-up was what 
may be one of the most massive campaigns of draft resistance in modem 
history" (Gagnon, 2004, p.2). He argues that, 
I ~ ~ 19 ' See also Hartman, 1999, p.2 . _. . 
19 Gagnon argues that, "between 50 and 85 percent of Serb men called up to tight m CroatIa 
either went into hiding or left the country (200,000 men r ~ p o r t e d l y y went abroad t ~ ~ ~ a v ( ~ ~ 1 1 the 
draft) rather than fight" (Gagnon, 2004, p.109). Accordmg ,to P o ~ a : . . m o r ~ o H · 1 . . ... 8 ~ ~ Yo of 
army reservists in Belgrade refused their call-ups to be sent to S!,wema ( P p ~ , l . . 1998, p.7.). 
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At a ~ ~time when 0 the ~ e r b i a n n media was filled with images of genocidal 
U s t a ~ ~ ~ massacnng mnocent women and children, the attempts to 
mobIlIze young men and reserve forces in Serbia to fight in Croatia were 
stunningly unsuccessful (Gagnon, 2004, pol 08)0 
What this meant, in practice, is that Milosevic was increasingly forced to rely 
upon extremist and criminal elements over which he had little or no control. 
To cite Woodward, 
The declining number of regular troops and difficulty finding conscripts 
willing to fight led to supplementation with militant extremist volunteers 
and criminals released from jails who were more often motivated by the 
invitation to loot and plunder than nationalist fervour. The worst 
excesses of reported massacres, rape, and mutilations emerged because of 
such conditions (Woodward, 1999, p.265). 
Thus, it might be argued that Milosevic's reliance on the Radicals IS 
symptomatic less of his criminal leadership than of his weak leadership. 
To conclude this section, it is argued that there is little support among the 
Serbian interviewees for the claim that Milosevic incited ethnic hatred. 
Regarding Milosevic' s speeches, the majority view is that they were more 
farcical than fanatical. They were speeches that fed people with dreams rather 
than with hatred. Similarly, the majority of interviewees emphasize more the 
media's propagation of ludicrous stories than the spreading of chauvinism and 
intolerance. Finally, we saw that while there are a small minority of 
interviewees who believe that Milosevic mistreated national minorities m 
Serbia, the more widespread view is that they were in fact treated well. 
Section 4 - The Opinions of the Nationail\linority Interviewees 
Surprisingly little has been written in Western literature about \1ilt)sc\ic's 
treatment of national minorities in Serbia. Yet, in \'iew of the literature· s daim 
that Milosevic incited ethnic hatred, it is important to look at what national 
minorities in Serbia actually experienced during the Milosevic years. Do they 
feel that they were mistreated by the Milosevic regime? Do they belie\'e that 
the regime had a specific and concrete policy against national minorities? 
Some might argue that a detailed analysis of the laws on national minority 
rights could tell us more than the data from eighteen semi-structured interviews 
can tell us. It can be counter-argued, however, that to rely solely on these laws 
is problematic. In short, the fact that national minorities had extensive rights 
on paper20 does not automatically mean that they exercised all of these rights in 
practice. For example, according to the Federal Ministry of National and 
Ethnic Communities, 
The conditions for receiving schooling in minority languages are much 
more favourable in the communities where a minority population is 
concentrated. They are less favourable in the communities where a lower 
number of members of the minorities live. As a result, the number of 
pupils/students attending classes in their mother tongue is much lower 
than the number of pupils/students receiving schooling in the Serbian 
language (Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities, 2001, 
p.29). 
Moreover, as Marija Vujnovic, from the Ministry for Human and Minority 
Rights, argues, " ... at the implementation level, sometimes it didn't all go quite 
as well as it looked in law".21 We cannot, therefore, gain an entirely reliable 
picture of the situation by confining our analysis to the legal level. Instead, we 
20 According to Serbia' s Lml' on Elementary Schools, for example, in areas \\'here at least 
fifteen pupils belonging to a national minority haw enrolled in the f i r ~ t t grade. c \ a ~ s e s s \\111 be 
held in the national minority language. Altematiwly. bilingual instructIOn will be glyen .. Ewn 
if the e\1yisaged threshold of fifteen pupils is not reached, classes rna): S:ll1 he held _ In the 
national minority language, subject to the approval of the Minister ot Education (federal 
Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities, 2001, p.26). 
21 Interyiew. New Belgrade, 1 September 2004. 
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must speak to the people directly concerned - the national minorities 
themselves. 
According to Vladimir Djuric, a legal advisor at the Ministry for Human and 
Minority Rights, "There were different approaches regarding different national 
minorities".22 This section, therefore, will look at different national minorities 
separately. 
(i) The Albanians 
According to the 1981 census, the last census that the Albanians participated 
in, there were 1 ,674,353 Albanians living in Serbia, accounting for 17.12% of 
the population (Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities, 2001, 
p.6). There are four Kosovar Albanian interviewees in the sample, three men 
and one woman, and one male ethnic Albanian interviewee. 
Cox contends that, "" ... minority groups under Milosevic faced severe 
discrimination" (Cox, 2002, p.3). Vujnovic, however, maintains that it is 
necessary to distinguish between different levels of discrimination against 
minorities, namely State discrimination, social discrimination, and institutional 
discrimination. Regarding State discrimination, an example of which might be 
apartheid in South Africa, Vujnovic contends that, "Serbia did not practice this 
type of discrimination. Some laws weren't very, let's say, beneficial to the 
minorities, but most of the laws didn't make any huge problems and in no way 
discriminated against minorities". 23 
.'.' Inteniew. New Belgrade. 1 September 2004. 
13 Interview, New Belgrade, 1 September 2004. 
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In contrast, social discrimination, she argues, was widespread. Such 
discrimination was closely linked to the unstable and tense climate that the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ensuing wars created. 
Vujnovic considers that institutional discrimination was perhaps most 
important with regards to Kosovo, because '"when you look at the Miloseyic 
period, it was very difficult to find an Albanian who was in a very important 
position".24 Corroborating this, the Albanian interviewees themselves 
underscore the Milosevic regime's strong institutional discrimination against 
them. One example that the interviewees give is the expulsion of Albanian 
professors from the university in Pristina, and the forced dismissal of many 
Albanians from their jobs. 
A male Kosovar Albanian interviewee, for instance, describes how he was 
expelled from Trepca25 in October 1991, without being given any reason. He 
recalls, ~ ~ A A Serbian man came to Trepca and started to apologise for having to 
sack the Albanians. At that time, Albanian employees at Trepca had not 
received their salaries for three or four months" (lL). 
This institutional discrimination against the Kosovar Albanians gave rise to the 
existence of so-called '"parallel institutions'". A male interviewee. for example, 
describes how, after Albanian students were expelled from uniyersity buildings 
in 1991, they started having their lectures in private houses (LF). Another 
24 Inter,iew, New Belgrade, 1 September 2004. . 
~ 5 5 Trcpi'a is the main company in Koso\'o. It has mines and factones all owr Kl)S\J\'O. 
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male interviewee explains, "My new university building was a pri\'ate house in 
a suburb of Pristina" (AR). 
As well as institutional discrimination, the interviewees clearly feel that there 
was also State discrimination against them, one example being the 1990 
Serbian Constitution. According to one male interviewee, 
Under that Constitution, the Kosovo Assembly lost the power to decide 
about crucial things. Kosovar Albanians lost school and university 
buildings, they lost their jobs, and they lost the opportunity to travel 
abroad and to be issued with regular documents (AR).26 
On this latter point, the interviewee emphasizes that, "I didn't have a passport 
for eight years, and I was unable to travel from 1992 until 1998. This is 
because I didn't want to serve in the Yugoslav Army" (AR). 
Not everyone agrees, however, that the Serbian Constitution of 1990 deprived 
the Kosovar Albanians of their rights. Vladimir Djuric, for example, maintains 
that, 
Albanians in Kosovo, after the 1990 Constitution, had national minority 
rights and they could enjoy national minority rights like every national 
minority in Serbia - to have their own schools, primary and secondary 
schools, perhaps a higher education, to have their language in official 
use. But they boycotted that. And after the boycott, the Milosevic 
regime started to pressure the minority, with armed forces. But in the 
context of minority rights, there was no change. If you accept that 
territorial autonomy is a part of minority rights, this would lead to the 
conclusion that the 1990 Constitution derogated minority rights, et cetera, 
et cetera. But according to our legal conception, that was not the case.27 
26 As explained in the previous chapter, this Constitution derogated the 197-+ Yug(ls\av 
Constitution, which had given Kosovo and Vojvodina the status of a u t o n o m o ~ s s p r o V l I 1 C ~ S S
within Serbia. Since none of the other Yugos\ay republics had autonomous provlI1ces wlthlI1 
their territories. many Serbs sa\\' the 1974 Constitution as a measure designed to keep S,-'rbia, 
as the largest Yugoslay republic, in check. 
27 Interyiew. New Belgrade. 1 September 2004. 
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According to a female Bosnian Muslim interviewee, married to a Kosovar 
Albanian man in Pristina, 
Officially, the 1990 Constitution did not deprive Albanians of their 
rights. But on the street, it was a different situation. Officially, you had 
a right to work like Serbian people, but it was very difficult to find a job 
if you were Albanian (I). 
The third form of discrimination that the interviewees experienced was social 
discrimination. One male interviewee describes feeling like a second-class 
citizen and being constantly intimidated. He claims that, "When you went out, 
you felt threatened by Serbian security formations" (AR). Another male 
interviewee explains that, 
During the early nineties, I experienced segregation for the first time. 
Suddenly everything changed - overnight. Serbs no longer wanted to go 
to school with Albanians. Albanians could not go freely to bars, discos, 
et cetera, and the police could stop and search you without justification 
(LF). 
Of all the national minorities in Serbia, the Albanians arguably suffered the 
greatest discrimination under Milosevic. According to some commentators, 
Milosevic had a deep personal hatred of Albanians. Zimmermann, for 
example, contends that, "Kosovo was Milosevic's hottest button. He was 
unyielding, emotional, pugnacious and full of invective for its Albanian 
inhabitants" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.57). What is interesting is that all except 
one of the Albanian interviewees believe that Milosevic did not harbour a 
specific hatred of Albanians.28 According to one male Kosovar Albanian 
interviewee, "Milosevic hated anybody who stood in the way of his plans, and 
he eliminated anybody who stood in the way of his vision, including Serbs" 
(LF). 
~ s s A notable exception to this is the female Kosovar Albanian i n t e f \ i e \ \ ' ~ e e in Pristina, who 
maintains that, "f'. I iloSeyiC wanted to destroy eyerything that w a ~ ~ Albaman. He wanted to 
destroy the li\es of Koso\'ar Albanians" (TG). 
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For his part, the male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade maintains that. 
"The way that minorities were treated under Milosevic was not very different 
to the way they were treated before Milosevic or after i\lilose\"ic". He 
explains, 
I have heard many stories of Albanians being oppressed by the Serbian 
government, not only in the time of Milosevic, but many years before. 
and many years b e f o r ~ ~ World War Two as well. It was just something 
that had been happemng there almost forever. My grandfather was 
ejected from high school because he said that he was an Albanian and , 
that happened in 1936. So things like that were happening all the time. 
The difference might be that under Milosevic, Albanians actually 
organized themselves and decided to fight (10). 
While the Albanians undoubtedly did suffer discrimination during the 
Milosevic regime, it would be over-simplistic to argue that such discrimination 
was the consequence of MiloseviC's personal antipathy towards Albanians. 
Firstly, it is necessary to emphasize that Kosovo was not simply a problem of 
minorities. It was also a major constitutional problem, as emphasized in the 
previous chapter. According to Professor Ljubinka Trgovcevic, a member of 
the Serbian Parliament from 1984 until 1986, "Milosevic opened the Serbian 
problem and Serbia had a problem. The problem was that Serbia was in three 
parts and had little influence over the provinces. She was like a kid with two 
parents".29 Trgovcevic explains that, 
Delegates from Kosovo and Vojvodina, in the State Presidency and in the 
Serbian Parliament, had the possibility to stop everything that happened 
in Serbia, to stop laws, to discuss them, to vote, to do all things. That 
was a great problem for Serbia, because the autonomous p ~ ~ v i n c e s s were 
states within a State. They were completely separate states. 
The second point to make is that the discrimination the Albanians sutTered. in 
particular the social discrimination, should not be looked at in isolation from 
29 Interview, Belgrade, 19 July 2004. 
1() Inter\'icw. Belgrade. 19 July 2004. 
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the broader context. According to the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in 
Serbia, for example, Serbian culture 
tends to find hidden separatist motives and aspirations in claims of 
national minorities. Serbian culture tends to view "minorities" as . a 
foreign, guest-like element', which is duty-bound to respect house order. 
to respect 'hospitality" and to stop irritating the 'host' with its demands 
(Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2001. p.167). 
Moreover, in a climate of heightened nationalism, insecurity and wars - such 
as existed in Serbia during nineties - ethnic distance necessarily increases. To 
cite Cohen, " ... Serbian intolerance and prejUdice was a long-standing feature 
of ethnic relations in the region and had been growing during the 1990s"" 
(Cohen, 2001, p.224). 
In addition, it should be noted that ethnic distance in Serbia has always been 
greatest vis-a-vis Albanians. According to the Belgrade sociologist Ognjen 
Pribicevic, "the Serbs do not treat the Albanians as equal, they treat them as 
uncivilized, very primitive, dirty ... as humans of a lower profile"" (cited in 
Cohen, 2001, p.224).31 For example, the results of a survey conducted by 
Argument, on a representative sample of 1322 adult citizens, in September 
1990, showed that 38% of respondents said that they would never marry an 
Albanian. In contrast, 230/0 said that they would not marry a Muslim, 15% said 
that they would never marry a Slovene, and 13% said that they would never 
marry a Croat (Argument, 1990). 
Research on threat perception, conducted in December 2000 by SM\IRI, also 
showed that Serbs perceive the Albanians as the most threatening nation. 
31 Ihree of the Serbian i n t e f \ i e \ \ e ( ' ~ ~ t h e m s e l w ~ ~ e x p r e ~ ~ e d d prejudice t o \ \ a r d ~ ~ . \ l h a n i a n ~ . .
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Asked which of their neighbouring nations they viewed as highly threatening 
to Serbia, 78.600/0 of the 1133 respondents answered Albanians. The 
percentages given for the other nations were dramatically lower - 41.200 0 of 
respondents identified the Croats as highly threatening, and 35.10% of 
respondents identified the Bosniaks (SMMRI, 2000, p.13). 
(ii) The Muslims 
According to the 1991 census, there were 237,785 Bosniaks/Muslims living in 
Serbia, making up 2.5% of the population (Federal Ministry of National and 
Ethnic Communities, 2001, p.55). There are three Muslim interviewees in the 
sample, two men and one woman. 
On the basis of the interview data, it is argued that with the exception of the 
Albanians, who suffered strong institutional discrimination, the main form of 
discrimination that all other national minorities in Serbia suffered during the 
Milosevic period was social discrimination. It is further argued that this 
discrimination was, in large part, attributable to the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia. These wars helped to create a climate of fear and uncertainty in 
which national minorities became an easy and convenient target. One male 
interviewee for example describes how relations between Serbs and Muslims , , 
in Novi Pazar began to change as a result of the wars. He explains, 
The Muslims here felt pretty unsafe when the Serbs came back from the 
wars, because they always carried a gun. It was very frightening. If you 
had a good friend, you never knew what you should expect from him. 
Everything changed. Everything in the Serbs' consciousness changed. 
The whole system was changed after that and, as I said, you n c n ~ r r knew 
what to expect from the neighbours who were Serbs (AD). 
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The interviewee also claims that Serbs in Novi Pazar started to treat the 
Muslims as second-class citizens. Consequently, the interviewee felt 
uncomfortable telling people his real name. He explains. "Irs a \erv 
unpleasant feeling when you are not free to say your name. Several times 
when I was in Belgrade, I couldn't say my name because I was worried" (AD). 
Having a Muslim name also caused problems for the female Bosnian Muslim 
interviewee in the sample. She used to be head of finance at the electro-
technical faculty in Pristina, a position that entitled her to an apartment. Yet, 
she was refused this privilege, because of her nationality. In her words, "It was 
very open. They said, 'you are Muslim. You don't have a right to get a flat''' 
(I). 
The third Muslim interviewee, a male from Novi Pazar, maintains that there 
was always some prejudice against minorities during the Milosevic years. He 
recalls, for example, that whenever he travelled by train to Budapest, it would 
always be his documents that were checked. He argues that, "As a minority, 
you always had to prove that you were not against the Serbian State. People 
were always suspicious of you because you were not a Serb" (NY). 
Whilst all three interviewees experienced discrimination during the Milosevic 
years, they have very different opinions about Milosevic's personal attitude 
towards minorities. One interviewee, for example, maintains that, 
Milosevic didn't hate minorities. He didn't even like the Serbs. \\"hat he 
loved was power, and he stayed in power. Everything he d.id was a g a ~ n s t t
"the citizens'. After that, we can say that everything he dld \vas agamst 
the minorities and against the Serbs. He wasn't a 'great Serb" ( ~ V ) . .
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The problem, however, according to this interviewee, is that \\'hile Milose\'ic 
did not hate minorities, he made them feel vulnerable and apprehensive. The 
interviewee explains, 
Milosevic said that Yugoslavia was the prison of Serbs. He said he 
would free them and give them back their dignity. It was a story that had 
nothing to do with Muslims, Hungarians or other minorities. He wasn't 
against other minorities, except Albanians. But if you always speak only 
about the Serb nation, what can the minorities do? What can they expect? 
(NY). 
The female interviewee shares the view that Milosevic was against Albanians 
and argues, "Milosevic was a big nationalist and he hated Albanians" (I). For 
the third interviewee, however, it was not only Albanians that Milosevic hated. 
According to this interviewee, although there was nothing that people could 
recognize as a campaign to persecute minorities, "Milosevic taught the Serbs to 
hate anyone who was not a Serb. This created great uncertainty among 
Muslims. He hated all minorities" (AD). 
(iii) The Hungarians 
According to the 1991 census, Hungarians comprise 3.52% of the population 
of Serbia. Hungarians are mainly concentrated in Yojvodina, where they make 
up 16.860/0 of the province's population (Federal Ministry of National and 
Ethnic Communities, 2001, p.6). There are five Hungarians in the sample, four 
men and one woman. 
When asked about their personal experiences during the Milosevic years, the 
ethnic Hungarian interviewees spoke mainly about the social discrimination 
they faced. In the words of one male interviewee in Novi Sad, .. :\s a national 
minority here in Serbia, the nineties were the start of some kind of \ery 
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unpleasant social atmosphere" (AN). As one example. he says that his mother. 
an invalid, was thrown out of a bomb shelter during the NATO bombing in 
1999. Since NATO planes were taking off from Hungary. the presence of a 
Hungarian woman in the shelter angered some Serbs. 
The interviewee feels that he himself experienced some discrimination, 
although it was not explicit. Rather, it occurred at the level of "those little 
things that you cannot see in everyday life. For example, when I wrote a 
screenplay and I gave it to the Ministry of Arts, I felt some kind of 
discrimination to get the money to make a movie". The interviewee also points 
out that nobody ever knew how to pronounce his name correctly. However, he 
does not feel that these were real problems. 
As far as he is concerned, "The problems - and this is important - for national 
minorities came mostly from the refugees who did not understand the historical 
background of this part of the country" (AN). The fact that there is strong 
support among Serbian refugees for the far-right SRS reinforces this. 32 
It is significant that the interviewee identifies a specific group of people. 
refugees, as causing the greatest difficulties for national minorities. This 
further supports the argument that social discrimination. rather than direct 
discrimination by the Milosevic regime, was the primary form of 
32 According to the March 2002 census in Serbia, the population of Voj"odina has substantially 
grown thanks to an influx of refugees (Helsinki .Committee for Human Rights. in >rb.ia. 200;. 
p . .259). It is no coincidence, therefore, that In the general electIOn he.ld In S.:rbla ?n ~ 8 . .
December 2003, the SRS achieved its greatest success in Voj"odina. \ V ~ n n m g g thlrty-tl\e ot 
the forty-five municipalities. the Radicals only lost in eight m ~ i n l y y Hunganan munICIpalitIes In 
the north, and in two municipalities dominated by Slovaks (Bnza. 2004). 
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discrimination against minorities in Serbia during the nlOnetlOes An 0 t . 
. In erVlewee 
from the village of Csantaver, for example, recalls one occasion when he was 
speaking in Hungarian with a friend on the street in Subotica. "A Serbian man 
came up to us and said, 'That's the last time I"ll hear you speak in 
Hungarian! '" (SS) 
For some interviewees, however, the discrimination was official as well as 
social. For example, a female interviewee in Subotica claims that, under 
Milosevic, Hungarians had to write their names in Serbian, not in Hungarian.33 
All official documents, such as birth certificates, also had to be written in 
Serbian. Marija Vujnovic, however, maintains that it was not State policy that 
Hungarians could not write their names in Hungarian. According to her, 
This is where it is very important to make a distinction between what the 
State is doing and what happens at the social level. When I say the 
'social level', I also mean the person that is working behind the counter 
in the administrative office of a particular municipality. If that person, 
for instance, discriminates against someone, for whatever reason ... that is 
social discrimination, not State discrimination. According to the rules, 
the person is supposed to act in a certain manner, but maybe he can 
sometimes be more helpful or less helpful. And this is where we did 
have problems. 34 
Another interviewee in Subotica also maintains that there was some official 
discrimination against minorities. He argues, for example. that, 
The Hungarian minority in Serbia was not mistreated like the Albanians 
were, but Hungarians did not have the same rights as Serbs. In 
Yugoslavia, all minorities had rights above European standards. and ~ h e y y
were officially called 'nationalities'. Under Tito, everything \\:as \ \ T l ~ t ~ n n
in six languages. Under Milosevic, everything was written In Cynlhc 
(MB). 
33 For example, the Hungarian surname "Koszo" is written as "Kl)Sl)oO in Snbian. 
34 Interview. New Belgrade. 1 September 20040 
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Nevertheless, the interviewee goes on to make the point that in Subotica. 
Hungarians are the majority, followed by the Croats. The Serbs are the third 
largest group. He explains, ""This is important, because if there had been any 
serious mistreatment of minorities during the Milosevic period, the Hungarians 
and Croats would have left Subotica and Serbia" (MB). 
Among the ethnic Hungarian interviewees, OpInIOnS differ regarding 
MiloseviC's personal feelings towards national minorities. The female 
interviewee claims that, ""Milosevic hated Hungarian people, but I don't know 
why" (AK); and a male interviewee maintains that it was Milosevic' s intention 
to cleanse Vojvodina of ethnic minorities (AN). One interviewee, however, 
stresses that everybody was a victim of Milosevic and his policies, and that it 
was not only national minorities who suffered (MB). Another male 
interviewee maintains that Milosevic was not a racist, and emphasizes that, "I 
never suffered under the Milosevic regime because of my nationality. I only 
suffered because, like everybody else, I had no job and no money" (RK). 
(il') Other National Minorities 
This section will deal with the remaining five interviewees - one male Slovak 
interviewee35 in Novi Sad, and four Roma interviewees36 in Belgrade, of whom 
three men and one woman. 
35 According to the 1991 census, Slovaks comprise less than 1 %. o ~ ~ S e r b i ~ ' ' s population. _ T h e ) ~ ~
make up 3.2°() of the total population of Voj"odina (Federal t\lmlstry at National and EtlmlC 
Communities, 2001, p.6). . . . 
36 According to the 1991 census, Roma constitute 1.43% of the population ,11 Serbia (Federal 
Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities, 2001. p.6). It should be noted that m 
Yugoslavia, the Roma were classed as an .. ethnic group". To cite Pupa\·.ac. " T h e t ~ n n n ' e ~ l c c
, I . I . I d d Romanl'es and Vlachs referred III a people \\ Ith pnm,1l1 h an l ral groups, \\' lIC 1 me u e . . ~ . . .' . " .") ~ ~ . 
tradition or in the process of codifying Its wntten language (Pupa\ ac, _000. p-- ). 
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According to the Slovak interviewee, "'Milosevic had a policy against some 
minorities, in particular the Albanians, but not against e\'ery minority", The 
interviewee feels that Milosevic maybe discriminated against Albanians, 
Croats, and Muslims, but not specifically against Slovaks.37 Neyertheless. he 
says that he did feel threatened when Milosevic was in power since "many 
people, when the war started, became "big Serbians', big nationalists. A.nd 
they were like sheep" (JG). 
For the interviewee, however, it was not all Serbs who posed a problem. 
Rather, he distinguishes between two particular groups of Serbs. On the one 
hand are those Serbs who came to Vojvodina after World War One and World 
War Two, together with those who came as refugees from Croatia and Bosnia 
during the nineties. On the other hand are those Serbs, old Vojvodinians, \\ho 
have lived in Vojvodina for more than eighty years. 
The interviewee explains that he never had any difficulties with the old 
Vojvodinians. Instead, "When we speak, we are the same. They don't treat me 
as a Slovak or Hungarian or Gypsy. It doesn't matter. It doesn't matter to 
them who I am, what nationality I am". In contrast, "Those people who came 
here after the First or Second World Wars, and who were infected with 
Milosevic's nationality virus - they look at me as somebody who is here and 
doesn't belong here" (JG). 
37 It might be argued that those national minorities whose c o u n ~ n e s , , were invoh'ed in the wars 
, he,"' I'" fCered more than those national mmontlL'S whose countnes were m t e lorrner 1 ugos a\ la su 11 • 
not il1\'oh'ed, 
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Although the interviewee felt physically threatened during the Milose\'ic 
period, he considers that his actual rights as a minority themseh'es were not 
endangered. He argues, "Milosevic was a nationalist but some of the things 
that national minorities had from earlier he didn't touch - schools. language. 
He didn't touch Slovak culture". Language is obviously an important aspect of 
any culture and according to the interviewee, 
My language rights were the same. You know, I hate Milosevic, but in 
that way he was fair. We had primary schools in the Slovak language. 
We had high schools in the Slovak language. If I wanted to, I could 
study the Slovak language at university. 
Nevertheless, for the interviewee, "Milosevic is guilty because many Serbs 
became nationalists, and he is guilty because many people from national 
minorities were frightened" (JG). 
All of the four Roma interviewees in the sample assess the Milosevic period 
from a very particular perspective - an economic perspective. Moreover, they 
consider that life under Milosevic was better than it is today, mainly because of 
the thriving black market that existed during the nineties. In the words of one 
female interviewee, "Under Milosevic, Roma could work on the black market 
and earn some sort of living, but today they can't do that (SL). A male 
interviewee similarly maintains that, '"During the Milosevic years, there were 
more opportunities for Roma to make money" (SE). 
As to whether Milosevic persecuted Roma, the female inten'iewec claims that 
Milosevic did not mistreat Roma. Rather, "He just let them do their own 
thing" (SL). A male interviewee, for his part, stresses that no Roma were 
forced to leave Milosevic's Serbia. He argues that "Although many went to 
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Gennany, they went of their own will, because of the wars and because of the 
economic situation. There is more discrimination against Roma today than 
there was under Milosevic (BR). 
A second male interviewee, who himself left Serbia and went to Germany as an 
economic migrant, claims that discrimination against Roma did exist. He 
argues, for example, that Roma people could not find jobs and that Roma 
children were put into special schools. He adds, however. that, 
"Discrimination against Roma still exists today - maybe it is even worse than it 
was under Milosevic" (Z). The third male interviewee maintains that 
Milosevic mistreated both Roma and Serbian people alike (SE). 
The Roma have always been the victims of social discrimination and prejudice, 
and not just in Serbia. If Roma in Serbia did suffer more during the Milosevic 
period than they had done previously, it might be argued that this was more 
because of the particular circumstances of the time than because of any 
deliberate policy by the Milosevic regime against Roma. Professor Vojin 
Dimitrijevic, for example, underscores the link between discrimination against 
Roma and circumstances. He argues that, 
... Roma were victims of increased violent behaviour that was caused by 
the wars. Troubled Serbia is now reaping the harvest of all the wars - the 
decline of morality, values and so on. So of course, again, the attitude 
towards the Roma is racist. You have the skinheads and so on - all these 
losers among the Serbs who vent their ire against the Roma and those 
who are powerless. 38 
In criminalizing Milosevic, Western literature often portrays him as a racist 
who specifically discriminated against other nationalities. l'iaimark, for 
,s 
., Interview, Belgrade, 26 May 2004. 
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example, contends that, " ... every nationality of fonner Yugoslavia - Croats. 
Slovenes, Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar Albanians - stood in the \\'ay of 
Milosevic's ambitions" (Naimark, 2002, p.155). This, however. is over-
simplistic. 
Firstly, it is important to note that some national minorities themsehes 
supported Milosevic, even if it was primarily for economic reasons. According 
to a male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Novi Sad, for example. "Minorities 
supported Milosevic because of the money and privileges they received. There 
was a part of society that got richer and richer in that period" (AN).39 A male 
Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vucitm similarly points out that, 
There were always some Albanians who were loyal to Milosevic. He 
paid them well and they enjoyed many privileges and 
opportunities ... Milosevic was very interested in loyal Albanians. in order 
to give the impression that his politics was inclusive of all nationalities 
(AR). 
Secondly, it should be emphasized that while national minorities did clearly 
suffer under Milosevic, so too did many Serbs, particularly refugees and lOPs. 
For example, according to a 1999 report by the Humanitarian Law Centre 
(HLC) in Belgrade, 
Several persons displaced from Kosovo told HLC researchers that the 
Serbian government had issued oral orders banning their employment in 
Serbia. The HLC also registered instances of displaced persons being 
denied proper medical care (HLC. 1999, p.1l). 
Moreover, 
Contrary to the requirement that the authorities mus! ensure t ~ a t t
displaced schoolchildren receive an education, the SerbIan E d u c a h ~ n n
Ministry orally recommended non-enrolment of students from Kosovo In 
the 1999-2000 school year (HLC. 1999, p.121). 
W According to a male ethnic Hungarian interviem:'e in Csantaver. the. H u n ~ a r i a n n landlord t1f 
the local pub joined the SPS so that he \\'ould not have to pay taxes on hIS busmess tSS ). 
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Thus, according to Marija Vujnovic, "'When you look at human rights or 
individual rights, maybe that's where the Milosevic regime can really be 
attacked". She argues that various individual rights, such as civil. political, and 
especially economic and cultural rights, were denied to the entire population 
and that, 
When you look at it that way, then you get a different picture. A lot of 
things seem to be a denial of minority rights when you just look at that 
specific group, but when you also look at the Serbian population, you can 
see that maybe everybody suffered from things like that. I think that 
maybe discrimination was strongest against those who actually opposed 
the regime and had democratic views.4o 
It will be recalled that this latter point is one that some of the national minority 
interviewees themselves make. In the words of a male Kosovar Albanian 
interviewee, for example, "'Milosevic hated anybody who stood in the way of 
his plans, and he eliminated anybody who stood in the way of his VISIOn, 
including Serbs" (LF). 
Thirdly, some prominent Western figures themselves do not believe that 
Milosevic was a racist. In his testimony to The Hague Tribunal on 3 
November 2003, for example, Lord Owen41 declared, 
It is my view that President Milosevic - no doubt Mr Milosevic you see 
now is not fundamentally racist. I think he is a nationalist, but even that 
he wears lightly. I think he's a pragmatist. And it is a fact that Muslims 
have lived --live in Serbia.42 There are areas of Serbia where there are 
substantial Muslim groups (Owen, 2003). 
For his part, Warren Zimmennann, the US Ambassador to Yugoshl\'ia from 
1989 until 1992, argues, '"I don't see Milosevic as the kind of ethnic exclusivist 
40 Interview, New Belgrade, 1 September 2004. . 
41 David Owen was the European Union envoy to the former Y u g o s l a v l ~ . , . . ~ ~ , 
4 ~ ~ Professor Mihailo Markm'ic, a former "ice-president of i\liloseYlc s SPS,. d e ~ c n b e s s ,an 
incident where i\ lilosevic angrily scolded Milorad Vucelie, then the director R 1 S. iL)r h a \ ' l ~ ? ?
allo\\'i:,d the broadcast of a song that had the words. ooAlija, I hate \'OU because you are a bahJa . 
a pejoratiH': term for Turks and i\luslims (Interview. Belgrade, 11 June ~ 0 0 4 ) , ,
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as Croatia's President, Franjo Tudjman43 who dislikes Serbs, or Bosnian Serb 
politician Radovan Karadzic, who hates everybody who isn't a Serb" 
(Zimmermann, 1996, p,25), 
Thus far, we have addressed the five key claims that Western literature makes 
with respect to Milosevic' s actions and intentions, and we have seen that there 
is far greater support for each of these claims among the national minority 
interviewees than there is among the Serbian interviewees. We can no\\' 
examine to what extent the interviewees agree with the literature's claims \"is-
a-vis the three remaining elements in Milosevic' s construction as a criminal 
leader - his motivations, his personality and psychological profile. and his 
comparison with other "criminal" leaders. 
Section 5 - Concluding the Analysis 
This section is divided into three sub-sections and, once again. the opinions of 
the Serbian interviewees and the opinions of the national minority interviewees 
will be treated separately. 
(i) Milosevii: 's Motivations 
According to Western literature, Milosevic was primarily driven by, even 
obsessed with power. This "insatiable appetite for power" (Di GiO\'anni, 2004. 
p. 73) resulted in cold, calculating and ruthless behaviour. The O\'erwhelming 
opinion among the Serbian interviewees themsel\'es is that power is essentially 
what drove Milosevic. A female interviewee in Belgrade, for example. 
43 Accordin!2: to Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, president of the Croatian Helsl:nki C011l'!littee. Tudjman 
frequently r ~ f e r r e d d to the t'.luslims as "dirty. stinking Asians" (UdOYICkl and Slllkcnac. 2000. 
p . ~ ~ 12. n59). 
contends that, "Milosevic had too much power. It closed his eyes to real life. 
to the real world ... And his power was never enough for him. He always 
wanted more and more. It was like an empire - the Milosevic Empire" (LC). 
According to Aleksander Nenadovic, the former editor-in-chief of the 
newspaper Politika, "Milosevic was a power-hungry man who enjoyed power 
as much as he enjoyed whiskey. He did not have faith in anything serious. He 
was obsessed with power". 44 
There is also a widespread belief among the Serbian inten'iewees that 
Milosevic's lust for power caused him to behave in a selfish and ruthless 
manner. A female refugee from Croatia, for example, argues that, "You must 
be made of a special material if you do whatever it takes to have power" (S): 
while a male IDP from Kosovo maintains that, "Milosevic didn't defend the 
people in Kosovo. He defended himself and his power in Belgrade" (SP). For 
his part, lanko Baljak, a documentary producer at B-92, claims that, 
The Serbian people were in the hands of a lunatic gambler. Milosevic 
was just gambling with them and with the image of the Serbs. And he 
was not even a good gambler. He was a bad gambler. He always lost -
wars, territory, people, buildings, image, everything.45 
The literature's claim that Milosevic was motivated by power is one that also 
finds support among the national minority interviewees. According to a male 
Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar, for example, "When you speak about 
Milosevic, it's all about power" (NY). In a similar vein. a male ethnic 
Hungarian interviewee from Subotica maintains that, "Milosevic \\'as obsessed 
with power, and he did what he did to stay in power" (SS). 
44 InltT\iew, Belgrade, 2 I May 2004. 
45 Intervicw, Belgrade, 30 June 200-L 
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We have seen in this chapter that there is support among the national minority 
interviewees for the literature's claim that Milosevic incited ethnic hatred. The 
fact, therefore, that many of them believe he was driven mainly by power. 
rather than by a visceral hatred of non-Serbs, is significant; it further suggests 
that Western portrayals of Milosevic as a racist are flawed. 
(ii) Milosevic 's Personality and Psychology 
We saw in chapter 1 that Western literature focuses heavily on l'vhlose\'ic' s 
negative personality traits, namely mendacity and narcissism, and portrays him 
as somehow abnormal, for example by emphasizing his reclusive nature. The 
Serbian interviewees similarly highlight a number of MiloseviC's unpalatable 
characteristi cs. 
Several interviewees stress that he was extremely stubborn. A male 
interviewee in Nis, for example, argues that, "Milosevic had a stubborn 
politics. He did not compromise. He believed that only he was right and 
nobody else" (SC). Similarly, a female interviewee in Cacak claims that, 
"When Milosevic spoke to Western politicians, he was rude, inflexible and 
arrogant. He was rigid in his speeches and manners, and this was good neither 
for him nor for the Serbian people" (VS). 
Some of the Serbian interviewees also remark upon Milosevic' s lack of 
warmth and humanity. For example, according to the Belgrade intellectual 
Aleksa Djilas46, "There is an exceptionally cold side to Milose\'ic that is \'cry 
46 Intenit?\\', Belgrade, 20 May 2004. 
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worrying".47 In a similar vein, Professor Ljubinka Trgon:e\'ic argues that, 
"Milosevic was so autistic - he hadn't any, any emotions for others. And that's 
the problem. He just wanted to know what was good for him, not what was 
good for others".48 
Describing Milosevic' s perfonnances in the courtroom, the Belgrade journalist 
Ljiljana Smailovic also highlights his lack of feeling for others. She claims 
that, 
Milosevic likes to extinguish his cigarette butt on the witnesses. He likes 
to kick them when they are down ... He is hard on people, and he likes to 
dominate. He displays a total lack of humanity. Because he feels so 
superior in the courtroom, he throws his weight around, and is not always 
aware of his own inhumanity and lack of human wannth and respect for 
others.49 
Linked to these claims about Milosevic' s extreme coldness is the belief many 
of the Serbian interviewees hold that he did not care about his own people. so 
In the words of one male interviewee in Belgrade, "I don't think that Milosevic 
really cared about the Serbian people. If he had cared, he would have done 
something proper for us. At least he would have prevented the NATO 
bombing in 1999" (NS). A female interviewee in Kikinda, moreover, contends 
that, "The only ideology that Milosevic believed in was his own self' (SU). 
47 Certain Western commentators who have met Milosevic similarly refer to his exceptional 
coldness. Zimmermann, for instance, argues that, "Despite his undeniable charm, I f o ~ n d d hIm 
a man of extraordinary coldness ... I never saw him moved by an individual case ot ?uman 
suffering. Nor did I ever hear him say a charitable or generous word about an l ~ d l V l d u a l l
human being, not even a Serb" (Zimmermann, 1996, p.24). For his part, ~ e e JournalIst ~ . I l ~ h a a
Glenny, who interviewed MiloSe\ic in the summer .of 199 ~ , r e c a l l s . . ~ h e . . 1 l 1 l ) . ~ l l a b l d l ~ ~ ~
feature ... \vas the complete absence of anything resemblmg feehng or humamty m h l ~ ~ attltuLit: 
(Glenny, 1993, p.126). 
~ , , Interview, Belgrade, 19 July 2004. 
~ q q Interview, Belgrade, 12 June 2004. ._ 
50 This is an important point that will be discussed more In chapter 
28:' 
Some of the interviewees also portray Milosevic as being psychologically 
impaired. A female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, argues, "First of all. 
I think he was mad" (G). For her part, a female Kosovo Serb interviewee in 
Kosovska Mitrovica claims that, ""Milosevic was a crazy guy - a lunatic" (SK): 
and a male interviewee in Nis describes Milosevic as a "bolestan covek" (""a 
sick man") (SC). 
Dr Branka Prpa develops this portrayal of Milosevic. According to her. 
I see Milosevi6 as a psychiatric case, because the intellectuals - myself 
included - who fought against him could never predict his next moves. 
His next step was always so crazy that it simply could not have been 
predicted. It was unthinkable. As rational people. we always tried to 
think about the rational moves that Milosevic would make next, but he 
always did the opposite to what we had expected. For the same reasons, 
the international community had real problems with Milosevic. He was 
unpredictable and the international community could not understand 
h· 51 1m. 
Some of the national minority interviewees similarly describe Milosevic as 
psychologically challenged. A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, 
for example, argues, "'I think Milosevic is a sick man and he believed in all the 
stupid things he said, and that is his problem. I really think he is abnormal, but 
he is very clever and very intelligent" (RK); and according to a female Kosovar 
Albanian interviewee in Pristina, ""Milosevic is a psychopath. He is a clever 
man, but he has devastated many lives. He is a psychopath. He is nothing for 
me" (TG). Unable to decide whether Milosevic was bad or mad, a male ethnic 
Albanian interviewee in Belgrade asks, ""Was Milosevic a crook or a lunatic. or 
both at the same time?" (IG). 
51 Interview. Ne\\' Belgrade. '::8 July '::004, 
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(iii) Milosevic 's Comparison with Other "Criminal" Leaders 
Regarding MiloseviC's comparison with other leaders, such as Saddam Hussein 
and Adolf Hitler, there is a prevalent belief among the Serbian interviewees 
that such comparisons are exaggerated and over-simplistic. According to 
Janko Baljak, for example, "Victims are victims, but Hitler was Hitler and 
Milosevic is Milosevic. For us, Milosevic is Hitler, but in the European 
context and the world context, the comparison is too strong".52 A male 
interviewee in Belgrade also rejects such comparisons, although on different 
grounds. In his words, 
In the West, Milosevic became a Balkan Butcher, a war criminal who 
was worse than Hitler. It's not a realistic picture. He is not a war 
criminal and he is not Hitler. If you look at the facts, all the big war 
criminals, the great war criminals - like the Nazis in World War Two, or 
Pinochet, or Noriega, or Stalin - they were all extraordinary men. And 
Milosevic was just an ordinary man who was an excellent actor. Nothing 
else. My point is that he was not capable of anything great. So he was 
not, therefore, capable of great crimes (RJ). 
Although some interviewees do compare Milosevic with other "criminal"' 
leaders, it is important to emphasize that they are not comparing Milosevic' s 
crimes with the crimes of men such as Hitler and Stalin. Rather, the 
interviewees compare Milosevic with other "criminal" leaders on the basis of 
his style of speaking and mannerisms. A male interviewee in Kragujevac, for 
example, argues that, "Milosevic was a good speaker - like Hitler" (MA): and 
according to a male interviewee in Nis, "Milosevic was like Mussolini in 
terms of his mannerisms - the way that he stared straight ahead of him, with his 
head held high" (SC). Similarly, a female Kosovo Serb interviewee in 
Kosovska Mitrovica claims that, "Milosevic \\-as \cry charismatic. but so too 
were Hitler and Ceausescu"' (SK). 
52 Interview, Belgrade, 30 June '::004_ 
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Dr Branka Prpa also makes use of comparison. She explains, 
It has always been a wonder to me how such a banal and trivial person as 
Adolf Hitler .came to be the leader of the German people. I often wonder 
the same thmg about Milosevic, who was also a \"ery trivial person. 
Everything he said was stupid demagoguery. 53 
It can be argued that all of these comparisons are more illustrati ve than serious 
, 
helping us to build up a clearer picture of Milosevic. In short, they bring him 
to life, rather than support his construction as a criminal leader. 
Among the national minority interviewees, while there is considerable support 
for Milosevic's construction as a criminal leader, few of them support his 
comparison with other "criminal" leaders. A male ethnic Hungarian 
interviewee in Subotica, for example, considers that it is more appropriate to 
compare Ratko Mladic with leaders such as Hitler and Stalin. He argues, 
For the first few years, Milosevic was portrayed as someone who was 
even worse than Ratko Mladic, but Mladic is a pure war criminal - like 
the Nazis in World War Two. He directly ordered the massacre in 
Srebrenica. That was a pure war crime. Milosevic just had a hunger for 
power (MB). 
For his part, a male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade argues that, 
If Milosevic had been the new Hitler, you wouldn't have had any Croats 
or Muslims or Albanians living in Belgrade. And here is the living proof 
of an Albanian ... You would expect me to have been dead for ten years 
now if Milosevic had been the new Hitler (lG). 
Conclusion 
Now that we have addressed all four elements in MiloseviC's construction as a 
criminal leader - his actions and intentions, his motivations, his personality and 
psychological profile, and his comparison with other "criminal" leaders - some 
final conclusions can be drawn. Beginning \\"ith the national minnnty 
5.1 Intervie\\', New Belgrade, 2 ~ ~ July 2004, 
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interviewees, the only element in MiloseviC's construction as a criminal leader 
that does not find much support among them is his comparison with other 
"criminal" leaders. On the basis of the interview data from the eighteen 
national minority interviewees, therefore, the question "is Milosevic a criminal 
leader?" can be answered in the affirmative. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasize that while this image of Milosevic 
finds strong support among the national minority interviewees, it is not 
unqualified support. For example, although we saw in chapter 5 that the 
majority hold Milosevic most responsible for the wars in ex-Yugoslavia, we 
also saw how some interviewees stress that Milosevic alone was not 
responsible and not solely to blame. It should also be underscored that support 
for Milosevic' s construction as a criminal leader is substantial, but not 
overwhelming. As we have seen, the national minority interviewees always 
express more than one viewpoint. 
One of the most interesting findings to emerge from the data relates to the 
literature's claim that Milosevic incited ethnic hatred. While the national 
minority interviewees broadly agree with this claim, they do not, overall, 
believe that Milosevic was driven by ethnic hatred. Thus, it can be argued that 
for the national minority interviewees, it is primarily Milosevic' s actions and 
intentions, rather than his motivations that render him a criminal leader. 
Turning now to the Serbian interviewees, it is important to emphasize that their 
whole perspective on Milose\'ic is \'ery ditTerent from that of the national 
minority interviewees, for two main reasons. Firstly, while it proved very 
difficult to find interviewees willing to admit to having supported Milose\"ic, 
the fact is that he did enjoy considerable support. In the presidential elections 
held on 11 November 1989, for example, Milosevic won 80.36% of the votes 
(67.13% of the whole electorate) and lost only in Kosovo (Antonic. 2002, 
pAll). In the presidential elections of 9 December 1990, he won 63% of the 
votes cast, obtaining 3,258,779 votes against Vuk Draskovic·s 821,674 votes 
(Djukic, 2001, p.36). 
Milosevic's party, the SPS, also won the largest number of votes, although not 
an absolute majority (46.1%) in the 1990 elections (Gordy. 1999, p.35), as well 
as in subsequent elections. In the 1992 republican elections, the SPS won 
28.80/0 of the votes; in the 1993 elections, it won 36.7% of the votes; and in 
1997 the SPS, in coalition with the SRS and JUL, won 34.2% of the votes. 
According to Goati, "Although one may assume that the SPS obtained part of 
the votes thanks to electoral manipulation, there can be no doubt that in that 
period, the SPS enjoyed powerful support amongst the Serbian electorate" 
(Goati, 2001, pA7). 
It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that at least some of the Serbian 
interviewees would have supported Milosevic, and this will have almost 
certainly influenced how they view him today. Although some national 
minorities did support Milosevic, their support was more self-interested than 
genume. 
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Secondly, as we saw in chapter 5, the overwhelming majority of the Serbian 
interviewees believe that they were Milosevic' s biggest victims. This is 
significant because the major claims that Western literature makes with respect 
to MiloseviC's actions and intentions, the key element in his construction as a 
criminal leader, are centred on the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and on the 
crimes that took place during those wars. However, since Serbia \\'as not 
directly affected by war until 1999, when NATO began its bombing campaign 
against the FRY, the interviewees tend to focus more on immediate events that 
directly impacted on their everyday lives, such as the economic crisis. Thus, 
because the Serbian interviewees are more concerned with what Milose\'ic did 
to the Serbian people, to their country, and to their reputation in the world, 
their frame of reference for judging Milosevic is very specific. 
Western literature and the national minority interviewees, in contrast, use a 
different broader frame of reference that looks at Milosevic' s crimes more , 
within a regional context. Thus, it is not surprising that the overall conclusions 
to be drawn from the Serbian interview data and from the national minority 
interview data are different. 
As regards the Serbian interviewees, the question '·is Milosevic a criminal 
leader?" can be answered in the negative. We have learnt that there is little 
support among them for any of the five key claims that Western literature 
makes with respect to Milosevic' s actions and intentions. This is mainly 
because, as explained above, the wars do not form the crucial element in the 
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Serbian interviewees' assessments of Milosevic. Rather. they judge him 
primarily on the basis of what he did to them. 
We have seen that there is, however, broad support among the Serbian 
interviewees for the literature's claim that Milosevic was primarily motivated 
by power. We have also learnt that the Serbian interviewees attribute to 
Milosevi6 various negative personality traits, such as stubbornness and 
coldness, just as Western literature does. Given that the interviewees do not 
support the literature's claims about Milosevi6' s actions and intentions, and 
thus do not support his construction as a criminal leader, their arguments with 
respect to Milosevi6' s motivations and personality are crucial. What these 
arguments reveal to us is that according to the Serbian interviewees, Milosevic 
was above all a '"bad" leader, an image that chapter 7 will now explore. 
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Chapter 7 
Milosevic as seen by the Serbian I n t e r v i e w e e s ~ ~
"Bad" but not Criminal 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the dominant image that the Serbian 
interviewees have of Milosevic - as a "'bad" leader. There is a fundamental 
discrepancy between this image of Milosevic and the dominant image of him 
that we find in Western literature, as a criminal leader. The existence of this 
discrepancy supports the thesis' contention that it is important to explore how 
the externally constructed criminal leader is seen by his own people. To 
reiterate the argument made in chapter 3, the criminal leader should be studied 
both from the top down and from the bottom up. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. Section 1 explores three of the 
four particular senses in which, according to the Serbian interviewees, 
Milosevic was a "bad" leader. Section 2 concentrates on the fourth and most 
important reason why Milosevic is considered as a bad leader - the economic 
consequences of his time in power. The section will begin by giving an 
overview of Milosevic' s economic policies, before looking in detail at the 
particular charges the interviewees make against him. Finally, Section 3 looks 
at a second image that some of the Serbian interviewees have of Milose\'ic - as 
a victim. They see him as a victim of himself, as a victim of the people around 
him, in particular his wife Mira, and as a victim of the W cst. 
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Section 1 - Milosevic as a "Bad" Leader 
What emerges from the interview data IS that according to the Serbian 
interviewees, Milosevic was a "bad" leader in four particular ways F' tl' h 
.' IrS). e 
cared only about himself and his power, and not about the Serbian people. 
Secondly, he was incompetent and lacked ability. Thirdly. he surrounded 
himself with bad people. Finally, the consequences of his rule - both for the 
Serbian people and for the country - were very bad. We can now examine 
each of these elements in tum. 
(i) Milosevic Cared Only About Himself and His Power 
The widespread belief among the Serbian interviewees that Milosevic cared 
only about power is very common in Western literature, as we saw in chapter 
1. It is, moreover, a view that various Serbian authors also hold. The 
sociologist Pribicevic, for example, maintains that Milosevic "'does not follow 
any particular ideology, but only and exclusively his interests in preserving his 
own power" (Pribicevic, 1997, p.IIS); Stevanovic clams that Milosevic "had 
no specific programme, either economic or political, other than to preserve 
power for himself' (Stevanovic, 2004, p.34); and the journalist Djukic 
contends that, " ... Milosevic simply lusted for power" (Djukic, 2001, p.79). 
In response to the above arguments, it should first of all be emphasized that 
Milosevic was not unique in his desire to remain in power. All politicians want 
to stay in power. Secondly, it is important to note that while \ 1ilosc\ic 
undoubtedly enjoyed power, it is greatly oyer-simplistic to see his leadership as 
nothing but a naked lust for power. He did hayc specitic goals. For example. 
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he initially wanted to preserve Yugoslavia, but once this was no longer 
possible, his objective was to create a unified Serbia in which all Serbs would 
live together in one state, as they had done in Yugoslavia. He wanted to 
defend Serbia's national interests; he wanted to institute economic r e f o r m s ~ ~ he 
wanted Serbia to retain her independence vis-a-vis the West and be able to 
remain strong in the face of external pressures. 
Yet, Milosevic was not operating in a vacuum, and as the environment In 
which he was functioning changed, so too he had to modify his objectives and 
re-evaluate his position. l This does not mean that he was inconsistent in his 
political line. Rather, he was very pragmatic and, in the words of Pribicc\'ic, 
'"demonstrated an enviable skill to adjust to new situations and the popular 
mood" (Pribicevic, 1997, p.IIS). Furthermore, Milosevic was very consistent 
in his pragmatism. Nevertheless, it is perhaps easy to understand why various 
interviewees and commentators alike might see in Milosevic' s pragmatism and 
ability to manoeuvre a lack of any clear strategy or agenda, other than the raw 
pursuit of power. 
According to some authors, part of Milosevic' s success lay in the fact that his 
appeal was not one-dimensional. Pavlowitch, for example, argues that, 
Milosevic 
had something to offer most people - a re-vitalization of the party \ \ ~ h i c h h
would also be read as a step towards the advent of d e m o c ~ a c y . . a defense, 
of Serbia which could be used in the defense of Yugoslana, a chance ot 
I For example, the impact on Serbia of sanctions. ti:st i ~ t r o d u c e d d in r v ~ a y y 1 9 9 2 ~ ~ t ~ r ( e d d
M 'I' " t 'd r hI'S PO'I'tl'on \'1"'-:'-\'1'" the Bosman Serbs. An:\wus Il) !!et ~ , l l 1 d I O n ~ ~I OS('\'lC 0 reconSI e ,s """ , ~ ~
1 ifted, M ilosevic' s patience was sewre Iy tested \ \ ' I ~ e n , , in July 1994. the Bosman S e r ~ ~ a s s e n ~ b l : :
rejected the Contact Group peace plan. t-.lilose\'ic responded, on -l August 1994, b ~ ~ Imposing 
his own sanctions on Repliblika Slpska. 
p r o m o t i o ~ ~ for ~ o u n ~ e r r politicians, and an alternative to open anti-
CommunIst natIonalIsm, namely a reformed unified socialist market 
(Pavlowitch, 2002, p.194). 
In a similar vein, VujaCic maintains that, 
... analyses of the 'Milosevic phenomenon' which insist on only one 
dimension of his appeal (typically nationalism) are bound to miss the 
point. On the contrary, it was precisely the combination of simultaneous 
appeals to different constituencies which helps to explain Milose\'ic' s 
success (Vujacic, 1995, p.6). 
For her part, Johnstone claims that, 
The ability to be 'all things to all men' is often the key to political 
success. What was really wrong with Milosevic was what was also his 
greatest political asset: his ambiguity. He appeared ... to be able to square 
all the circles (Johnstone, 2000). 
If Milosevic could be "all things to all men", this further helps to explain why 
it can be difficult to identify precisely what he stood for and why, therefore, so 
many interviewees and commentators believe that he cared only about himself 
and about power. 
(ii) Milosevic was an Incompetent Leader with Limited Abilities 
In contrast to the Balkan strongman image of Milosevic that one finds in so 
much of the Western literature, the interview data yields a very different image 
of him as a rather weak and incompetent leader. In the words of one female 
interviewee in Belgrade, "Milosevic was a very middle class politician in 
historically the most important moment in our history. That was his misery, 
and it was ours too" (MM). Professor Svetozar Stojanovic adds that, 
"Milosevic was simply a small, local, provincial post-Communist politician. 
And that was his real capacity".2 
2 Interview, Belgrade, 29 June 2004. 
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According to the interview data, Milosevic demonstrated his incompetence and 
mediocrity in four particular ways. Firstly, he did not make any long-term 
plans. In the words of one male interviewee in Kragujevac, 
MiloseviC's politics was catastrophic. He was not born for politics. For 
a man to be a successful politician, he must have vision and the ability to 
think ten years ahead. Milosevic had neither. He had no plans at a11-- it 
was real chaos (MA). 
A male interviewee in Novi Sad similarly argues that, "Milosevic was not able 
to see far ahead. The decisions he took were made on the basis of short-term 
, 
not long-term, calculations. They were made on a day-to-day basis" (Ve).3 
In contrast, those Western authors that regard Milosevic as a criminal leader 
emphasize that he did make plans. In particular, as we saw in chapter 1, it is 
claimed that Milosevic planned the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the 
crimes that Serbs committed during those wars, in order to create a "Greater 
Serbia". 
Various authors argue that the 1986 SANU Memorandum provided the 
foundations for Milosevic' s programme. Ramet, for example, contends that 
almost exactly one year after it was published, "Milosevic would step forward 
to carry out the program spelled out in the Memorandum"' (Ramet, 2002, p.20): 
and Rusinow describes the infamous Memorandum as Milosevic's "scripture" 
(Rusinow, 1995, p.20). According to Professor Kosta Mihailovic. howe\cr, a 
member of SANU and one of the authors of the Memorandum, this document 
did not constitute a programme. Rather, "It was a reaction to the deep 
3 It would, it is suggested, be more accurate to say that Milose\ic constantly had to revise and 
reconsider his plans as circumstances changed. Had he had no plans at all. It IS very unllkel! 
that he could h a n ~ ~ stayed in power for as long as he did. 
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economic and social crisis in Yugoslavia, and it was addressed to the Serbian 
Parliament. There was no intention for it to be a public document".4 
Secondly, according to the interviewees, Milosevic failed to acknO\\'ledgc his 
own limited abilities, always thinking that he was stronger and more powerful 
than he actually was. A male interviewee in Belgrade, for example, maintains 
that, 
Sometimes Milosevic presented himself as bigger than he really was. If s 
quite incredible. He was a very good actor - a very good actor. He 
presented himself as if he was a big man, a big leader. He was so full of 
himself. It was like he was above, so much above, everybody else. E n ~ n n
when he spoke with some Western leaders, he was so pompous (RJ).5 
In chapter 1, a distinction was made between approaches in Western literature 
that emphasize the role of circumstances, and approaches that stress the role of 
actors. In the case of Milosevic, it could be argued that his rise and success 
had more to do with circumstances than with his skills as a leader. In the 
words of one male interviewee in Belgrade, '"Milosevic was the wrong man in 
the right place at the right time" (RJ). A male interviewee in Novi Sad 
expresses a similar view, arguing that, "'At the right time and in the right place, 
one man came along and said the right words. A few right words. And that 
was if' (A). 
The problem, however, is that Milosevic himself was not able to appreciate the 
fundamental role that circumstances played in his rise to power and political 
career. In the words of Professor Stojanovic. 
4 Interview, Belgrade, 15 July 2004. .... .", 
5 In the literature, the adjective "pompous" i ~ ~ often r e ~ e r v e d d tor t ~ e e late l I .datlan, P r ~ ~ I J L L 111. 
. "r d Z· Cor example argues that " H I ~ ~ p a ~ ~ l l ) n n l\)r display laused hl111 FranJo u man. Immermann, 1\ , ' • . , • d . 
. h' , 'pee 'hes and to concoct ceremomal events at whllh. resplen ent 10 to wnte I ~ ~ own pompous s l . _ 
fi ,. (Z' n 1996 ph) military unifonn. he would be the central Igure Immennan. .' , 
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Milosevic has never been able to distinguish between his abilities and 
capabilities, and just what you would call circumstances or historical 
luck/misfortune. In the initial phases of his power. historical 
circumstance.s assigned him a much greater role than his real capacities 
as a personalIty and as a ruler, but he never understood that hiatus. 6 
Unable to recognize his own limitations, Milosevic behaved arrogantly and 
with a sense of superiority that antagonized those whom he should ha\e sought 
as allies. 7 As he created more and more enemies, both the country and the 
Serbian people increasingly suffered. After all, in the words of one male 
interviewee in Belgrade, "You cannot be a good leader if you have war, you 
have sanctions and you argue with half of the world" (SZ). For her part, a 
Bosnian Serb refugee in Kosovska Mitrovica maintains that, "Milosevi6 should 
have been smart and had the United States as his friend, not as his enemy. 
Instead, he acted with inat8 towards the United States and towards the whole 
world" (NM). 
Thirdly, according to the interview data, Milosevi6 was out of touch with 
reality. In the words of Professor Mihailo Panti6, from the Philological Faculty 
in Belgrade, "Milosevi6 was a post-Communist Emperor who was out of his 
time and living in his own reality".9 Milosevi6's view of the international 
political situation highlighted this. To cite Professor Stojanovi6, "Milose\'i6 
thought he understood the world very well and didn't need any ad\isors. In 
6 Interview, Belgrade, 29 June 2004. 
d fid t and even cocky in his d e a l t l 1 ~ s s with 7 According to Sell, Milosevic "seeme con 1 en 
international negotiators ..... (Sell, 2002, p.22S). , ' 
E I h lent It mean>.; s()mething like 8 This is a specific Serbian term that has no direct ng IS equlva ' 
"'spite" . 
<) Interview, Belgrade, 22 June 2004. 
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other words, he was a lonely figure ... And he simply didn't understand that 
there was no possibility to continue being non-aligned". 10 
Milosevic regarded himself as a key figure on the international stage. yet failed 
to realize that several important scene changes had taken place - notably the 
end of Communism and the fall of the Berlin Wall - and fundamentally altered 
the nature of that stage. For example, he persisted in the erroneous belief that 
Russia would come to Serbia's assistance. I I According to Goran Svilanovic. 
the president of the GS, '"Milosevic was waiting for something big to happen in 
Russia. He never came to terms with the fact that Communism was dead and 
that the world had changed".12 The Belgrade journalist Vladimir Milic 
similarly argues that, 
Milosevic acted under the false belief that the Communists would return 
to power in Russia, and that Russia would help Serbia. He simply did 
not understand that the world had changed and that Communism was 
dead. By the time he realized this it was too late. 13 
If Milosevic had such a tenuous grasp of the new international order and such 
limited abilities as a leader, the image that we get of him is above all an image 
of incompetence, rather than belligerence. In the words of Professor 
Stojanovic, '"Surely, in terms of Serbian national interests, he was a sheer 
h " 14 catastrop e . 
10 Interview, Belgrade, 29 June 2004. . .. . 
II Beset with difficulties following the end of communIs,m a n ~ ~ the b r e ~ - u p p of the USSR. 
Russia did not make any serious effort to come to Serbia S assistance until 1999. dunng the 
NATO bombing of the FRY. 
12 Interview. Belgrade, 3 June 2004. 
U Interview. Belgrade, 23 May 2004. 
14 Inteniew. Belgrade, 2q June 2004. 
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Intercepted telephone conversations between Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb 
leader, Radovan Karadzic, between 1991 and 1992, appear to reinforce this 
image of incompetence. They show that Milosevic seemed to have far less 
knowledge and information about events on the ground than we might expect a 
leader to have. During a conversation that took place on 10 September 1991. 
for example, Karadzic asked Milosevic if Kostajnica had been taken. 
Milosevic replied, '"Well , I don't have preCIse information" 
(www.domovina.net). Later, on 19 September 1991, Karadzic remarked, 
'" ... we have confidential information that the situation with the army in 
Slavonia is catastrophic", to which Milosevic responded, "Really! I also heard 
that there are great difficulties, but I don't have correct information" 
(www.domoviva.net). 
That Milosevic appeared to be so poorly informed about events on the ground 
is significant given that, in his trial in The Hague, the Prosecution is seeking to 
prove Milosevic's "command responsibility", a concept that will be discussed 
more in chapter 8 
The fourth and final way in which Milosevic showed his lack of competence 
was by neglecting vital PR work. IS According to one male Milosevic supporter 
in Belgrade, for example, "Milosevic didn't know how to use marketing and 
15 Tim Marshall argues that in contrast to the Croatian Government, \\hich spent m i l ~ i o n s s on 
hiring American and Canadian PR finns, " B e l g r ~ d e , , g o v e ~ e d d by a bunc,h ot. ~ t l ) h d . .
Communist, nationalist. out-of-touch, criminaL conspIracy theonsb, told the outsIde \\-orld to 
mind its own business. and prodded \·isiting journalists in the chest. .They illS! the public 
relations \\ar along \vith all the other \\ars. for t.\\O r e a s ~ ) n s : : F ~ r s t l y . . theIr ~ l l k k c O ~ l m l t t e ~ ~ the 
.. t'th '. dl they were stupId and dldn t e\ en bother \Hth PR (\ larshall. maJonty 0 e cnmes, secon y. c 
2002, p.59). 
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public relations. He didn't want to spend money on that, but he is now paying 
a much higher price" (AB). Echoing this, Vladislav Jovanovic, a former 
Foreign Minister of Serbia and later of the FRY, argues that, "Milose\'ic 
neglected PR work. He believed too much in the truth of Serbia's arguments. 
This was political naivete on his part, for which he has been criticized"'. 16 
Aleksa Djilas adds that, 
Milosevic completely lacked imagination. He had lived in the West and 
he spoke good English. He should, therefore, have understood the power 
of the media and the influence that it has on politicians. Yet it took him 
a long time to realize this. Consequently, he did little to try and change 
the West's image of the Serbs, unlike Tudjman and Izetgegovic who 
hired PR firms to gamer international sympathy. 17 
(iii) Milosevic Surrounded Himself With "Bad" People 
For some interviewees, the problem was not so much Milosevic himself as the 
people he had around him, above all his wife, Mira Markovic. 18 The influence 
that Mira had on her husband is widely regarded as something very negative 
and harmful. 19 A female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, maintains that 
Milosevic committed a "big political mistake" by marrying Mira, whom the 
interviewee describes as "a woman who wanted to run politics"' and "a 
complicated and powerful woman" (MM). For Aleksander Nenadovic, the 
former editor-in-chief of Po litika , 
Mira's influence is a dark part of the Milosevic story. She inspired him, 
and he may have accepted her as being more intelligent, more 
knowledgeable, and more capable than he was. He talked to her before 
16 Interview, Belgrade, 24 May 2004. 
17 Interview, Belgrade, 20 May 2004. . ' .' 
18 More about Mira and her political party. the }"ugos/a\' United Left (lUL). WIll be said III 
section 3. . 
I'l Zimmermann notes that, "She \\'as thought to have the influence l1t a Lady \lacbcth on her 
husband ... " (Zimmermann, 1996, p.2l). 
"01 
-' -
he made any important decisions, and he tried to find out what she really 
thought - whether or not she approved.2o 
Nenadovic adds, "There was something irrational about their relationship. 
After all, Mira was not particularly attractive. She got fat!" 
According to Professor Svetozar Stojanovic, moreover, "1 think that i\1ilose\ic 
cannot be understood without his wife, and vice versa. 21 And French 
psychiatrists have a good term for that - 'une folie it deux'''. Highlighting 
Mira's influence on her husband, Stojanovic recalls, 
1 was a witness on several occasions when, in the evening, he would 
agree with more rational people, and he would promise to do this and not 
to do that. And then, next morning, he would change his mind, so 
something had happened during those twelve hours. Well, he went 
home!22 
It is noteworthy that those interviewees, and they are very small in number. 
who still support Milosevic significantly downplay the influence that Mira had 
on her husband. According to one female Milosevic supporter in Belgrade. for 
example, 
The idea that Mira had a strong influence over Milosevic is a figment of 
the West's imagination. Serbia is a conservative and patriarchal society, 
and by creating stories about the enormous influence that Mira had over 
her husband, the West was trying to deprive Milosevic of his manhood 
(RB). 
A male Milosevic supporter, also in Belgrade, claims that, "'Mira could not 
influence her husband because he was simply not the type of person that you 
20 Interview, Belgrade, 21 May 2004. .. ,. .. 
21 Scharf and Schabas similarly argue that, "One cannot deCipher MIlose\ll Without , d ~ l ) )
focusing on his lifetime partner, Mira MarkoviC (Scharf and Schabas. 2002. p.6): and Cohen 
notes that, "The extremely close bond between Mira and Slobodan ~ l l g g e ~ t s s that h e ~ ~ role r n u ~ t t
be carefully considered when assessing the s t r e n g t h ~ ~ and d e f i c i e n c I ( , ~ ~ l) t t--I Ilosenc ~ ~ political 
behavior" (Cohen, 2001, p.112). 
22 Interview, Belgrade, 29 June ~ 0 0 4 . .
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could influence. She had similar views to her husband but the d b 
' y argue a out 
many things. She was not as influential as people think" (PK). 
Some of the interviewees also maintain that Milosevic made the mistake of 
surrounding himself with incompetent people. In the words of one male 
Milosevic supporter in Belgrade, "Milosevic is a person who trusted the people 
around him, and he made many wrong decisions because of that. In that 
respect, he was not a good leader, because many of those people were bad 
people" (AB). 
Milorad Vucelic, the current vice-president of the SPS, claims that 
"MiloseviC's greatest weakness was choosing the wrong type of people to have 
around him, starting with me! [laughs]. He chose the wrong people and gave 
them positions for which they were not equipped".23 In a similar vein, Zivadin 
Jovanovic, the former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, argues that one of 
Milosevic's weaknesses was that, 
He surrounded himself with rather incompetent people, but people \vho 
would please him and his family ... Many people around him did not fulfil 
the criteria of competency but the criteria of formal loyalty. So I think it 
was a great weakness - the absence of clear-cut criteria so that people 
would be selected to fit functions and not vice-versa?4 
Interestingly, some of the national minority interviewees express similar 
opinions. According to one male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vucitm, tor 
example, "In the case of many dictators, the people around the dictator are 
worse than the dictator himself is. Maybe this \vas the case \\ith \1iloSc\·ic 
too" (LF). A male ethnic Hungarian interyic\\·ce in Subotica likewise argues 
23 Interview, Belgrade, 5 June 200·-l. 
2-1 Intcryiew, Belgrade, 17 May 200-l. 
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that, "The people around Milosevic were very bad people - war criminals. His 
wife was even worse" (RK). 
Section 2 - MiloseviC's Economic "Crimes" 
The final and most important reason why Milosevic was a "bad" leader. 
according to the Serbian interviewees, is that his economic policies had \'ery 
bad consequences, both for the country and for the people. Before dealing with 
the interview data itself, this section will begin by providing a brief o\'Cniew 
of Milosevic' s economic policies, of which there has been very little analysis 
in Western literature. This overview will help to put the interviewees' 
comments into context. 
(i) The Economic Policies of Milosevic and the SPS - An Overview 
Before embarking upon a career in politics, Milosevic had been president of 
the Udruiena beogradska banka. While working at the bank, he made several 
visits to the United States, met David Rockerfeller of the Chase Manhattan 
Bank, and attended the 1979 annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank, 
held in Belgrade. 
During this time, Milosevic was widely seen in the West as an economIC 
liberal. The former US Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, for 
example, who had known Milosevic during the late 1970s, told Zimmermann, 
"r thought he [Milosevic] was a liberal; he talked so com"incingly about 
westernising Yugoslavia's economy". He then added, "r just must h a n ~ ~ been 
wrong" (cited in Zimmermann, 1996, p.59). 
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It is not the case that Milosevic was adverse to econom' .c IC relorms. As \\'e saw 
in chapter 4, the economy was a prominent theme in f h' 
many 0 IS speeches. 
The problem, from a Western point of view was that M'l ~ ~ ',. , 
, 1 osevIc s economIC 
reforms reflected the belief of him and his Party that "th h' f fu d 
, e c Ie n amental 
form of property under socialism remains social property" (cited in Thomas, 
1999, p.48).25 In 1990, for example, the SPS placed key sections of the 
economy and social services under state control. In addition, Milose\"ic slowed 
down the process of privatisation and annulled all the privatisation that had 
been carried out under the federal law of 1990, by passing a new law in 1994. 
This is not to say that Milosevic and the SPS were wholly opposed to a market 
economy.26 Article 56 of the 1990 Serbian Constitution, for example, declares 
that, '"Social, state, private and cooperative property and other forms of 
ownership shall be guaranteed", and that "All forms of ownership shall enjoy 
equal protection of the law" (The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, 
1990); and the 2000 Report of the SPS refers to '"an integral programme of 
25 This commitment to social property put Milosevic and his party at odds with other political 
parties in Serbia, such as the Democratic Party (DS). In its 1990 Letter of Intent, for example, 
the DS declared that social property is "contrary to every rational law of economics", and that 
..... only a market economy and free enterprise can provide for a prosperous society ... " 
(Brankovic, 1995a, p.64). Unsurprisingly, therefore, according to a survey of 900 adults in 
November 1990, 51 % of private owners supported one of the opposition parties (20% the SPO, 
11 % the DS, and 20% others), while only 16% of private owners supported the SPS 
(Brankovic, I995a, p.65). 
~ 6 6 According to Mihailo Markovic, a former Vice-President of the SPS (1990-1992). 
"Milosevic offered a socialist idea in a very much re\'ised and improwd version - as a third 
way. This 'revised socialism' was the idea that the State takes care and feels responsible for 
the social security of people: that education - as much as possible - should be free, including 
university: that the health service should also be free; and that the State should greatly support 
culture. The second idea was that there should be a pluralist economy \\'ith all three kinds \)f 
property - private property, co-operative property (where people join resources l\) create a 
business), and State property, The third idea was that one should avoid the pitfalls of two 
extremes - one was State control and State planning, like in Russia. The other \\as eC0lh)mic 
anarchy, a laissez-faire economy, Bet\\een these two, a middle way \\as to have a market 
economy where some necessary elements of regulation were in the hands of the representatih's 
of the people, of the State" (Intervie\\'. Belgrade, II June 2004). 
J06 
reconstruction and development of the economy and country". and in particular 
"'the programme designed to create realistic economic prerequisi t e ~ ~ for 
economic growth, economic and social security, and continuation of market 
reforms" (Report on the Socialist Party of Serbia's Work Between the Third 
and Fourth Congress, 2000, p.13). 
These reforms, however, would occur at a pace set by Milosevic and his Party, 
not by Western institutions, in order not to alienate core SPS voters. 
The SPS was created in July 1990, by a merger of the League of Communists of 
Serbia and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia. Claiming 
to be a party maintaining continuity with the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia, the SPS presents itself as a modem leftist party, committed to 
achieving ""freedom, peace, social justice, equality, solidarity and creativity" 
(Report of the Socialist Party of Serbia's Work Between the Third and Fourth 
Congress, 2000, p.3). 
During the nineties, the Party's leftist orientation was particularly reflected in 
its economic policies. To cite Obradovic, the SPS 
endeavoured to present itself as a 'peoples party' that represented the 
interests of the Serbian people and Serbia, but also as the 'protector of the 
interests of potential ""social losers" in the process of economic transition' 
(Obradovic, 2000, p.432). 
Thus, it adopted various measures specifically aimed at helping particular 
social groups, most notably farmers. workers. pensioners. and peasanh. 
During its 1990 election campaign. for example. the P ~ 1 I 1 y ' S S main slogans were 
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"land for the fanners", "pay for workers" and "pensions for pensioners" 
(Slavujevic, 1995, p.176). 
According to the Basic Tenets of the Platforms and Statutes of the Socialist 
Party of Serbia, adopted at the Party's founding congress in 1990, the SPS is 
"against the widespread dismissal of workers and against policies that produce 
social insecurity" (Obradovic, 2000, p.445). Job security became particularly 
precarious following the introduction of UN sanctions. in May 1992. Before 
the 1992 and 1993 elections, however, the SPS promised voters that thev 
would not lose their jobs as a result of decreases in production; and this was 
not to remain an empty promise. In June 1993, on the initiative of the SPS, the 
Serbian Parliament adopted a Law on the Special Conditions for Hiring and 
Dismissing Employees During the UN Security Council Sanctions. Under this 
law, it was impossible to fire an employee while the sanctions were in etTect 
(Obradovic, 2000, p.448). 
Following the introduction of sanctions, the regIme also ..... limited wage 
differences and paid out guaranteed wages, rationed supplies of staple foods 
and set low prices for them, and exempted the poorest sections of the 
population from communal charges" (Slavujevic, 1995, p.176). 
Appealing to the needs of its rural constituency. in 1990 the SPS effected the 
restitution of land confiscated from the peasantry by the authorities in 1946 and 
1955. Further highlighting its commitment to its rural constituency, the Party, 
in its 2000 Report, maintains that it has upheld, inter alia, .. tinancial 
. 3 0 ~ ~
consolidation and stable financing of agriculture", "protection of domestic 
production", and "renewal of agricultural machinery" (Report on the Socialist 
Party of Serbia's Work Between the Third and Fourth Congress, 2000, p.18). 
The Report also claims that, 
an the SPS initiative, the government bodies provided substantial 
financial resources for the development of agriculture and rural 
regions ... In the course of the last three years over Din. 10 million was 
invested for these purposes (Report on the Socialist Party of Serbia's 
Work Between the Third and Fourth Congress, 2000, p.19). 
Given that the economic policies of the SPS primarily targeted dependent 
social groups, it is not surprising that these same social groups constituted the 
Party's main support base. That is to say that, "A number of polls show that 
the most important SPS strongholds need to be looked for among manual 
workers, pensioners and the elderly population in general, farmers, the less 
educated, civil servants, and the military" (Pribicevic, 1997, p.lI1). 
For example, according to a poll of 900 Serbian citizens, in November 1990, 
40% of manual workers supported the SPS (in contrast, only 13% supported 
the spa and only 40/0 supported the DS); 42% of non-manual workers 
supported the SPS (only 10% supported the spa and only 7% supported the 
D S ) ~ ~ 500/0 of farmers supported the SPS (13% supported the spa and 2% 
supported the DS); 68% of pensioners supported the SPS (only 2.5% supported 
both the spa and the DS); and 48% of housewives supported the SPS (II % 
and 4% supported the spa and the DS respectiYely) (Brankovic, 1 9 9 ~ b , , p p . 8 ~ ~
88). The same poll revealed that 43% of low-income groups supported the 
309 
SPS, 16% supported the sPa, and 2% supported the OS (BrankO\ic. 1995b, 
p.90). 
According to a later poll, conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences in 
Belgrade, on the eve of the 1993 republican elections, the SPS was supported 
by 41 % of interviewed workers, 30% of pensioners, 28% of farmers, 26° ° of 
housewives, and 15% of clerks (Pribi6evi6, 1997, p.111). 
The above-mentioned social groups are those most afraid of fundamental 
change. For example, a large part of the working class feared political change 
(a change in the ruling party) for at least two reasons -
1. many work in the 'socially-owned' commercial sector. The general 
move towards privatisation announced by political opponents of the 
socialist government threatened jobs while heralding the introduction of 
more stringent standards of expertise, quality and discipline; 2. the 
changes indicated also threatened elements of the welfare state workers 
were used to (social security, health insurance, guaranteed minimal wage, 
a high level of job security, etc) (Brankovi6. 1995a, p.61). 
As to pensioners, "'Their productive years are over and any change which could 
threaten the position they have earned by their work would directly endanger 
their survival" (Brankovi6, 1995a, p.62). The fact that the SPS positioned itself 
as a party of moderate change - in 1990, its election slogan was "With us there 
is no uncertainty" - further helps to explain its appeal among these social 
groupS.27 
27 Some interviewees claim that the SPS also offered the p r o m i ~ e e of a gOl)d career and 
professional s u c c e ~ s s as a means of attracting support. :\ccording to a t ~ m a l e e ,inter:'iewee i ~ ~
No\i Pazar. for example, "If you wanted to get a job. you had t,) be O ~ l e e ot ~ l i l o s e \ l c c ~ ~ pawn..; . 
(Sf\l). The interviewee recalls ho\\ her sister. an English teacher 111 a high-school In Nov) 
Pazar. \"lIS promised the job of school principal if she joined the SPS. 
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In view of Milosevic and his Party's declared commitment to social securitv. 
social justice and social welfare, it is significant that so many of the Serbian 
interviewees focus on Milosevic' s economic crimes, accusing him of making 
them poor. The first point to make is that at the height of the economic crisis, 
many people did not actually blame Milosevic for their plight, even if they do 
so today. According to Thomas, by the winter of 1993/1994. 
the relationship between the town and countryside had broken down ... On 
both sides of this rural/urban divide there were many who did not blame 
the government or the President for this crisis. In the towns food 
shortages were blamed by some on the laziness or vindictiveness of the 
peasantry. In the rural areas blame for the lack of basic materials such as 
petrol and fertiliser was often aimed at a general class of urban 
bureaucrats, who were held responsible for exploiting the peasantry, 
rather than specifically at the government (Thomas, 1999. p.166). 
The second point that should be made is that had the interview sample included 
more dependent social groups - for example, some peasants, or more 
pensioners - it is very likely that there would not have been the same emphasis 
on MiloseviC's economic crimes. Unsurprisingly, of all the interviewees in the 
actual interview sample, it is the pensioners who speak most positively about 
Milosevic's economic and social policies. 
According to a female pensioner and Milosevic supporter in Belgrade, for 
example, "Under Milosevic' s regime, I had job security - I knew that nobody 
was going to take my job away from me. Today, I have no job and no 
opportunity of finding one" (RB). A male pensioner. also in Belgrade, 
maintains that, "Milosevic had good social policies, much better than in many 
countries. There was good job security, and companies had to provide 
payments - regular monthly payments - to people who were on \\'hat we called 
"forced leave'" (PK). 
.3 11 
Finally, it is important to underscore that although the majority of the Serbian 
interviewees in the sample heavily blame Milosevic for Serbia's economic 
crisis, he was by no means solely responsible for it. Rather, various external 
factors significantly contributed to this crisis, in particular IMF macro-
economic stabilization policies, UN sanctions, and the NATO bombing. 
(iiJ External Factors that Contributed to Serbia's Economic Crisis 
During the 19708, the Yugoslav government had fuelled growth with foreign 
loans. However, the result of a Western recession that started in 1975, 
developing into a worldwide economic depression during the 1980s, was that 
these foreign loans suddenly began to dry up. After 1978, for example, 
commercial banks virtually stopped lending money to Eastern European states. 
Nevertheless, Yugoslavia still needed to repay its huge foreign debt. 28 Thus, in 
1982, the government obtained a so-called "three-year standby loan" from the 
IMF and, as Woodward explains, 
The IMF conditions were that the government introduce domestic 
economic reforms to make the country better able to service its debt. It 
proposed, in effect, an anti-inflationary macroeconomic stabilization 
policy of radical austerity, trade and price liberalization, and institutional 
reforms to impose on firms and governments monetary discipline and 
real price incentives (Woodward, 1999, p.49). 
All of this came at a price for ordinary people. Food subsidies were abandoned 
in 1982, and prices for petrol, heating fuel, food and transportation rose by one-
third in 1983. Firms showing losses were obliged to layoff workers, and there 
was high inflation. Aggregate inflation for the period 1979-1985, for example, 
exceeded 1,0000/0, compared to a European a\'erage of less than 50% (Lampe. 
2X In IQ71, Yugos]a\'ia owed US $4 billion; in 1975. she owed llS S(',.6 b i l l i o n : ! ~ ~ 1?7R. ~ h e e
figure owed \Vas around US $11 billion; and by 1983 the figure had reached US ~ _ O . ) ) blll1011 
and \\as still rising (Benson, 2001, p.IJ3). 
1996, p.293). Inflation, in tum, created poverty. For example, ""By the end of 
1984, the average income was approximately seventy percent of the official 
minimum for a family of four, and the population living below the poverty line 
increased from 17 to 25 percent" (Woodward, 1995, p.52). 
Various authors maintain that the problems caused by these IMF austerity 
policies in Yugoslavia were a fundamental factor in the country's 
disintegration. Hudson, for example, argues that, "" ... it was primarily the 
disastrous economic problems caused by the IMF economic policies imposed 
on Yugoslavia in the 1980s which provoked the crisis that eventually resulted 
in the break-up of the federal republic" (Hudson, 2003, p.2). In a similar vein, 
Chussudovsky contends that, ""Macro-economic restructuring applied in 
Yugoslavia under the neoliberal policy agenda has unequivocally contributed 
to the destruction of an entire country" (Chussudovsky, 1996, p.29). 
What is striking, however, is the number of interviewees who appear to have 
no recollection of how IMF policies impacted on their daily lives. Instead, 
many of them simply remember the Tito years as a golden era. A female 
interviewee in Belgrade, for example, recalls that, ""During the time of Tito. we 
got credits and we had a lot of money, people were working, they had their 
salaries, they had their education, they had everything". She adds, "We are 
nostalgic for that period" (DN). A male interviewee in Nis also says that he 
feels nostalgic for Yugoslavia, because it was a "divna zemlja" ("'beautiful 
country") (VU). Such rose-tinted memories of the past can help to explain 
why the interviewees are so critical of Milose\·ic - he is seen as having rnbbed 
them of the good life they once enjoyed. 
If there were already economic problems when Milosevic came to power in 
1989, these problems only deepened as a result of UN sanctions and the NATO 
bombing. Sanctions, first imposed on 30 May 1992, had extremely detrimental 
effects on Serbia's economy. For example, sanctions had a huge impact on 
prices. Thus, 
After one year of sanctions (mid-1992 to mid-1993), the loss of revenue 
in the new Yugoslavia is estimated to be some $25 billion, and the per 
capita national income has dropped by an order of ten, from around 
$3,000 to $300. In that one year, the price of bread has increased 800 
times, while the price of milk has increased over 1,000 times.29 GNP 
dropped by $12 billion in that year, the value of foreign trade fell by $9 
billion, industrial output fell by forty percent in the first five months of 
1993 over the same period in 1992, and one half of the labour-force is 
unemployed (Bookman, 1994, p.114). 
Serbia's economy also suffered enormous damage as a result of the NATO 
bombing, in 1999. According to analysis by the economic group G 17, direct 
damage suffered by Serbia - excluding Kosovo - amounted to approximately 
$US 3.8 billion, and indirect damage amounted to $US 30 billion. The average 
salary in Serbia before the war had been about 150 German Marks, whereas 
after the war, it was just 80 German Marks. Furthermore, several thousand 
people were left without a job because their factories had been destroyed 
(Antonic, 2002, p.282). 
As we shall now see, however, it is Milosevic whom the overwhelming 
majority of interviewees hold most responsible for Serbia's economic crisis. 
Moreover, what the interviewees remember most about Milosevic' s time in 
power is economic hardship and extreme poverty. 
~ < ) ) "At the onset of sanctions, 5,000 dinars had a yalue of 5550. while three wceb after 
. . . d d $'" 70 I the course of three weeks In .\Ugust sanctIons were Imposed, their value roppe to ~ . . . n, " :- .. 
1992, the yalue of the dinar had dropped from 9 million per deub("he mark Il' _i5 million 
(Bookman, 1994, p.117). 
(iii) Everyday Life in Milosevic 's Serbia 
In the words of one male interviewee in Kragujevac, "In the history of the 
Serbs, starting from the seventh century, there never was a man who caused 
more suffering and more deaths among the Serbian people than ~ 1 i l o s e \ ' i c " "
(MA). Echoing this, Slobodan Antonic, one of Belgrade's leading experts on 
the Milosevic regime, argues that Milosevic "can definitely be counted among 
the worse rulers in Serbian history. In the thirteen years of his rule, Serbia was 
struck by the most diverse evils" (Antonic, 2001, p.39). 
As previously noted, Western literature has tended to neglect the domestic 
consequences of Milosevic' s leadership and to focus more on the regional 
consequences. Thus, while we know that Serbian people suffered as a result of 
hyperinflation and sanctions, we know very little about their daily lives and 
about how they were feeling during the Milosevic years. This is one area in 
which the interview data makes an important contribution to the existing 
Western literature. 
G, a middle-aged woman with two children in Belgrade, recalls how she 
struggled when her second daughter was born, in 1992. 
I always needed milk powder for my baby, but the stores were empty: I 
remember sitting next to the telephone with a phone directory ~ n d d nngmg 
around all the pharmacies, to see if any of them had some mIlk powder. 
One pharmacy in Belgrade would have one tin, a pharmacy in Panee\'() 
would have one or two tins, et cetera. 
Owing to the food shortages, G suddenly had to learn how to make bread and 
other essentials. "My mother used to buy enormous bags of flour and she was 
always making bread. It was her way of dealing \\'ith the situation". 
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MA, a middle-aged man from Kragujevac, chose to temporarily leave Serbia 
and his family and find work abroad. In 1993, he travelled to Crete and 
worked for three months picking olives. "I worked hard to be able to buy four 
pairs of Nike trainers for my family. Even then, we were still \-ery imJge-
conscious" [laughs]. He also sold his car to get extra money. MA' smother 
lived in the countryside. She had a pig and grew vegetables, and used to send 
her son and his family food. During the nineties, many Serbs who lived in 
cities and towns were heavily dependent on food parcels sent to them by 
friends and relatives living in the villages. 
It was not only food that was in short supply. RJ, a twenty-five year old male 
in Belgrade, broke his ankle in 1994, while staying with relatives in Ljubovija, 
in western Serbia. The nearest hospital had no film to X-ray his ankle. His 
uncle therefore drove him, in the middle of war, across the river Drina to the 
nearby town of Bratunac, in Repuhlika Srpska. 
Interestingly, when asked about everyday life during the Milosevic years, very 
few of the interviewees mentioned war. Instead, the overwhelming majority 
focused on the economic situation, associating the Milosevic period with 
economic misery. In the words of Professor Mihailo Pantie. "Under Milosevic, 
people lived for ten years on the existential margins. Average life was awful 
and disgusting. There was great instability, and people just lived from day tl) 
day".30 
30 Inteni('w. Belgrade, 22 June 2004. 
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According to a male interviewee in Kikinda "Most of us whe . 
, , n you mentIon 
the Milosevic period or era, remember the hyperinflation in 1993.31 That was 
probably the worst thing that happened to us" (RP). This hyperinflation 
reached a peak in January 1994, when the monthly rate of inflation in Serbia 
averaged 313,563,558.00/0. This meant that the daily rate of inflation averaged 
62.02% for that month (Gordy, 1999, p.170). Thus, a kilogram of potatoes that 
had cost 4,000 dinars on 10 November 1993 cost 8,000,000,000,000,000 dinars 
on 17 January 1994 (Gordy, 1999, p.71). 
The spiralling inflation created a surreal situation. According to one female 
interviewee in Belgrade, " ... it was complete madness, like in a twilight zone. 
For example, you had to write nine cheques, to the maximum value, to buy one 
chocolate" (G). Another interviewee, a male in Cacak, recalls, "1 remember 
my mother writing ten cheques for ten eggs" (IB). At the same time, money 
was constantly losing its value. As one female interviewee in Belgrade 
describes, 
The worst year was 1993 - that was the nightmare. My salary, as an 
interpreter in a foreign trade company, was around two Gennan Marks 
per week. And we were paid on Friday, each Friday, and it made a 
difference whether you received your salary before noon or after noon, 
because if you received your salary before noon, you could buy about 
five German Marks for it, maybe even seven if you were lucky. If you 
received it after noon, you could not buy anything, but you had to spend 
that money because the next morning, it was worth nothing (G). 
Inflation also created widespread poverty in Serbia. For example, in i\larch 
1996, "According to some indicators, at this moment almost 70 per cent of the 
population of Serbia is on the verge of poverty .... · (Kaljc\ic. 1996); and the 
sociologist Ljiljana Mijanovic maintains that in the first half of 1997. just - ' ~ ( ) ) 0 
31 At the end of November 1993. inflation was running at 18.70 0 a day: ~ ~ 1.190% a month: and 
~ i ' \ 6 6 billion percent a year (Thomas, 1999, p.165). 
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of the Serbian population had an income sufficient to provide the bare 
necessities (cited in Milan Milosevic, 2000b, p.54). Thus. most interviewees 
remember struggling to buy even basic essentials. One male interviewee in 
Cacak, for example, recalls that during the hyperinflation, he and four of his 
colleagues had to pool their wages in order to buy two hundred grams of coffee 
(V). To cite Stevanovic, "Until Milosevic came to power, modern Serbia had 
never experienced real hunger" (Stevanovic, 2004, p.156). 
Poverty, in tum, bred crime. Between 1990 and 1993, for example, the number 
of reported crimes in FRY rose from 120,442 to 173,642. As might be 
expected, the largest increase was in the number of economic and property 
crimes (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996, p.613). According to Nikolic-Ristanovic. 
'"Although it was not reported officially, it is well known that during the war. 
almost every citizen of the FRY was involved in some illegal activity" 
(Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996, p.616). 
Who was to blame for Serbia's economIC crisis? According to Dr Oskar 
Kovac, from the Economics Faculty in Belgrade, it is "rubbish" to blame 
Milosevic. Kovac maintains that hyperinflation was the result of sanctions32 , 
not of MiloseviC's bad economic policies. He admits that, between 1992 and 
1994, Serbia's GDP dropped by almost 60%, but adds that, 
.. , from 1994 until 1998, Serbia had rates of growth of GNP between five 
and six percent, which nobody had in the whole of Europe, at least not in 
Eastern Europe, in the so-called transition countries, because they had t ~ e e
so-called transitional recession. So they certainly were not bad economIC 
p. . d 301\\ 199' 0 16 Noyember 1992 the United Natwns 
-- SanctIOns were first Impose on n ay _. n . '. . .., 
. d 1 bI k d t' SerbI'a and Montenegro in order to entorce fuel sanctions. On_h Impose a na\'a OC a e ·
A '1 1993 t' . f' rther e'"tended in order to freeze YUl!lls!ay assets abroad and to pn , sane IOns \\ere u ., '. -
pren.'nt the transhipment of goods through the FR\ . 
31S 
policies if they could stop a hyper-inflation and prod C C fi 
uce lor lour or lye 
years average rates of growth of five or six percent.33 
The eminent Belgrade economist Professor Kosta MI'h'l ." . '1 1 
at 0\ IC sImI ar \' 
maintains that Milosevic was not responsible for Serbia' s economic troubles. 
He argues that, 
The. core of Milosevic' s economic policy was very practical - how to 
survIVe and to get out of that economic crisis. The conditions didn't 
allow for the creation of a good, consistent policy of economic 
development. All external conditions directed the behaviour of Serbia 
and the Serbian economy, so that Slobodan Milosevic was not in the 
position to influence seriously - in either a positive or a negative sense _ 
that policy.34 
Most of the interviewees, however, directly blame Milosevic for the economic 
crisis. Some also claim that the Milosevic regime benefited from the fact that 
people were so poor. In the words of one male interviewee in Belgrade, for 
example, "Milosevic made the people poor and when he made them poor, he 
killed in them any critical opinion" (RJ). A female interviewee in Belgrade. 
and one of the founding members of Otpor35, further highlights the impact that 
poverty had on people. She explains, 
I think it's important, when I look back, that for all of the people who 
fonned Otpor, our economic situation was not that bad. And I think it 
gave us the freedom to focus on something else. And, of course, on the 
other side, if you are very involved with helping your family or working 
everyday for some small salary, you don't have the same inspiration or 
ignition to do something. And I think that' s something very important -
36 that we more or less had the freedom to focus on Otpor (MJ). 
33 Interview, Belgrade, 7 May 2004. 
34 Interview, Belgrade, 15 July 2004. 
35 Otpor ("The Peoples' Movement of Resistance") was created by students from the 
Philosophy Faculty in Belgrade, in late October 1998. It had some 70,000 members, and about 
80 offices throughout Serbia. With its very simple and direct message, "Gotov je!'" ("He's 
finished!"), Otpor played a key role in bringing about the downfall of the I\lilosevic regime. It 
was an NGO until December 2003, when it became a political party. 
36 Such arguments can also be found in the existing \\'estem literature. Gordy. for t'xample. 
contends that, "As long as individuals were seyerely hindered in their private Jiws. the regIme 
maintained its ability to act unobstructed in the public sphere" (Gordy, 1999, p.176). In a 
similar win. Sell maintains that, "forced to expend more and more physical and mental energy 
for their day to day surviyal. people simply did not have the time or the s t r t ' n g ~ h h left over to 
oppose the regime" (Sell, 2002, p.ll)-l). Such arguments do not. howeyer. expla1l1 why people 
acti\i?ly supported the regime. 
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What is very clear is that many interviewees experienced feelings of 
powerlessness during the Milosevic years, and poverty most certainly 
contributed to such feelings. However, these feelings were more complex than 
simply economic powerlessness. People felt powerless against a regime that 
exerted strong control over their lives. In the words of one female interviewee 
in Belgrade, ""The worst thing about living under Milosevic was the feeling that 
you were not in control of your own life. You felt that someone else was 
controlling it" (G). 
Research by TNS Medium Gallup, in April 2000, suggests that such feelings 
were widespread. The 1088 respondents were asked the question, "Do you 
believe that people like yourself can have some effect on the decisions made by 
the national government?" Only 1.8% answered ""Almost always", and 65.0% 
answered "Almost never" (TNS Medium Gallup, 2000). 
Some interviewees dealt with the situation through escapism. According to a 
female Kosovo Serb interviewee, ""Drugs and alcohol were very cheap during 
that period. It was a bad way to try and escape reality"(SK}. For his part, a 
male interviewee in Belgrade recalls, ""My favourite place in Belgrade was the 
National Library. It was my place of refuge"' (ZG). 
Some interviewees also describe feeling powerless to change the West' s very 
negative opinion of the Serbs.37 A male interviewee in Cacak, for example, 
-'1 Hockenos claims that. "Most of the world's diplomatic players ~ a m e e tl) judge Serbia. 
embodied in Milosevic. as the principal antagonist, even if no l)l1e Side deserved exclUSive 
blame" (Hockenos. 1993, p.108). 
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explains, "I felt very sad and angry about how the West was portraying the 
Serbs, and 1 didn't know what we could do to correct the West's opinion of us" 
(IB). According to a female interviewee in Belgrade. this sense clf 
powerlessness vis-a-vis the West came to a head during the NATO b o m b i n g . 3 ~ ~
She argues, "We all felt completely helpless in regard to NATO and in regard 
to Slobodan Milosevic, because it seemed like we were between the hammer 
and the nail. It was two big forces that just kind of turned your life around" 
(MJ). 
A male interviewee from Belgrade, moreover, claims that these feelings of 
powerlessness still exist today. He explains, 
What I personally lost with MiloseviC's regime is that when you go to 
any foreign country and say that you are from Serbia, people look at you 
differently. They look at you as if you were some barbarian [laughs], or 
as if you come from some country that has nothing, knows nothing ... and 
I don't think that the new government - any new government in the near 
future - will have the power or the strength to change that. It's going to 
stay for a long time (SC). 
In addition, some interviewees felt powerless in the context of their family 
lives. For example, a male Kosovo Serb interviewee in Kosovska Mitrovica, 
made a refugee in 1999, describes feeling helpless at not being able to do 
anything for his mother and brother who were living in a collective centre in 
Vranje (RN). Younger generations sometimes felt powerless to express 
different beliefs and opinions to their parents. As one male intervie\vee. a 
Kosovo Serb now living as an IDP in Belgrade explains. "In 1996. the younger 
generation started to think in another way. but we didn't have enough powl'r 
because our parents were for Slobodan Miloseyic" (SP). Another intenil'\\l'l', a 
.18 Writing during the NATO bombing, John Simpson noted, "The ~ l a j l ) . n t y y of p ~ o p k k in t h ~ s s
country feel like prisoners at present, hideously \ulnerable to an outSide tllrce WhH.;h call "tnke 
.' . d" S . 1999) them at any time it chooses. accordIng to a logiC they cannot understan (Impson. . 
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female living in Novi Pazar, describes how she voted for Milosevic simply In 
order to fit in with her family (SM). 
Closely linked to their feelings of powerlessness, many intervie\\'ees also 
describe feelings of humiliation. In part, poverty was the cause of this 
humiliation. One female interviewee in Kikinda, for example, recalls that, 
In 1993, I couldn't afford even a potato. I used to wake up in the 
morning without any dinars even for bread. 1 felt so humiliated, and 1 
had doubts about myself as a parent, because 1 couldn't provide basic 
food for my family. I felt that I was not clever enough, not smart enough 
(SU). 
A second reason for peoples' sense of humiliation was that they could no 
longer travel freely. MiloseviC's Serbia became an international pariah and 
suddenly Serbs could no longer travel without visas.39 For many, this was 
extremely humiliating. In the words of one female interviewee in Belgrade, "I 
remember when I used to travel to England without visas, and 1 also know very 
well what it's like now when you want to travel anywhere, and the feeling that 
we are in some kind of cage and under some kind of punishment. Still!" (G). 
Some of the interviewees emphasize that it was very different when Tito was 
President. At that time, according to one female interviewee in Belgrade, 
""Everybody loved us and it was a great feeling. You could go everywhere and 
everybody was polite to you. And you really had the feeling that you could be 
proud of coming from Yugoslavia at that time" (LC). A male intcn'iewcc in 
Cacak similarly argues that, ""Before Milosevic. Yugoslavia \\'as a military 
39 En:-n today, Serbs still need \'isas to \isit most countries, 
force in the world, and with the red Yugoslav passport ld .. you COil go any\\'here 
(IB). 
A third major feeling that some interviewees describe is C'ea C' f h ' 
11 r - lear 0 anng to 
fight in war. 40 A female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, recalls, 
It was in 1992, the first time, when maybe five or six of my male friends 
escaped because they didn't want to go to the Army. There were wars 
and there was an extreme fear of what could happen to you. And it was 
always safer to go out of the country than to even risk being sent to the 
Army (MJ). 
For his part, Janko Baljak, a documentary producer for B-9it' , describes how 
he managed to avoid being mobilized, by sleeping in a different place every 
night. "Every day, the police would come to my mother's house, and she 
would tell them that I was away from Belgrade, shooting a documentary 
somewhere".42 
For some, however, the idea of fighting a war was very attractive. In the words 
of one male interviewee in Belgrade, 
War gave people - particularly unemployed people - a sense of pride and 
purpose. When they joined the army, they were given nice uniforms, 
they got a good salary, and they felt important. It's very easy to make a 
war where there are a lot of people without jobs (SZ). ~ 3 3
40 Some of the national minority interviewees also experienced this fear. A male ethnic 
Hungarian interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, recalls how, "Many of us - many of us young 
people - went to psychologists, and in that way we avoided serving in MiloseviC's army. They 
liked to recruit ethnic minorities to fight in those wars" (AN). A male Kosovar Albanian 
interviewee, moreover, claims that when he was in his fourth year of secondary school, there 
were only three males left in his class, The other ten had left for Germany, Switzerland, and 
other countries, due to fear of having to serve in the army (LF), 
41 B-92 was created in 1989. It was closed down on 9 March 1991 (during the large street 
demonstrations led by Vuk Draskovic). and was also closed down for two days at the 
beginning of December 1996 (again, during the big street demonstrations provoked by the 
local election results), It was then closed down the night before the NATO bombing started. 
and was taken o\er during the bombing, Today, howe\'er. it has resumed broadcasting and is 
now a television network. 
42 Interview, Belgrade, 30 June 2004. 
4.1 Woodward similarly argues that, "In the early stages of the contlict. the u n e m p l o ~ e d d
provided ready tighters because they \\'I;'re promised \\·ages and benetits" (\\\)\)dward. 1999. 
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Now that we have a clearer image of what ordinary Serbian people experienced 
and felt during the Milosevic years, it is perhaps easier for us to understand 
why, as we saw in chapter 5, so many of the Serbian interviewees consider that 
Milosevic's greatest crimes were committed against Serbia and against Serbs. 
In tum, once we understand this, we thus have an important context, or frame 
of reference, within which to assess the interviewees' opinions of Milosevic. 
What is clear is that in contrast to the existing Western literature, which 
primarily judges Milosevic from a normative perspective. the Serbian 
interviewees largely judge him from a socio-economic perspective. They do 
not regard him as a "bad" leader for having lost four wars (in Slovenia, Croatia, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo). Instead, as we have seen, they particularly blame him 
for making them poor and for creating an economic crisis. 
We have seen why, according to the Serbian interviewees, Milosevic was a 
"bad" leader. We can now examine a second image of Milosevic that emerges 
from the interview data - as a victim. 
Section 3 - Milosevic as a Victim 
Although it proved extremely difficult to find interviewees willing to admit 
that they had supported Milosevic44, it is clear that there is, ne\'cr1heless. 
considerable sympathy for him among Serbs. This sympathy manifests itself 
not only in interviewees' attitudes towards The Hague Tribunal, to be 
p364). In 1993. for example, there were -+50.000 unemployed people in Serbia (Kaljeyic. 
1996), " "d h h 1"11 rt 
-l-l Of the fortv-nine ordinary Serbian intervie\H'es. only SIX sal t" ~ t , , t ey S I SUppO 
1\ lilos('\"ic toda)!, and only four admitted that they had supported M t\os('\1C In the pa-;, 
J2.+ 
examined in chapter 8. It is also reflected III the perception that some 
interviewees have of Milosevic as a victim. 
Firstly, Milosevic is seen as a victim of those around him. According to 
Aleksander Nenadovic, for example, the former editor-in-chief of Politika and 
a fierce Milosevic critic, "Milosevic was pushed by those who had more 
knowledge and more experience than he did", for example the intelligentsia. 
These "'empty heads", as Nenadovic describes them, 
were eager to help Milosevic and to convince him that if he wanted to be 
successful, then he should listen to them - they would provide him with 
arguments. Milosevic loved the love that was offered to him by these 
people. 45 
Professor Mihailo Markovic, moreover, claims that the people around 
Milosevic simply used him. According to Markovic, sanctions enabled a small 
number of private individuals to become extremely rich, and 
Milosevic believed that these rich businessmen would be his natural 
opponents, because they would naturally be against any kind of socialist 
idea ... But he wrongly believed that he could make them his allies. He 
would organize them into a Party, which was JUL, and his own wife 
would lead that Party. So these 'nouveau riche', as the French say, 
would become his friends, his allies, but that was a devastating idea and 
an idea with very big consequences, because there was a terrible 
contradiction here. We have rich people in a very poor country, and 
these rich people get all kinds of privileges because they are in one of the 
ruling organizations. And that was their motive, in fact, for being 
interested in this alliance with Milosevic, because they would get 
privileges. They would be protected and their money and their riches 
would be protected. And they would be able to promote their business 
using those privileges.46 
If Milosevic was a victim of those around him, he is seen above all as a \ictim 
of his wife, Mira. According to a male interviewee in Belgrade. for example. 
45 Ink'fyiew. Belgrade, 21 May 2004. 
4(, Interview, Belgrade, 11 June 2004. 
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I t h i ~ ~ that a big,. big factor ir7 his d e c i s i ~ n - m a k i n g g was his \\'i fe. \1ira, 
w h ~ ~ I n f l u e ~ c e d d .hIm so much. And I thInk that he just lost touch with 
realIty by lIstenIng to her, her decisions, her opinions, and also to some 
of the people who just wanted to stay in power. That" s why they kept him 
misinformed (SC). 
A male interviewee in Kragujevac expresses a similar opinion. He argues that. 
In the beginning, Milosevic was a good leader for Serbia. He started off 
very well. His mistake was that he listened to his wife. Some of the 
things he did he did only because of Mira, and the nation suffered as a 
result. She was a megalomaniac for power, control and money. She 
wanted more and more, and she is guilty for everything (DZ). 
Concurring with such views, Sasa Mirkovic, the director of B-92, claims that, 
'"Milosevic had this crazy wife who was manipulating and who, in the end. was 
probably the most responsible for the Milosevic catastrophe".48 
Mira's influence on Serbian political life was particularly evident after 1994, 
following the creation of JUL, a pro-Yugoslav and Marxist party. which 
quickly became very powerfu1.49 Indeed, according to Djukic, 
... the Socialist Party was shaken from its roots by YUL, which quickly 
established itself as the most influential Serbian party. Suddenly, 'the 
regime' no longer referred to the Socialists but to YUL, even though it 
was in fact a minority party (Djukic, 2001, p.84). 
There were important similarities between the SPS and JUL. For example. 
both parties presented themselves as parties of the left, and both parties 
d ., 50 claimed to promote the welfare of disadvantage CItIzens. The close 
47 According to Cohen, "Mirjana's influence grew considerably d u r i n ~ ~ the 19?Os as 
Milosevic's position was becoming increasingly more precarious, and a ~ ~ hIS mner cIrcle \11 
friends and loyal advisors gradually shrank" (Cohen, 200}' p.113). 
48 Interview, New Belgrade, 14 June 2004. . . 
49 For example, although JUL failed to win a single seat in the Serbian legIslature In 1993. t \ ~ r o o
cabinet ministers came from JUL. Furthermore, according to research by the Institute Il)r 
Social Sciences in Belgrade, the SPS was 13.3 times more powerful than JUL. and yt't m 1997. 
the SPS acquired only -l.3 times more seats in the legislature than JU (Milan \l1loSevlL. 
2000b, p.97). . h 
50 In contrast to the SPS, however, whose main support. as we ha\"e seen. came trom t e 
. ' d .' . such people were not a m o n ~ ~poorest sectIOns of socIety. such as peasants an pensIOners.. . ~ ~
JUL's membership. According to Djukic, "t-,Iarko\"ic' s Serbia was a place where the nch gCl! 
326 
relationship that developed between the SPS and JUL culminated in the 
November 1996 federal elections, when the two parties entered into a coalition 
(together with the New Democracy party), and in March 1998, when the SPS 
formed a coalition government with JUL (and the SRS). 
Some commentators, however, maintain that the close relationship between the 
two parties was based purely on strategic calculations. According to Thomas, 
for example, 
It was reasoned that if support for the SPS waned amongst Serbs then 
minority groups, for whom the SPS was irrevocably tainted with 
nationalism, might be persuaded to cast their votes for an apparently 
'non-nationalist' party of the left (Thomas, 1999, p.229). 
For his part, Pribicevic claims that JUL was founded "to support Milosevic as 
well as satisfying Mirjana MarkoviC's ambition to take an actiYe part in 
politics" (cited in Milan Milosevic, 2000b, p.99). 
The relationship between the SPS and JUL, moreover, created deep divisions 
within the ranks of the SPS. Mihailo Markovic, for example, the Vice-
President of the SPS from 1990 until 1992, strongly disapproved of his Party's 
dependence on JUL and Mira Markovic. In his view, "JUL did not represent a 
real Left. 51 Its members were just thieves and profiteers, so they could not be 
in an alliance with the SPS".52 
richer and the poor could only hope for better times . . v i r t u a l ~ ~ ~ n ~ n e e . ~ f f her follow<:,rs was poor, 
and most belonged to the nation's political and financIal elIte ( ~ J U k l C , , 2001. .p.16 )'. 
51 When Professor Markovic suggested that JUL was not a c r e ~ l b ~ ~ ~ party. \ ! t ~ a a replIed that he 
was a "decrepit academician and infantile Socialist" (cited in DJukic, 2001. p . ~ - l ) . .
:12 Interview, Belgrade, 11 June 2004. 
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On 28 November 1995, Mihailo Markovic, Borisav Jovic and \1ilorad \'ucelic 
- the main critics of Mira and JUL53 - were dismissed from the SPS exccuti\'e 
committee and replaced with people of whom Mira approved. Emphasizing 
Mira's influence on her husband, Mihailo Markovic maintains that she was 
behind these dismissals. He claims that, "While Milosevic had been in Dayton, 
Mira informed him that some people in the SPS were preparing a conspiracy 
against him. She named Jovic, Vucelic and myself,.5.+ 
The second sense in which the Serbian interviewees see Milosevic as a \'ictim 
is as a victim of himself and his own weaknesses. According to a female 
Bosnian Serb refugee in Kosovska Mitrovica, Milosevic had good intentions 
but was not wise enough to help the Serbs in Kosovo. She argues that, "He did 
not have enough political wisdom to do the things he wanted to do" (NM). A 
male Kosovo Serb interviewee, also in Kosovoska Mitrovica, likewise claims 
that, "'Milosevic did not have good politics, but he did have good intentions" 
(ZT). 
A female interviewee in Cacak, moreover, maintains that although Milosevic 
made many mistakes, above all his failure to pay attention to the wishes of 
Europe and the United States, nevertheless "Everything that Milose\'ic did he 
did because he was trying to protect Serbian citizens" (VS). These claims that 
Milosevic had good intentions are especially interesting because, as we have 
seen those Western authors that regard Milosedc as a criminal leader 
, 
emphasize the criminal nature of his intentions. 
53 According to Vucelic, "Milose\,ic's biggest mistake was creating JUL" (Interview, Belgrade, 
5 June 2004). 
54 Interview, Belgrade, II June 200·-L 
328 
For others interviewees, Milosevic was a victim of his own misguided beliefs. 
According to a female Kosovo Serb interviewee in Gracanica, for example. 
"Milosevic is convinced that he was right and that he was doing the right thing 
for the people" (ALD). ss Professor Stojanovic similarly feels that \lilose\'ic 
saw himself as a sincere supporter of the Serbian cause. He argues, 
It's simply not true ... that somehow Milosevic, from the very beginninl!. 
was deep inside himself manipulating the Serbian national interests ~ d d
Serbian emotions and Serbian patriotism. He simply believed that he 
was, actually, ready to do everything possible in order to defend Serbian 
national interests when it became quite obvious that Yugoslavia would 
fall apart. S6 
These claims that Milosevic had good intentions and a deep-felt, if misplaced, 
conviction that he was acting in the best interests of Serbia and of the Serbian 
people, make him appear more tragic than criminal. In the words of one 
female interviewee in Belgrade, 
Everything that Milosevic was fighting for and dreamed of is in mud 
now. He had the role of a superhero who would save his own people, 
and now he is in the role of a super butcher who destroyed his own 
people. He was loved, and he so believed in his role as a saviour - as 
someone who would give his people a better life. He fought for the 
freedom of his country. Now, he is a prisoner and his country is a 
prisoner too. He is a prisoner of those who made war here, and his nation 
is a prisoner of money. That is the reason why he is a tragic person. He 
fought for freedom, and what happened? (MM). 
Thirdly, Milosevic is seen as a victim of Western powers. According to this 
view, Milosevic stood in the way of Western, in particular American 
interests. S7 Thus, he was an obstacle that needed to be removed. A male 
55 A male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade shares this view. He a r g u . e s ~ ~ "r think that 
Milosevic really thought that he was doing what \\'as best for S e r b ~ a . . H: wasn t Just ~ ~ ~ bad guy 
who decided to become rich and powerful. It's just. he saw hlll1seit as a Sl1rt 01 natIOnal 
messiah or something. And people believed him" (lG). 
56 Interview, Belgrade, 29 June 2004. . . 
q P l' M'h'l M k . , g es that "The Balkans became an area of which .the Umted. 
. rOlessor 1 al 0 ar OVIC ar u, c •..• 
States and its allies needed to have control, because of long-teml projects 111 the Middle 1:a:-l 
and Central Asia, connected with oil" (Inten·iew. Belgrade. 11 June 2004). 
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interviewee from Cacak, for example, claims that, "Saddam stood in the way of 
America's interests, just as Milosevic did" (L). 
This is not to say that the West was always against Milosevic. Indeed, several 
interviewees claim that, in the beginning, Milosevic was the West' s man. A. 
male Kovovo Serb interviewee, for example, argues that, ·,It is not possible to 
stay in power for ten years without support from the West" (ZT). Expressing a 
similar view, a male interviewee in Belgrade claims that, 
Milosevic appeared in Serbia out of nowhere, so to speak. and he had a 
very fast rise in the political life of Serbia. That's really strange, you 
know. He had to have had some backing from the West, from the United 
States itself, and in the beginning I think he was their man (SC). 
However, there is a widespread belief among interviewees that once MiloSevic 
had served his purposes, the West saw him as a nuisance and thus turned 
against him. In the words of one male interviewee in Belgrade, "Maybe they 
wanted him in power for all those years, and when he was no longer of any use, 
they just decided to throw him away" (SC). A second male interviewee in 
Belgrade claims that Milosevic and Serbia had become a liability. In his view, 
at some point, when the West saw that any form of cooperation was too 
expensive for them, they just decided that it was easier for them to fight 
and to overthrow Milosevic. I think that they used a cost effective 
scheme. They simply calculated that it wasn't paying - it wasn't 
worthwhile to negotiate with him. Generally the Serbs, Serbia, were an 
example of a rogue state - a state that obeys no orders. And the \Vcst 
estimated that such an example of a state could not be tolerated (RJ). 
According to a third male interviewee in Belgrade, and a Milosevic supporter. 
it is because Milosevic refused to be the West's "yes man" that he is now 
sitting in a courtroom in The Hague. In the interviewce' swords, 
Milosevic is on trial only because he resisted against \'ery unjust 
demands from abroad. That is his only guilt. If he had listened to the 
West's demands and conditions, he would not havc been transferred to 
J30 
The Hague T ~ b u n a l . . ~ h a t t is sure. It's quite sure that he could have been 
the greatest kIller, but If he had followed the West's \\'}'sh ~ ~ d t h 
,. e ~ ~ an astes. e 
wouldn t have been pUnIshed (DB). 
In a similar vein, Aleksa Djilas maintains that, ""If Milosevic had signed the 
Rambouillet accords, he would have been treated for hyper-tension in \Valter 
Reed hospital" (a top hospital in Washington that treats foreign dignitaries and 
politicians).58 
The representation of Milosevic as a victim is interesting for three particular 
reasons. Firstly, it is fundamentally at odds with the Western construction of 
Milosevic as a criminal leader. Secondly, it illustrates that interviewees' 
feelings towards Milosevic are highly complex, and sometimes ambiguous.59 
They see him not in very black and white terms, as either a villain or a hero, 
but rather in terms of grey. Finally, the view of Milosevic as a victim is 
important because it gives us some insight into interviewees' attitudes towards 
the West. In particular, it is a view that attests to the sense of general 
powerlessness that many interviewees appear to feel vis-a-vis the West.60 
Exemplifying this sense of powerless, a male interviewee in Belgrade argues, 
I think that the destiny of Slobodan Milosevic, Yugoslavia, and all the 
people of the Balkans was designed somewhere else, many years before 
the conflict actually broke out. Western powers were just using our 
58 Interview, Belgrade, 20 May 2004. , 
59 Other researchers have highlighted the ambivalence of public opinion. lovan Teokarc\lc. 
for example, a researcher at the Institute for European Studies in Belgrad,e: argues .that, "The 
basic characteristic of public opinion in FRY during 1995 was mstabllity. c o n t u ~ l l ) ! 1 1 and 
inconsistency in the dominant values" (cited in Nikolic, 2002, p.I-l). , 
60 It is not surprising, therefore, that according to the results of r e ~ e a r c h h on threat perceptwI1 by 
SMMRI, in December 2000, Serbs regard the West as a slgmficant threat to S.erbla, I ' ~ ) r r
example, when asked about threats coming from Western, nations. 7 0 % _ ~ ~ ) t t the I ~ - ' ) )
respondents said they regarded Americans as highly threatenmg, to "l'rbla. ~ ~ ..,0 Identlh;d 
Germans, and 5 Y ~ o o said they saw the British as highly t h r e a t e m ~ g g (":-- lMRI. ~ O O O , , p.1 ). 
These results are interesting because they show that Western natll 11b are seen a-; poslIlg a 
greater threat to Serbia than other nations in the region. 
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history. Knowing the history of this peninsula or region, they knew just 
where and how to spark the conflict. And it just unfolded spontaneously 
afterwards (SC). . 
In a similar vein, a female refugee from Bosnia claims that , 
Y u g o ~ l a v i a a was just an open laboratory for somebody to perform 
expenments on and to see how the people in Yugoslavia would react. 
The people were like mice. Maybe it was a step towards achieving some 
particular goal - for example, the relocation of NATO bases from 
Germany to the Balkans, or to Russian territory. The aim was not to 
conquer the Balkans territorially. The aim was to make the Balkans into 
a unique market, and thus make a profit (B). 
Some Western commentators will no doubt dismiss such arguments as pure 
conspiracy theories. However, the fact that many of the interviewees 
justifiably feel that the West contributed to the destruction of Yugoslavia 
cannot be simply dismissed as some sort of conspiracy theory. It should also 
be noted that where conspiracy theories do exist, they themselves ret1ect 
feelings of powerlessness. To cite Ashraf, "Conspiracy theories often serve an 
important social function, helping to assuage certain kinds of anxiety among 
group members ... " (Ashraf, 1997).61 
If ordinary Serbian people continue to feel powerless, this further underscores 
the importance of further bottom-up research that gives these people a voice. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the two dominant images that the Serbian 
interviewees have of Milosevic. According to the interviewees. he \\'a5 a "bad" 
61 Knight sees a connection between conspiracy theories and globalization, In his. view. "In 
. 'nki h b t· much the 81"11 of a crackpot delUSion as part many \\'ays conspiracy thl ng as ecome no sO " ~ . . ' , . 
of an everyday struggle to make sense of a rapidly changmg world. Given t h ~ t t the ton.:es and 
institutions of globalization are affecting countless p e o ~ l ~ ~ across the p l ~ n ~ t . . It I ~ ~ ,Ill), s l l r p n ~ e e
h . t . I of bel'ng the victim of inn sible and mdetatlgable t o r l e ~ ~ l ~ ~ ,1Il t at a consplra ona sense . 
everyday attitude in many countries" (Knight, ~ 0 0 2 . . p. ~ ) . .
leader because he cared only about himself and not about the Serbian people: 
because he was incompetent; because he surrounded himself with bad people: 
and because the consequences of his rule were very bad. Some of the 
interviewees, however, also/alternatively view Milosevic as a victim. They ~ e e e
him as a victim of the people around him (especially his wife). of himself, 
and/or of the West. 
The fact that the Serbian interviewees do not regard Milosevic as a criminal 
leader does not necessarily mean that the dominant Western view of Milose\'ic 
is wrong. In other words, the external image of Milosevic as a criminal leader 
is not "'invalid" because it finds little support among the Serbian interviewees, 
It is, however, an image that is problematic from a domestic perspective. In 
short, the interview data can be read as a rejection both of Western conceptions 
of the criminal leader, and of the particular normative standards that inform 
these conceptions. 
The implications of this are clearly very significant. Milosevic has not merely 
been externally constructed as criminal, but has also been put on trial in The 
Hague for war crimes. The very existence, however. of alternative domestic 
images of Milosevic poses a problem for these legal proceedings against him in 
The Hague. That is to say that if the Serbian interviewees and, by extension. 
the Serbs as a nation, do not see Milosevic as a criminal leader, and if they du 
not buy into the normative standards that have so strongly influenced the 
creators of the Tribunal as well as the Prosecution in ~ ~ Ii 1ose\ic' s trial. this 
raises questions about whether and to what extent the Tribunal can actually 
.,., ., 
-' -'.) 
succeed in achieving its declared goals - peace and justice. It also raIses 
questions about the very meaning of '"justice" - "justice" according to whom? 
The final chapter in this thesis will now explore the attitudes of both the 
Serbian interviewees and the national minority interviewees towards The 
Hague Tribunal. Since the Serbian interviewees overwhelmingly do not see 
Milosevic as a criminal leader, we should expect them to be far more 
antagonistic towards the Hague Tribunal and far more opposed to Milosevic' s 
trial than the national minority interviewees who, as we have seen, largely 
support the image of Milosevic as a criminal leader. 
Chapter 8 
Interviewees' Attitudes towards The Hague Tribunal 
Introduction 
The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY) was created by the UN 
Security Council, on 25 May 1993 (Security Council Resolution 827).' It is 
empowered to try cases involving (i) grave breaches of the Gene\'3 
Convention, regarding the treatment of soldiers and civilians in wartime Oi) 
violations of the wars and customs of war, (iii) crimes against humanity, and 
(iv) genocide. In contrast to the existing Western literature, the Tribunal is 
concerned not with Milosevi6's moral culpability, but with his legal 
culpability. Within the courtroom, it is facts that matter, not values. 
The Prosecution's case against Milosevi6 rests on demonstrating his 
participation in a "'joint criminal enterprise", a concept discussed in chapter 2. 
It also rests on establishing Milosevi6's "command responsibility" - it must 
prove that he personally ordered killings to be committed, or that he knew 
about atrocities being committed and chose not to stop them? In other words, 
command responsibility is responsibility for both acts and omissions. This is 
I It is important to note that the UN Security CounciL in fact, has no actual authority 1(1 create 
courts, a point to which we shall return in section 1, " . , . 
2 The trial of General Yamashita Tomoyuki, before the InternatIOnal i\lJ1llary Tnbunal 10 
Tokyo, established the principle that high political officials and military c o m m ~ d e r ~ ~ have a 
positi\'e responsibility to ensure they know about acts being c o m m i t ~ e d , u n d e r r their command. 
as well as to prevent and punish violations of international human.Hanan law. even 10 c a ~ c s s
where conditions were such as to prevent them from actually knowmg about these \'WLitHII\,> 
Yamashita \\as sentenced to death for atrocities that twops under his command had committed 
in the Philippines in 1944. 
significant because, as we have seen, the nonnative construction of \lilosevic 
as a criminal leader emphasizes his actions, not omissions. 
The existing Western literature criminalizes Milosevic for having caused the 
wars in the fonner Yugoslavia. What matters to The Hague Tribunal, howe\'er. 
is not who is responsible for having started the wars3, but rather who is 
responsible for the terrible crimes committed during those wars. Thus, 
Milosevic has not been indicted for starting the wars, although according to 
Gordy, '" ... many Serbs believe that Milosevic is being tried for having started 
the wars or for bringing about the destruction of Yugoslavia" (Gordy, 2003, 
p.57).4 Rather, Milosevic has been indicted for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide, relating to the wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
and Kosovo. 
In his famous typology of different types of guilt, Karl Jaspers distinguishes 
between criminal, political, moral, and metaphysical guilt (Jaspers, 2000, p.34). 
In practice, however, the distinctions are often less clear-cut. In the particular 
case of Milosevic, it can be argued that there has been an equation of moral and 
political culpability with legal culpability. While on the one hand this raises 
questions about whether Milosevic can receive a fair trial, what his trial has 
3 In contrast to the International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo, the Hague 
Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with the so-called "crime against peace". defined a ~ , ,
the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression. or a war m \IOlatlOn ot 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common p.lan \ lr 
conspiracy for any of the foregoing" [Article 6 of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tnbunal] 
(Woetzek, 1962, 122). . . 
4 Ivaniseyic similarly argues that, "Most persons in Serbia beliew t h ~ t t the t n b ~ a l l ,IS tl}lllg 
Slobodan Miloseyic for having started the \,'ars in the former YugoslaVia. m purSUit ot creatmg 
a "(jreater Serbia'" (hanisevic. 2003). 
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itself highlighted is the difficulties of establishing legal culpability in practice. 
To cite Ivanisevic, 
Many Western observers expected the tribunal to rapidly confirm the 
accepted wisdom that Milosevic was responsible for war crimes crimes 
against humanity, and even genocide in the former Y u g o s l a Y i ~ ~ in the 
1990s. Yet they failed to appreciate the important difference behveen 
determining political responsibility in the realm of public opinion and 
establishing criminal responsibility in a court of law (Ivanisevic, 2004). 
The very fact that the trial is taking so long highlights this. 5 The Nuremberg 
trials, in contrast, were concluded in ten months. 
If moral/political culpability and legal culpability have been equated, so too 
have individual and collective guilt, according to many of the Serbian 
interviewees. There is a widespread feeling among them that the Tribunal 
wants to establish not just MiloseviC's culpability, but also the collective guilt 
of the Serbian people. This is despite repeated insistence by the Tribunal that it 
wholly rejects the concept of collective guilt. Speaking on 22 May 2001, for 
example, the newly appointed Registrar of the Tribunal, Hans Holthius, stated 
that, 
By focusing on individual responsibility, the founders of the Tribunal 
wished to prevent the stigmatisation of a whole national, ethnic or 
religious group and to neutralize those persons who sustain the climate of 
hatred and nationalism which caused the terrible chaos (cited in 
Beigbeder, 2002, p.94).6 
We have so far learnt that there is considerable support among the national 
minority interviewees, although not among the Serbian interyiewees, for 
5 Milosevic' s ill health has contributed to delays in the trial process. 
6 Jaspers himself dismisses the notion of collective guilt. In his vie,,: ... It is nonsensicaL I(l 
charge a whole people with a crime. The criminal is always an indiVidual. I ~ ~ IS. nonsensical. 
too, to lay moral guilt to a people as a whole ... Morally one can Judge the mdlVldual (lIlly. 
> • " (J 2000 p 36) He adds that "To pronounce a group cnmmally. m o r a l l ~ ~11t: \ er a group aspers, ,.., .. I 
or metaphysically guilty is an error akin to the laziness and arrogance of average. uncntlca 
thinking" (Jaspers. 2000, p.36). 
MiloseviC's normative criminalization. By examining the attitudes of both the 
Serbian interviewees (section 1) and the national ml'non'ty 'nt . 
1 en"Iewees 
(section 2) towards The Hague Tribunal, the aim of this final chapter is to 
discover whether and to what extent there is support among the interviewees 
for Milosevi6' siegal criminalization. 
Section 1 - The Opinions of the Serbian Interviewees 
Among the Serbian interviewees, attitudes towards The Hague Tribunal are 
surprisingly diverse. We can identify three main viewpoints. The first 
viewpoint is that Milosevi6 should have been tried in Serbia, not in The Hague. 
According to the second viewpoint, it is right that Milosevi6 is in The Hague. 
The third viewpoint, which is held by only a small minority, is that Milosevic 
should not be on trial at all. We can now explore in more detail each of these 
three positions. 
(i) Milosevic Should Have Been Tried in Serbia, Not in The Hague 
According to Gordy, "Surveys indicate that a broad majority of the Serbian 
people would like to see Milosevi6 prosecuted, albeit for violations of Serbian 
- not international - law" (Gordy, 2003, p.59). Supporting this, the prominent 
feeling among the Serbian interviewees is that Milosevic's trial should hayc 
been held in Serbia.7 The reason that interviewees most frequently giyc is that 
it was Serbs who were Milosevi6's biggest victims.8 According to a male 
. h l"'-r 7 More generally, according to research by S M M ~ , , in August 200-+. ?l% ~ t t t e , - ) 
respondents (adult citizens of Serbia) said that war cnmes tnals ~ h o u J d d t a ~ ) e e pJale .10 Slrhla. 
h h . Tl H T . 1 held l'n domestic courts accordmg to (1(1 0 01 respondents. rat er t an m le ague. na s . ") 
would be fairer and more impartial than trials held in The Hague ( ~ \ I ~ I R I , , 20()·t pp.ll-l_). 
8 It will be recalled from chapter 5 that the majority of the Serbian mtervlewel'S beiJeve that 
Milosc\"ic's biggest crimes were committed against Serbia and agall1st the Serbian people 
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Kosovo Serb interviewee in Belgrade for example "I thO k h S . 
, ,In t at erblan people 
should have tried Slobodan Milosevic, because he did more to us than to 
anybody else" (SP). 
A female refugee from Bosnia similarly maintains that "If th' h' 
, ere IS somet 1I1g 
to judge Milosevic for, it is the Serbian people who should judge him, because 
he brought the country into war, he created an economic disaster and he made 
Serbian people poor" (B). Nikola Lazic, the international secretary of the DSS 
agrees. He argues, "I think that it was necessary for Milosevic to be tried in 
Serbia, in order to show here the real light, the full truth about his regime". 9 
It is important to note that the charges brought against Milosevic by the 
Serbian authorities, following his arrest in April 2001, themselves reflect such 
views. These charges, namely financial violations related to embezzlement and 
abuse of office, referred only to Milosevic's alleged misdeeds in Serbia. 
The second reason that Milosevic should have been tried in Serbia, according 
to the Serbian interviewees, is that he will not get a fair trial in The Hague. \0 
In the words of one female interviewee in Belgrade, "'Western propaganda 
9 Interview, Belgrade, 28 May 2004. 
10 Certainly, it can be argued that the Tribunal's rules and procedures heavily favour the 
prosecution. To cite Chandler, " ... because, like Nuremberg, the Tribunal \\'as established on 
an ad hoc basis to try certain crimes with a preconceived aim, there was little pretence that 
defendants' rights would be safeguarded" (Chandler, 2002a, p.141). Chandler e m p h a s i z e ~ ~ that. 
"There has been little pretence of judicial impartiality. The first president of t h ~ ~ T nbu,nal 
publicly declared that the Bosnian Serb leaders, KaradZic and Mladic, were '\\ar ~ , n n l l n a l s s . a 
presumption of guilt which would have disqualified him in domestic legal systems ~ ~Challd ler. 
2002a, p.142). Furthermore, the defence may be barred from a c e ~ s s s to Lhlcuments l.l.r 
information that may be "contrary to public interest or affect the seeunty mterests 01 any state, 
and ..... Tribunal rules allow a judge or trial chamber to take measures to pre\'ent diSC hlsure ~ l f f
the identity or whereabouts of a yictim or witness, on the pretext that they must be protected 
from reprisals" (Johnstone. 2002, p.l 03). 
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wants to make one person guilty for everything and t fi' h h . 
o mlS t e Job that 
Western governments started ten years ago Milosevic' t . 
, IS a raglc person. and 
finally he's a tragic victim ofwhafs happening" (MM), 
One reason that Milosevic will not get a f:al'r tn'al d' 
, accor mg to some 
interviewees, is that the Tribunal lacks independence. I I For these intervie\\'ees. 
it is a political court dominated by American interests. A male interviewee in 
Belgrade, for example, claims that, "The Hague Tribunal is an American 
instrument for removing political opponents" (SZ). 
In a similar vein, Vladislav Jovanovic describes the Tribunal as "A terrible 
political instrument to fulfil the policy of the United States".12 In October 
2000, Vojislav Kostunica, Milosevic' s successor and a strong opponent of the 
Tribunal, also claimed that, "The Hague court is not an international court, it is 
an American court and it is absolutely controlled by the American 
government" (cited in Bass, 2003, p.93).13 
A second reason why Milosevic' s trial is seen as unfair is that the institution 
conducting the trial is itself unfair, by failing to treat all sides equally. The 
Belgrade journalist Vladimir Milic, for example, argues that, "Tudjman and 
Izetbegovic were never accused of war crimes. The Hague Tribunal waited for 
II Echoing this view. Chandler maintains that, "the Tribunal lacks any independence from the 
major world powers, particularly the United States" (Chandler, 2002a, p.l-l3). The 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg suffered similar c r i t i c i ~ m ~ ~ A ~ ~ Woetzel n ( ) I L ' ~ . .
" ... the fact that the Allies conducted the trial and that Allied judges ~ l ' r v e d d \111 the tribunal. h a ~ ~
led to the political criticism that it was a trial of the v a n q u i ~ h e d d by the \ " i c t o r ~ . . and. therefore, 
an act of political policy rather than a judicial proceeding" (WoetzeL 1962. p.xi). 
12 Interview, Belgrade. 24 May 2004. 
13 Johnstone emphasizes that, " ... the Tribunal has been hea\ily dependent on the government 
of the United States, which sponsored i t ~ ~ creation and pro\'ided it with perSl1 lml'1. r l ' ~ o u r c e ~ . .
and information needed to formulate indictments" (Johnstone. 2002. p.l)-f). 
them to die, and then said that it had been planning to indict them b o t h " . l ~ ~ He 
further claims that, '"This has contributed to anti-Western and pro-Milosevic 
feelings in Serbia. People see it as a question of justice - if Milosevic is the 
only leader that the Court sees as guilty, then the Serbs will get behind him ... '5 
The Belgrade intellectual Aleksa Djilas makes a similar argument. In his \·iew. 
It is unjust that Tudjman died peacefully in his bed, in December 1999. 
and was never indicted by the Tribunal, despite all the terrible things he 
did. There would have been greater support for the Tribunal in Serbia if 
Tudjman had also been put on trial, instead of just Milosevic.1 6 
There is, moreover, a feeling among interviewees that others besides Tudjrnan 
and Izetbegovic should have been put on trial for their actions. According to a 
female interviewee in Cacak, for instance, "Those outside of Yugoslavia 
should also be tried for the damage that they did, like the NATO generals. 
They should be prosecuted for so-called 'collateral damage'" (VS). In a 
similar vein, a female Kosovo Serb interviewee, now living as an IDP in 
Belgrade, argues that, "The Tribunal does not deal with every war crime. If it 
did, then Clinton and Blair would also have been put on trial for their war 
crimes against civilians in FRY" (SNP). 
Some Western commentators themselves hold similar views. Chomsky, for 
example, claims that, -'The Tribunal instantly discredited itself in the Balkan 
case by excluding crimes committed by NATO" (cited in Hamilton. 200 I ): and 
Laughland argues that by refusing to prosecute NATO for war crimes. the 
Tribunal has given "tacit legal approval" to the organization' s attempts to tum 
14 According to LeBor, "Officials a ~ ~ the I C ~ Y Y confinn t ~ ~ t t had T u d ~ m ~ n n l i \ l ~ d . . he would ha\ e 
been indicted for war crimes and cnmes agamst humal1lty (LeBl1r. _00 •. p.2. 4). 
15 Interview. Belgrade, 23 May 2004. 
16 lntef\'iew. Belgrade, 20 May 2004. 
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itself into "a worldwide police force with an effectively unlimited mandate" 
(Laughland, 2002). For his part, Chandler contends that, "The only reason for 
the lack of investigation into NATO actions would appear to be the close links 
between the two institutions" (Chandler, 2002a, p.145). In his vie\\', mOrelWI:?L 
"The creation of the ICTY provides a striking case study of the current 
institutionalisation of legal and political inequality in the international sphere" 
(Chandler, 2002a, p.141). 
The Serbian interviewees see the Tribunal as having a particular bias against 
Serbs. 17 Notwithstanding the repeated insistence by Tribunal spokespeople 
that it is individuals, not nations, who are on trial, there is a widespread belief 
among the interviewees that the entire Serbian people are being judged. 18 
According to a male interviewee in Belgrade, for example, 
I think that the Court's only purpose is to sentence Milosevic. and to 
close the story about 'the Great Butcher from the Balkans', to close the 
story about Serbian aggression towards Bosnia and Croatia, to make the 
Serbs bear guilt - the kind of guilt that even the Germans at the end of 
World War Two were not made to carry (RJ). 
Expressing a similar view, a male interviewee in Cacak contends that, "The 
Hague is an ad hoc tribunal, created only for judging the nations of the former 
Yugoslavia, and above all the Serbs. Somebody must be blamed for 
everything, and the Serbs are guilty because they lost the wars" (V). 
17 It is not, therefore, surprising that according to research on threat perception by S M ~ I R I . . in 
December 2000, 58.0% of the 1133 respondents polled viewed The Hague Tnbunal as highly 
threatening to Serbia (SMMRI, 2000, p.21). . . . 
18 Milosevic himself has encouraged this belief. For example. m hiS Introductory Statement to 
the Hague Tribunal, on 13 February 2002, he argued that, "Over the past two days all the 
prosecutors that we have heard have uttered one particular sentence - that they were Justtrymg 
an individual.. .But in all the indictments they a c c u ~ e e the \vhole, ~ a t \ O n : : .. b e g l ~ m m g r r : \ l t ~ l l t ~ e e
Serbian intelligentsia and the Serbian Academy of Arts and S C l e n c e ~ ~ (t-.1tlose\ Ie. _00 .... 
p.136), 
According to fonner Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Zivadin Joyanovie. 
h . 'd d 19 moreover, suc VIews are WI esprea. He claims that, "Most of the Serbian 
people see the Tribunal as a continuation of the one-sided policy of the \Vest _ 
that Serbs must be condemned for all consequences of the wars in the fonner 
Yugoslavia".z° The Bosnian Serb writer, Gojko Berie, howeyer. is far more 
cynical. In his opinion, the theory of collective guilt "has been of the greatest 
importance to the Serbs, since it did away with any individual responsibility. If 
an entire people is guilty, it goes without saying that no one is individually to 
blame" (Berie, 2002, p.281). 
What is clear from public opinion research is that the Tribunal is generally very 
unpopular in Serbia. Gredelj, for example, summarizes the findings of a 
survey in mid-February 2001 by Argument, on a representative sample of 910 
adult citizens of Serbia. He argues that the respondents 
manifest a high level of (reactive, situational) agreement with some of 
the most widespread negative stereotypes about this institution which are 
increasingly placed in public, despite their dubious nature: 'The Hague 
Tribunal is an instrument of NATO policy' (72% of respondents agree); 
'The Hague Tribunal is a political tribunal and serves as a means of 
political pressure on Serbia' ( 67% agree); . As concerning Croats and 
Muslims, only the "small time offenders" are called before The Hague 
Tribunal' (68% agree); 'Secret indictments are contrary to law' (63% 
agree); 'The Hague Tribunal declares all the accused guilty in advance' 
(55% agree) (Gredelj, 2001, p.255). 
In a survey by the weekly Serbian newsmagazine NIN, in July 2001, 72% of 
Serbs said that the Tribunal is "illegitimate", even though 57% said that 
Milosevie is responsible for war crimes (Bloche, 200 I). At this point, it should 
19 Some Western commentators hold similar yiews. Johnstone, for example. contends that . 
..... the planned conviction of Milosevic by the ICTY \\as designed not only to j u s t i t ~ ' . . t h ~ ~
NATO bombing, but also to establish Serbia's guilt for all the \\'ars ofYugosla\, dls1l1tegratlon 
(Johnstone. 2002. p.120). 
2(l interview, Belgrade, 17 May 2004. 
be emphasized that Western critics of the Tribunal similarly argue that it is 
illegitimate, on the grounds that it was created by an institution - the If.\ 
Security Council - that has no authority to set up courts.21 In the words of 
Johnstone, the creation of the ICTY was thus "an ingenious usurpation of 
judicial authority, which clearly overstepped the Security Council's mandate as 
envisaged by the authors of the Charter" (Johnstone, 2002, p.93). The fact. 
therefore, that the Tribunal was flawed from its very inception can help us to 
understand the interviewees' criticisms of, and lack of trust in the ICTY. 
According to the South East Europe Public Agenda Survey in 200222 , trust 
ratings for The Hague Tribunal were lowest in Serbia (8%) and in Republika 
Srpska (40/0) (International Institute for Electoral Assistance, 2002). 
Supporting this finding, research by SMMRI, in 2003, 2004, and 2005, also 
shows that there is little trust in the Tribunal among Serbs. In each year, 69% 
of respondents said that they had no trust in the ability of the Tribunal to judge 
indicted Serb nationals impartially, on the basis of established facts. Similarly, 
in each year, only 10% of respondents said that they did trust the Tribunal to 
judge Serbian nationals fairly (SMMRI, 2005, p.20). 
In research by SMMRI in August 2004, the 1245 respondents were asked what 
they considered to be the primary purpose of holding war crimes trials in The 
Hague. Of these, 74%) saw in the Tribunal some sort of conspiracy theory. 
21 On '27 May 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 827. in w ~ i c h h it determined 
that the situation in the fonner Yugoslavia - particularly in Bosnia-Hercegonna - amounted to 
a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN C h a r t e ~ . .
~ ~ ~ The survey involved a total of 10,000 face-to-face interviews conducted d u n ~ g g January and 
February 2002 in Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia and Hercegl)\1I1a. Croatia. \tacedol11a. 
Bulgaria, and Romania. 
According to 12% of respondents, the primary purpose was to establish a new 
world order, headed by the United States; 30% said the main purpose was to 
judge Serbia and the Serbs, and thereby justify the NATO "aggression" of 
1999; and 32% maintained that the principal purpose of the trials was to make 
Serbs guilty for all the suffering that occurred during the wars, in order to place 
Serbia in a position of dependency on the international community (Si\lMRI, 
2004, p.29). 
According to the same research, 70% of respondents (compared to 85% in 
2003) said that it was necessary to co-operate with The Hague Tribunal. 
However, of this 70%, only 150/0 of respondents said that such co-operation 
was necessary to bring about justice. For 33% of respondents, co-operation 
with the Tribunal was essential to avoid new sanctions being imposed on 
Serbia; and 22% were in favour of co-operation on the grounds that this was a 
prerequisite for Serbia's re-integration into the international community 
(SMMRI, 2004, p.28). 
Similar research in April 2005, involving 1205 respondents, shows that 76% 
now favour co-operation with the Tribunal. However, only 17% regard co-
operation as a means to achieve justice. The majority support co-operation 
with the Tribunal simply on the basis that this will benefit Serbia. For 3 2 ~ ' o o of 
respondents, co-operation is necessary to avoid sanctions, and 27% consider 
such co-operation to be a necessary precondition for Serbia' s re-inkt.,Tfation 
into the world community (SMMRI, 2005. p.17). 
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Between 20 and 27 April 2005, TNS Medium Gallup also surveyed Serbs about 
their attitudes towards The Hague Tribunal. Of the 1494 respondents, 611 
(40.9%) expressed extremely negative attitudes towards the TribunaL and 321 
(21.5%) expressed somewhat negative attitudes. Only 118 respondents (7.900) 
displayed somewhat positive attitudes, and only 32 (2.1 %) were very positi\e 
about the Tribunal (TNS Medium Gallup, 2005). 
Most recently, between 6 June and 12 June 2005, Marten Board International 
asked 1234 respondents if they supported the delivery of Serbian citizens to the 
Hague Tribunal. Of these respondents, 17.5% answered "absolutely", and 
20.1 % said ~ ~ m a i n l y y yes". It is noteworthy that the percentages of those who 
answered "mainly no" and "absolutely not" were slightly lower - 15.5 0 0 and 
18.8% respectively (Marten Board International, 2005). It is significant that 
this research was conducted shortly after The Hague Tribunal released footage 
of members of a Serb paramilitary group, the Scorpions. killing Muslim men 
on Mount Treskavica, south-west of Srebrenica, in 1995. Several Serbian 
television stations broadcast the video on 2 June 2005. 
While there is a growing acknowledgement on the part of many Serbs that co-
operation with The Hague Tribunal is necessary, there is no doubt that it 
remains highly unpopular. According to Dimitrijevic, the Prosecution is 
heavily to blame for this. In his view, 
... the Prosecution played into Milosevic's hands. Inste.ad of addn:.ssing 
the massive number of Serb TV viewers. poisoned by mne years ot antl-
Tribunal propaganda, and telling them that the t r i a ~ ~ \\'as about. il!s in, 
bello, about violations of humanitarian law i r r e s p e c ~ l \ c c o ~ ~ the o n ~ t n n ~ ) t t
the conflict and the rightness and wrongness of the alms ot the parties III 
conflict, the prosecutors started with a recI'tal of S b' h' er Ian Istor\ and of 
the plans for Greater Serbia (Dimitrijevic, 2002, p.2). -
Echoing this, Gordy argues that "'the tribunal has not reall' d gh 
, Y lll\este enou 
energy to explain its goals and procedures, and establish its legitimacy, to the 
people in the countries where it has oversight" (Gordy, 2003, p.61). Recent 
public opinion research by SMMRI supports this argument. According to the 
research, conducted in April 2005, of the total 1205 respondents only 6° ° said 
that they were very informed about the organization and workings of the ICTY. 
In contrast, 72% said that they were not well informed (29% said they kne\\' 
little about the Tribunal, and 43% said they knew very little) (SMMRI, 2005. 
p.6). 
Gordy also claims that, "'The prosecution, through its choice of witnesses. 
sometimes plays right into his [Milosevic's] hands" (Gordy, 2003, p.61). For 
his part, Nikolic blames the Serbian government. He argues that, 
Milosevic is in The Hague, but Serbia does not know why. The 
government and the media under its influence do not explain to the 
population the reasons for it, nor do they document the crimes of which 
he has been accused (Nikolic, 2002). 
In addition to these criticisms, there is a more fundamental issue to consider: 
are the Tribunal's twin objectives of achieving peace and justice23 actually 
compatible? According to a male interviewee in Belgrade, "'If Milose\'ic is 
found guilty, and if Serbia and Montenegro are sentenced to pay war damages 
23 At the start of Milosevic's trial, on 12 February 2002, the chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte 
declared that "This Tribunal is one of the measures taken by the Security Council acting for all 
Member Sta;es of the United Nations to restore and maintain international peace and ~ e c u r i t y , ,
That is our purpose, and our unique contribution is to bring to justice the persons r e ~ p o n s i b l e e
for the worst crimes known to mankind" (Del Ponte, 2002). Beloff. however. e m p h a s i z e ~ ~ that 
in the years between Nuremberg and the creation of the ICTY, t ~ e r e e had been some t h i r t y ~ ~ \ ) . u r r
civil wars, many of them causing far more deaths than the \\,W; 10 the t\)rmer Y u g ( ) ~ l a \ ' l a . . ) et 
Washington has neYer felt it necessary to show \\'hy 'justice' \ \ a ~ ~ reqUired only 10 the ca"L' of 
Yugoslavia" (Beloff, 1997, p.91), 
to the other republics, there will never be peace in the Balkans ... So this IS 
really the true danger that lies in his trial. .. " (RJ). 
This suggests that the establishment of a true and lasting peace requires that not 
only is justice done, but is also seen to be done - by all sides.24 If not, the 
danger is that some will seek their own fonns of justice, thus bringing further 
instability and bloodshed to the region. To cite Kent, "If, somewhere along the 
way, the parties involved do not come to feel that legal justice has actually 
been done, the cycle of reprisals cannot be broken for good" (Kent, 1995). 
The difficulty, however, is that justice has no unifonn or universal meaning. 
Like the concept of the criminal leader itself, justice is a contested concept, at 
both an inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic level. Personal experiences and interests 
shape conceptions of justice. Thus, as Johnstone argues, the Tribunal's slogan 
"no peace without justice" "may well be a formula for eternal war when justice 
on one side of the mountains is injustice on the other" (Johnstone, 2002, p.96). 
If, therefore, the notion of justice is essentially contested, is not the Tribunal's 
pursuit of this elusive ideal likely to obstruct, rather than to facilitate, the 
process of peace and reconciliation?25 Chandler, for example, maintains that, 
"The international attempt to judge selective acts of the Bosnian war as war 
24 According to a recent study, based on interviews conducted bet\\een M a ~ c h h 2000 an? July 
2002 with survivors (in Belgrade, Sarajevo, Rijeka and Banja Luka) l1t the w ~ r s s In ex-
Yugoslavia, 79% of survivors believe that justice has not been sef\ed. On]:. AO u ut ~ U f \ I \ W S S
interviewed for the study said they were satisfied that those \\ho had committed cnmes were 
being investigated, prosecuted and punished (Kole, 2005). , _ 
25 In a recent address at Goldman Sachs in London. on 6 October _00), Carla Del P(1llte. 
declared that, "Our primary objecti\'e is to bring justice, thereby c o n t r i b u t i ~ g g to the p ~ o ~ ~ s s s ot 
reconciliation between peoples who have been tom apart by the wars ot the n t n e t l e ~ ~ (Del 
Ponte, 2005). 
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crimes has meant that ten years after the war ended there has been little chance 
for reconciliation" (Chandler, 2005). 
It might be argued, however, that the "justice" administered by The Hague 
Tribunal is to a large extent symbolic. It is about conveying the message that 
the international community will not and does not tolerate human rights abuses 
and war crimes. Substantive justice, in contrast, has a more tangible. 
grassroots impact. It directly affects peoples' lives and, therefore, more 
directly affects the process of peace and reconciliation. To cite Chandler, 
"Postwar reconciliation has little to do with legal judgements and much more 
to do with the practice of getting on with life and developing shared interests in 
the present" (Chandler, 2005). From this point of view, the fact that so many 
of the Serbian interviewees express a wish to forget the past can be regarded as 
something positive - as a desire to move forwards. 
The third reason why, according to some of the Serbian interviewccs, 
Milosevi6 should have been tried in Serbia is that he would have had a much 
tougher time in a Serbian prison than in The Hague. In the words of one male 
interviewee in Cacak, 
Milosevi6 should be in our prison, not having a nice life there, He should 
be with prisoners who are in prison because of him. I think that he 
wouldn't survive a night in our prison ... He has to thank those people 
who sent him to The Hague (IB). 
Another male interviewee in Cacak similarly feels that The Hague is too glH1d 
for Milosevi6. He argues that, "Milosevic should be put in the stocks and 
h ' h' He should not be sitting in an air-people should throw t mgs at 1m. 
conditioned court wearing a suit" (V). Such arguments support (Jprdy' s claim 
that, "There is no reason to believe that people who object to the ICTY belie\e 
that Milosevic is innocent. Most Serbs feel that he is guilty of something" 
(Gordy, 2003, p.S9). 
(iiJ It is Right That Milosevic is in The Hague 
A second group of interviewees consider it right that Milosevic is standing trial 
in The Hague. Although they give a number of different reasons, the most 
common reason proffered is that Milosevic could not have been properly tried 
in Serbia. According to one male interviewee in Kragujevac, for example. 
If Serbia had a proper legal system, judges, et cetera, Milosevic should 
have been tried in Serbia, rather than in The Hague, because his biggest 
crime was against the Serb people. But given the weaknesses of the 
judicial system in Serbia, it is better that Milosevic is now in The Hague 
(MA).26 
Other interviewees feel that the possible consequences of Milosevic being tried 
in Serbia are sufficiently serious to warrant his trial being held in The Hague. 
One female interviewee in Belgrade, for example, argues that, '"Ifhe were here, 
maybe there would be some demonstrations or some kind of fights. And it's 
much better for peace inside the country that Milosevic is not in Serbia'" (ON). 
Another female interviewee in Belgrade considers that if Milosevic were tried 
in Serbia, ""he would manage to make himself into some kind of hero" (G). 
It should, however, be pointed out that those interviewees who approve of 
Milosevic being in The Hague do not necessarily support the ICTY as an 
~ 6 6 Bass similarly argues that, "In a perfect world, it would have been better to put r-. t i l o s e \ " ~ ~ ~ on 
trial in a Serbian court in Belgrade, just as it would have been better to put the top NaZIS ~ n n
trial before a German court in Berlin ... But a Belgrade trial \\ould have helped matters o n l ~ ~ It It 
I . t . I that produced the kinds of rewlatll1l1s about B O ~ l l l a a and the were a rea war cnmes na - one . . ....") ~ ~ S( 
self-styled Krajina Serb republic that are emerging no\\' tn The lIat!ue (Bass. _00 .. p., )) 
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institution.27 One male interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, explains that 
while deficiencies in the Serbian judicial system make it is necessary for the 
trial to be in The Hague, he himself does not support the Tribunal, on the 
grounds that it is a political court (DK).28 Echoing this, a male Kosoyo Serb 
interviewee in Kosovska Mitrovica claims that, "The Hague Tribunal is a place 
where international law is broken. It is a political court" (ZT). For her part. 
Professor Ljubinka Trgovcevic, the Vice-Dean of the Political Science Faculty 
in Belgrade, explains, "I was asked to testify for the Prosecution. but I said no 
because I see the trial as political".29 
Finally, some interviewees feel that while Milosevic should be tried in The 
Hague, he should also be tried in Serbia. To cite Branka Prpa, ·' ... Serbia's 
victims have the same rights as other victims to satisfaction in the form of 
justice".30 A female interviewee in Kikinda, for example, believes that, 
"Milosevic should be tried in Serbia as well as in The Hague, because of the 
people here - the people who suffered while he was leader. He has to pay for 
what he did" (D). In a like manner, a female interviewee in Novi Pazar 
maintains that, "It is right that Milosevic was sent to The Hague, but he should 
also have been tried in Serbia, in order to give Serbs the opportunity to say how 
they felt when he was in power" (SM). 
27 According to Gordy. "All institutions. past or present, domestic or in.ten:ationaL consistently 
register low confidence levels in public opinion surveys. Repeated!y, I ~ S t I t u t \ O n s s a r ~ . . r e ~ a r d e d d
as relatively closed, corrupt, and working against the interests ot ordmary people «(Jordy. 
2003, p.59). . . '.' . . .' 'd 
28 Kerr maintains that ""In the international arena, law and p o h t \ C ~ ~ are mextncabl: mtert\\ tnt: . 
This was reflected i ~ ~ the establishment of the Tribunal and in its operation" (Ke?" 2.004. 
p.208). She further argues, howen'r. that, "The Tribunal was established a ~ ~ a l\lol at p o l t l l ( ~ . .
but it was a judicial not a political tool" (Kerr, 200 ... L p.21 0). 
~ 9 9 Intef\ie\\. Belgrade, 19 July 2004. 
30 Inteniew, Ne\\' Belgrade, 28 July 2004. 
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(iii) Milosevii: Should Not Be On Trial At All 
A small minority of Serbian interviewees take the view that Milosevic should 
not be on trial at all, either in The Hague or in Serbia. For the tiny number of 
Milosevi6 supporters in the sample, Milosevic should not be standing trial 
because he is an innocent man. A male Milosevic supporter in Belgrade. for 
example, explains, ""When I see him in The Hague, I can compare him with 
Jesus. Why? Because Milosevi6 is innocent and is in court, and that court will 
find him guilty. He's not guilty" (AB). Another male Miloseyic supporter, 
also in Belgrade, contends that if Milosevi6 were to be tried in Serbia, this 
would only be the lesser of two evils. Yet,"'1t would be e\'il too, because 
Milosevi6 really doesn't deserve to be put on trial for any, any reason in this 
world. It's a kind of foolishness, because it's something like Kafka's trial" 
(DB). 
There are also a very small minority of interviewees, not Milosevic supporters, 
who maintain that Milosevi6 cannot be held accountable for his actions and, 
therefore, should not be standing trial. According to a male refugee from 
Croatia, for example, ""Milosevi6 shouldn't be tried. He was the president"' 
(DNO). This interviewee considers that if Milosevic did something wrong. it 
was up to the Serbian people to vote against him. Another male interviewee. in 
Cacak, contends that, "'Milosevi6 cannot be held accountable for the actions of 
individuals. Kennedy was not guilty for what American soldiers did III 
Vietnam, and Milosevi6 is not guilty for what Serbian soldiers did" (L).31 
31 As we saw in the introduction to this chapter, howen?r. according tv the principle of 
command responsibility, a high political official or militar,Y commander c ~ n . . be held 
responsible for the crimes of his subordinates ifhe knew about cnmes belllg commltttd and did 
nothing to stop them. 
Section 2 - The Opinions of the National Minority Interviewees 
As we have just seen, there is strong opposition to The Hague Tribunal among 
the Serbian interviewees, the majority of who consider that Milosevic should 
have been put on trial in Serbia. In contrast, all except one of the national 
minority interviewees approve of Milosevic being in The Hague. 32 According 
to a male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade, for example, "'I was very 
happy to see Milosevic leaving for The Hague, like most of the people 
around". He adds, ""I see the Tribunal as a very good institution, and I'm \'ery 
glad that it exists" (IG). 
For some of the national minority interviewees, Milosevic could simply not 
have been properly tried in Serbia. A female Kosovar Albanian interviewee in 
Pristina, for example, argues that, "It is better that Milosevic is tried in The 
Hague, rather than in Serbia. If he were tried in Serbia, he would not be 
punished for the deeds that he did" (TG). According to a male Muslim 
interviewee in Novi Pazar, "You know, it's very hard for the Serbs to see what 
Milosevic has done. He ruined them. He ruined them" (AD). A second male 
Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar, moreover, believes that the Serbs are 
simply not ready, or not willing, to deal with the past. He argues, 
It is better than Milosevic is being tried in The Hague rather than in 
Serbia. Serbs avoid talking about what happened during the nineties, and 
if they are against Milosevic today it is because he lost the wars, not 
33 because he started them (NV). 
, ~ ~ The three Roma interviewees in the sample were not asked about The Hague TribunaL 
mainly because the interviev;s were of very short duration. The Roma. interviewees were asked 
mainly about the economic situation in Serbia both today and when i\hlosevlC was In p o ~ e L L
" The interview data itself does not support this latter point. As we have seen, the Sl'rblan 
interviewees regard Milosevic as a "bad" leader primarily on the grounds that he made them 
poor and destroyed the Serbian economy, not because he lost the wars. 
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However, according to one male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in \'ucitm, it 
would have been very beneficial to the Serbs if Milosevic had been tried in 
Serbia. In the interviewee's view, 
For the Serbian people, it would have been better if Milosevic had been 
tried in Belgrade. Serbs are not fully aware of the atrocities committed 
on MiloseviC's orders since he was very smart to conceal them. If 
Milosevic had been tried in Serbia, the Serbs would ha\'e had the 
opportunity to learn the full extent of atrocities ordered bv him. 
However, it is good for the region that Milosevic is being tried -in The 
Hague (AR). 
While there is an almost total consensus among the national minority 
interviewees that Milosevic should be in The Hague, not all interviewees agree 
on the main purpose of the trial. For most of the interviewees, the priority is 
that Milosevic be punished for his actions. In the words of one male Slovak 
interviewee in Novi Sad, for example, ""Milosevic has to explain why he did 
what he did and he has to be punished for that. Many people died. Many 
people still have many problems - financial, psychological, and health 
problems" (JG). 
A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Subotica, moreover, emphasizes that 
Milosevic's crimes against Serbs should not go unpunished. He argues, 
""Milosevic is a war criminal, but the problem is that he is on trial for his crimes 
in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia, and not for his crimes in Serbia, for example 
the murder of people like Stambolic34 and Curuvija35 .• (RK). Howc\cr. 
14 Ivan Stambolic Milosevic's erstwhile mentor and the former president of Serbia. wa" 
, , .. '1 - A 't 2000 His bod\' was later ON'o\ered mysteriously kidnapped whde out Joggmg, on _) ugus. . '. . ' .. , . 
in 2003. Milosevic and his wife are believed to haw been mvoh'ed m S t a ~ b o h c c " murder . 
. ,5 Slavko Curuvija was a journalist who became openly critical of the M l l ~ ( k \ l C C regIme. He 
was made to pay the price and was gunned down on his o()l)rSlep. on l.... Apnl 1999. HI' 
partner, Branka Prpa, was inter\,ie\wd as part of the present research. 
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according to a male ethnic Albanian interviewee in Belgrade, Miloseyic has 
been made a scapegoat. The interviewee maintains that 
, 
Some people in Serbia took Milosevic and they put all their internal Quilt 
into his personality. People that were voting for him, and who s h ~ u l d d
feel at least a little share of guilt, were happy to see him in The HaL!ue 
because they were purified by him leaving. Do you understand what 1'm 
trying to say? It was much easier to blame one person - and I'm talking 
about Serbs now - than to blame oneself (IG).36 
For his part, a male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vucitm emphasizes that 
justice is not simply about just deserts. He argues, ··It is right that Milosevic is 
in The Hague, and he should be given a fair trial there. Truth is relati\'e - it has 
two sides. It is not absolute. Milosevic' s version of the truth should be heard 
also" (LF). 
A small minority have very negative VIews about the trial process and its 
purpose. One male Kosovar Albanian interviewee in Vucitrn, for example. 
asks, "What good can come of Milosevic' s trial? No one can compensate for 
all those losses" (IL). A male Muslim interviewee in Novi Pazar is equally 
pessimistic. In his view, "I think that Milosevic will never pay for what he has 
done" (AD). 
A male ethnic Hungarian interviewee in Novi Sad expresses mainly 
indifference towards the Tribunal. In his words, .. It's a real comedy in The 
Hague. How is Milosevic in the Court without a lawyer? I don't \\'ant to hear 
,,6 A female Serbian interviewee in Belgrade expresses a similar yie\\', ,\cc,1rding to ,her ... ,' 'lit 
, ' "L ',' d him' because tho..;c \\'erL' t le peop e is very ugly of people In Serbla to now ~ a y , , et ~ ~ JU ~ e e , I' 'h d that I live in a 
'I '. I" I you know - It s a shame, m a ~ ~ ame 
who voted for Ml oseVlC, t s very ug y, , I h II "natl' )llal ,hame 
d b h I 'k h t If' a natlOna s ame ~ ~ rea y u , . , country where people talk an e 3\'e let a, " ~ ~ . 
And no one will respect sllch a nation, you knO\\' (M 1\ \) 
about him. Just send him to a village give him a bl'g hou d I ' t' 
, se an et s orget 
'-
about him" (AN). 
A second male ethnic Hungarian interviewee, in Subotica, however, is strongly 
opposed to the Tribunal. For him, '"The crimes for which Milosevic has been 
accused in The Hague are crimes for which many others - including Tony 
Blair - could also be accused". He adds, "I don't think that the Tribunal \\·ill 
prove Milosevi6' s responsibility in the right way. They don't have the right 
proof or the right motives. They have mainly political motives (MB). 
Interestingly, it will be recalled that both of these arguments made by 
interviewee MB are also voiced by some of the Serbian interviewees. 
What we have seen is that there is far greater support among the national 
minority interviewees than among the Serbian interviewees for the ICTY. The 
attitudes of the Serbian interviewees vis-a-vis the Tribunal are consistent with 
the two main images of Milosevi6 that emerge from the Serbian interview data. 
Milosevi6' s image as a '"bad" leader is reinforced by the widespread belief 
among interviewees that he should have been tried in Serbia, on the grounds 
that his biggest crimes were against Serbia and the Serbian people. 
Similarly, the image of Milosevi6 as a victim is buttressed by claims that he is 
being tried by an unfair, politically motivated tribunal that lacks independence 
and has a strong bias against Serbs. The claim made by Milosevic' s supporters 
that he is an innocent man who should not be standing trial at all further 
reinforces this image of him as a victim. 
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The attitudes of the national minority interviewees towards the Tribunal. in 
contrast, are consistent with their support for MiloseviC's construction as a 
criminal leader. Seeing Milosevic as a criminal leader, these interyiewccs 
consider it only right that he is standing trial for his crimes in an international 
court of law. Their support for the ICTY thus shows that they apprO\e of 
Milosevic's criminalization in both a normative and legal sense. 
MiloseviC's trial is likely to end in the summer of 2007. If, as seems most 
likely, he is found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity37, it would 
be very interesting to know what impact such a verdict would haye both on 
interviewees' attitudes towards the Tribunal and towards Milosevic himself 
Would a guilty verdict, for example, mean that the Serbian interviewees start to 
see Milosevic more as a criminal leader, at least in legal terms, than as a "bad" 
leader? Conversely, what effect would a not-guilty verdict have on the opinions 
of the national minority interviewees? Clearly, further bottom-up research of 
this kind would be extremely useful and valuable once the trial is over. If the 
Tribunal does deliver a guilty verdict, we could then re-formulate our research 
question: is Milosevic the convicted war criminal a criminal leader? 
Conclusion - Some Final Reflections 
The hostility and opposition that so many of the Serbian interviewees express 
towards the Hague Tribunal reflect their belief that Miloseyic is not a criminal 
leader, but rather a "bad"' leader and/or a yictim. The existence of these 
alternative images of Milosevic, in turn, raises important questlnns about the 
37 He is far less likely to be found guilty of genocide, o\\ing to the difficulty of establishing, the 
, ' " "d H '. nlore Iikelv to be t()Und gUlltv ot the 
requISIte mens rea -intentIOn to commIt genocl e. e l . ~ ~ . ~ ~ -
lesser charge of conspiracy to commit genocide. 
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Hague Tribunal, not least the question of whether the Tribunal can achie\e 
"justice" and what exactly "justice" means in this context. 
Whilst the significance of the interview data and its main findings has been 
clearly demonstrated, it is anticipated that some Western commentators will 
nevertheless challenge this on normative grounds. That is to say they \\ill 
argue that a normative reading of the interview data leads to the conclusion that 
the Serbs are in denial, and therefore unable to give an objective assessment of 
Milosevic's leadership. In other words, it was inevitable that the Serbian 
interviewees would not see Milosevic as a criminal leader. This type of 
argument, however, is over-simplistic. 
Firstly, it is wrong to automatically assume that just because the Serbian 
interviewees overwhelmingly view themselves as MiloseviC's biggest victims 
and emphasize his crimes against Serbs, this necessarily means that they are in 
denial. Serbia's economic situation is such that people perhaps feel that their 
major priority today is not confronting the past, but rather dealing with the 
present and finding a way to make ends meet. It should be noted. for example, 
that, "an estimated 800,000 people - 10 per cent of the population - live on an 
income of less than 2.40 Euros per day" (European Agency for Reconstruction 
in Serbia, 2004). 
Many people in Serbia today are particularly concerned about liying standards. 
For example, according to recent research by 1Harten Board international, in 
June 2005. of the 1234 respondents, only 10.7% said that their current liying 
standards were good. In contrast, 38.0% said that their living standards \\"ere 
average, 29.80/0 said that they were bad, and 16.3% said that they were \erv 
bad (Marten Board International, 2005). 
Furthennore, only 17.3% of respondents said that they expected their living 
standards to improve within the next six months. Attesting to the Serbs' 
general lack of optimism about the future, 41.1 % of respondents said that they 
expected their living standards to remain the same, and 26.7°. ° said that they 
expected them to worsen (Marten Board International, 2005). In this context. 
the desire that many of the interviewees express to simply forget the Milosevic 
period can be seen as a fonn of coping mechanism, rather than deliberate 
denial of past events. 
Secondly, the Serbs were widely demonized during the nineties, with the result 
that their own suffering received little international attention or sympathy.38 
During the NATO bombing in 1999, for example, John Simpson, the BBe's 
World Affairs Editor, was in Belgrade, reporting on the war. As a result of 
this, he received "'large amounts of hate mail from people who didn't want to 
be told what it was like to be on the receiving end of NATO's bombing" 
(Simpson, 2001, p.286). Not surprised by this, he explains, " ... I always knew I 
would get a lot of grief for sleeping with the enemy; or at any rate li\"ing. 
working and to some extent suffering with them" (Simpson, 2001, p.286). The 
world, in short, was not interested in hearing about the Serbs' pain and misery. 
38 To cite Handke, "so many international magazines. from ~ T i m : ' ' . to the 'l'l\U\e! 
Observateur', in order to bring the \\"ar to their customers. set up 'the Serbs . ~ ~ r r and near. LII ge 
and small, as the evildoers and 'the Muslims' in general as the good ones (Handke. 1997, 
p.76). 
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In View of this, it is perhaps not surprising that the interviewees want to 
emphasize what they themselves endured during the nineties. 
Thirdly, although this research focuses primarily on the Serbs, it is \'ery 
possible that had the interviewees been mainly Croats or Muslims, they too 
would have focused on their own sufferings during the nineties. For example, 
referring to the establishment by the international community of a war crimes 
tribunal in Bosnia, Srdjan Dizdarevic, president of the Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights in Bosnia, argues that, '"The court will face strong pressure from 
nationalists from all three [ ethnic groups] who insist that they were the victims; 
that they fought to protect their [people] and that in a defensive war there are 
no war crimes" (cited in Freebairn, 2004). 
In a similar vein, Amor Masovic, a member of the Bosnian Muslim Party of 
Democratic Action (SDA) is of the opinion that, '"A considerable part of the 
Bosnian public is not ready to face the truth and admit that crimes were 
committed" (cited in Freebairn, 2004). For his part, the British journalist 
Jonathan Steele claims that, '- ... Serbia is largely still in a state of denial about 
the crimes committed in its name - and the same applies to Croatia" (Steele. 
2005). 
Fourthly, the Serbian interviewees work with a particular frame of reference. 
In contrast to the existing Western literature and the national minority 
interviewees, the Serbian interviewees primarily judge T\tilose\'ic within a 
domestic context, rather than within a regional contcxt. T\ loreO\cr. as their 
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view of Milosevi6 as a bad leader highlights, they judge him mainly from a 
socio-economic perspective, rather than from a normative perspectiYe Th' . 
. IS. In 
tum, gives some clues as to why people may have supported i'v1ilosevic. It: as 
the analysis of Milosevic's speeches suggests, his economic pledges 
significantly contributed to his popularity, any moral condemnation of the 
Serbs for lending their support to Milosevic becomes problematic. 
Finally, and most importantly, the discrepancy that this research has revealed 
between the dominant Western image of Milosevic as a criminal leader, and 
the domestic images of him as a "bad" leader and/or victim, should not be 
interpreted as evidence that Serbian morality is flawed. Instead, it should be 
seen as evidence that, to cite E.H Carr, "'Theories of international morality 
are ... the product of dominant nations or groups of nations'" (Carr, 1939. 
p.I 0 I). 39 In other words, it is the morality of the most powerful that prevails. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the image of Milosevic that has prevailed in 
international politics is as a criminal leader. 
If morality is a reflection of power, the implications of this extend to the legal 
sphere. In theory, the gradual erosion of the principle of sovereign immunity 
means that any leader can be put on trial. The realities of international politics, 
however, make it unlikely that powerful Western leaders will eyer stand trial. 
even when they unleash illegitimate wars.-Hl In his capacity as British foreign 
39 More recently, Chandler has argued that, "The strength of t h ~ ~ \\"t'st in r e l a t i o ~ ~ to EaSll:I.l1 
Europe ensures that Western claims to exert moral authonty over the regIOn remam 
uncontested" (Chandler. 2000, p.32). . . . . ' . 
40 Johnstone notes that. "Of course, the very idea of indlctmg the president of the \\ orld ~ ~
. It·' indeed preposterous bccaUSl' of the greatest military pl)\\er seems utterly preposterous. l ~ ~ " 
relationship of forces" (Johnstone, 2002, p.122). 
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secretary, for example, the late Robin Cook once remarked of the Hague 
Tribunal that, '"this is not a court set up to bring to book the Prime \1inisters of 
the United Kingdom or Presidents of the United States" (cited in Chandler, 
2002a, p.145). In other words, just as the criminal leader is not a uni\ersal 
concept, neither, it would seem, is the administration of justice. 
Various commentators argue that what we are in fact witnessing is the erosion 
of sovereign equality. Franceschet, for example, contends that, --Particularly in 
recent years, unequal sovereign equality has been a more salient feature of the 
application of international law, thus making for non-universal legal and 
political relationships among states and societies" (Franceschet, 2005). For his 
part, Chandler refers to '"a new epoch of unequal sovereignty" (Chandler, 
2001). In conclusion, therefore, rather than distinguishing between criminal 
and non-criminal leaders, perhaps the key distinction is between indicted 
criminal leaders and un-indicted criminal leaders. 
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Conclusion 
This final part of the thesis will begin by summarizing the chapters and their 
main findings. It will proceed to a discussion of both the limitations of the 
research and its contributions to the existing Western literature on Milosevic. 
as well as to international history and IR. It will then open out the thesis to 
explore some broader issues. Firstly, it will examine some of the possible 
consequences of criminalizing leaders. Secondly, it will consider how the 
current "'War on Terror" has affected the notion of criminal leaders. Thirdly, it 
will reflect upon some of the wider implications of the research. Finally, it will 
make some suggestions for future research that build upon this thesis and its 
findings. 
Thesis Summary 
The thesis was divided into two parts, built around the two main research 
questions - is Milosevic a criminal leader, and how should we study a criminal 
leader? Part I of the thesis was literature-based and laid down the fundamental 
foundations upon which the empirical part of the thesis - Part II - was built. 
Chapter 1 provided the reader with an overview of existing Western literature 
on Milosevic, focusing on the dominant image of him as a criminal leader. It 
explored how Milosevic has been constructed as a criminal leader, breaking 
this construction down into its component elements. It identified four key 
elements. The first of these elements, and the most signitIcant. was 
Milosevic's actions and intentions. According to the literature. MiloScvic was 
the person most responsible for the wars in the fonner Yugoslavia, he planned 
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these wars in advance, he planned and premeditated Serbian crimes committed 
during the wars, he used violence to achieve his aims, and he incited ethnic 
hatred. 
The second key element was Milosevic' s motivations - the literature portrays 
him as a leader motivated by power and prepared to ruthlessly pursue po\\"er 
whatever the human cost. Milosevic' s personality and psychology constituted 
the third element in his construction as a criminal leader. The literature depicts 
him as a reclusive and warped individual with various negative personality 
traits, such as mendacity and narcissism. The fourth and final element was a 
comparative element, whereby Milosevic is compared to other "criminal" 
leaders, past and present. 
The chapter argued that Liberalism constitutes the theoretical underpinnings of 
MiloseviC's criminalization. It sought to show that he was perceived in Britain 
and in the United States as a threat to liberal peace and values, and to thereby 
highlight the extent to which policy considerations played a part in Milosevic' s 
construction as a criminal leader. 
The final part of the chapter examined some alternative viewpoints in the 
literature. It first examined two alternative images of Milosevic - as an 
improviser and as an obstacle to the West. It then examined some alternative 
explanations of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. These alternative 
explanations, rather than seeing Milosevic as the main cause of the wars. 
instead emphasize the role of circumstances, both internal and international. 
Chapters 2 and 3 moved the discussion away from the particular case of 
Milosevi6, but like chapter 1 they formed an indispensable part of the thesis. 
To answer the question of whether Milosevic is a criminal leader, it \\-as 
important to consider the notion of the criminal leader in more general tenns. 
Chapter 2 sought to explore how this notion actually arose. by linking it to 
certain developments in IR, such as the erosion of the principle of so\"ereign 
immunity and the normative tum within the discipline. 
The second part of the chapter attempted to develop the concept of the criminal 
leader. Drawing upon both the literature on Milosevic and the broader IR 
literature, it identified four key dimensions of a criminal leader - namely a 
behavioural dimension, a character dimension, an institutional dimension, and 
a policy dimension. It argued that the policy dimension is the most significant, 
underscoring the fact that the criminal leader is an externally constructed - and 
thereby an essentially contested - concept. 
If the criminal leader is externally constructed, this raises the important 
question of whether the leader is seen by his own people as criminal. The key 
argument made in chapter 3, therefore, was that the criminal leader must be 
studied not only from above, but also from below. The chapter first sought to 
explain why, in theory, the criminal leader should be studied from below- Four 
main reasons were given. In particular, it was argued that since leadership is a 
relationship, it is not possible to adequately study the criminal leader by 
focusing only on one half of that leadership relationship - the leader himself. 
Instead we must also examine the second half of that relationship - ordinary 
, 
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people. By exploring how ordinary people see their leader, we can thus 
ascertain whether and to what extent their views are congruent with external 
vlews. 
The chapter then sought to demonstrate why the criminal leader should be 
studied from below, using examples of bottom-up research on the Hitler and 
Stalin regimes. The insight into these regimes that such research has generated 
not only highlights the value of bottom-up research. Since both Hitler and 
Stalin can be regarded as paradigm cases of the criminal leader, it also supports 
the argument that we can gain crucial insight into the criminal leader by 
exploring his leadership from the bottom up. The concept of the criminal 
leader, developed in chapter 2, was accordingly modified to include a 
fundamental domestic dimension, the importance of which the data chapters 
would confirm. 
Part I of the thesis, therefore, answered the question of how one studies a 
criminal leader. The objective of Part II was to find out whether the image of 
Milosevic as a criminal leader finds support outside of Western literature, by 
analyzing two important primary sources - Milosevic's speeches and 
qualitative interview data. This, in tum, would allow us to answer the 
question of whether and to what extent Milosevic is a criminal leader. 
according to these sources. 
Chapter 4 analyzed Milosevic's main speeches between 1987 and 2000. To 
find out whether these speeches support the image of Milosc\·ic as a criminal 
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leader, the chapter focused on two particular claims that \Vestern literature 
makes about him - the claims that he planned the wars in the fonner 
Yugoslavia and incited ethnic hatred. It argued that MiloseviC's speeches do 
not support either of these claims and provide no evidence of his imputed 
"criminal" intent. It further argued that Milosevic's speeches, particularly his 
1989 Gazimestan speech, have been heavily misrepresented through highly 
selective quoting; and that only when certain sentences or paragraphs of 
individual speeches are taken totally out of context and looked at in isolation 
can they be seen as lending any support to the literature's claims. 
Moving from the top down to the bottom up, chapters 5 to 8 sought to explore 
whether and to what extent ordinary people in Serbia support the image of 
Milosevic as a criminal leader, using qualitative interview data. While some 
elites were included in the interview sample, the overwhelming majority of the 
interviewees were "ordinary" people, both Serbs and national minorities. 
Chapters 5 and 6 were structured around the four key elements of Milosevic' s 
construction as a criminal leader, as set out in chapter 1. The aim was to find 
out whether and to what extent the Serbian and national minority interviewees 
support the various claims that Western literature makes with respect to each of 
these four elements. It was argued that, overall, the national minority 
interviewees support Milosevic' s construction as a criminal leader. although 
not as a racist. In contrast the Serbian interviewees, it was argued. do not see 
Milosevic as a criminal leader. Rather, they view him above all as a "had"" 
leader. 
Chapter 7 explored this image of Milosevic as a "bad" leader. It began by 
identifying the four senses in which, according to the Serbian interviewees 
, 
Milosevic was a bad leader - namely, he cared only about himself and about 
power; he lacked competence and ability; he surrounded himself with bad 
people; and the consequences of his rule were very bad for the Serbian people 
and for the country. The chapter then examined a second image of Milosevic 
that emerged from the Serbian interview data - as a victim. We saw that 
Milosevic is considered a victim of those around him, in particular his wife; a 
victim of himself; and/or a victim of Western powers, above all the United 
States. It was argued that these alternative images of Milosevic are very 
significant, in particular because their existence poses a problem for the legal 
proceedings against Milosevic in The Hague and for the Tribunal's professed 
aim of achieving "justice". 
Chapter 8 built on this argument by examining the attitudes of both the Serbian 
interviewees and the national minority interviewees towards The Hague 
Tribunal. It argued that, as might be expected, the national minority 
interviewees overwhelmingly approve of Milosevic being in The Hague, and 
thereby support both his normative and legal criminalization. In contrast, it 
showed that the Serbian interviewees are overwhelmingly opposed to 
MiloseviC's trial in The Hague and to the ICTY itself. The majority opinion 
among them is that Milosevic was a bad leader whose biggest crimes were 
against his own people. According to the intervie\\'ees, therefore. the Serbs 
themselves should have put Milosevic on trial. 
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It was recognized that some might claim, based on a nonnative reading of the 
interview data, that the Serbs are a nation in denial and, therefore, unable to see 
Milosevic as criminal. However, it was counter-argued that rather than reading 
the interview data as evidence of a flawed Serbian morality, the data should 
instead be interpreted in accordance with E.H Carr's observation that it is the 
morality of the most powerful that prevails. This reality, it was claimed, helps 
to explain the discrepancy this thesis has exposed between the Serbian 
interviewees' view of Milosevic and the dominant Western view of him as a 
criminal leader. 
Limitations of the Research and its Contributions to the Existing Western 
Literature 
Like any piece of research, the present research has certain limitations. Three 
in particular can be highlighted. Since these have already been discussed 
elsewhere, a summary will suffice here. Firstly, because the interviews are 
retrospective, the research can only tell us what the interviewees think about 
Milosevic today. It cannot tell us what they thought about him during the 
nineties. Nor can it tell us anything about how, or why, interviewees' opinions 
of Milosevic changed over time. In short, the research is limited to the extent 
that it is only tell us whether and to what extent the interviewees today support 
the image of Milosevic as a criminal leader. 
A second limitation of the research is that it cannot tell us whether and to what 
extent the opinions and attitudes expressed by the interviewees are 
representative of public opinion as a whole. The use of public opinion polls to 
complement the interview data indicates that some of the opinions expressed 
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by the Serbian interviewees do reflect Serbian public opinion more broadly. 
However, neither the interview data nor the public opinion poll data can tell us. 
for example, whether and to what degree the perception of Milosevic as a 
"'bad" leader and/or a victim is widespread among Serbs. 
A third limitation of the research, and one that is unconnected to the interview 
data, is that, for practical reasons of time, it does not examine certain sources , 
most notably Serbian newspapers. Although Serbian language training \Vas 
successfully undertaken, it would simply have been too time-consuming to 
undertake a systematic survey of Serbian newspapers, given that time in the 
field was limited. The thesis does, however, refer to certain authors whose 
work focuses on the Serbian media, such as Thompson (1994) and Bennett 
(1995). Moreover, as will be recalled, some of the elites interviewed as part of 
this research work in the media, most notably Aleksander Nenadovic, the 
former editor-in-chief of Politika. 
It is, however, important to underscore that, "There are no perfect research 
designs. There are always trade-offs" (Patton, cited in Marshall and Rossman, 
1999, p.42). Virtually all research has certain flaws and weaknesses. It should 
also be emphasized that despite the thesis' particular limitations, its 
achievements are considerable. It makes three very significant contributions to 
the existing Western literature on Milosevic. 
Firstly, through its strong interview data, the thesis makes an important 
empirical contribution to the literature. The fact that the existing literature IS. 
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overall, surprisingly weak in this area makes the interview data particularly 
valuable. Above all, this data broadens and enriches our understanding of the 
Milosevic regime, by providing us with a more detailed and nuanced picture. 
Through its analysis of MiloseviC's speeches, which as previously emphasized 
have been heavily neglected, the thesis makes a second important empirical 
contribution to the existing literature. This analysis not only draws attention to 
crucial speeches that are never cited. It also demonstrates the extent to which 
certain speeches have been strongly misrepresented. 
Thirdly, through its emphasis and exploration of the view from below, the 
thesis makes a worthy bottom-up contribution to a literature that is heavily top-
down in its approach. In this way, the thesis provides critical insight into the 
opinions and experiences of two particular groups of people that the existing 
literature neglects - ordinary Serbian people and national minorities in Serbia. 
This research however contributes not only to area studies. The bottom-up , , 
work of scholars such as Peukert (1987) and Kotkin (1995) has stimulated an 
important debate in international history about how one should study regimes 
like those of Hitler and Stalin. Through its use of a bottom-up approach, the 
thesis contributes to this debate in a positive way, by demonstrating through its 
rich interview data the insight to be gained from studying a constructed 
"criminal'· leader from below. 
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Just as the thesis seeks to combine area studies with social history. it also 
endeavours to bring together area studies and IR. It uses the case-stud\' of 
Milosevic to develop the concept of the criminal leader and, in this way. 
contributes to important debates in IR and international politics about what 
makes a criminal leader, at what point a leader becomes criminal, and whether 
a criminal leader should be put on trial. At the same time, it draws upon IR 
both in order to contextualize the concept of the criminal leader and. more 
broadly, to help us evaluate the normative approach which the concept reflects. 
In short, while area studies has long been considered to be the poor relation of 
IR, this thesis demonstrates, through its eclectic approach, how area studies, IR 
and social history can be fruitfully combined in an original and creative way to 
generate new insight and debate. 
Some Possible Consequences of Criminalizing Leaders 
As previously emphasized, this research IS concerned with MiloseviC's 
normative criminalization and construction as a moral criminal. It is not 
directly concerned with his trial and legal culpability. Nevertheless, it might be 
argued that the process of normative criminalization has potential legal 
repercussions. This thesis has suggested that MiloseviC's normative and legal 
culpability have, to a certain extent, been equated. As a result he is widely 
assumed guilty until proven innocent. A key question, therefore. is whether a 
leader's normative criminalization might prevent him from recei \'ing a fair 
trial. 
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The very fact that The Hague Tribunal, like the Tribunals in Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone, is an ad hoc tribunal, created for the specific purpose of prosecuting. 
arguably put Milosevi6 at a strong disadvantage from the outset. To cite 
Chandler, ""The emphasis is on prosecution rather than fact-finding" (Chandler. 
2002a, p.142). It is significant, for example, that according to the opening 
sentence of its statute, the Tribunal's aim is the "Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law". The statute does 
not refer to persons ""accused of' serious violations of humanitarian law. 
For Chandler, this is evidence of the Tribunal's "implicit rejection of 
'innocence until proven guilty' ... " (Chandler, 2002a, p.142).1 Echoing this, 
Black argues that the trials that take place within these ad hoc tribunals are 
""inquisitorial proceedings in which there is only one objective, and that is to 
put the accused in prison and use them as examples to their home peoples" 
(Black, 2005). 
We saw in chapter 8 that many of the Serbian interviewees consider that 
Milosevi6 is not receiving a fair trial. They are not alone in this belief. The 
book Pisma za Slobu (2002) contains letters of support for Milosevic from 
mainly ordinary people, in Europe and beyond, who are extremely critical of 
the trial process. Prominent Western figures, such as the former U.S Attorney 
General Ramsey Clark, and the playwright Harold Pinter, have also \'oiced 
I Kerr notes that, "The accused were more often than not referred to as war criminal> even 
b C' h . I h d d" (Kerr 2004 p 99)' and Johnstone contends that Tnbunal elore t e tna a commence , ,.. .' . . . k t 
indictments are "the equivalent of conviction in the court of publtc OpInIOn. With gUIlt ta en \ 'r 
l.!.ranted ..... (Johnstone, 2002, p.97). 
'7' - ~ ~ - ~ ~
concern about the fairness of MiloseviC' s trial? Both men are members of the 
ICDSM. 
Similar concerns have been raised in relation to the trial of Saddam H - ~ ~ ,. u ~ ~ t : m . .
To cite Bennan, 
Everyone agrees that Saddam Hussein and his henchmen, if tried 
~ r o p e r l y , , s h o u l ~ ~ be found guilty of crimes against humanity. But a long 
lIst of human nghts groups and international law experts doubt if the 
tyrant and his deputies will receive the due process and fair trials 
promised by U.S and Iraqi authorities (Berman, 2005). 
According to Human Rights Watch, for example, "The Iraqi Special Tribunal 
lacks significant fair-trial protections, including ... a requirement that guilt be 
proven beyond reasonable doubt" (Human Rights Watch, 2005); and Richard 
Dicker, director of the International Justice Programme of Human Rights 
Watch, maintains that the Tribunal has "serious human rights shortcomings" 
(cited in Collier, 2004). 
It is also noteworthy that according to a recent report by the BBe, Saddam' s 
lawyers "say they have none of the estimated eight million documents relating 
to the case, and have not been fonnally told of the charges" (BBC News, 
2005).3 In short, the question is whether Saddam can receive a fair trial in a 
court of law, notwithstanding that he "has already been tried and found guilty 
of atrocities in the international court of public opinion" (Scharf, 2004). 
2 In an interview with Ramona Koval, in 2002, Pinter said, "i\ly position is that I t h ~ n k k
Milose\ic should be given a fair trial. If he's to be tried, then it should be an Impartial. 
objective trial. And clearly it cannot be the case here, because he' s ?eing tned essentially and 
effectively by NATO. NATO is paying f ~ r r the C?urt. ~ h : r e f ? r e e It ~ ~ aNA fO court. It 1 ~ . . If 
YOU like a victor's court and it cannot pOSSibly be Impartial (Pmter. ... 000). -
. , '. ed on 17 Juh "00"' \ The first of a series of charges against Saddam Hussem \\ ae a n n o ~ n c . . -' - .. 
Since his capture by US forces in December 2003, he had been held 10 sohtary conhnemcl1t 
\\ithout charge (Howard. 2005). 
Secondly, the thesis has argued that leaders seen as posing a threat to liberal 
peace are consequently criminalized. Ironically, however, it might be argued 
that the criminalization of leadership itself poses an indirect threat to peace, 
more specifically to regional peace. If leaders who are constructed as criminal 
thereby fail to receive a fair trial and, more importantly, are seen by their own 
people as receiving an unfair trail, regional peace and stability might 
consequently be put in jeopardy. As previously argued, if Milosevic is found 
guilty by a Tribunal that many regard as illegitimate and biased against the 
Serbs, this could have long-term negative consequences for the region. If 
Serbs feel that the Tribunal has not brought them justice, there is the danger 
that some will seek their own forms of justice. 
Similarly, the trial of Saddam Hussein, which began on 19 October 2005, 
might inflame the existing situation in Iraq, further dividing its already 
dangerously fragmented society and intensifying anti-American feeling. For 
example, 
Some analysts say many Iraqis could be enraged if Hussein receives a 
flawed trial and is then executed. That could reinforce the growing 
public suspicion that the U.S occupation has continued Iraq's long 
tradition of politicised justice and arbitrary killings (Collier, 2004, p.2). 
A third implication of constructing a leader as criminal is that all e\'ils are 
automatically attributed to him. As a result, his removal from po\\'er seems the 
most obvious solution to resolving a complex set of problems. For example, a 
poll commissioned by CNN International, in April 1999, found strong support 
in five NATO countries for Milosevic's remoyal from p o \ \ ' e r . ~ ~ Asked the 
.j The .rl1l\ZUS Reid Group questioned by telephone 300 people in France, 4?6 people in 
Gennany, '300 people in Italy, 300 people in the United Kingdom. and 300 people 10 the Untted 
States. 
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question, "Must any peace settlement include the removal of Milose\'ic?" 77% 
of respondents in France answered yes; in Germany 85% said yes: 79 0
0 
in Italy 
said yes; in the United Kingdom 83% answered in the affirmatiye: and in the 
United States 82% answered yes (Free Serbia, 1999). For his part, Prime 
Minister Blair told reporters, on 6 June 1999, that, "There isn' t a future for 
Serbia with Milosevic" (Radio Free Europe, 1999). 
However, like a cancerous tumour, it is often insufficient simply to remove the 
criminal leader. The entire system must also be destroyed. Yet, according to 
various interviewees, the system that Milosevic helped to create remains intact. 
According to one male interviewee in Belgrade, for example, 
As the years have passed since 5 October 2000, I have realized that only 
Milosevic was taken out, and that the whole system has stayed the same. 
The political system is still functioning by the same laws it did in 
Milosevic's time. The system is the same ... And irs as if the system is 
now producing a new Milosevic, a new leader, a new father of the nation, 
because nothing else has changed. Nothing else has changed. And as 
time passes, we will certainly have a new Milosevic if we don't change 
the system (RJ). 
A second male interviewee in Belgrade similarly maintains that, 
The roots of the Milosevic regime have not been removed - they are still 
in place. This is the reason that Zoran Djindjic was killed. Money and 
power in Serbia are still in the hands of the people who worked with 
Milosevic, such as the Army and the secret police (ZG). 
Thus, in contrast to 5 October 2000, when there was much optimism in Serbia, 
today there is great disappointment, political apathy and deep concern about 
the economic situation, manifested in growing support for the SRS. For 
example, according to a recent survey by Marten Board International. between 
6 June and 12 June 2005. 30.2% of the 1234 Serbian respondents said that they 
would vote for the SRS if parliamentary elections \\'ere held tomorrow (\ larten 
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Board International, 2005). In the words of a male ethnic Albanian interYiewee 
in Belgrade, '"People are very frightened, and again they are looking for a 
'good prince' who will make fast changes" (lG).5 None of this bodes well for 
the future. 
It is not, of course, argued that the West's criminalization of Milose\'ic caused 
these problems. What is argued, however, is that Milosevic' s construction as a 
criminal leader influenced Western policy vis-a.-vis Serbia, in particular by 
encouraging a somewhat blinkered approach, and thereby indirectly 
contributed to the current situation in the country. 
International Politics and the Criminal Leader 
Chapter 2 of the thesis sought to explore the criminalization of leaderships in a 
broader context, by linking it to certain developments in IR. From this, it 
became clear that the criminalization of leaders is very much a post-Cold War 
phenomenon.6 Yet, the post-Cold War world was fundamentally shaken - and 
in many ways changed - by the events of September 11 2001. It might be 
argued that the nineties constituted a normative interregnum. The current "War 
on Terror", however, could be seen as marking a return to Realist politics. It is 
important, therefore, to consider how the normative concept of the criminal 
leader fits into this post-9/l1 world. Has the criminal leader become less 
significant? 
5 Many interviewees saw the late Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Ojindjic. as a "good prince" 
who would make their liyes better. Consequently, his assassination, on 12 March 2003. IS 
widely seen as a great tragedy for Serbia. . . . 
6 This is not to say. however, that the phenomenon did not exist during the Cold \\ ar. r 0 cite 
Fiiredi "At a s t r ~ k e e anti-colonial activists could be transformed into criminals or terronsts"' , 
(Fiiredi, 1994, p.l). 
377 
We have seen that central to Milosevic' s construction as a criminal leader are 
the Yugoslav wars and the atrocities therein committed. Yet. as Joseph points 
out, 
The ~ t t a c k s s of S e p t ~ m b e r r 11, 2001, and the subsequent war against 
terronsm have long smce overshadowed the graphic atrocities and ethnic 
cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. Throughout the U.S 
presidential campaign - a contest dominated by foreign policv - the 
Balkans remained invisible (Joseph, 2005, p.III). . 
Thus, it might be argued that the magnitude of 9/11 and its global implications 
have, to some degree, eclipsed the criminal leader' s crimes. 
Certainly, from a Realist perspective, it is not the criminal leader that poses the 
greatest threat, but rather certain states, such as North Korea and Iran. 
However, if we approach the concept of threat from a Liberal, rather than a 
Realist perspective, it is not only security but also values that are important. 
Thus, the criminal leader, by virtue of the threat he poses to liberal peace and 
values, is still an important actor in IR. 
Moreover, the establishment of various war crimes tribunals, for example in 
The Hague, in Rwanda, in Sierra Leone, and most recently in Iraq, as well as 
the ICC, shows that the crimes of criminal leaders and their accomplices have 
not, and will not, be forgotten. The trial of Milosevic and the future trial of 
Saddam Hussein are likely to strengthen the concept of the criminal leader. 
Thus, it can be argued that the war on terror has not diminished the 
significance of the criminal leader. What it has done, howe\er, is to render the 
concept of the criminal leader far more problematic. both in nonnatiYe and 
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legal tenns. As part of its war on terror, the US has committed extremel\' 
grave human rights violations. To cite Amnesty International, '"In the 'war on 
terror', the [US] administration has jettisoned fundamental human rights 
principles, while continuing to proclaim the USA to be the bastion of human 
rights" (Amnesty International, 2005b). 
Both Abu Ghraib, described by Human Rights Watch as one of the most 
flagrant examples of human rights violations in 2004 (Channel Nc\\"s Asia, 
2005), and Guantanamo Bay exemplify this discarding of fundamental human 
rights. For example, at Guantanamo Bay, in Cuba, detainees are held 
incommunicado in tiny cells, denied access to lawyers, and SUbjected to 
interrogation techniques including sleep deprivation, isolation, and hooding. 7 
They have the status of "enemy combatants", not prisoners of war. and are thus 
denied the protection of the Geneva Conventions. The so-called "enemy 
combatant" is another example of an externally constructed concept.8 
Not only is the US guilty of human rights violations. It is also guilty of blatant 
double standards. For example, "The human rights violations which the US 
has been so reluctant to call torture when committed by its own agents are 
annually described as such by the State Department when they occur in other 
countries" (Amnesty International, 2004). Amnesty International also claims 
that, '" ... Guantanamo has become a symbol of a government's attempt to put 
7 The first detainees were transferred from Afghanistan to the US naval base in Guantanamo 
Bay in January 2002. . . 
8 The US has defined an "enemy combatanf' as "Any person that US or allied Il)rCCS could 
properly detain under the laws and customs of war. For purposes of the war l).n terror an 
enemy combatant includes, but is not necessarily .lim.ited to, .a member pr agent .\)1 :\1 (),:l'da: 
Taliban, or another international terrorist organIzatIOn agalllsl whICh the UnIted St,lto 1. 
engaged in an armed cont1ict" (Amnesty International, 2005a). 
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itself above the law. The example it sets is of a world where basic human 
rights are negotiable rather than universal" (Amnesty International. 2005a). 
The net result of these human rights abuses and double standards is that the US 
has lost credibility and moral authority. To cite Kenneth Roth, the director of 
Human Rights Watch, "Governments facing human rights pressure from the 
United States now find it easy to turn the tables" (Channel News Asia, 2005). 
On the one hand, therefore, the US, and the West more generally, have lost the 
moral authority they need to construct certain leaders as '"criminal". On the 
other hand, some Western leaders, such as Blair and Bush, have lost their own 
credibility and moral authority as a result of the war in Iraq. It was argued in 
chapter 2 that the criminalization of leaders is linked to the criminalization of 
war in IR. Given that many regard the war in Iraq as an illegal, and thus a 
criminal war9, it is not surprising that there have been calls for those who 
launched this war to be put on trial for war crimes. 
On 28 March 2003, for example, in a letter printed in The Guardian, the 
Labour MP Tam Dalyell argued that, "' ... since Blair is going ahead with his 
support for a US attack without unambiguous UN authorization. he should be 
branded as a war criminal and sent to The Hague" (DalyelL 2003). For his 
part, Teague maintains that, "The invasion of Iraq was illegal. Its authors are 
criminals and should be tried as such" (Teague, 2004). 
q Fisk describes the Iraq war as an "illegaL immoral, m e r e t r i c l l ~ u S S war'" (FIsk. 2004). 
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It is thus clear that the concept of the criminal leader has become more 
problematic as a result of the war on terror. As previously emphasized. the 
criminal leader is externally constructed. If, however, those who construct 
criminal leaders - namely Western powers, above all the United States _ 
themselves violate human rights, disregard international law, and launch illegal 
wars, this means that according to the behavioural dimension of the criminal 
leader (actions and intentions), there is little to distinguish the criminal leader 
from his creators. 
What is more, if the criminal leader is deemed to pose a fundamental threat to 
liberal peace and values, the irony is that the US and its allies are themselves 
now threatening these same liberal principles, through their war on terror. In 
the words of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, speaking on 10 
December 2004, 
The sinister shadow of terrorism is generating a confused response, 
unanchored in the principles that have guided us in the search for a 
proper balance between our desire for collective security and our need for 
liberty and individual freedom (cited in Amnesty International, 2005a). 
Just as the war on terror has rendered the concept of the criminal leader 
normatively problematic, it has also problematized the concept in legal tenns. 
As we have seen in the cases of Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, the rhetoric of 
criminalizing leaders increasingly requires that concrete measures be taken. in 
the form of putting these leaders on trial. Notwithstanding various calls for 
Bush and Blair to stand trial for war crimes, it is unlikely that this will cvcr 
happen. In June 2003, for example, Belgium indicted Bush. Blair. and l ) t h c r ~ ~
for war crimes during the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan. Ho\\'c\'cr. 
when Donald Rumsfield threatened to moye NATO out of B r u ~ s e l s . . Belgium 
~ 8 1 1
capitulated and its Court of Cassation asked for the indictments to be dismissed 
(Cohn, 2003). 
If the principle of sovereign immunity is being eroded, it is clear that this 
process is very uneven. To cite Chandler, "while, for some states, sovereignty 
is being limited, for others, it is increasingly free from traditional international 
constraints" (Chandler, 2002a, p.121). What is more, while Milosevic is not 
only on trial, but also on trial for the acts of his subordinates (the principle of 
"'command responsibility"), Bush will not find himself on trial for the acts of 
US soldiers in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. This is because in 2001, the 
US passed the American Service Members Protection Act, to shield its 
servicemen from the reach of the ICC. 
The key point to be emphasized, therefore, is that the criminal leader is not a 
concept that can be universalized. It is an externally constructed concept and, 
as such, the United States and its allies will decide who is a criminal leader. 
They will also decide when a leader's "'criminal" behaviour can be excused, 
mainly on the grounds that he is a useful ally, as in the case of Pakistan's 
General Pervez Musharraf. He is "'considered by the Bush Administration to 
be an indispensable and loyal ally in the war against terrorism - someone who 
is willing to take on the mullahs" (Hersh, 2004. p.287). 
These Western powers will also do everything to ensure that calls for their own 
leaders to be put on trial are obstructed and never realized. \\'hat this 
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highlights is that the policy dimension of the criminal leader IS the most 
important. Western policy constructs certain leaders as criminal. 
Wider implications of the Research 
While the thesis has concentrated on the particular case of Milosevic, its 
implications are more far-reaching. Firstly, it has implications for how \\"e 
study other criminal leaders. The thesis has emphasized, and demonstrated, the 
importance of exploring Milosevi6's "criminal" leadership from below. More 
broadly, however, it has also argued that every criminal leader must be studied 
both from the top down and from the bottom up. Using examples of bottom-up 
research on the Hitler and Stalin regimes, it has sought to demonstrate that 
studying a criminal leader from below can bring new and valuable insight into 
his leadership and regime, insight that we would not gain by confining 
ourselves to a purely top-down approach. 
At an academic level, therefore, the implications of the present research are 
that other scholars studying criminal leaders, such as Saddam Hussein, should 
not neglect the view from below. That is to say that in analyzing Saddam's 
leadership and regime, they should explore both the opinions that ordinary 
people in Iraq have of their former leader, and peoples' everyday life 
experiences while Saddam was in power. 
Secondly, the thesis has implications at a policy le\"el, in terms of how one 
should deal with a criminal leader. As we have seen. the interview datJ reveals 
that the Serbian interviewees, as a whole. do not support the \\·estcm. liberal 
383 
construction of Milosevic as a criminal leader. The fact that there is a 
fundamental discrepancy between international (Western) and domestic 
opinion underscores that in dealing with the criminal leader, \\'estem policy-
makers cannot afford to ignore domestic public opinion. If they act against the 
criminal leader without taking any account of public feeling, they risk 
inflaming, rather than calming the situation, as the case of Iraq highlights. To 
cite Beloff, with reference to the former Yugoslavia, "Too much damage has 
been done by ignorant and arrogant outsiders who pay no attention to the 
feelings and fears of the local peoples" (Beloff, 1997, p.134). 
Thirdly, the policy implications of the research extend to The Hague Tribunal. 
While the Tribunal's objectives may be laudable, the fact is that, "If the ICTY 
is to contribute to peace and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia, its 
decisions will have to be perceived as just and fair" (Meernik, 2003, p.159). In 
Serbia, it can be argued that the Tribunal's decisions are not perceived in this 
way. That the Court is not very popular among the Serbs is well known. If 
real progress is to be made, however, it is also important to know the reasons 
why. If the Tribunal is to try and improve its image in Serbia, and it 
unquestionably needs to, its representatives must first understand why public 
opinion is hostile to the Tribunal in the first place. This means exploring in 
depth popular attitudes towards it. 
The present research, by examining the opinions of ordinary Serbs "is-ii-vis the 
ICTY, has generated important insight that could, if taken seriously. help the 
Tribunal to improve its image. Of course, the Tribunal cannot do this without 
3S-l 
the co-operation of the Serbian government, but equally it cannot seek to 
appeal to Serbian public opinion unless it has some understanding of the 
beliefs, misconceptions and grievances that shape that opinion. 
Fourthly, the research has implications for our understanding of Serbian 
nationalism. We have learnt that the Serbian interviewees judge Milosevic 
from a heavily socio-economic perspective, and analysis of his speeches 
suggested that Milosevic' s economic promises were an important reason for his 
popular appeal. Similarly, it can be argued that the current popularity of the 
SRS is more economic-based than ideological. During the December 2003 
elections, for example, Nikolic 1o '"concentrated on joblessness and the high 
price of basic foods in his campaign, promising in the November [2003] 
election to peg the price of a loaf of bread at three dinars" (Sudar, 2004). Thus, 
..... the SRS' s populist policies have found an audience in those citizens who 
have suffered the most during the transition process - pensioners, farmers, the 
unemployed, and those who once worked for state-owned corporations" 
(Cvijanovic, 2003). This suggests that Serbian nationalism is not primordial, 
but instrumental - a response to circumstances. As Kupchan argues, 
'" ... underlying social and economic conditions affect the course of nationalism 
within a given polity" (Kupchan, 1995, p.3). 
Finally, the research contributes to discussions in IR about the causes of war. 
The thesis argues that one of the defining features of the criminal leader is that 
he causes war. It also argues, however, that the concept of the criminal leader 
10 Tomislav Nikolic is the deputy leader of the SRS 
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is externally constructed, and therefore not a concept that can be universalized. 
Consequently, its implications for lR are that the criminal leader' s relevance as 
a cause of war depends on the circumstances. That is to say that it is only in 
wars, such as the wars in the former Yugoslavia, where a particular leader is 
constructed as criminal that the concept of the criminal leader provides an 
explanation for war. 
The research also suggests that the line separating war from peace has become 
increasingly fluid. The criminalization of war, as discussed in chapter 2. 
means that higher moral principles, such as humanitarianism, are needed to 
justify it. Thus, Realist concerns, at least officially, playa far less significant 
role in today's wars. Instead, they are "liberal" wars, fought for the cause of 
democracy and liberal peace. The implications of this are that the criminal 
leader is not only a cause of war. He is also, and perhaps more importantly, a 
justification for external powers to make war in the name of liberal peace. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
By way of concluding this thesis, some ideas for future research will be 
outlined. The bottom-up, everyday life approach adopted in this thesis 
suggests two possible areas for future research (various suggestions were also 
made in chapter 3). Firstly, there is a need for further research on national 
minorities in Serbia. As previously argued, although Western l i t e r a t u r ~ ~
portrays Milosevic as a leader (in some cases, as a racist leader) who incited 
ethnic hatred, it does in fact devote little attention to the objects of this hatred -
Serbia's national minorities. No comprehensive assessment of \Iilosc\ic's 
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leadership and regIme can be made without some understanding of what 
national minorities actually experienced. 
This thesis contends that national minorities suffered primarily social 
discrimination, rather than State or institutional discrimination, a hypothesis 
that further research could test. It would be especially interesting to explore 
the relationship between national minorities and Serbian refugees, both today 
and during the nineties, since several of the national minority interviewees 
claimed that it was refugees who created the most problems for them. 
The second suggestion is for further research on Serbian refugees and lOPs, 
another group that Western literature has heavily neglected. In the present 
research, five refugees and three IDPs were included in the total interview 
sample. Interestingly, these interviewees did not, overall, blame Milosevic for 
what had happened to them. It would be very useful, however, to explore 
whether other refugees and IDPs feel the same way. We have seen that the 
majority of the Serbian interviewees blame Milosevic primarily for what he did 
to Serbs and to Serbia. If those Serbs who arguably suffered the most - those 
who had to leave their homes and who lost everything - do not overall hold 
Milosevic responsible for what happened to them. this would open up many 
new research questions, particularly concerning the relationship between 
refugees/IDPs and Milosevic. 
Further research, however. need not only be q u a l i t a t i \ ' l ~ . . The thesis also lends 
itself to future quantitative research. Such research could be used to test some 
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of the thesis' main arguments. The argument, for example, that the Serbian 
interviewees, as a whole, view Milosevic above all not as a criminal leader but 
as a "bad" leader, could be made the basis of a public opinion survey. This 
would give us some indication of how widespread this particular perception of 
Milosevic actually is in Serbia. 
Similarly, the idea that Milosevic was a victim could be further explored 
through quantitative research. Once MiloseviC's trial has concluded and The 
Hague Tribunal has delivered its verdict, it would be particularly interesting to 
examine, using both qualitative and quantitative methods, whether and to what 
extent this has affected popular attitudes towards Milosevic and towards the 
ICTY itself. 
Quantitative research, particularly in the form of public opinion polls, would be 
especially useful vis-a-vis national minorities in Serbia. All of the public 
opinion polls referred to in this thesis are polls of Serbian public opinion. 
National minorities have been far less involved in this type of research. Some 
of the national minority interviewees made very important and interesting 
arguments that could form the basis of future survey research. These include 
the argument that Milosevic was not a racist and hated anybody who stood in 
his way, irrespective of nationality and ethnicity, and the argument that Serbs 
were Milosevic' s biggest victims. 
Finally, some suggestions for future comparative research \\'ill be made. 
Firstly, the thesis has concentrated on Western literature \\'rittcn about 
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Milosevic. It would be very fruitful, however, to compare Western literature 
with Serbian and regional literature. How do scholars in Serbia and in the 
former Yugoslavia portray Milosevic? If, as argued, the criminal leader is an 
externally constructed concept, to what extent is it used by scholars from the 
region? Do these scholars, like the Serbian interviewees, regard Milosevic 
above all as a '"bad" leader? Given the absence of any systematic studies of the 
media, a survey of Serbian newspapers could also be usefully undertaken." 
Secondly, smce Milosevic is sometimes compared to Saddam Hussein, it 
would be useful to explore how Western literature and Western policy-makers 
have constructed Saddam as a criminal leader. To what extent do the elements 
in this construction differ or resemble the elements in Milosevic' s construction 
as a criminal leader? Given the current situation in Iraq, it would be too 
dangerous to undertake fieldwork in the country. However, perhaps at some 
point in the future, it would be very interesting to interview ordinary Iraqis 
about their everyday life experiences under Saddam's regime and their 
opinions of him, and to thereby empirically test his construction as a criminal 
leader. 
Thirdly, it would be very worthwhile to analyze and compare the speeches of 
several different "criminal" leaders. With the notable exception of Adolf 
Hitler, the criminal leader's speeches have typically received little attention. In 
short, the criminal leader is rarely permitted to speak for himself. Research 
II A bottom-up surwy of Serbian n e \ \ · ~ p a p e r ~ ~ might f o c u ~ ~ more on regional n e w ~ a p e r s . .
particularly on the " l e t t e r ~ ~ to the editor" c o l u m n ~ . . Such a s u r v e ~ · · would help u ~ ~ to ~ 1 I 1 d d out 
whether and to what extent the o p i n i o n ~ ~ e x p r e ~ ~ e d d by the Serbian 1 I 1 t e r \ " l e \ \ ' e c ~ ~ dil ter trom the 
opinions that ordinary people held during the n i n e t i e ~ . .
that examines and compares the speeches of various "criminal'· leaders would 
highlight what these leaders have in common, as well as what distinguishes one 
criminal leader from another. This infonnation, in tum, could help us to 
further develop the concept of the criminal leader. 
The thesis lends itself, therefore, to future qualitative, quantitative and 
comparative research, and it is hoped that other researchers will follow up 
some of the above-made suggestions. Certainly, one particular suggestion will 
be taken forward. As part of a postdoctoral fellowship at the Uniyersity of 
Wales, Aberystwyth, further bottom-up research on national minorities will be 
undertaken next year. 
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Appendix 
Interviews with Serbs 
Interview with SZ. Belgrade, 3 May 2004. 
Interview with LC. Belgrade, 9 May 2004. 
Interview with SM, RB and PK. Belgrade, 10 May 2004. 
Interview with NS. New Belgrade, 12 May 2004. 
Interview with RJ. Belgrade, 13 May 2004. 
Interview with MY. Belgrade, 16 May 2004. 
Interview with S. Belgrade, 17 May 2004. 
Interview with B. Belgrade, 18 May 2004. 
Interview with SNP. Belgrade, 26 May 2004. 
Interview with SP. Belgrade, 28 May 2004. 
Interview with MM. New Belgrade, 9 June 2004. 
Interview with BM. Pozarevac, 15 June 2004. 
Interview with J. Pozarevac, 15 June 2004. 
Interview with IZ. Belgrade, 21 June 2004. 
Interview with ZG. Belgrade, 21 June 2004. 
Interview with MJ. Belgrade, 29 June 2004. 
Interview with DN. Belgrade, 1 July 2004. 
Interview with A. Novi Sad, 3 July 2004. 
Interview with AS. Novi Sad, 3 July 2003. 
Interview with YC. Novi Sad, 3 July 2003. 
Interview with DK. Novi Sad, 3 July 2003. 
Interview with DB. Belgrade, 6 July 200-+. 
Intcrvicw with lB. Cacak, 8 July 2004. 
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Interview with V. Cacak, 8 July 2004. 
Interview with VS. Cacak, 9 July 2004. 
Interview with L. Cacak, 9 July 2004. 
Interview with SC. Belgrade, 16 July 2004. 
Interview with G. Belgrade, 19 July 2004. 
Interview with D. Kikinda, 21 July 2004. 
Interview with SUo Kikinda, 22 July 2004. 
Interview with RP. Kikinda, 22 July 2004. 
Interview with DNO. Belgrade, 6 August 2004. 
Interview with ZM. Kragujevac, 10 August 2004. 
Interview with DZ. Kragujevac, 10 August 2004. 
Interview with MA. Kragujevac, 10 August 2004. 
Interview with AB. Belgrade, 12 August 2004. 
Interview with IDP. Kosovska Mitrovica, 19 August 2004. 
Interview with MV. Kosovska Mitrovica, 19 August 2004. 
Interview with SK. Kosovska Mitrovica, 19 August 2004. 
Interview with ZT. Kosovska Mitrovica, 20 August 2004. 
Interview with NM. Kosovska Mitrovica, 20 August 2004. 
Interview with RN. Kosovska Mitrovica, 20 August 2004. 
Interview with ALD. Gracanica, 22 August 2004. 
Interview with SM. Novi Pazar, 25 August 2004. 
Interview with GM. Novi Sad, 7 September 2004. 
Interview with SC. Nis, 14 September 2004. 
Interview with VU. Nis, 14 September 200'+. 
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Interviews with National Minorities 
Interview with IG. Belgrade, 25 May 2004. 
Interview with MB. Subotica, 31 May 2004. 
Interview with SS. Csantaver, 31 May 2004. 
Interview with RK. Subotica, 1 June 2004. 
Interview with AK. Subotica, 1 June 2004. 
Interview with BR. Belgrade (Bon::a), 8 June 2004. 
Interview with Z. Belgrade (Borea), 8 June 2004. 
Interview with SL. Belgrade (Borea), 8 June 2004. 
Interview with SE. Belgrade (Borea), 8 June 2004. 
Interview with 1. Pristina, 23 August 2004. 
Interview with TG. Pristina, 23 August 2004. 
Interview with IL. VuCitm, 24 August 2004. 
Interview with LF. Vueitm, 24 August 2004. 
Interview with AR. VuCitm, 24 August 2004. 
Interview with AD. Novi Pazar, 25 August 2004. 
Interview with NV. Novi Pazar, 25 August 2004. 
Interview with JG. Novi Sad, 7 September 2004. 
Interview with AN. Novi Sad, 7 September 2004. 
Interview with Elites 
Interview with Dr Oskar Kovac. Belgrade, 7 May 2004. 
Interview with Zivadin Jovanovic. Belgrade, 17 May 2004. 
Interview with Aleksa Djilas. Belgrade, 20 May 2004. 
Interview with Sasa Nenadovic. Belgrade. 21 May 2004. 
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Interview with Vlada Milic. Belgrade, 23 May 2004. 
Interview with Vladislav Jovanovic. Belgrade, 24 May 2004. 
Interview with Professor Vojin Dimitrijevic. Belgrade, 26 May 2004. 
Interview with Nikola Lazic. Belgrade, 28 May 2004. 
Interview with Goran Svilanovic. Belgrade, 3 June 2004. 
Interview with Milorad Vucelic. Belgrade,S June 2004. 
Interview with Ljiljana Smailovic. Belgrade, 10 June 2004. 
Interview with Professor Mihailo Markovic. Belgrade, 11 June 2004. 
Interview with Sasa Mirkovic. New Belgrade, 14 June 2004. 
Interview with Professor Mihailo Pantic. Belgrade, 22 June 2004. 
Interview with Professor Svetozar Stojanovic. Belgrade, 29 June 2004. 
Interview with Janko Baljak. Belgrade, 30 June 2004. 
Interview with Professor Kosta Mihailovic. Belgrade, 15 July 2004. 
Interview with Professor Ljubinka Trgovcevic. Belgrade, 19 July 2004. 
Interview with Zoran Milesevic. Kikinda, 23 July 2004. 
Interview with Dr Branka Prpa. New Belgrade, 28 July 2004. 
Interview with Branislav Kovacevic. Kragujevac, 10 August 2004. 
Interview with Vladimir Djuric and Marija Vujnovic. New Belgrade, 1 
September 2004. 
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